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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis re-examines the relationship between finance and growth. Most previous 
studies that have dealt with different aspects of this relationship show that a well-
developed financial system is important for economic growth. However, instead of 
concentrating  on  the  aggregated  perspectives  of  this  relationship,  this  research 
investigates whether financial development influences the level of competition in the 
real sector, as one possible mechanism through which finance may influence growth. 
The study focuses on the changes in industrial structure and performance following a 
regime  change  in  the  financial  system:  from  financial  repression  to  financial 
liberalization. It has been suggested that financial liberalization may be a key policy 
to  promote  industrialisation  as  it  removes  the  credit  access  constraints  on  firms, 
especially small and medium ones. Competition among financial institutions, which 
accompanies  financial  liberalization,  leads  to  greater  availability  of  finance  and  a 
reduction  in  the  cost  for  firms  of  raising  capital  for  investment.  In  turn,  this 
encourages  creation  and  entry  of  new  firms  and  promotes  industrial  growth, 
particularly  of  those  firms  and  sectors  that  are  external  finance  dependent.  The 
implications  of  financial  liberalization  on  the  real  sector  are  investigated  using 
industry-level  panel  data  from  Malawian  manufacturing,  a  variety  of  econometric 
methods, and standard measures of industry structure and performance, as well as 
financial  development  indicators.  The  analysis  aims  to  ascertain  whether  financial 
liberalization  in  Malawi  has  had  any  impact  on  the  availability  of  credit  for 
manufacturing  firms  and  whether  its  effects,  which  are  hypothesised  to  influence 
industry structure and performance, differ depending on characteristics such as the 
degree  of  external  finance  dependence  of  firms  or  firm  size.  The  main  empirical 
findings show that financial liberalization, even if it results in greater supply of credit 
and a larger number of lending institutions compared with the pre-reform period, does 
not remove financing constraints on firms, especially the small and medium ones. 
Instead, it is the large existing firms that benefit from a more liberal financial regime. 
Indeed the evidence is that financial reforms have mostly facilitated the expansion of 
existing  establishments  rather  than  the  creation  of  new  establishments,  and  have 
resulted in greater industry concentration. Further, profitability and output growth are 
disproportionately higher in large firms than in small ones. The implementation of 
financial  liberalization  in  Malawi  has  been  judged  a  success;  nevertheless  the 3 
 
evidence is that these reforms have been detrimental to competition in industry. What 
are  the  policy  implications  of  these  findings?  This  study  shows  that  financial 
liberalization is not the key for the promotion of industrialisation. In the presence of 
pervasive market failures in financial resource allocation, as have been experienced in 
Malawi, the withdrawal of the state from credit allocation decisions is unlikely to 
result in industrial development.  
 
Keywords:  Financial  liberalization,  financial  development,  external  finance 
dependence, industry structure, industry performance, Malawi.  
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CHAPTER 1.0: BACKGROUND AND JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STUDY. 
 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION. 
 
Economic literature provides different perspectives on the theoretical link between 
financial  development  and  economic  growth.  According  to  Schumpeter  (1911), 
financial intermediaries provide essential services that are catalytical for innovation 
and  growth.  Thus,  a  well-developed  financial  system  is  able  to  channel  financial 
resources  to  the  most  productive  use.  However,  an  alternative  explanation  by 
Robinson  (1952)  argues  that  finance  has  no  causal  effect  on  growth.  Robinson 
contends that, instead, it is financial development that follows economic growth as a 
result of higher demand for services. According to this hypothesis, when an economy 
grows,  more  financial  institutions,  financial  products  and  services  emerge  in  the 
markets in response to higher demand for services.  
 
The literature in this research is generally more in support of the hypothesis advanced 
by Schumpeter (1911), which is later conceptualized by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw 
(1973),  and  further  formalized  by  Fry  (1988)  and  Pagano  (1993).  According  to 
McKinnon and Shaw, government restrictions on the operation of the financial system 
such as interest rate ceiling, directed credit policies, and high reserve requirements 
may  hinder  financial  deepening.  Consequently,  this  may  affect  the  quality  and 
quantity  of  investments,  with  a  subsequent  adverse  impact  on  economic  growth. 
Therefore, the McKinnon-Shaw financial repression paradigm implies that a poorly 
functioning  financial  system  may  retard  economic  growth
1.  However,  some 
economists  are  not  convinced  about  the  suggested  prominent  role  of  the  financial 
system  in  influencing  the  economic  growth  process.  Lucas  (1988)  argues  that 
economists  tend  to  over-emphasize  the  role  of  financial  factors  in  the  process  of 
growth. Singh (1997) also contends that development of financial markets may be an 
impediment to the economic growth process particularly when it induces volatility 
and  discourages  risk-averse  investors  from  investing.  Further,  according  to  Mauro 
                                                 
1 According to the endogenous growth literature, financial development has positive impact on growth 
  (see,  for example,  Bencivenga  and  Smith,  1991;   Bencivenga et al,  1995;   and,  Greenwood  and 
  Jovanovic, 1990) 16 
 
(1995), the introduction of certain financial tools that allows individuals to hedge 
against  risk  may  lead  to  a  reduction  in  precautionary  savings  and  hence  lowers 
economic  growth.  These  views  have  therefore  excited  further  research  on  other 
possible avenues that justify the relationship between finance and growth.  
 
However, until recently, lack of sufficient time series data, particularly for developing 
countries, has been a major constraint on research efforts regarding the relationship 
between finance and growth. As a result, cross-country studies have dominated the 
literature.  Nonetheless,  in  recent  years,  empirical  research  on  the  finance-growth 
nexus  has  now  increased  with  availability  of  new  data  compiled  by  international 
institutions such as the IMF, the United Nations institutions, and the World Bank
2. 
Notwithstanding this development, most of these research studies have not attempted 
to establish the exact link between finance and growth; and, have instead taken for 
granted  the  views  suggested  by  the  McKinnon-Shaw  hypothesis.  Arguably,  on  a 
priori grounds there are different avenues through which finance and growth can be 
related. As such, theoretical underpinnings proposed under the McKinnon-Shaw view 
require  extensive  empirical  investigation.  Notably,  whilst  prior  studies  have  made 
significant contribution to the literature and even attracted interest for further research 
on the finance and growth nexus, the results cannot be generalized across countries 
due to differences in the nature and operations of the financial institutions and policies 
pursued in each country.  
 
 
1.2. MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY.  
 
This study is motivated by the need to provide a further perspective regarding the 
finance and economic growth debate. This is achieved by investigating further one 
possible avenue through which finance may relate with economic growth – its effect 
in influencing the level of competition in industry. Thus, rather than examining the 
broad correlation between financial development and economic  growth, this study 
specifically  investigates  whether  industries  that  are  more  dependent  on  external 
financing, are likely to become more competitive following financial liberalization. 
                                                 
2 Such  data  has  been  employed by, for example, Beck et al (2000, 2004), Beck and Levine   (2002), 
   Levine et al (2000), and Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001) 17 
 
Accordingly,  within  these  industry  groups,  this  study  decomposes  the  impact  of 
financial liberalisation and financial development on industry concentration and net 
firm entry; as well as industry price-cost margins and output growth.    However, 
before outlining the study’s research questions, the following sections briefly outline 
the conceptual issues, which guided formulation of the related research questions. 
 
In  a  market  economy,  lack  of  competition,  as  signified  by  concentrated  market 
structures, has direct effects on prices, profits and economic welfare. Research by 
such scholars as Edwards (1955), Weiss (1983), and Caswell (1987) is illustrative and 
has concluded that the impact of economic concentration is negative overall. To the 
extent  that  increased  concentration  leads  to  increased  market  power,  thereby 
facilitating pricing above competitive levels, the degree of concentration is a potential 
public  policy  problem.  Economic  reforms  that  have  recently  characterized  most 
countries  in  the  world,  such  as  the  financial  liberalization  process,  have  been 
implemented  with  the  objective  of  achieving  equitable  distribution  of  resources 
through market forces other than state intervention, thereby engendering competition 
and  ensuring  increased  productivity  as  well  as  affordable  prices,  and,  ultimately, 
improved  consumer  welfare.  This  framework  therefore  provides  an  opportunity  to 
assess how the widely adopted financial reform efforts impact on competition levels. 
Arguably,  results  of  this  type  of  exercise  may  not  be  easily  generalized  across 
countries.  Obviously,  initial  conditions  in  each  country  or  within  each  group  of 
countries may have a lasting influence on the outcome of the reforms. This study, 
therefore,  investigates  the  relationship  between  financial  liberalization,  industry 
structure  and  industry  performance  in  the  manufacturing  sector  of  a  single  sub-
Saharan African country – Malawi. Justification for this approach is based on two 
main arguments.  
 
First, there has been minimal empirical research on the relationship between the level 
of financial development and degrees of intra-industry dynamics in economies with 
relatively underdeveloped financial systems such as are found in sub-Saharan Africa. 
It is worth noting that economies in the sub-Saharan Africa region are continuously 
exposed to large, externally and policy-generated shocks as well as to high political 
instability, civil strife and natural calamities, such as droughts and floods, thereby 
rendering these economic environments to be highly uncertain and risky, than other 18 
 
parts of the world (see, Adam and O’Connell, 1997; Collier, 1998; Nissanke, 2001). 
Besides,  several  theoretical  and  empirical  studies  have  suggested  that  the  role  of 
financial  development  in  an  economy  may  vary  across  countries  because  of 
differences in institutional and economic structures (see, La Porta et al, 1997, 1998; 
and  Bell  and  Rouseau,  2001).  As  such,  the  role  and  effectiveness  of  financial 
intermediation  in  the  economic  growth  process  is  expected  to  take  a  different 
perspective in sub-Saharan Africa than it does in other parts of the world. Results 
from  cross-country  studies  could  therefore  be  misleading.  Moreover,  to  date, 
economic theory remains ambiguous on the issue of whether effectiveness of financial 
development  in  promoting  economic  growth  depends  on  the  structure  or  level  of 
development of the economy. There are those who argue that, in a given economy, it 
is  the  sector  with  high  economies  of  scale  that  benefit  more  from  financial 
development  (Kletzer  and  Bardhan,  1987;  Beck,  2002),  implying  that  financial 
development  is  much  more  effective  in  promoting  economic  growth  in  more 
industrialized economies than in less industrialized economies. On the other hand, 
there are those who contend that countries at their early stage of development benefit 
more  from  financial  development  (McKinnon,  1973;  Fry,  1995).    Further,  and 
specifically related to empirical industrial organisation literature, this study approach 
is also motivated by Haber (1991) who, following a comparative study of industry 
concentration  and  capital  markets  for  Brazil,  Mexico,  and  the  United  States, 
concludes that,  
 
“... [T]he forces  giving  rise to concentrated industrial structures in  Latin America 
(and, most likely, in other parts of the less developed world) differed in both degree 
and kind from those operating in Western Europe and United States. Gerschenkron’s 
model  for  Germany,  for  example,  in  which  banks  encouraged  the  formation  of 
industrial  cartels,  does  not  appear  to  be  a  useful  model  for  explaining  industrial 
concentration in Latin America. In short, to fully understand industrial organisation 
from a world viewpoint, scholars need to look beyond the United States and Western 
European cases.”  (Haber, 1991, p.578) 
 
Second,  most  of  the  previous  studies  on  the  possible  link  between  financial 
development and economic growth have largely focused on cross-national estimates, 
and very few on specific country situations. And yet, it has been well documented that 19 
 
the  pure  cross-country  studies  method  fails  to  explicitly  address  potential  biases 
induced  by  endogeneity  of  the  explanatory  variables  and  the  existence  of  cross-
country  heterogeneity.  Many  researchers  argue  against  widespread  use  of  cross-
section  econometric  analysis  in  the  context  of  attempting  to  discover  a  reliable 
empirical relationship between financial development and economic growth
3. They 
contend  that  the  results  from  such  investigations  usually  rest  on  a  relationship  of 
averages across countries, which may not exist in any one particular country. Further, 
the results report partial correlations, which may change as more variables are added 
to  the  equations.  They  also  argue  that  the  issue  of  causality  is  not  addressed 
adequately  in  cross-section  analysis.  And,  indeed,  time  series  investigation  has 
suggested that the direction of causality may vary across countries (see, Demetriades 
and  Hussain,  1996;  Arestis  and  Demetriades,  1997).  As  Rodrik  (2005)  suggests, 
therefore, focusing on a single country enables to bypass the limitations of cross-
country  studies;  and,  the  findings  so  obtained  may  be  representative  of  the 
relationship between financial development and growth. Solow (2001) also argues 
that, whilst a group of economies may share some common features, each has its own 
distinctive characteristics. As such, explaining the evolution of economic behaviour 
observed  over  time  requires  an  economic  model  that  is  dynamic  in  nature.  In 
particular, Solow (2001) contends that it is important to carry out country-specific 
studies in order to relate the findings to policy designs within specific cases. 
 
The foregoing, therefore, supports the need to conduct similar studies on the financial 
development and growth nexus for countries at different levels of development; and, 
preferably  on  an  individual  country  basis,  in  order  to  effectively  establish  the 
linkages. This study, therefore, attempts to fill this gap and proposes to add to the 
literature  by  investigating  the  relationship  between  financial  development  and 
industry structure (thus, industry concentration and net firm entry); and, performance 
(thus, profitability and output growth) in the Malawian manufacturing sector, using 
panel data covering 20 industry groups for the period 1970 to 2004. To date, there is 
no known research study that has extensively focused on the link between financial 
development and the manufacturing industry structure and performance in Malawi; 
certainly, not following financial liberalization.  
                                                 
3 See,  for  instance,    Kenny  and  Williams  (2001);    Arestis  and  Demetriades  (1997);  Gibson  and  
  Tsakalotos (1994); Levine and Zervos (1993); Quah (1993); and, Levine and Renelt (1991) 20 
 
 
Besides being a country-specific investigation, which is a departure from tradition, 
this empirical study takes advantage of Malawi’s implementation of financial reforms 
during the review period.  As an integral part of the structural adjustment program, 
which the country adopted since 1981, under the auspices of the World Bank and 
IMF, the financial system was liberalized. And, besides institutional reforms – which 
included  reviewing  of  the  laws  and  regulations  governing  the  financial  sector, 
restructuring and privatization of banks, and the adoption of indirect instruments of 
monetary  policy  –  the  financial  liberalization  process,  in  the  main,  involved 
decontrolling  interest  rates  and  eliminating  directed  credit  allocation  systems  and 
credit  ceilings  (see,  for  example,  Mehran,  et  al,  1998).  The  objective  was  that, 
following the McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) hypotheses, financial liberalization 
would lead to higher levels of investment and output growth, as resources would be 
channelled towards financing the more productive projects. According to this view, 
therefore,  an  increase  in  real  interest  rates  following  the  financial  liberalization 
process, should encourage saving and expand the supply of credit availability to firms. 
As a consequence, a larger volume of investment can be financed; and further, that 
through  easy  access  to  credit,  any  previously  rationed  high  return  projects  are 
afforded a chance to compete for funds, thereby contributing to economic productivity 
and growth.  
 
Evidently, the financial liberalization process in Malawi has generally led to some 
transformation of the entire financial infrastructure. The process has also affected the 
environment in which firms in the manufacturing sector operate in terms of openness 
of financial market institutions and availability of financial products for private sector 
investment. And, according to literature on business systems that attempt to explain 
the organization and functioning of the manufacturing industry, the development of 
institutional  environment  is  hypothesised  to  have  a  lasting  influence  on  industry 
structures  and  performance.  Important  elements  in  this  institutional  environment 
include financial institutions, both formal and informal, which determine who gets 
access to credit and capital (Whitely, 1992; Aryeetey et al, 1997). Arguably therefore, 
effective financial markets are essential ingredients in the development of industry. 
Rarely, if ever, are industrial firms able to generate in their normal operations the 
resources  needed  to  finance  capital  expansions  or  working  capital.  A  smoothly 21 
 
functioning financial system can provide the required resources in a timely fashion 
and at adequate costs.  Failure to do so enhances barriers to entry to any aspiring 
entrepreneurs, and for those firms already in operation, this raises production costs, 
fosters  inefficiency,  and  retards  growth  and  competitiveness  in  the  manufacturing 
sector (see, Aryeetey et al, 1994; Levy, 1992; and Steel and Webster, 1992). This 
ultimately breeds monopolies, oligopolies, which are detrimental to the development 
of the manufacturing sector and economic growth (see, for example, Pedersen and 
McCormick, 1999). 
 
However,  several  studies  and  survey  results  provide  evidence  that  despite  the 
transformation  of  the  financial  infrastructure  following  the  financial  liberalization 
efforts, access to credit remains a major problem for firms in Malawi, just like in 
many other countries in the sub-Saharan African region, as well as other developing 
countries that have implemented these reforms
4. Notably, as documented by Loayza 
and Ranciere (2006) and, Pagano (1993) among others, financial liberalization may 
either deepen the financial system or induce financial fragility; thus, its long-term 
benefits  on  an  economy  are  ambiguous,  from  both  empirical  and  theoretical 
perspectives. Studying the Malawi manufacturing industry, before and after financial 
liberalization,  therefore  makes  an  excellent  test  case  of  the  relationship  between 
financial development and industry structure and performance. 
 
 
1.3. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY AND PROBLEM STATEMENT. 
 
In addition to its contribution to the literature on the finance and growth nexus, this 
study has significance because of its important development policy implications. If 
financial  liberalization  and  financial  development  have  distributional  effect  on  the 
Malawian manufacturing sector, then the country, which has remained agricultural-
based for many years, will have a lot to gain in terms of its industrialization efforts. 
This should be achieved through the adoption of policies directed at expanding and 
improving the efficiency of its financial system, thereby promoting the development 
of the manufacturing sector. 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Nissanke (2001)  and,  Aryeetey et al (1997)  for  a  comprehensive  review  on  the  
   sub-Saharan African countries experience. 22 
 
  
In  Malawi,  continued  high  dependence  on  agricultural  commodities  has  been  of 
concern because it is associated with decreasing terms of trade and macroeconomic 
instability, with potential adverse consequences for output and consumer prices. More 
importantly,  Malawi,  like  other  countries  in  sub-Saharan  Africa,  needs  high  and 
sustained growth to make a significant impact on poverty; and, history has shown that 
the manufacturing sector is the main source of dynamic and sustained growth (see, 
UNCTAD,  2003).  Besides,  literature  on  endogenous  growth  also  emphasise  the 
importance  of  increasing  returns  to  scale  in  the  manufacturing  sector  in  long-run 
growth (see, for example, Matsuyama, 1992). By supporting the manufacturing sector 
and lifting any constraints to its high and sustained growth, is critical to improving 
economic  performance  and  growth.  However,  according  to  a  number  of  surveys 
conducted  in  many  parts  of  the  sub-Saharan  Africa  (see,  for  example,  Biggs  and 
Srivastava,  1996;  UNIDO,  1985);  there  exist  a  lot  of  constraints  that  impede  the 
development of the manufacturing sector, a situation shared by Malawi. Evidently, 
policies within the manufacturing sector are usually biased against small and new 
investors,  while  favouring  large  and  fully  established  firms
5.  For  instance, 
concessions such as investment incentives and tax holidays are sometimes accorded 
selectively, usually only benefiting large established firms.  
 
Extending  from  the  foregoing,  a  key  constraint  to  the  development  of  the 
manufacturing sector, and of particular relevance to this research study, is the lack of 
access  to  financial  resources  for  firms’  investments  and  development.  Financial 
institutions view large established firms as low risk, and cheap to service per unit of 
funds  lent.  As  a  result,  they  have  preferential  access  to  credit.  Even  though  this 
phenomenon is evident in both developed as well as developing countries, it is more 
prevalent in the latter group of countries. This is because in developing countries like 
Malawi,  private  sector  credit  is  relatively  scarce,  information  networks  are 
underdeveloped,  and  binding  interest  rates  characterise  the  financial  markets
6. 
Arguably,  poorly  functioning  credit  markets  constrain  firm  entry  and  expansion, 
                                                 
5  For   a  more  comprehensive  review,  see  Little  (1987), and Gauthier and Gersovitz   (1997).   Also 
   specific   case  studies  by  Pack  and  Westphal  (1986)   on Korea, Cortes et al (1987) on  Colombia,  
   and Wade (1990) on East Asia. 
6  Aryeetey et al  (1997,  1994);   Nissanke  and  Aryeetey  (1998);  and,   Nissanke (2001)   adequately  
   cover   this   phenomenon   as  it    relates   to  sub-Saharan    African   countries,  including   Malawi.  
   However, Chipeta and Mkandawire (1996, 1992) specifically focus on Malawi. 23 
 
thereby  rendering  the  industrial  sectors  uncompetitive  and  inefficient  oligopolies. 
Hence,  credit  programmes  have  long  been  a  favoured  intervention  by  donors  and 
governments in most developing countries, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa, 
which includes Malawi. Implicit in these interventions is a concern that credit markets 
are not functioning well and that their malfunctioning results in low economic activity 
and growth. The literature documents well-established reasons for credit markets not 
to be perfect (see, Hoff et al 1993).  
 
The prevalence of the foregoing conditions in the Malawi economy, raise a number of 
fundamental  empirical  issues  in  regard  to  the  development  of  the  manufacturing 
industry;  and  more  particularly,  the  effectiveness  of  the  financial  system  in 
engendering  a  competitive  business  environment  as  is  claimed  in  the  orthodox 
theoretical literature, following the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis. Most critical are the 
questions:  first,  whether,  through  deregulated  interest  rates  and  increased  credit 
accessibility,  the  financial  liberalization  and  development  process,  has  any 
distributional  ramification  on  the  industrial  structure  in  the  manufacturing  sector, 
thereby engendering dynamism and competition in the industry; and second, whether 
entrenched oligopolies have instead emerged following the financial liberalization and 
financial development process, that are neither innovative, technically efficient, nor 
likely to price competitively; and, in turn, if this has compounded the problem of 
monopoly profits that usually arise in such business environments.  In this research 
study, therefore, these issues are investigated from industry-level datasets drawn from 
the Malawian manufacturing sector. 
 
 
1.4. MAIN HYPOTHESES INVESTIGATED. 
 
In this study, the following main hypotheses are examined: 
 
(i)    Financial  liberalization  has  positive  and  robust  distributional  effects  on         
the  industry  structure.  This  is  accomplished  through  a  critical  appraisal  of  the 
following two related sub-hypotheses; 24 
 
     ⇒    Industries  where  firms  are  more  dependent  on  external  finance  become                        
    relatively more competitive; and, disproportionately less concentrated with   
    the liberalization and development of the financial system.  
     ⇒    Financial  liberalisation,  working  through  financial  development,  facilitates 
    firm’s  access  to  credit,  thereby  fostering  the  creation  and  entry  of  new      
    firms over the life cycle of an industry. 
 
(ii) Financial liberalization enhances performance in those industries that are 
characterised  by  a  significant  number  of  small-sized  firms.  This  involves  an 
appraisal of the following sub-hypotheses;  
     ⇒    Financial liberalization induces higher price-cost margins in those industries 
    that are characterised by a significant number of small-sized firms. 
     ⇒    Financial liberalization leads to increased and real output growth, more in 
    those industries that are characterised by a significant number of small-sized 
    firms. 
 
The  first  hypothesis  is  investigated  in  Chapters  Four  and  Five,  while  the  second 
hypothesis is the subject of Chapter Six. 
 
 
1.5. DATA SOURCES. 
 
The study uses panel data on Malawi’s manufacturing firms over a 35-year period 
(1970 – 2004). Dataset for industry value-added over 20 industry sectors is obtained 
from two related sources: the UNIDO electronic database [Industrial Statistics Data 
base 2006 at the 3-digit level of ISIC Code (Revision 2) (INDISTAT 3) (1963-2004)]; 
as  well  as  from  the  Annual  Economic  Survey  (AES)  reports  as  published  by  the 
Malawi National Statistical Office. Apparently, these two sources are related as the 
country page for Malawi on the UNIDO database is updated using AES data. The 
AES data, which is collected through a questionnaire, gives a quantitative description 
of  economic  enterprises  in  the  economy  with  regard  to  their  production  and 
employment characteristics, profitability level, acquisition and issue of both real and 
financial  claims  in  different  sectors  of  the  economy.  Further,  the  survey  covers 25 
 
industries with 20 or more employees engaged in the production and sales of goods 
and  services  on  the  market  at  prices  normally  designed  to  cover  the  cost  of 
production.  The  United  Nations  system,  ISIC  (New  York),  is  used  to  classify 
economic  activities.  Where  possible,  the  data  is  presented  for  each  4-digit  ISIC 
division. However, in order to preserve confidentiality, since Malawi Statistics Act of 
1967  restricts  publication  of  any  information  that  would  identify  the  activities  of 
individual persons or business undertakings, some activities are classified at 3-digit 
level. Over the study period, 1970-2004, some enterprises have emerged while others 
have disappeared or did not qualify for selection into the AES sample. Total number 
included in the survey sample during the study period has therefore ranged between 
307 and 404 establishments. Further, from the  Malawi National Statistical Office, 
privileged access was also obtained to unpublished individual firms’ files from the 
AES questionnaires, from where largest firms’ value-added data was extracted; which 
together  facilitated  the  estimation  of  some  of  the  variables,  such  as  the  industry 
concentration ratios, price-cost margins, external finance dependence ratios, and firm 
sizes. 
 
Data on financial and monetary aggregates is sourced from the International Financial 
Statistics of the IMF, and Reserve Bank of Malawi periodic reports. This includes 
data on sectoral distribution of credit to the economy as reported by the Malawian 
banking system. World Development Indicators published through the World Bank 
database is the main source of data on the real sector aggregates
7. 
 
 
1.6. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY. 
 
The methodological and analytical basis for this study is drawn from the empirical 
literature  focusing  on  financial  liberalization,  financial  development,  and  industry 
dynamics. An extensive review of the theoretical and empirical literature underpins 
the  analysis  for  the  Malawian  manufacturing  sector.  Descriptive  statistics  and 
econometric  techniques  are  used  to  derive  the  results  in  this  study.  Econometric 
                                                 
7  Where a variable is determined through a  ratio between one variable measured at the end of the  year  
   and  GDP  which  is  measured  over  the year,  the  ratio  is  deflated  using the GDP deflator  as,  for   
   example, in Favara (2003). 26 
 
models  are  constructed  which  forms  the  basis  of  the  test  of  the  hypotheses.  The 
methods and analytical techniques employed in the study are highlighted in each of 
the chapters in which they are used and their limitations are also clearly spelt out. 
Where necessary, graphic illustrations and tables also support the results obtained in 
the study. Policy implications of the results and areas that warrant further research are 
highlighted in the last chapter of the thesis.  
 
 
1.7. STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY. 
 
This  study  is  organised  into  seven  chapters.  Chapter  One,  provide  introductory 
background to the study. Chapter Two, gives an overview of developments in the 
Malawian economy. In particular, this overview seeks to demonstrate how changes in 
the  Malawian  economic  landscape  during  the  study  period  have  influenced  the 
research interest as highlighted in the empirical questions above. The overview also 
includes a preliminary simple econometric investigation of the before and after effect 
of financial liberalization on major financial and industrial sector aggregates.  
 
Chapter Three, reviews literature related to the role of finance in the economic growth 
process.  Special  focus  is  made  on  literature  regarding  the  effect  of  financial 
liberalization on the availability of credit, or lack of it, in terms of its supply as well as 
pricing,  on  firms’  size  distribution,  investment  decisions,  and  by  extension, 
profitability of its investments. This takes the form of an inspection of both theoretical 
models as well as empirics on financial development and industrial organisation. The 
literature review in its entirety makes preparation for the specification of the models 
in this study, in line with developments in theory and in estimation techniques.  
 
Empirical models are specified  and presented in Chapters  Four,  Five,  and Six.  In 
Chapter Four, aggregated models relate to the link between financial development, 
external  finance  dependence,  and  industry  structure  –  specifically,  industry 
concentration and net firm entry; in Chapter Five, a disaggregated approach is used to 
investigate heterogeneity across industry groups in terms of their responsiveness to 
changes following financial liberalization; and, in Chapter Six, the study examines the 
effects of financial liberalization on the relationship between firm size and industry 27 
 
performance,  measured  through  price-cost  margins  and  output  growth.  Models 
investigated in the empirical Chapters Four, Five, and Six, draw heavily from the 
literature discussed in Chapter Three as well as consideration of the structure of the 
Malawi economy as discussed in Chapter Two. Further, Chapters Four, Five and Six 
also separately discuss, in detail, the estimation techniques adopted in the respective 
chapters, and present and analyse the econometric regression results following the 
estimation process. Discussions following the models’ estimations involve assessing 
the  consistency  of  the  results  with  regard  to  economic  and  statistical  theoretical 
criteria, as well as evaluating their individual performance. All the three empirical 
chapters make assessments of policy implications drawn from the respective analyses.  
 
Chapter Seven, presents a summary of the study findings, draws conclusions based on 
the  analyses,  identifies  the  study’s  contribution  to  the  literature  as  well  as  policy 
implications of the study findings, and finally recommends areas for future research.   
 
 
1.8. CONCLUSION. 
 
Theoretical  and  empirical  literature  continues  to  deliver  disparate  predictions 
regarding the impact of financial liberalization on the firm’s investment capacity; and, 
its influence on industry structure and performance.  
 
In Malawi, the paradox is that during the same period that the country’s economic 
policy  stimulated  entrepreneurship,  through  easier  access  to  capital  following 
financial liberalization, the manufacturing sector contracted; unlike during the pre-
liberalization  period  when  it  registered  some  expansion.  To  date,  the  sector  has 
persistently  declined  and  has  registered  closure  of  several  major  companies
8.  The 
trend for most companies is: either to shift from manufacturing production in the 
country to marketing products which they previously used to produce but are now 
manufactured  by  their  offshore  sister  companies;  or  simply  close-down  and  exit; 
thereby leaving a structure that is only dominated by a few firms. Such a structure 
                                                 
8  Closures  and  exits,  in  the  main,   include  those  of major companies in the metal fabrication and    
    machine  tool,   fertilizer  production,   furniture,   textiles,   tobacco   processing,  and  even in  food   
    processing industries (World Bank, 2004b). 28 
 
hides inefficiency and limits the ability to compete both locally and globally. Though 
firms operating in such an environment are likely to enjoy scale economies, they are 
also  likely  to  focus  on  static  rather  than  dynamic  gains.  Firms  operating  under 
monopoly  are  likely  to  focus  on  temporary  gains  that  they  enjoy  due  to  their 
monopoly power, all at the cost of consumer welfare as a result of their uncompetitive 
pricing. However, under a competitive environment, innovation and product quality 
are likely to flourish. As such, apart from anti-trust policy formulation, there is need 
for articulating the role of the financial sector in facilitating this process. 
 
Against  this  background,  it  is  therefore  important  to  examine  the  links  between 
financial liberalization, financial development and industry structure and performance 
in the manufacturing sector. Indeed, given the hypothesised competition-enhancing 
effects of this policy on the economy, one is led to ask whether there is a possible link 
between a liberalized financial system and the structure of the industry that evolves, 
as well as the performance patterns that emerge. Besides, since the impact of financial 
liberalization in each industry is also likely to vary over time
9; but, also depending on 
industry-specific characteristics – including the extent to which an industry depends 
on external financing – this research study therefore explicitly consider these aspects 
in its empirical framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 As observed by  Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008)  as well as Loayza and Ranciere (2006), all  recent  
  models that examine the evolution of the effects of financial liberalization through time, differentiate    
  between short- and long-run effects on economic growth.  29 
 
CHAPTER 2.0:      MANUFACTURING   INDUSTRY, FINANCIAL    
             LIBERALIZATION AND THE FINANCIAL     
             DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN MALAWI. 
 
 
2.1.      OVERVIEW OF THE ECONOMY AND THE MANUFACTURING     
  SECTOR IN MALAWI. 
 
2.1.1. Macroeconomic Background. 
 
The  performance  of  the  Malawian  economy  up  to  1978  was  relatively  good, 
registering  high  growth  rates  and  favourable  balance  of  payments  position.  The 
contribution  of  the  manufacturing  sector  to  gross  domestic  product  rose  from  8.0 
percent  in  1964  to  11.0  percent  in  1978.  However,  the  country  experienced 
macroeconomic instability and structural constraints after the 1979 international oil 
shocks  and  civil  strife  in  the  neighbouring  Mozambique,  which  prompted  the 
implementation of the IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programme (SAP) in 
1981.  Several policies were therefore implemented under these programmes, amongst 
which were those specifically aimed at stimulating competition and growth in the 
manufacturing sector.  
 
However,  more  than  twenty  years  following  the  economic  reform  programmes  in 
Malawi, the policies have had limited success and in some instances even perpetuated 
instability in the manufacturing sector. The contribution of the manufacturing sector 
towards  real  output  has  been  erratic  and  declining,  while  the  agricultural  sector 
remains  to  be  the  dominant  sector  of  the  economy.  Further,  the  size  of  the 
manufacturing  sector  is  still  small,  predominantly  oligopolistic,  and  mostly 
concentrated  in  five  sub-sectors:  food  processing,  beverages,  tobacco  processing, 
textiles,  and  pharmaceuticals.  This  chapter  therefore  provides  an  overview  of  the 
structural  changes  that  have  characterised  the  Malawian  manufacturing  industry 
within the reform period; and attempts to relate the policy reforms with the intended 
objectives. Specifically, an important question for policy debate is whether financial 
sector  related  reforms  managed  to  engender  competition  and  growth  in  the 
manufacturing industries in Malawi.   30 
 
2.1.2. Industrialization Policy Framework. 
 
Like  most  sub-Saharan  countries,  Malawi  adopted  industrialization  as  part  of  its 
development  agenda  since  attaining  political  independence  in  1964  (see,  Malawi 
Government, 1971). The primary objective of this policy option was to enhance the 
modernisation of the economy. According to literature, industrialization is expected to 
facilitate the transformation of a country’s economic structure from being typically 
agricultural-based to a modern economy. Further, the importance of industry to the 
economic growth process include its effects in stimulating production more widely 
through its forward and backward linkages with other parts of the economy
10.  The 
industrialization policy option in Malawi was, therefore, expected to translate into an 
increased  share  of  industry  activity  in  GDP;  thereby  increase  employment 
opportunities,  raise  incomes,  and  ultimately  translate  into  improved  standards  of 
living for the country’s population. These efforts were originally embedded in two 
related pieces of legislation. First, the Industrial Development Act of 1965 that set out 
the conditions for licensing industrial firms including the related incentives. Thus, it 
governed entry procedures by allowing discretionary approvals of entry applications 
based on, inter alia, adequacy of resources, and public significance of the products, 
location  and  relative  size  of  the  investment,  in  the  manufacturing  sector.  This 
legislation  also  provided  exclusive  monopoly  rights  to  large  enterprises  with  the 
potential  for  the  exploitation  of  economies  of  scale.  Thus,  the  emphasis  on  a 
minimum efficient scale in the Act – together with other protection provisions relating 
to depreciation allowances, and tariffs – meant that large firms were favoured at the 
expense of small firms; thereby breeding monopolies and infant industries that could 
not have survived if protection were lifted. Second, was the Control of Goods Act of 
1966, which imposed an ‘average cost plus margin’ ceiling on prices for selected 
domestic  manufactured  products.    Regulations  were  imposed  regarding  fixed 
maximum ceiling prices on mass-produced, fairly homogeneous commodities; and, 
both maximum selling prices at the retail level and controls at the wholesale level on 
certain consumer  goods that allegedly  composed an important part of low-income 
budgets.  However, the government also set up price controls by decree for a wide 
variety  of  other  goods  (see,  Malawi  Government,  1971).  Generally,  this  system 
                                                 
10 Lewis (1954),  Fei and Ranis (1964)  provide the  theoretical  background  to  this phenomenon. Also  
    see, Seidman (1986); Killick (1993); Gibbon (1996); Pedersen and McCormick (1999).  31 
 
introduced price distortions in the manufacturing sector; and provided little incentives 
to  entry  by  potential  investors,  as  government  was  now  seen  to  be  limiting  price 
movements on the existing firms, thereby distorting their profitability (World Bank, 
1981, p.39).  
 
 
2.1.3. Industry Structure. 
 
The  industrial  sector  in  Malawi,  like  elsewhere  in  sub-Saharan  Africa
11,  was 
characterized by a dualistic structure, where large numbers of small-scale enterprises 
co-existed  with  a  small  number  of  relatively  large-scale  modern  plants,  mostly 
dominated by public enterprises and multinational affiliates; and, with few linkages 
between the two.  
 
 
2.1.3.1. Large- Scale Enterprises. 
 
The large-scale enterprises have predominantly been in the form of public enterprises. 
As observed by Pedersen and McCormick (1999), after political independence, most 
of the new states in Africa, including Malawi, agreed with donors that due to the 
limited indigenous capital, the state had to play a catalytic role in the industrialization 
process. Public enterprises were therefore created in key manufacturing sectors, either 
through nationalisation of existing enterprises or through government investment in 
existing or new industries
12. Multinational companies have also invested at the back 
of either the state, in a joint venture with a public enterprise, or with a large private 
business (see, for example, Seidman, 1986, p.566). Generally, in such arrangements, 
the foreign investor supplied management and technical services and some capital, 
while  the  public  enterprise  supplied  additional  capital  plus  expertise  on  the  local 
economic  environment.  As  observed  by  Seidman  (1986),  such  arrangements  were 
                                                 
11  A relatively  recent  description  of  structure  of  industry  in  less developed countries, like Malawi, 
     is made by UNCTAD (2006, pp.222-224); and Tybout (2000). 
12  According  to  World Bank  (1989b)estimates,  by 1980, state-owned enterprises accounted for  17.0 
     percent of GDP in sub-Saharan Africa. 32 
 
mostly common elsewhere in the less developed countries of the sub-Saharan African 
region as well
13.  
 
Accordingly,  where  private  entities  were  either  unable  or  unwilling  to  set  up 
industries, public enterprises were set up to fill the gaps, as government pursued an 
industrial  strategy  aimed  at  increasing  local  participation  in  light  of  a  weak  local 
private  capital  base.  This  industrial  strategy  was  implemented  under  the  aegis  of 
public  enterprises,  viz,  MDC,  PRESS,  ADMARC,  IMEXCO,  and  INDEBANK, 
amongst others (see, Lawson and Kaluwa, 1996; Chirwa, 2001, 2004). Although each 
of these five leading public enterprises started out with a very specific purpose, each 
rapidly branched out into many different industries. As Chirwa (2004) notes, by 1980, 
ADMARC  and  MDC  had  direct  and  indirect  ownership  in  32  manufacturing 
enterprises, operating in highly oligopolistic markets and competing with private local 
and foreign firms in various industrial markets. Whilst all the public enterprises were 
operated on commercial lines, with government expecting them to make profits, the 
majority  performed  dismally,  due  to  weak  management,  partly  explained  by  the 
interlocking  ownership  structures.  And,  Harrigan  (1991)  observes  that  due  to  the 
interlocking  ownership  structures  in  several  investments,  it  meant  that  any  poor 
performance in major subsidiaries affected the rest of the public enterprises.  
 
  
2.1.3.2. Small-Scale Enterprises. 
 
The small-scale enterprises, by definition, consist of micro- small- and medium-scale 
enterprises.  In  Malawi,  this  sub-sector  grew  as  a  relatively  small  segment  of  the 
industrial sector, both in absolute terms and in relation to the formal manufacturing 
sector. In terms of characteristics, Ettema (1984) observes that, in Malawi, just like in 
other  countries  within  the  sub-Saharan  region,  enterprises  in  the  small-scale  sub-
sector  are  labour  intensive  and  mostly  depend  on  local  inputs  of  raw  materials; 
machinery and spare parts have to be imported. The technology to which the small-
scale enterprises have access is mostly very simple. In individual enterprises, methods 
                                                 
13 In  Malawi,     such    arrangements    were   most    notable   in  the  following  industries:  beverages       
    (Calrsberg  from  Denmark);   Pharmaceuticals   (Unilever  International,   UK);     Food   Processing  
    and Textiles (LONRHO, UK). 33 
 
and machinery used are directly related to the entrepreneurs’ access to finance and 
technical assistance, rarely to a conscious choice of appropriate production methods. 
However, the usual shortage of imported inputs forces many to adapt their mix of 
inputs. As a result, quality and/or production have tended to decline in those areas 
where there are no alternatives to imports, but not the price (see, for example, Ettema, 
1984;  Malawi  Government,  2000).    Generally,  small-scale  enterprises  have 
underperformed despite government’s provision of technical and financial support
14.  
 
 
2.1.4. Macroeconomic Policy Framework and the Manufacturing Industry. 
 
The performance of the manufacturing industries in Malawi has been intimately tied 
to overall economic growth in general. Thus, while GDP grew at 5.7 percent per year 
between 1973 and 1979, industrial output grew at the same rate. Between 1980 and 
1987 the economy grew at 2.3 percent per year and industry grew at 1.2 percent. The 
close relationship between the growth of the sector and that of the economy is not 
coincidental; industrial output is mainly sold in the domestic market and consequently 
domestic  demand  is  by  far  the  most  important  factor  affecting  sales  of  industrial 
goods.  
 
Accordingly, as shown in Table 2.1, the implementation of the broad-based structural 
adjustment programme that Malawi embarked on during 1981, in response to a series 
of external shocks that characterised the economy at that time was, in part, aimed at 
stimulating competition and growth in the manufacturing sector (see, World Bank, 
1989a). Overall, the objective of the reform efforts, in relation to the manufacturing 
sector, was to develop outward-looking industrial structures; create an enabling policy 
environment through sound macroeconomic management and reforms of trade policy 
and  financial  intermediation;  downsize  inefficient  public  sector;  improve  the 
management and finances of public enterprises; and, foster the development of private 
sector enterprise, especially small and medium-sized enterprises
15. 
 
                                                 
14 Several institutions have since been created, viz; INDEBANK, MUSCCO, and SEDOM,     providing  
    financial  support; MEPC,  for   export   promotion;   MEDI and DEMATT, for     vocational training  
    and skills development (see, Ettema, 1984)  
15 See, World Bank (1996); Gulhati (1989); Kaluwa et al (1992); and,  Mulaga and Weiss, 1996) 34 
 
However, despite all these policy initiatives, the performance of the manufacturing 
sector fell short of expectations. And, in its analysis of the industrial sector in Malawi, 
the World Bank (1989a), identified financial sector underdevelopment as a continuing 
impediment to the growth and development of the manufacturing sector in particular, 
and  the  overall  economy  in  general.  Consequently,  after  several  financial  sector 
studies and initiatives, systematic financial sector reforms were undertaken within the 
realms of the structural adjustment program framework (World Bank 1991). 
 
 
Table 2.1: Malawi’s Structural Adjustment Programme, 1981-1998 
 
 
Prog. / Year  Main Policy Action Affecting the Manufacturing Sector 
SAL I  
1981-83 
-Devaluation of currency by 15% in Apr.1982, 12% in Sep. 1983. 
-Periodic increase of interest rates 
SAL II 
1984-85 
-Devaluation of currency by 3% in Jan.1984, and 15% in Apr.1985. 
-Industry Price Decontrol-41% of controlled products. 
-Periodic adjustment of interest rates. 
SAL III  
1986-87 
-Devaluation of currency: 9.5% in Jan., 10% in Aug.1986, and 20% in Feb.87. 
-Industrial Price Decontrol 
-Privatisation of State-Owned Enterprises.  
-Establishment of an Export Financing Facility. 
-Periodic adjustment of interest rates. 
ITPAC  
1988-89 
-Devaluation of the currency by 15% in Jan. 1988. 
-Industrial Price Decontrol. 
-Abolition of exclusive product (monopoly) rights. 
-Revision of duty drawback and introduction of surtax credit system. 
-Partial liberalization of foreign exchange rationing on 65% of imports. 
-Reductions in the scope of export licensing. 
ASAC  
1990-91 
-Devaluation of the currency by 7% in March 1990. 
-Periodic adjustments of interest rates. 
-Complete liberalization of foreign exchange allocation. 
EDDRP  
1992-95 
-Devaluation of the currency by 15% in June and by 22% in July 1992. 
-Floatation of the local currency (Malawi Kwacha) in February 1994. 
-Malawi Investment Promotion Agency is created.  
-Replacement of Industrial Development Act with Industrial Licensing Act. 
-Review of Labour market imperfections including minimum wage policy. 
-Reduction in tariffs and consolidated tariffs limited to a maximum of 75%. 
-Elimination directed bank credit controls and liberalisation of interest rates. 
FRDP  
1996-98 
-Implementation of Export Processing Zones Act. 
-Establishment of the Malawi Stock Exchange. 
-Privatisation of State-Owned Enterprises. 
Source: World Bank (1996), and Reserve Bank of Malawi Economic Reports (Various Years). 
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2.1.5. Financial Liberalization Objectives and Implementation Framework. 
 
Malawi  implemented,  within  the  structural  adjustment  programme,  a  series  of 
financial reforms with the objective of developing the financial system. The financial 
liberalization process started with the deregulation of lending rates in 1987, and of 
deposit rates in 1988. Deposit rates were adjusted upwards by 3.0 percentage points; 
immediately followed by a reduction in both lending and deposit rates (see, Nissanke 
and Aryeetey, 1998). The liquidity reserve ratio was also introduced as a monetary 
policy tool during this period. These reforms, which were seriously embarked on in 
1989, also led to the overhaul of the legal framework for the financial sector. Changes 
were effected on the Reserve Bank Act of 1965 and the Banking Act of 1965; and 
government enacted the Reserve Bank Act of 1989 and the Banking Act of 1989, both 
of  which  broadened  the  powers  and  mandates  of  the  central  bank;  and  gave  due 
recognition  to  the  role  of  market  mechanism  in  the  resource  allocation  process. 
Further to this, the central bank was given the task of promoting and developing the 
money  and  capital  market  in  Malawi  (see,  World  Bank,  1991).  These  changes 
immediately resulted in the restructuring of the existing institutions, and facilitated 
entry of new financial institutions; thereby reducing,   to an extent, the monopoly 
power  of  the  dominant  commercial  banks  (see,  Mlachila  and  Chirwa,  2002).  The 
fixed exchange rate regime of the local currency was also discontinued by 1994 in 
favour of a market-determined system. Further, the central bank stopped the use of 
periodic changes in the liquidity reserve requirement to control liquidity, preferring 
the use of the discount rate as the main instrument of monetary policy
16.  
 
 
2.1.6. Financial Liberalization and the Financial Development Process. 
 
A key objective in the implementation of financial liberalization, according to the 
orthodox  view,  is  achieving  development  in  the  financial  system
17.  However,  a 
number of studies have examined the effect of financial liberalization on the Malawi 
                                                 
16  Notably,   through   open   market   operations,   the  central bank  started issuing Treasury bills with       
     low  denominations  in  order  to  encourage  small  savers  as well (see, Mlachila and Chirwa, 2002) 
17  Gertler  and  Rose  (1994, p.32)   characterize   this  process  as   multi-dimensional,  involving, inter 
     alia:    an   evolution   from   self   finance   to   external  finance,   development   of  intermediation,  
     subsequent development of markets for direct credit, and narrowing of interest rates spread. 36 
 
financial system, and find evidence of positive impact of this policy initiative in the 
country; albeit, not of the expected magnitude. Chirwa (1998a) observes an annual 
increase  in  financial  depth,  re-allocation  of  credit  to  non-preferential  sectors,  and 
increase in the share of deposits of non-bank financial institutions, and a decline in 
monopoly power within the banking system.  Seck and El Nil (1993, pp.1873-1875) 
observe  some  improvement  in  real  interest  rates,  as  well  as  a  reduction  in  the 
monetary system’s net claims on government relative to GDP, during the period after 
financial  liberalization  in  Malawi.  Aryeetey  et  al  (1997),  also  find  evidence  of 
improvements  in  financial  depth  in  Malawi,  but  observe  that  the  financial  system 
remains  segmented.  Nissanke  and  Aryeetey  (1998)  observe  positive  changes  in 
financial  indicators  in  Malawi,  among  other  countries  in  the  sub-Saharan  Africa 
region that undertook  financial  reforms. Further, in a study  involving twenty-nine 
sub-Saharan African countries, Reinhart and Tokatlidis (2003) identify Malawi to be 
among the only nine countries (together with Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, 
Namibia, South Africa, Uganda and Zambia) that register “more advanced” progress 
in financial development following financial liberalization. Gelbard and Leite (1999), 
arguing  against  the  orthodox  criteria  for  assessing  the  impact  of  financial 
liberalization  on  financial  development,  particularly  for  the  sub-Saharan  region, 
provide a summary of improvements in the financial systems of 38 countries in sub-
Saharan Africa, including Malawi, using a calculated comprehensive survey-based 
index of financial development. They demonstrate that compared to other countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa, and based on six aspects of financial development, the financial 
system in Malawi improved from being underdeveloped in 1987, to being minimally 
developed by 1997.  
 
Conclusion  from  the  foregoing  studies  is  that,  despite  the  relatively  impressive 
developments in the financial sector, it is nonetheless clear that Malawi still has to do 
more, particularly in areas of financial liberalization, institutional environment, and 
monetary policy
18. Consistent with these observations, Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998) 
and  Nissanke  (2001)  separately  note  that  merely  changing  policy  from  financial 
repression to financial liberalization has not fully addressed the fundamental problems 
                                                 
18  As  observed by   Mlachila  and   Chirwa (2002),  interest  rate  spreads  in  the  Malawian   banking       
     system  significantly  increased  after  the  reforms,   and   that  the  banks  are  shifting  the  cost  of  
     liberalization to customers. 37 
 
facing financial systems in sub-Saharan Africa, including Malawi. Specifically, the 
savings mobilization and private sector credit availability have been observed to be 
slow to emerge
19. Evidently, in Malawi, despite some positive developments related 
to  private  sector  credit,  most  firms  continue  being  affected  by  both  high  cost  of 
finance due to high interest rates, as well as problems stemming from limited access 
to finance. Certainly, those sectors of the economy that suffered from policy biases 
under the financially repressive regime, such as the private small-scale manufacturing 
sector, continue to experience problems of credit access after the financial reforms 
(see, Aryeetey et al, 1997; Nissanke and Aryeetey, 1998; NORAD, 2002; Malawi 
Government, 2000, 2004). Accordingly, whilst one of the key objectives of financial 
liberalization in Malawi was to increase the volume of lending to competitive sectors 
of the real economy, credit allocation to the private sector has varied over the period 
(see, Chart 2.1).  
 
Source: Reserve Bank of Malawi Economic Reports (Various Years) 
 
 
This notwithstanding, however, in recent years the trend has been in favour of the 
private sector, albeit still unstable (see, Sacerdoti, 2005). Besides, when compared to 
other countries in Africa, Malawi’s position is much better in this regard. as observed 
                                                 
19  Nissanke  and  Aryeetey  (1998)  cite high  incidence of non-performing loans , excess liquidity, and  
     externally imposed  policy uncertainty and credibility, as reasons behind these developments.  
Chart 2.1: Distribution of Domestic Credit between Public and Private sector.
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by Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998) in a comparative study of some countries in the sub-
Saharan Africa region, actually documents that unlike in the other countries where 
financial reforms have also been undertaken, Malawi has had a better distribution of 
financial system’s loans and advances and that the private sector has tended to be 
favoured in lending. 
 
            Table 2.2: Private Sector Credit as a Share of Total Domestic Credit.  
                                                    (Percentages) 
Year      Malawi    Tanzania    Ghana     Nigeria 
1986        39.4         7.2      13.6     47.2 
1987        29.0         7.8      10.6     54.7 
1988        35.5       12.9      16.9     51.9 
1989        48.2         9.6      37.0      n/a 
1990        52.5         4.6      37.6     63.5 
1991        59.0       11.8      30.1     54.1 
1992        63.0       23.0      30.9     40.8 
1993        40.4       27.1      35.8     44.9 
            Source: Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998). 
 
           Source: Reserve Bank of Malawi Economic Reports (Various Years) 
 
Chart 2.2: Share of Private Sector Credit by Main Economic Activities.
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As depicted in Chart 2.2, most private sector credit has been extended to agriculture, 
manufacturing and trading sectors, which, since independence in 1964, have together 
accounted for more than 50.0 percent of loans and advances extended by the banking 
system, with the balance being absorbed in the various services industries. During the 
period before liberalization, average  credit to the agricultural sector accounted for 
38.0 percent, whilst that to manufacturing was only 9.5 percent of total advances. 
Government’s deliberate policy of directing credit to the agricultural sector that was 
implemented during the 1970s explains the dominance of the agricultural sector in the 
credit market. However, after financial liberalization, the banks are now exercising a 
lot  of  discretion  as  they  freely  allocate  credit  to  various  economic  sectors. 
Accordingly, by 2001, the share of bank loans and advances to the agricultural sector 
was  8.6  percent,  whilst  that  to  the  manufacturing  sector  was  33.7  percent;  and, 
increasing on average.  
 
However, despite these positive developments in credit to the manufacturing sector, 
most firms continue experiencing financing constraints in Malawi. Apart from the 
high  cost  of  finance,  as  alluded  to  earlier,  there  are  institutional  and  regulatory 
problems regarding access to credit for both the large- and small-scale enterprises. 
Clearly, the problem is not one of inadequate number of institutions with a mandate to 
finance business activity, since, by 2004, the country boasted of eleven registered 
commercial banks (compared to only two during the pre-liberalization period)
20, a 
stock exchange, two discount houses, and over twenty notable NBFI’s, additional to 
insurance  companies  and  foreign  exchange  bureaux.  Nevertheless,  despite  this 
financial infrastructure, access to finance still remains a problem for both large- and 
small-scale  enterprises;  particularly  the  latter  category  (Chirwa,  2004;  Malawi 
Government, 2000, 2004; Aryeetey et al, 1997). Several reasons explain this situation.  
 
Regarding credit access problems by large-scale firms, there is very little term lending 
carried out by the commercial banks. Business lending, which mostly is to “blue chip” 
firms, is in the form of short-term overdraft facilities. As Chipeta and Mkandawire 
(1996) argue, the commercial banking sub-sector has for too long focused on short 
                                                 
20  Apart from actively lending to large firms, most of these banks (notably, National Bank of Malawi, 
     Commercial   Bank  of  Malawi,  and  INDEBANK)   also  have  specialized windows for lending to 
     small-scale enterprises.  40 
 
term lending that has historically targeted the foreign trade sector  and  large scale 
enterprises, leaving a persistent unsatisfied demand for medium term and long term 
capital  finance  for  both  large  and  small-scale  enterprises.  And,  surveys  by  World 
Bank (1991) and Malawi Government (2000, 2004) did show that the financial sector 
in Malawi indeed specialises in short-term credit as opposed to the long-term loans 
that are necessary for industrial development. This is partly because of the availability 
of high interest government bonds, as a result of which there is no pressure on banks 
to lend to businesses. Further, the traditional term lending institutions such as pension 
funds are not yet fully developed. Most important factor is regarding the financial 
institutions lending characteristics where banks tend to concentrate their lending to 
traditional and established customers (often public enterprises and businesses with 
good cash flow – usually large and modern), and avoid those that are new and without 
any record. In their study of financial reforms in four sub-Saharan African economies 
of Malawi, Ghana, Tanzania and Nigeria, Aryeetey, et al (1997, pp.210-211) notes, 
“[Following the financial reforms] there was little change in banks’ lending profile 
within private sector portfolio. Banks continued to concentrate on their traditional 
large, established customers and to avoid small-scale enterprises and small farmers... 
In Malawi, the small enterprise sector (fewer than 30 workers) received only 15.0 
percent of total loan volumes in 1992, while large enterprises received 63.0 percent of 
total loans disbursed.”
21 Thus, typically banks find it easier and more profitable to 
deal with the already established and large-scale enterprise segment of the market, as 
risk is considered to be minimal and transaction costs are lower. As Little (1987) 
notes, “institutional credit is better seen as a means of facilitating the expansion of 
firms that have passed the survival stage and have acquired at least the beginnings of 
a good track record.” (ibid, p.233)   
 
The small-scale enterprises also encounter similar problems;  albeit, in  a relatively 
severe manner. Thus, despite establishing facilities to cater for small-scale enterprises, 
applicants  from  this  sector  are  rarely  served.  Collateral  security  and  information 
inadequacy are usually used as reasons for denying credit to this sub-sector. Recent 
studies (Malawi Government 2000, 2004) show that finance feature highly as a key 
                                                 
21  A  similar  observation  is  made  by  Bigstein et al (2003)  in  a  study of Ghana, Zimbabwe, Kenya,  
     Ivory  Coast,   Burundi,   and   Cameroon,   where,  on  average,  of  those  firms  with a demand for 
     credit,  only  25.0 percent  obtained  the  loans;  and,  of  those   that   received   loans,  the  majority 
     were mostly large firms compared with the small firms who were much less likely to get a loan. 41 
 
constraint  to  starting  up  an  enterprise  in  Malawi.  As  shown  in  Table  2.3,  at  2.0 
percent, loans from credit institutions barely register as source of start-up capital for 
most  small-scale  enterprises  in  Malawi  (Malawi  Government,  2000).  Besides,  for 
those that are able to obtain loans – particularly from the micro-financing institutions 
– repayments rates are erratic and poor. This adversely affects the operations of the 
micro-financing institutions in terms of lending capacity, as most of these institutions 
were  created  with  donor  seed  capital  and  have  no  mandate  to  collect  savings. 
Consequently the low recovery rates directly translate into an erosion of the capital 
base; which, in turn, constrains the institutions lending capacity. Besides, these micro-
finance lending institutions do not provide medium and long-term credit, which is 
necessary for economic growth (Chipeta and Mkandawire, 1996; Chirwa, 2004).  
 
 
Table 2.3:  Principal Sources of Start-Up Capital for Micro- and Small - Scale  
         Enterprises in Malawi. 
                   (Percentages) 
       Creation of Micro and Small-Scale Enterprises  Source of Capital:- 
Pre-88  1988-92  1992- 96  1996- 00  Total 
Loan from family / friends      5.0      5.0      7.0      7.0      6.0 
Given free from family/ friends    18.0    13.0    15.0    20.0    17.0 
Money Lender      0.0      1.0      1.0      0.0      0.0 
Own Savings    59.0    60.0    62.0    64.0    61.0 
Agricultural Credit      3.0      5.0      4.0      2.0      4.0 
Credit Institution      1.0      3.0      1.0      2.0      2.0 
No need for Credit    14.0    13.0    10.0      5.0    10.0 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
 Source: Malawi Government (2000) 
  
Further, most entrepreneurs within the small-scale sub-sector consider credit from the 
lending institutions to be expensive and would therefore risk their own savings, if 
available, rather than pay for expensive loans to start-off with (Malawi Government, 
2000, p. 39)
22. A related study (Malawi Government, 2004) describes how business 
establishments secured financial assistance between 2000 and 2003. Chart 2.3 below 
shows that, about one-third of enterprises that did not apply for any loan, reported 
lack  of  information  on  potential  lenders,  as  the  main  factor  barring  them  from 
borrowing. This highlight the low outreach financial institutions have to this business 
                                                 
22  Similarly, an  UNCTAD  (2001)  study  of  several  African countries, establishes that between 59.0 
     percent and 98.0 percent of SME’s   use their personal   assets   to   capitalize  their enterprises than  
     borrow from the financial system. 42 
 
sector. About 16.0 percent did not apply due to the rigorous screening requirements, 
which  most  consider  unnecessary.  Furthermore,  high  rejection  rates  tend  to 
discourage any would-be applicants and potential investors.  
 
Legend: 
1. No need for credit (12%)  5. Inadequate Collateral (6%) 
2. Believed would be refused (15%)  6. Do not like to be in debt (8%) 
3. Too expensive (9%)  7. Do not know any lender (33%) 
4. Too much trouble for what it is worth (16%)  8. Other (1%) 
Source: Malawi Government (2000) 
 
 
2.1.7. Manufacturing Industry Performance following Financial Liberalization. 
 
2.1.7.1. Industry Productivity. 
          
The  macroeconomic  environment  in  Malawi  has  had  a  devastating  effect  on  the 
performance  of  the  manufacturing  sector.  Measured  by  the  index  of  industrial 
production, Chart 2.4 shows total manufactured output to be lower in 2004 than it was 
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in 1991; and, even much lower than what was recorded during the period before the 
reforms started in 1980 (see, Mulaga and Weiss, 1996, p.1272). 
 
           Source: Malawi National Statistical Yearbook (Various Years). 
 
 
Table 2.4: Capacity Utilization in Key Industries of the Manufacturing Sector. 
(Percentages) 
Industry Group   1997  1998  1999  2000 
Food Processing    65.0   54.6   47.5   49.0 
Beverages    60.0   55.0   60.0   43.0 
Textiles     53.5   50.5   46.0   46.0 
Sawmill and Wood Products    63.3   68.3   67.5   85.0 
Paper and Paper Products    60.0   65.0   62.5   61.5 
Other Chemicals (Pharmaceuticals)    90.9   74.2   78.9   74.3 
Metal Fabrication    12.7   23.1   21.5   30.0 
Mineral Products    42.0   55.0   62.0   63.0 
Source: World Bank (2004b) 
 
As Table 2.4 shows, the low and declining level of manufacturing activity is further 
reflected in low capacity utilisation across all sub-sectors. Major sub-sectors such as 
food processing, beverages, textiles, and metal fabrication have been operating below 
50.0 percent capacity. Notably, Malawi has not fully succeeded in diversifying its 
exports away from agricultural to manufactured products, despite prevailing export 
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opportunities
23.  Further,  as  a  proportion  of  total  merchandise  exports,  the 
manufacturing  sectors’  contribution  remains  to  be  relatively  low,  with  the 
manufactured exports per capita currently at less than half the level recorded in 1980, 
whilst  the  share  in  GDP  has  fallen  to  11.0  percent.  When  compared  with  other 
countries in the region, Malawi’s manufacturing sector is lagging in most respects.  
 
Table 2.5: Key Manufacturing Sector Performance Indicators: Selected African  
         Countries – 1980, 1990, and 2000 
 
Indicator:-  Year  Ethiopia  Kenya  Malawi  S. Africa 
Manufacturing Value Added 
per capita (USD) 
1981  
1991 
2001 
    13 
    12  
    21 
   33  
   37 
   34 
   34 
   33 
   23 
 729  
 661  
 591 
Share of Manufacturing in 
GDP (percent) 
1981  
1991 
2001 
   6.8   
   7.3  
   6.2 
   9.6  
 10.1 
 10.3 
 14.4 
 17.4 
 11.1 
   21.5  
   21.5  
   19.4 
Share of Manufactured Goods 
in Total Exports (percent) 
1981  
1991 
2001 
 10.2   
 17.0  
 12.4 
 52.7  
 51.3 
 37.7 
 35.1 
 13.1 
 19.1 
   19.4  
   25.7  
   63.8 
Manufactured Exports 
per capita (USD) 
1981  
1991 
2001 
   1 
   1  
   - 
 39  
 22 
 19 
 15 
   6 
   6 
 139  
 288  
 384 
Source: UNIDO Industrial Development Report (2004). 
 
Following a study review of its support of the private sector development in Malawi, 
NORAD (2002, p.9) reports that, “...the Malawi manufacturing sector showed 0.0 
percent growth in the period 1996-1999. The reasons for this are many, but worth 
mentioning is the rapid liberalization of markets, exposing Malawi’s manufacturers to 
competition  from  South  Africa  and  Zimbabwe.  The  sector  is  still  hampered  by 
monopolistic  behaviour,  trade  barriers,  and  lack  of  access  to  capital  (etc)....  The 
privately  owned  garment  [clothing  and  apparel]  sector  is  fast  disappearing.  Since 
September 1999, five garment manufacturing companies have closed, and others at a 
serious risk. It is a possibility that the whole garment sector will have closed in the 
next two years.” Further, in its assessment of the Malawi manufacturing sector, the 
World Bank (2004b) observes that, “...in Malawi the manufacturing sector has been in 
stagnation over the past five years and there has been a contraction in output during 
the past two years. Over the past five years, there have been 10 closures of major 
manufacturing  enterprises  in  tobacco  processing,  metal  products,  and  garments. 
                                                 
23  For  example,   the   US-based   AGOA  facility  and  the  EU/ACP  “Everything-But-Arms”  (EBA) 
     agreement, provide preferential market access for exports from countries like Malawi. 45 
 
Furthermore, value-added in manufacturing grew by only 0.5 percent per annum over 
1996 – 2001, respectively. While the fall in output has been observed in all sectors, 
the largest fall (38.2 percent) has been experienced in the clothing, footwear, and 
textile  sector[s].  The  fall  in  output  has  been  reflected  in  the  reduction  of  private 
investment, most of which goes into manufacturing, from about 8.0 percent of GDP in 
1995 to 2.7 percent of GDP in 2000.” (ibid, p.60)  
 
Survey results on the prevailing patterns of finance (see, Malawi Government, 2000, 
2004; World Bank, 2004b) suggest that, despite the reforms, insufficient finance for 
working  capital  continue  to  constrain  the  daily  operations  of  most  enterprises, 
particularly the micro and small-scale enterprises. As a consequence, enterprises use 
their retained profits to finance working capital for survival, rather than ploughing 
back into expansion of capacity. The micro- and small-scale sectors’ ability to grow 
and  provide  competition  in  the  manufacturing  sector  continues  to  be  inhibited  by 
unavailability of adequate financial resources; thereby making it difficult to transform 
from micro and smaller enterprises to larger establishments
24.  Consequently, more 
than 70.0 percent of enterprises in this sub-sector have, over their lifetime, contracted 
in size (both in terms of capital, as well as number of employees). Specifically, over 
the period 1996-2000, 78.0 percent of the firms started, ended up contracting in size. 
Further, since 1999, more enterprises have closed-down much faster than those that 
have been created (Malawi Government, 2000). 
 
  
2.1.7.2. Competition in Industry. 
 
The pattern of industrial structure in the manufacturing sector, following the financial 
liberalization process, remains to be typical of a country at an early stage of industrial 
development. In terms of ownership structure, the manufacturing sector is still heavily 
skewed towards a few prominent, but relatively large establishments; a feature linked 
with the centralizing role of the public corporations, as well as foreign ownership. 
State  involvement  has  been,  and  still  remains,  significant  in  a  number  of 
manufacturing  sub-sectors  through  its  designated  public  enterprises  (see,  Chirwa, 
                                                 
24  According to recent survey results, micro- and small-scale enterprise sub-sector is stagnating despite 
     showing great potential for growth (World Bank, 2004b). 46 
 
2004).  For  instance,  government  has  had,  and  continues  to  have,  presence  in 
manufacturing sub-sectors. Evidently, there is a persistent lack of competition within 
the  manufacturing  sector,  with  most  industries  continuing  to  be  dominated  by 
monopolies  and  oligopolies.  As  Chirwa  (2004)  observe,  despite  the  privatisation 
process,  there  is  continued  holding  of  ownership  by  the  state  in  most  of  the  key 
privatised  enterprises;  and,  the  major  public  corporations  (ADMARC,  MDC  and 
PRESS) continue to dominate a wide range of businesses, including agro-processing 
and production of consumer goods
25.  Disappointingly, the small-scale enterprise sub-
sector  has  not  developed  adequately  to  provide  the  needed  competition  in  the 
manufacturing sector. The graduation rate from micro “seed bed” into more complex 
enterprises is not high; and, in particular, it is found to be lower in Malawi, like most 
sub-Saharan African countries, than it is in Asia and Latin America (see, for example, 
Nissanke and Aryeetey, 1998). This is because the small-scale investors have not been 
able to effectively compete with the conglomerates. Further, the relatively small size 
of the domestic market and the need for firms to be large to gain the benefits of 
economies of scale partly explains the relatively skewed industry structure in Malawi. 
Government granting monopoly rights to certain firms in a bid to allow them to grow 
enhanced this development.  
  
Foreign ownership too, either through direct multinational investments or as a joint 
venture  with  a  locally  based  entrepreneur,  has  contributed  to  the  development  of 
oligopolistic structures in the manufacturing sector. Notably, many of the industries 
that  are  characterized  by  oligopolistic  structures,  with  foreign  involvement,  are 
significantly capital intensive; and, thus have large economies of scale
26. This has 
been a key entry-deterrent for most aspiring local entrepreneurs, due to inadequate 
resources to acquire even the required minimum capital. This characteristic seems to 
be consistent with the view in the literature that multinational corporations may also 
enhance skewed industry structures through their aggressive conduct and possession 
of intangible assets (see, Lall, 1979).  
 
                                                 
25  According the World Bank (2004, pp.59 and 95), as of end-2001,  annual sales  of firms belonging 
     to these three conglomerates  (ADMARC,  MDC, and  PRESS) together accounted for  nearly 26.0 
     percent of Malawi’s GDP.   
26  For instance, tobacco manufacturing, beverages, printing and publishing, electrical machinery, and  
     transport equipment, are all characterised by high capital intensity.  47 
 
Finally, the absence of any effective antitrust legislation must have also contributed to 
lack  of  competitiveness  in  the  manufacturing  sector.  It  was  only  in  1998  that  a 
Competition  and  Fair  Trading  Act  was  introduced  to  restrict  anti-competitive 
practices. Prior to this, government used some of its policies to control restrictive 
business  practices  or  abuse  of  dominant  positions  of  market  power;  such  as  the 
extensive regime of price controls, the directed credit and foreign exchange allocation 
system, all designed to influence private sector operators (see, Mulaga and Weiss, 
1996).  The  introduction  of  the  Competition  and  Fair  Trading  Act  in  1998  was 
therefore in recognition of the fact that, despite the implementation of the economic 
reform programmes (including financial liberalization), which was aimed at ushering 
in a market-oriented economy; there remains a need to level the playing field. As 
noted  in  the  preamble  to  the  Act,  “...the  Malawian  economy  is  characterized  by 
imperfect market structures. In addition to ‘natural’ monopolies such as utilities, most 
goods in Malawi are produced and distributed  under monopolistic or oligopolistic 
conditions. Even after all regulatory barriers to entry into these markets are removed; 
economies of scale may inhibit other players from entering certain markets. [The] 
ongoing privatization programme [of public enterprises] may result in some public 
sector monopolies being divested into private ownership with an attendant greater risk 
of the abuse of a position of dominant market power.” (Malawi Government, 1989) 
 
 
2.1.8. Summary of Observations. 
 
In  summary,  following  several  government  efforts  and  policy  initiatives,  the 
foregoing  situation  has  had  two  notable  implications  in  terms  of  shaping  and 
influencing the structure and performance of the Malawian manufacturing sector:  
 
First, apart from a few large-scale establishments, the rest of the manufacturing sector 
is  comprised  of  small-scale  firms.  However,  due  to  several  barriers  to  entry  and 
growth,  these  small-scale  enterprises  are  not  able  to  graduate  into  large-scale 
enterprises that could lead to deepening of industrial transformation, thereby lowering 
the  monopolistic  and  oligopolistic  structures  that  have  been  prevalent  in  the 
manufacturing  sector  in  Malawi.  Notably,  inadequate  financial  resources  severely 
restrict  small-scale  enterprises  investment  and  expansion.  Thus,  for  a  prospective 48 
 
small-scale entrepreneur with a well thought out project, whether in an existing or a 
new product line, investment capital is a problem. The situation is aggravated by the 
lack of commitment from commercial banks and other lending institutions, in terms of 
credit extension to the small-scale enterprises. The commercial banks have played 
practically no part in financing small-scale enterprises. As observed by Chipeta and 
Mkandawire (1992) following a study of the Malawian financial institutions lending 
characteristics,  “...few  SME’s  obtain  credit  from  commercial  banks,  and/or  other 
financial  institutions,  as  [these  institutions]  have  not  developed  mechanisms  for 
dealing directly with SME’s whom they consider to be risky. Further, [for those who 
attempt to obtain credit from these institutions] the number of loan applicants always 
far exceeds the number that succeed in obtaining credit
27.  Credit constraints have 
been experienced even where the institutions were specifically created to cater for the 
small-scale  enterprises.  Apart  from  a  1.0  to  2.0-percentage  point  interest  rate 
advantage available on loans from these institutions, compared with prime rates to 
commercial  bank  borrowers,  the  institutions  are  inadequately  capitalized  and  lack 
effective outreach to carry out the functions for which they were established. Besides, 
their  lending  conditions  have  not  been  favourable  either
28.  Consequently,  the 
institutions’ liquidity constraints, coupled with the owner contribution requirement, 
have worked against the success rate of obtaining credit from these institutions.  
 
Second, the public corporations have over the years reinvested their profits, rather 
than distributing them. However, despite this property income leading to high rate of 
investment in the manufacturing sector, it has nonetheless increased further the public 
enterprises’  market  power  in  the  manufacturing  sector  (Chirwa,  2004).  The 
privatisation policy on public enterprises which was designed to promote participation 
by Malawian public in the state owned enterprises which are being privatised, as well 
as reducing monopoly and increasing competition, has not been effective either. This 
is because the majority of the interest group of indigenous people earns low average 
levels of income. Even though this constraint is being addressed by setting up special 
loan  facilities  through  banks  to  enable  Malawians  to  purchase  shares  in  the 
                                                 
27  According to a study by  Chipeta and Mkandawire (1992, p.14),  out  of   an average of 726  SME’s 
     that  applied for loans  at SEDOM,  an annual average of 53.0 percent was rejected. At INDEBANK 
     the rejection  rate averaged 93.0 percent per year.  
28  For instance,  INDEFUND  requires  borrowers  to put up at least 10.0  percent  of the initial capital, 
     whilst SEDOM has a  20.0 percent  floor  for the clients’ own   share   in a project (see, Chipeta and  
     Mkandawire, 1992). 49 
 
enterprises, which are being privatised, there is no easy access to these facilities (see, 
Chipeta  and  Mkandawire,  1992).  This  is  because  applicants  to  these  facilities  are 
subjected  to  the  same  usual  creditworthiness  tests  by  the  banking  system. 
Consequently,  the  programme  is  only  benefiting  few  individuals  and  institutional 
investors who the banks consider to be financially strong. Further, the objective of 
reducing monopoly is not achievable, particularly in cases where large enterprises 
undergoing privatisation are not being split into and sold as small independent units, 
in  order  to  facilitate  affordability  as  well  as  spread  ownership  (Privatisation 
Commission, 1998).       
 
In view of the foregoing developments, therefore, there is limited competition in the 
manufacturing industries. As observed by Chirwa (2004) and the World Bank (1989), 
in Malawi, the majority of the industries have been registering high concentration 
ratios, with a generally increasing trend. This suggests that the manufacturing sector 
continues to be beleaguered by lack of competition, despite the broad-based economic 
reforms,  which  included  financial  liberalization.  Accordingly,  as  suggested  by 
Reinhart  and  Tokatlidis  (2003),  refining  future  policy  choices  and  enhancing 
government intervention and measures, necessitates the undertaking of a broad-based 
investigation  of  the  responsiveness  of  the  related  economic  indicators  to  the 
implemented financial liberalization process. In the next section of this chapter, this 
study attempts to achieve that through a simple preliminary empirical investigation on 
the effects of financial liberalization.  
 
 
2.2.      ECONOMETRIC EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL  
  LIBERALIZATION   ON   SELECTED   FINANCIAL AND   REAL  
  SECTOR VARIABLES. 
 
2.2.1. Empirical Framework. 
 
Financial liberalization, according to literature, can either have a negative or positive 
effect on both the financial as well as manufacturing industry aggregates. The process, 
which is premised on the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis, is often believed to enhance 
economic growth through its effect in promoting the development of the financial 50 
 
system
29.  However,  while  the  financial  liberalization  paradigm  has  gained  wide 
acceptance at the conceptual level, empirical testing of its validity remains, at best, 
inconclusive. For instance, there is a view that if financial liberalization is introduced 
at an early stage of development it will have a negative rather than positive impact on 
growth (Kawai, 1994; and, Adelman and Morris, 1997). Arguably, deregulation of 
financial markets in developing countries, such as Malawi, may lead to higher interest 
rates, thereby increasing the cost of funds and reducing investment. Some researchers 
have therefore expressed doubts as to the effectiveness of financial liberalization in 
creating  a  competitive  manufacturing  sector  in  developing  countries  (see,  for 
example,  Taylor,  1981;  Diaz  Alejandro  and  Helleiner,  1982;  and  Rodrik,  1992a). 
Amongst the reasons for such pessimism is that developing countries lack efficient 
institutions responsible for effective resource allocation (see, Nissanke, 2001).  
 
Whilst the foregoing issues are tackled in more detail in the subsequent chapters of 
this thesis, this chapter conducts a simple preliminary investigation on the effect of 
financial  liberalization  on  key  macroeconomic  variables.  Accordingly,  in  order  to 
identify the pre- and post-financial liberalization effects, the study tests whether the 
behaviour of selected industrial and financial variables significantly  change in the 
years  following  financial  liberalization,  using  a  simple  model  by  Demirguc-Kunt, 
Detragiache, and Gupta (2006). Investigations start from 1990, which is one year after 
financial  liberalization  in  Malawi.  Accordingly,  applying  the  OLS  estimator,  the 
variables  are  regressed  on  six  time  dummies,  one  each  for  six  years  following 
liberalization.  Where  necessary,  industry  dummy  variables  are  introduced  in  the 
regression  to  control  for  heterogeneity  across  industries.    Thus,  the  following 
empirical model is estimated: 
 
it i it y g m = +          for t = T-1, T-2.... T-6; i =1...N; and,                                           (2.1)         
it i t it y t g b m = + +      for t = T+1, T+2... T+6; i =1...N.                                            (2.2) 
 
where, N denote the number of industries, and yit is an observation for variable y in 
period t and industry i. Further, µit represent the disturbance term, whilst γ and β are 
                                                 
29  McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) argue that, financial liberalization induces positive real interest 
     rates,  thereby  giving  rise  to  more savings, increased investments, improved efficiency of capital  
     markets in terms of credit allocation, and ultimately economic growth. 51 
 
regression coefficients. The estimate of each β, the coefficient of the period t dummy 
is therefore the mean difference between the value of the variable at t and the mean of 
the  pre-liberalization  period.  Thus,  according  to  Demirguc-Kunt,  Detragiache,  and 
Gupta (2006), if the estimated β values are significantly different from zero, then the 
variable  behaves  differently  in  the  post-liberalization  period  than  in  the  pre-
liberalization years. This approach provides a comparison between the coefficients of 
the time dummies, which, in turn, facilitates tracing of the dynamic evolution of each 
variable  during  the  period  after  the  financial  liberalization  process.  Due  to 
heterogeneity across industries, the study uses heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors to do hypothesis testing. 
 
 
2.2.2. Data Specifications. 
 
The dataset is of the combined cross-section (N = 1, 2…20), time series (T = 1, 2... 
35) variety, with a total of N x T = 20 x 35 = 700 observations for each variable. Table 
2.6 presents the summary statistics for most of the key variables in this study, and 
Table 2.7 shows the correlations between these variables.   
 
Table 2.6:  Summary Statistics: Major Financial and Real Sector Components 
(Annual Panel Data: 1970-2004) 
Variable Description:-    Mean    Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
GR  Industry value-added growth as % of real GDP    1.787    4.555  -14.16    11.25 
NFE  Number of Firms (% Change)    0.003    0.174    -0.60      3.00 
SH  Industry Share (Ratio of Industry Value Added to Total Man. Value Added)    0.047    0.072     0.01      0.70 
CR  3-Firm Concentration Ratio  82.202  18.065   29.45  100.00 
PCM  Industry Price-Cost Margins    0.183    0.135   - 0.26      0.70 
MM  Ratio of Manufactured Imports  to Total Merchandise Imports (% Growth)  73.637    3.148   63.39    80.77 
MX  Ratio of Manufactured Exports  to Total Merchandise Exports (% Growth)    8.572    2.811     4.62    15.44 
GDP  Real Gross Domestic Product (Annual % Growth)     3.822    5.395  -10.24    16.73 
DD  Demand Deposits (Annual % Growth)  20.011  14.768    -7.60    56.90 
M2  Time and Savings Deposits (Annual % Growth)  23.317  16.174    -5.03    67.76 
LR  Lending Rates (Nominal)  24.703  15.139     8.50    56.17 
DR  Deposit Rates (Nominal)  15.028    9.429     5.50    37.27 
RR  Real Interest Rates    5.609  10.382  -16.86    36.31 
TDC  Total Domestic Credit from the Banking System (Annual % Growth)    1.255    0.216     0.69      5.86 
FIT  Credit to Manufacturing  Sector (as  % of Total Domestic Credit)    0.283    0.086     0.18      0.48 
FIN  Credit to Manufacturing  Sector  (as  % of GDP)    0.120    0.129     0.01      0.44 
  
 
Table 2.7: Correlation among Major Financial and Real Sector Components: (Panel Data - Yearly Observations). 
Note:   This table report the correlation matrix of selected industry and financial variables. And, ***, **, * indicate significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.  
“T+1” is a dummy for one year following implementation of financial liberalization, and T+2, T+3, T+4, T+5 and T+6 are dummies for each of the subsequent five years 
following the financial reforms.
       GR      NFE      SH       CR3     PCM      MM       MX      GDP      DD       M2       LR       DR       RR      TDC      FIT     FIN 
GR    1.000                               
NFE    0.007    1.000                             
SH    0.669
***      0.082    1.000                           
CR3    0.105
***     -0.112
***   -0.735
***    1.000                         
PCM    0.097
**    0.176
**    0.132
**    0.425
***    1.000                       
MM   -0.190
***    0.081
**   -0.079
**   -0.224
***    0.165
*    1.000                     
MX    0.156
***   -0.033   -0.070
*    0.316
***    0.005   -0.397
***    1.000                   
GDP    0.054   -0.054    0.011    0.062    0.110
***    0.191
***   -0.284
***    1.000                 
DD   -0.175
***    0.013    0.035    0.106
***    0.080
**   -0.195
***    0.252
***    0.097
**   1.000               
M2    0.111
***   -0.013    0.042    0.358
***    0.041   -0.195
***    0.202
***    0.089
**   0.065
*    1.000             
LR   -0.323
***  -0.053   -0.112
**    0.480
***    0.012   -0.512
***    0.576
***   -0.089
**   0.080
**    0.471
***   1.000           
DR   -0.241
***  -0.042   -0.107
***    0.452
***    0.053   -0.385
***    0.467
***   -0.090
***  -0.050    0.527
***   0.945
***   1.000         
RR    0.198
***   -0.013   -0.099
**    0.198
***  -0.105
***   -0.607
***    0.324
***   -0.265
***   0.262
***    0.022   0.540
***   0.359
***    1.000       
TDC   -0.181
***    0.085
**    0.061
*   -0.537
***  -0.079
*    0.084
**   -0.325
***   -0.277
***  -0.072
*   -0.390
***  -0.458
***  -0.398
***   -0.097
**    1.000     
FIT    0.128
*   -0.044   -0.090
**    0.605
***    0.110
***   -0.184
***    0.294
***    0.148
***   0.233
***    0.334
***  0.658
***   0.634
***    0.289
***    0.741
***    1.000   
FIN    0.025   -0.010    0.012    0.214
***    0.172
***   -0.188
***    0.107
**    0.108
**   0.133
***    0.133
***  -0.054   0.091
**   -0.117
**   -0.302
*8*    0.536
***    1.000 
T+1   -0.022    0.037    0.007   -0.034  -0.053    0.222
***   -0.077
**    0.059  -0.021   -0.130
***  -0.042  -0.053    0.062
*   -0.095
*    0.131
***    0.248
*** 
T+2   -0.021    0.009    0.007   -0.007    0.014    0.106
**   -0.225
***    0.156
***   0.003    0.023  -0.053  -0.046    0.046   -0.087
**    0.161
***    0.370
*** 
T+3   -0.046   -0.001    0.003   -0.030    0.085
**    0.071
*   -0.082
**   -0.355
***  -0.021   -0.080
**  -0.031   0.027    0.035    0.088
**    0.025    0.181
*** 
T+4   -0.019    0.003   -0.001    0.090
*    0.096
**   -0.004   -0.219
***    0.187
***  -0.017    0.176
***   0.054   0.122
***   -0.076
**    0.009    0.171
***    0.255
*** 
T+5   -0.046   -0.050    0.011    0.114
**    0.129
***    0.024    0.297
***   -0.447
***  -0.042    0.140
***   0.071
*   0.182
***   -0.029    0.074
**    0.209
***    0.539
*** 
T+6   -0.012   -0.003    0.006    0.120
**    0.073
**   -0.007    0.095
**    0.411
***  -0.040    0.349
***   0.257
***   0.405
***   -0.371
***   -0.175
***    0.156
*    0.025 53 
 
 
 
2.2.3. Estimation Results. 
 
Table 2.8 show results for simple regressions on the effect of financial liberalization 
on the behaviour of selected real sector and financial sector variables.  
 
Table 2.8: Financial Liberalization Effect on Selected Economic Indicators. 
 
  T+1  T+2  T+3  T+4  T+5  T+6 
 GR  0.023
 
(0.140) 
0.230
* 
(0.128) 
0.538
*** 
(0.150) 
0.045 
(0.258) 
0.878
*** 
(0.081) 
0.391
*** 
(0.076) 
PCM  -0.032 
(0.028) 
0.020 
(0.035) 
 0.077** 
(0.037) 
0.085
** 
(0.049) 
0.111
** 
(0.041) 
0.067
** 
(0.026) 
 NFE  0.040 
(0.051) 
0.013 
(0.016) 
0.015 
(0.017) 
0.000 
(0.010) 
0.054 
(0.073) 
0.000 
(0.010) 
SH  -0.029 
(0.138) 
0.192 
(0.128) 
-0.090 
(0.148) 
-0.044
 
(0.256) 
0.438
*** 
(0.077) 
0.134
** 
(0.075) 
CR3  -0.038 
(0.028) 
0.002 
(0.027) 
-0.031 
(0.030) 
0.145
*** 
(0.021) 
0.180
*** 
(0.020) 
0.190
*** 
(0.020) 
MM  4.471
*** 
(0.139) 
2.201
*** 
(0.139) 
1.530
*** 
(0.139) 
0.121  
(0.139) 
0.641
*** 
(0.139) 
0.051
 
(0.139) 
MX  -1.607
*** 
(0.115) 
-3.307
*** 
(0.115) 
-1.677
*** 
(0.115) 
-3.247
*** 
(0.115) 
5.473
*** 
(0.115) 
1.043
*** 
(0.115) 
GDP  1.880
*** 
(0.167) 
4.920
*** 
(0.167) 
-11.140
*** 
(0.167) 
5.880
*** 
(0.167) 
-14.050
*** 
(0.167) 
12.920
*** 
(0.167) 
DD  -0.551
** 
(0.176) 
-0.048 
(0.176) 
-0.570
*** 
(0.176) 
-0.472
** 
(0.176) 
-1.011
*** 
(0.176) 
-0.962
*** 
(0.176) 
M2  -10.694
*** 
(0.663) 
3.676
*** 
(0.663) 
-5.974
*** 
(0.663) 
18.096
*** 
(0.663) 
14.776
*** 
(0.663) 
34.466
*** 
(0.663) 
LR  -2.923
*** 
(0.666) 
-3.923
*** 
(0.666) 
-1.923
*** 
(0.666) 
5.577
*** 
(0.666) 
7.077
*** 
(0.666) 
23.407
*** 
(0.666) 
DR  -1.723
*** 
(0.380) 
-1.323
*** 
(0.380) 
2.677
*** 
(0.380) 
7.927
*** 
(0.380) 
11.177
*** 
(0.380) 
23.447
*** 
(0.380) 
RR  3.034
*** 
(0.438) 
2.104
*** 
(0.438) 
1.394
*** 
(0.438) 
-5.276
*** 
(0.438) 
-2.476
*** 
(0.438) 
-23.166
*** 
(0.438) 
TDC  -6.384
*** 
(0.479) 
-5.865
*** 
(0.479) 
5.115
*** 
(0.479) 
0.155 
(0.479) 
4.235
*** 
(0.479) 
-11.365
*** 
(0.479) 
FIT  8.171
*** 
(0.365) 
11.081
*** 
(0.365) 
0.141 
(0.365) 
12.161
*** 
(0.365) 
16.711
* ** 
(0.365) 
10.611
*** 
(0.365) 
FIN  1.143
*** 
(0.017) 
1.603
*** 
(0.017) 
0.893
*** 
(0.017) 
1.173
*** 
(0.017) 
2.243
*** 
(0.017) 
0.303
*** 
(0.017) 
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. “T+1” is a 
dummy for one year following implementation of financial liberalization, and T+2, T+3, T+4, T+5 and 
T+6  are  dummies  for  each  of  the  subsequent  five  years  following  the  financial  reforms.  White’s 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
2.2.3.1. Real Sector Performance. 
 
The results in Table 2.8 show that the performance of the Malawian manufacturing 
industries,  as  measured  by  growth  in  manufacturing  value-added  and  price-cost 
margins,  does  not  change  in  the  year  immediately  after  the  financial  reforms. 54 
 
 
 
However, by T+2 manufacturing growth register recovery, as it is significantly above 
the pre-liberalization level during the subsequent years, except for the brief stagnation 
in T+4. Next, after stagnating in T+1 and T+2, price-cost margins increase to a level 
above the pre-liberalization level from T+3 and in the subsequent years.  
Source: Malawi Government (National Statistical Office, Economic Planning Ministry). 
 
Arguably, however, growth in real industry output can be linked to either an increase 
in industry value-added or expansion in the number of firms. Evidently, in the case of 
the  Malawian  manufacturing  sector,  growth  in  output  must  be  due  to  the  former 
explanation,  since  the  number  of  firms  does  not  change  during  the  five  years 
following financial liberalization, as evidenced by the insignificant coefficient on net 
firm  entry.  Apparently,  this  outturn  may  explain  the  increase  in  the  average  firm 
share, and, possibly, in the three-firm concentration levels. What may be happening is 
that the increase in value-added is originating from a few pre-existing large firms or 
companies,  which  subsequently  grow  even  bigger.  Hence,  industry  concentration, 
which had hitherto remained unchanged following the financial liberalization process, 
now has a positive and significant coefficient from T+4 and the subsequent years.  
 
A  related  explanation  for  the  insignificant  result  in  output  growth  in  the 
manufacturing sector during T+4 is the impact of donor-aid withdrawal from Malawi 
during this period, due to governance concerns by the donor community. In Malawi, 
as is similarly common with most recipients of large donor aid in sub-Saharan Africa, 
Chart 2.5: Manufacturing Value-Added (as % of GDP)
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the  high  levels  and  unpredictability  of  aid  flows  contribute  to  macroeconomic 
volatility (see, Bulir and Hamann, 2001)
30.  
 
Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank). 
 
The  country’s  foreign  reserves  position,  which  benefit  significantly  from  donor 
inflows, was eroded following this development; with adverse implications on the 
manufacturing  sector’s  performance.  It  is  for  similar  reasons  that  manufactured 
imports also register no change in T+4, after recording annual increases between T+1 
and  T+3.  However,  manufactured  imports  are  significantly  above  the  pre-
liberalization  level  in  T+5,  before  slowing  down  again  in  T+6.  Apparently,  the 
manufacturing imports intensity that followed the financial reforms exposed domestic 
manufacturing firms to stiff foreign competition. In reaction to this, many firms either 
stopped  normal  operations  or  started  to  scale  down  their  operations,  or  turned  to 
trading in goods, which they formerly produced themselves. Notably, the insignificant 
outturns on the change in the number of firms, or the lack of firm creation, from the 
year after financial liberalization through to T+6, testify to this policy development. 
Besides,  as  part  of  the  financial  liberalization  package  the  exchange  rate  regime 
changed from fixed to a managed float. This had a massive impact on the exchange 
rate,  which  depreciated  by  a  significant  margin  within  a  short  space  of  time, 
particularly due to the low foreign reserves levels that characterised the economy at 
                                                 
30  In Malawi,  foreign aid amounts to  approximately 20.0 percent of GDP per annum.  And, budgeted 
     government   expenditures   -  mostly  in   form  of  demand for manufactured goods  -  are made in 
     anticipation of aid, and if that aid is curtailed, this creates ‘ripples’ throughout the economy. 
 
Chart 2.6: Donor Aid and International Reserves Movements.
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that time, as indicated. This had a crippling effect on the economy overall, which is 
predominantly dependent on imported inputs. In contrast, however, the exchange rate 
regime change benefited the manufactured exports sector, which gained in terms of 
local currency earnings; hence its significant recovery to above the pre-liberalization 
level in T+5 and T+6.  
 
In terms of the overall economic performance, financial liberalization is accompanied 
by an increase in gross domestic product (GDP) growth, of the order of 2.0 percentage 
points  in  the  year  immediately  after  the  reforms.  Growth  remains  above  the  pre-
liberalization levels in the second year following the financial reforms, registering an 
increase of 5.0 percent, before decreasing below the pre-liberalization levels in T+3. 
This  underperformance  is  due  to  persistent  drought  during  the  period  T+3  that 
adversely affect agricultural productivity. Agriculture, a primary component of the 
economy, account for about 33.0 percent of GDP. Economic recovery in T+4 is again 
disrupted, mainly due to two developments that put pressure on the government’s 
fiscal position: the donor aid withdrawal, and the conducting of the country’s first 
multi-party  elections.  However,  in  T+6,  macroeconomic  performance  strongly 
recovers  and  registers  a  13.0  percent  growth.  Overall,  despite  underperformance 
during the two periods, output growth remained above the pre-liberalization levels. 
This is consistent with findings of Bakaert et al (2005), that financial liberalization 
positively  influences  economic  growth,  particularly  through  its  effect  on  financial 
development,  thus  emphasizing  the  importance  of  financial  development  for 
economic  growth.  The  result  is  also  consistent  with  findings  by  Vlachos  and 
Waldenstein (2005), who establish that economic growth in real output is boosted by 
financial  liberalization.  Further,  this  confirms  the  evidence  of  Laeven  (2003), 
suggesting a positive correlation between financial liberalization and growth, given a 
relatively developed financial system.        
 
 
2.2.3.2. Financial Sector Performance: Savings Mobilization, Intermediation, and 
   Credit Availability.        
 
In the year after the financial reforms and all the subsequent years, except in T+2, the 
rate of growth in demand deposits significantly falls below the pre-liberalization level. 57 
 
 
 
Evidently, there is an increase in long-term liabilities in the banking system as broader 
money supply (M2) becomes significant and positive from period T+4 to T+6. These 
findings  suggest  that,  following  financial  liberalization,  there  is  some  moderate 
change in depositors’ behaviour from short-term to medium and long-term savings. 
 
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
 
Interest  rates  on  deposits  and  lending,  which  were  controlled  by  the  monetary 
authorities before the financial reforms, initially decline below the pre-liberalization 
level in the liberalization year and the following two years. However, in the three 
years  after  financial  liberalization,  the  average  interest  rate  on  deposits  increased 
significantly above the pre-liberalization levels. Lending rates also become positive 
and  significantly  above  the  pre-liberalization  level  from  T+4  onwards,  mainly 
reflecting  the  reaction  from  the  banking  system  on  the  ‘squeeze’  on  their  profit 
margins following the introduction of the liquidity reserve ratio (LRR). The LRR was 
introduced during the reforms in 1989 for monetary policy objectives as well as for 
prudential  purposes  so  as  to  safeguard  depositor’s  interest.  However,  the  legal 
liquidity reserves form a sizeable loanable fund that the financial institutions could 
use to expand the size of their loan portfolio. Apparently, in Malawi, the high reserve 
requirements (which comprise the legal liquidity reserve ratio and the cash reserve 
ratio), together with high central bank discount rate and high inflation are the factors 
influencing interest rate spread. As Seck and El Nil (1993) also observe that, the high 
spread  between  lending  and  deposit  rates  in  many  developing  countries  that  have 
Chart 2.7: Monetary Growth in Malawi (1980-1995) 
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undertaken financial reforms can be viewed as an implicit tax through the high reserve 
requirements on the banking sector by the monetary authorities
31.  
    Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank). 
 
Real interest rates are significantly above the pre-liberalization level from the year 
after financial liberalization and continue to rise during the subsequent two  years. 
However, beginning in the period T+4, they slide back to the pre-liberalization level, 
as  they  reached  negative  16.9  percent  in  1995.  This  was  a  result  of  increasing 
inflation,  which  rose  from  a  three-year  average  of  15.2  percent  during  the  year 
following the financial liberalization to an average high of 46.9 percent for the rest of 
the period, with a record high of 83.0 percent in 1995. Two major reasons explain this 
increase in inflation following financial liberalization. First, the liberalization of the 
exchange rate system in February 1994 resulted in a huge depreciation of the local 
currency, and the higher price of imported inputs quickly filtered through to domestic 
prices. Second, unbudgeted expenditure on the country’s 1993 political referendum 
for pluralistic politics, followed by Malawi’s first general elections in 1994, led to a 
large increase in money supply which became inflationary (World Bank, 2004b).  
                                                 
31  In Malawi, the spread between the deposit and lending rates has been around 20.0 percent on 
     average (see, Mlachila and Chirwa, 2002). 
Chart 2.8: Nominal Interest Rate Spread and Movements in Real Interest Rates
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On credit availability following the financial reforms, the results show that despite 
total domestic credit initially remaining below the pre-liberalization level in the two 
years after the financial reforms, credit to the manufacturing sector rose substantially 
beginning in the year after financial liberalization. This was due to the discontinuation 
of  directed  credit  allocation  policy,  where  the  agriculture  sector  was  previously 
accorded preferential treatment. Subsequently, the share of commercial banks’ loans 
and advances to the manufacturing sector increased. Thus, as a percentage share of 
GDP, credit to the manufacturing sector is, to a great extent, significantly different 
from its pre-liberalization level from T+1, through to T+6. 
 
 
  Source: Reserve Bank of Malawi Quarterly Economic Reviews (various) Table 1.7. 
 
Notably, however, a significant proportion of the increase in credit to manufacturing 
was invested into financial assets and not the real sector.  The high treasury bill rates – 
which fluctuated between 40.0 percent and 70.0 percent nominally (or approximately 
between 20.0 percent and 50.0 percent in real terms) led to increase in demand for 
these financial assets, as this was considered more lucrative at that time than investing 
in the real sector
32. Due to a few alternative financial instruments, the composition of 
broad money shifted gradually in favour of time deposits and financial assets, despite 
negative interest rates on deposits during part of the period under review 
                                                 
32 A World Bank (2004b) study shows that, in Malawi, following financial liberalization  (precisely, at  
    end-2001)  four  large  conglomerates  and  their  subsidiaries  (which included financial institutions)    
    held  nearly  60.0  percent  of   Treasury   bills   (or  about  7.0  percent  of  GDP).    A  tendency  for 
    ‘speculative’  type    of    investments,   particularly    following   financial    liberalization    is    well 
    documented  in  the literature (see, Grabel, 1995). 
 
Chart 2.9: Selected Credit Indicators.
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Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank) and Reserve Bank of Malawi. 
 
 
2.2.4. Robustness Test. 
 
In the foregoing results, insignificance of some of the coefficients of the aftermath 
time dummy may be due to a small number of observations.  In order to increase 
degrees of freedom, therefore, the regressions are re-estimated: first, using one time 
dummy covering the period following the implementation of the financial reforms; 
thus,  excluding  the  year  when  financial  liberalization  is  implemented  (FL1);  and, 
second, using another time dummy covering the entire period, thus, both during and 
after the reforms (FL2). Table 2.9 show the results. Despite slight variations in some 
of the variables, the results are basically unchanged particularly when we consider 
coefficients  for  industry  concentration,  savings  mobilization  and  credit  indicators. 
Overall, these results lend credence to the fact that financial liberalization has some 
effect on the behaviour of the variables.  
 
In  summary,  the  econometric  results  provide  a  clear  indication  of  the  effects  of 
financial liberalization on the various macroeconomic variables. However, as argued 
by Demirguc-Kunt, Detragiache, and Gupta (2006), whilst the foregoing methodology 
is  simply  designed  to  specifically  identify  the  effects  of  financial  liberalization 
without necessarily establishing any causal links, it nonetheless provides a robust base 
Chart 2.10: Treasury-Bill Rate and Private Sector Holdings of  Treasury-Bills 
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for  identifying  possible  relationships  between  the  variables  that  may  necessitate 
further  in-depth  investigation  and  analysis.  The  subsequent  chapters  of  this  study, 
therefore, attempt to accomplish such a task by making a comprehensive examination 
of  a  possible  link  between  financial  liberalization  /  financial  development, 
concentration, net firm entry, profitability, and output growth in industry. 
 
Table 2.9: Financial Liberalization Effect – Robustness Tests Results. 
 
Variable:-        FL 1        FL 2 
GR       - 0.346
* 
      (0.183) 
      0.139
** 
     (0.061) 
PCM         0.003
** 
      (0.014) 
      0.023
*** 
     (0.012) 
NFE         0.020 
      (0.017) 
      0.000 
     (0.010) 
SH         0.000
 
      (0.000) 
       0.003
 
     (0.008) 
CR        -0.003
 
      (0.021) 
      0.080
*** 
      (0.019) 
MM         0.007
*** 
      (0.002) 
      0.014
*** 
     (0.002) 
MX         0.213
*** 
      (0.031) 
     -0.030
*** 
     (0.013) 
GDP        2.358
*** 
     (0.876) 
     -2.558
*** 
     (0.171) 
DD       -0.151
*** 
     (0.030) 
     -0.467
*** 
     (0.182) 
M2         2.476
*** 
      (1.400) 
     -1.626
*** 
     (0.673) 
LR         5.472
*** 
      (0.862) 
     -0.956
*** 
     (0.687) 
DR         8.103
*** 
       (0.795) 
     -1.111
*** 
      (0.393) 
RR         1.842
*** 
      (0.824) 
     -6.117
*** 
     (0.450) 
TDC        1.963
*** 
      (0.519) 
     -4.469
*** 
     (0.493) 
FIT         0.007
*** 
      (0.002) 
      0.014
*** 
     (0.002) 
FIN         0.503
*** 
      (0.055) 
      0.749
*** 
     (0.017) 
         Note: ***, **, and *, indicate significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. White’s    
         heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
2.3. CONCLUSION. 
 
Overall, development of the structure and performance of the Malawi manufacturing 
sector can be traced to the highly risky environment faced by firms in engaging in 62 
 
 
 
production.  Arguably,  the  unstable  macroeconomic  environment  and  a  fragmented 
financial structure have led to high costs of capital coupled with a discretionary credit 
system that might have bred monopolies and oligopolies in the manufacturing sector. 
 
Despite an improvement over the years in private sector credit as a proportion of total 
credit from the banking system, the financial markets have not adequately addressed 
firm’s capital needs to enable them grow. This is because the financial markets are 
segmented and different kinds of firms enjoy very different access to capital (see, 
Nissanke and Aryeetey, 1998; Nissanke, 2001). Thus, as some classes of firms face 
limited access to borrowing, they will be forced to rely on internally generated funds 
and may have to forego some desired investment because of financial constraints. The 
ability to obtain external funds in domestic credit market differs between private and 
public  enterprises,  between  firms  affiliated  with,  and  owned  by,  a  group  and 
independent  firms,  and  between  export  and  domestic  oriented  firms.  Moreover, 
following  the  liberalization  of  exchange  controls  makes  it  possible  now  for  those 
firms with good reputation and close connections in other countries to borrow from 
offshore. Access to domestic credit also differs across firms and industries. Although 
most commercial banks are now extending credit to various enterprises, it is mostly to 
the  larger  firms,  which  have  special  channels  to  the  bank  in  terms  of  long-term 
relationships  and  ability  to  provide  collateral.  Besides,  those  belonging  to 
conglomerates, as well as large joint ventures and public enterprises, have ability to 
borrow offshore. Relatively new and young, independent firms, which have not built 
up their reputation and connections, face highly constrained access to credit. This is 
despite most commercial banks now having specialised windows for lending to small-
scale enterprises (Aryeetey et al 1997; Malawi Government, 2004).   
 
In summary, there are profound differences among Malawian firms in their access to 
credit markets. Arguably, this differential access to, and cost of, external finance for 
different categories of firms is likely to have a profound effect on their investment 
choices, level of competition, and market share, which determine the structure and 
performance of the industry. However, the link between financial liberalization and 
industry structure and performance in the Malawian manufacturing sector remains to 
be investigated further in order to inform this policy debate.  
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CHAPTER 3.0: LITERATURE SURVEY. 
 
 
3.1. FINANCE AND GROWTH – AN OVERVIEW. 
 
“Banks were the happiest engines that ever were invented for spurring economic 
growth”  
(Hamilton – 1781) 
 
“Banks harm the morality, tranquillity, and even wealth of nations”  
(Adams – 1819) 
 
These  contrasting  views  reflect  the  different  perspectives  economists  hold  on  the 
theoretical link between financial development and economic growth
33. Hamilton’s 
(1781)  views  are  later  extended  by  Bagehot  (1873)  who  argue  that  the  financial 
system played a critical role in igniting industrialisation in England by facilitating the 
mobilization of capital  and  growth;  and, subsequently by  Schumpeter  (1912) who 
contends  that  services  provided  by  financial  institutions  are  essential  drivers  for 
innovation  and  growth.  Schumpeter  notes  that  a  well  developed  financial  system 
channel  financial  resources  to  the  most  productive  use.  Alternatively,  and  in 
agreement with Adam’s (1891) views, Robinson (1952) propagates an explanation 
that finance does not exert a causal impact on growth. Robinson instead asserts that 
financial  development  follows  economic  growth  as  a  result  of  higher  demand  for 
financial services. According to this view, which is somehow shared by Lucas (1988), 
it  is  argued  that  when  an  economy  grows,  more  financial  institutions,  financial 
products and services emerge in the markets in response to higher demand of financial 
services. In fact, Lucas (1988) contends that the role of finance in economic growth 
has been overstressed.        
 
However, the literature on this debate is generally more supportive of the growth-
enhancing  view  espoused  by  Hamilton  (1781),  Bagehot  (1873),  and  Schumpeter 
(1912), that a country’s financial development has a causal impact on its long-run 
                                                 
33  The quotations from Hamilton and Adams are drawn from Hammond (1991). 64 
 
 
 
economic performance and growth. These arguments are subsequently formalized by 
Gurley and Shaw (1955), Goldsmith (1969), Shaw (1973), and McKinnon (1973); 
and, much later, by Fry (1988) and Pagano (1993). Building on these works, recent 
studies have focused on assessment of the role of the financial sector in stimulating 
growth.  Theory  suggests  that  economic  agents  create  debt  contracts  and  financial 
intermediaries  to  ameliorate  the  economic  consequences  of  informational 
asymmetries,  with  beneficial  implications  for  resource  allocation  and  economic 
activity.  Several  empirical  studies  have  been  conducted  on  these  theoretical 
predictions
34.  Overall  conclusion  of  this  research  agenda  is  that,  indeed,  financial 
development exerts a ‘first-order’ effect on long-run economic growth.  As Levine 
(1997)  concludes;  “...the  preponderance  of  theoretical  reasoning  and  empirical 
evidence suggests a positive, first-order relationship between financial development 
and economic growth...There is even evidence that the level of financial development 
is a good predictor of future rates of economic growth, capital accumulation, and 
technological change” (ibid, pp. 688-689). 
 
 
3.2.      TRANSMISSION MECHANISM BETWEEN FINANCE AND     
  GROWTH:   A MACRO MODEL. 
 
In  the  literature,  Pagano  (1993)  demonstrates  how  finance  and  growth  could  be 
related, using a simple hypothetical macro model. Pagano structures a transmission 
mechanism showing that financial development influences economic growth through 
the savings mobilisation process. Pagano’s exposition summarises a process where the 
financial system mobilises savings; thereby increasing the proportion of savings going 
towards investment. The private savings rate is altered and the marginal productivity 
of  capital  is  increased.  In  order  to  demonstrate  this  resource  mobilisation  and 
transmission mechanism, Pagano proposes a simple endogenous growth model, where 
aggregate output is a function of aggregate capital stock, as follows; 
 
                                                 
34  King and Levine  (1993a);   Levine and Zervos    (1996, 1998);Bencivenga and Smith  (1991);  and,    
     Greenwood  and Jovanovic  (1990) , all provide  evidence that financial   intermediation   promotes   
     growth.    More    elaborated  econometric analyses by  Rousseau  and  Wachtel (2001);  Beck et al  
     (2000),  and    Beck and Levine   (2002),    further    confirm    the   relationship   between   financial  
     development and economic growth.  65 
 
 
 
t t Y K b =                                                                                                                     (3.1) 
 
where,  b   is  the  social  marginal  productivity  of  capital t K .  The  economy  is 
hypothesised to produce a single good, which is either consumed or invested. If the 
good is invested, then gross investment is given by; 
 
( ) 1 1 t t t I K K a + = - -                                                                                                  (3.2) 
 
where, a  is the depreciation rate of investment per periodt. Aggregate investment is 
merely  a  change  in  aggregate  capital  stock,  less  depreciation.  For  simplicity,  the 
model assumes a closed economy, such that, in equilibrium, aggregate savings  t S  
equal aggregate investment t I . The transmission of savings into investment involves 
the  financial  sector  in  the  process  of  financial  intermediation.  There  is  a  cost 
associated  with  intermediation;  such  that,  a  proportion  of  savings  1 d -   is  ‘lost’ 
through intermediation whilst  t S d  is the remaining proportion of savings that goes 
into investment; thus, 
 
t t S I d =                                                                                                                      (3.3) 
 
From Equations (3.1) (3.2) and (3.3) above, dropping the time indices, the steady state 
growth rate may be given as; 
 
I
g s
Y
b
b d a
a
= = -
-
                                                                                               (3.4) 
 
where,  s is the private savings rate. According to Pagano (1993), through Equation 
(3.4), the model shows how financial development can raise economic growth.  
 
First,  this  can  be  achieved  by  increasingd ,  the  proportion  of  savings  channelled 
towards investment. As indicated, 1 d -  represents the proportion of savings absorbed 
by financial institutions as a reward for providing services, which may be in the form 
of  increased  interest  rate  spreads  between  lending  and  borrowing,  and  the 66 
 
 
 
commissions and fees that securities brokers and dealers charge, etc (see, Roubini and 
Sala-i-Martin, 1992). Accordingly, if financial development leads to a reduction in 
this leakage of resources – thereby increasing d  in Equation (3.4) – then this should 
lead to an increase in the growth rate g .  
 
Second, financial development can also influence growth by increasingb , the social 
marginal  productivity  of  capital.  As  argued  by  Diamond  and  Dybvig  (1983), 
Bencivenga  and  Smith  (1991),  and  Greenwood  and  Jovanovic  (1990),  financial 
development  enables  banks  to  increase  the  productivity  of  investments  both  by 
directing funds to illiquid, high-yield technology and by reducing investment waste 
due to premature liquidation. Hence, the gains in productivity increase the growth 
rate g .  Further,  b  in Equation (3.4) can also be increased through the increased risk 
sharing process that is made possible through increased financial intermediation. For 
instance,  Levine  (1991),  and  Saint-Paul  (1992)  show  that  economic  agents  buffer 
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks through selling of shares on the stock market, while the 
stock markets also facilitate the reduction of the rate-of-return risk through portfolio 
diversification. Accordingly, Pagano (1993) argues that when this risk can be shared 
efficiently via the stock market, producers are encouraged to specialise and this raises 
productivity, and ultimately, economic growth g .  
 
Third, the financial sector could also influence growth of the economy through the 
savings rate. However, in the literature, direction of the effect of the savings rate on 
economic growth remains ambiguous. Financial development enables households to 
gain better insurance against endowment shocks and better diversification of rate of 
return  risk,  while  consumer  credit  becomes  more  readily  and  cheaply  available. 
Further, as the financial system develops, the wedge between interest rate paid by 
firms and that  received  by households is narrowed. Overall, each of these factors 
affects savings behaviour, but in each case the effect is ambiguous, and the relevant 
empirical studies remain inconclusive on the direction of impact
35.   
 
 
 
                                                 
35 See, for example, Bencivenga and Smith (1991); Devereux and Smith (1991); Jappelli and Pagano,  
    (1992); and, De Gregorio (1992). 67 
 
 
 
3.3. FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT. 
 
3.3.1. Policy Overview. 
 
Policy debate on the finance-growth nexus became increasingly prominent around the 
1970s  when  most  governments  –  particularly  in  developing  countries  –  adopted 
interventionist policies in the financial system, with the objective of achieving quick 
development, as well as fulfilling social agendas (see, World Bank, 1989b; Gibson 
and Tsakalotos, 1994). This took the form of ‘financial repression’; which McKinnon 
(1973) defines as policies and regulations that prevent financial intermediaries from 
operating at a level in accordance with their technological potential
36.  
 
As emphasised by Fry (1988, 1997), Giovannini and de Melo (1993), and Nichols 
(1974), the main motive behind financial repression is fiscal, as governments aim to 
generate  financial  resources  to  finance  intertemporal  budget  constraints.  Through 
imposition of large liquidity and reserve requirements, it creates a captive demand for 
its own interest bearing or non-interest bearing instruments, respectively, and uses it 
to finance its own priority spending (see, Agenor and Montiel, 1996 p.152). Further, 
putting  a  cap  on  interest  rates  creates  excess  credit  demand,  and  directs  credit  to 
selected  priority  sectors.  Financial  repression  also  involves  limiting  the  menu  of 
instruments that the public can hold in order to ensure greater seigniorage revenue to 
finance  government  expenditures  (see,  Roubini  and  Sala-i-Martin  (1992).  In  fact, 
evidence from empirical studies point to substantial government revenue generated 
through controls on financial markets. For instance, Giovannini and DeMelo (1993) 
find that the Mexican government extracted about 6.0 percent of that country’s GDP 
(almost 40.0 percent of total conventional tax revenue) through controls on financial 
markets.  Similarly,  Fry  (1993)  reports  a  figure  of  almost  2.8  percent  of  GDP  as 
revenue from inflation tax alone for a sample of 26 developing countries. The size of 
these  sums,  in  comparison  with  the  fiscal  revenue  generated  by  explicit  taxation, 
possibly explains why financial repression is often used as a source of tax revenue, 
having the added advantage of being more flexible than formal tax legislation.  
                                                 
36  Financial repression practices include; low-yield required reserves, ceilings on  nominal deposit and 
     lending interest rates, quantitative controls and selective credit allocation,  and    inflation     tax    on 
     monetary assets. As savings are sensitive to real interest rates, nominal interest rate   controls     cum  
     inflation reduces the amount of national income allocated to capital formation (McKinnon, 1973). 68 
 
 
 
 
In  a study that focus on some of the developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 
Nissanke (2001) observes that, historically, financial repression regimes in this region 
emerge  out  of  post-independence  economic  landscape  when  the  policies  pursued 
during  this  period  were  interventionist,  with  governments  determining  credit 
allocation  to  specific  sectors,  imposing  high  reserve  requirements,  and  enforcing 
interest-rate ceilings. However, according to Nissanke (2001), implementation of such 
policies  in  most  developing  countries  was  justified  in  terms  of  the  Keynesian 
approach  to  investment  demand.  The  argument  is  that  low  interest  rates  were 
considered to be an instrument for private investment promotion, while directed credit 
allocation was meant to facilitate resource redistribution in a bid to achieve broad-
based  economic  development.  However,  as  observed  by  Aryeetey  et  al  (1997), 
Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998), and Nissanke (2001) for sub-Saharan Africa, under 
such conditions emerges a fragmented  credit market in which favoured borrowers 
obtain funds at subsidized, often highly negative, real interest rates, while others are 
forced to seek credit in inefficient, expensive informal markets. Generally, therefore, 
following theoretical arguments as well as the foregoing empirical evidence, financial 
repression weakens the incentive to hold money and other financial assets, lowers 
savings, reduces credit availability for investors, reduces productivity of capital and 
therefore retards economic growth
37.  
 
 
3.3.2. Financial Liberalization. 
 
Financial liberalization policies have been implemented in many developing countries 
with the objective of developing the financial systems, a la McKinnon (1973) and 
Shaw (1973). In theory, financial liberalization is hypothesised to encourage savings 
mobilisation; thereby leading to easing of liquidity constraints for firm’s investments. 
This view follows classical economics where interest rates are seen as providing a 
return for the choice between consumption and saving. Put simply, a rise in interest 
rate decreases the incentive to borrow and lowers the utility of consumption raising 
                                                 
37  Besides, ceilings on deposit rates and loan rates tend to raise the demand for and depress the supply 
     of funds. Unsatisfied   demand  for   investible   funds   then forces financial intermediaries to ration  
     credit by means other than the interest rate (McKinnon 1973;, Shaw 1973; Fry 1982, 1988). 69 
 
 
 
the inducement to save and lowering the excess demand for savings (see, Gersovitz, 
1988; Bayoumi, 1993; and Mavrotas and Kelly, 2001). When interest rates are put 
artificially low, the result will be shallow financing. As Shaw (1973) and McKinnon 
(1973) separately argue “...[financial] deepening implies that interest rates must report 
more accurately the opportunities that exist for substitution of investment for current 
consumption and the disinclination of consumers to wait. Real interest rates are high 
where finance is deepening.” (Shaw, 1973, p.8); and “...if financial policy including 
inflation reduces real rates of interest and makes savings appear cheap, so cheap that 
they must be rigorously rationed” the result will be “excess demand” for savings (op. 
cit.  p.12).  “If  the  real  return  on  holding  money  increases  so  will  self-financed 
investment  over  a  significant  range  of  investment  opportunities...The  financial 
“conduit” for capital accumulation is thereby enlarged” (McKinnon, 1973, p.60).  
 
Figure  3.1  is  a  simple  illustration  of  the  foregoing  orthodox  view  of  financial 
liberalization. Under a financially repressed regime, interest rates may be officially 
held  at  r1,  which  means  there  will  be  a  resource  gap  (a  savings-investment  gap) 
represented by the distance between s1 and i1. Where possible, this resource gap may 
be covered through dependence on overseas sources of finance.  
 
 
 
However, implementing financial liberalization or de-repression policies means that 
the  interest  rate  will  be  allowed  to  move  from  the  officially  ‘controlled’  to  the 
equilibrium level; and, supply of savings will increase from s1 to s2, and the savings-
investment gap disappears. Consequently, any inefficient projects, which might have 
Interest 
Rate  Supply of Savings 
             Equilibrium 
             Interest Rate                r 2 
             'Controlled'
             Interest Rate                r 1  Demand for Investment 
(Marginal Efficiency of Capital) 
              s 1               s 2    i 1  Investment, Savings  Investment, Savings  Investment, Savings  Investment, Savings  Investment, Savings  Investment, Savings  Investment, Savings  Investment, Savings 
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been profitable at the government-managed rate of interest r1, but not at the new rate 
r2, will naturally close down and exit. Ultimately, quality of the entire investment 
portfolio and in time the  growth rate of the  economy  will increase.  An increased 
growth  rate,  in  due  course,  will  bring  down  the  savings  supply  curve  and  the 
equilibrium interest rate. 
 
Neoclassical theorists such as Kapur (1976, 1983), Mathieson (1980), and others have 
followed this line of thought and supported it by formalizing various models
38. This 
line  of  thought  has  however  been  contested  by  a  group  of  economists  called 
neostructuralists,  led  by  Buffe  (1984),  Taylor  (1983),  and  van  Wijnbergen  (1982, 
1983a, b), who argue that financial liberalization which leads to higher interest rate 
will probably reduce the rate of economic growth by reducing the real supply of credit 
available to firms. Using a portfolio framework for the allocation of household assets, 
they contend that whether higher interest rates really increase total amount of real 
lendable  funds  depends  on  the  required  reserve  ratio  and  on  whether  increased 
holdings of real money balances come mainly at the expense of cash and inflation 
hedges or mainly from direct lending in the informal credit market.  
 
As Cho (1990) observes, policy recommendations from the foregoing two conflicting 
views – the McKinnon-Shaw group of neoclassical theorists that is for the positive 
effects of financial liberalization, and the neostructuralists group which is against it – 
have confused financial policy makers in developing economies. Worst still, Grabel 
(1995),  amongst  others,  also  identifies  a  third  dimension  to  this  debate  –  the 
emergence of a post-Keynesian perspective to financial liberalization, which argues 
that  financial  liberalization  induces  speculative  investments,  thereby  adversely 
affecting economic growth. According to this view, financial liberalization creates 
boom-euphoric expectations and/or competitive pressures to engage in profit-seeking 
activities. This, as argued by Crotty (1993), drives economic agents to engage in and 
abet high-risk investments that they would have never been involved in if it were not 
for  financial  liberalization.  As  such,  the  economic  agents  become  vulnerable  to 
financial system shocks – such as, credit availability and interest rate fluctuations – as 
                                                 
38 For an extensive survey of the literature, see Fry (1988). 71 
 
 
 
they  tend  to  move  toward  ‘speculative  financing’,  the  short-term  financing  of 
investment projects with long-term horizons.  
 
Figure 2: Neoclassical, Structuralist, and Post-Keynesian Interpretation of the Effects 
                of Financial Liberalization in Developing Countries.
A properly specified, implemented,  Regardless of specification, implementation, 
and timed Financial Liberalization Programme:  and timing, a programme of Financial Liberalization: 
1. induces a vituous cycle of increased savings, 1. induces a vituous cycle of stagflation;
     investment and economic growth; 2. reduces the availability of loanable funds; and
2. eliminates opportunities for directly  3. is growth-impeding.
     unproductive profit-seeking behaviour
     endemic to government regulation; and
3. is growth-promoting.
Regardless of specification, implementation, 
and timing, a programme of Financial Liberalization: 
1. induces risky investment practices,
     shaky financial structures and ultimately lower
     rate of real sector growth than would prevail in 
     the absence of liberalization;
2. introduces new opportunities for directly 
     unproductive profit-seeking activities; and
3.  is growth-distorting.
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Figure  2  summarizes  different  interpretations  of  how  the  financial  liberalization 
process is hypothesised to influence economic growth. Notably, views emerging out 
of the three perspectives remain, utmost, inconclusive. As Khan et al (2001) notes, 
therefore, the connections between financial liberalization and economic growth are 
very  complex  and  that,  as  of  now,  it  is  not  possible  to  discern  what  the  overall 
relationship is – in terms of its direction as well as the nature or avenue through which 
it exists. This has been the basis of numerous researches in financial development. 
 
 
3.3.3. Macroeconomic implications of Financial Liberalization. 
 
Whilst  the  McKinnon-Shaw  hypothesis  has  made  significant  contributions  to  the 
literature and spurred further research, the proposed theoretical underpinnings have, in 
most  studies,  been  taken  for  granted  and  their  validity  not  adequately  examined.  
Hence, the wide applicability of the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis has, at times, been 72 
 
 
 
challenged in the literature
39. In fact, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) amongst others have 
observed  that  financial  liberalization  as  such  does  not  solve  the  problem  of 
asymmetric information as hypothesised. Others, like Boot (2000), have even argued 
that  financial  liberalization  may  actually  increase  information  problems.  Further, 
following  a  range  of  reviews,  the  experience  of  financial  liberalization  has 
demonstrated not to conform to prior expectations. Notably, those studies that exhibit 
a significant positive influence of financial liberalization on economic growth cannot 
be  satisfactorily  addressed  in  a  simple  broad  comparative  framework  as  they  are 
largely  confined  to  industrialized  countries  (see,  Arestis  and  Demetriades,  1997). 
Otherwise,  for the majority of developing  countries, particularly those in the sub-
Saharan African region, financial liberalization has not led to the hypothesised results 
and  in  some  cases  even  culminated  into  economic  and  financial  crises.  Empirical 
results on the investigation of the macroeconomic effects of financial liberalization 
have, therefore, often been conflicting.  
 
Positive effects of financial liberalization are reported by, for instance, Nazmi (2005) 
in a study of five Latin American countries. Similar results are found by Abiad et al 
(2004), using data from five emerging markets. Bakaert et al (2005) also find support 
for the view that liberalization of the stock market spurs economic growth through 
reducing  cost  of  equity  capital  and  increasing  investment,  in  a  large  sample  of 
countries. Henry (2000a, b) finds that stock market liberalizations are associated with 
a reduction in the cost of capital, followed by an investment boom in a sample of 
listed firms in 12 emerging markets. Mitton (2006) finds that firms with stocks that 
open  to  foreign  investors,  experience  higher  growth,  greater  profitability,  and 
improved efficiency. Similarly, Levchenko et al (2008) also establish that financial 
liberalization  has  a  positive  effect  on  growth  of  production  across  industries;  and 
further observe that this positive growth effect partly comes from increased entry of 
firms. Bertrand et al, (2007) suggest that the banking reform in France during the 
1980’s  influenced  product  market  competitiveness  by  increasing  entry  and  exit  of 
firms and lowering industry concentration, especially in bank-dependent industries. 
Guiso  et  al,  (2004)  analyze  variations  in  financial  development  across  Italian 
                                                 
39  For  example,   Bascom  (1994);  Lewis  (1992);  Lucas  (1988);  Singh  (1997);  Mauro (1995); and  
     Bhagwati (1998),   all   contend   that  an   increase   in   real   interest rates   results in decline in real 
     investment, which disrupts economic growth.   73 
 
 
 
provinces and find that financial development enhances entrepreneurship. Cetorelli 
and  Strahan  (2004),  show  that  increased  competition  among  banks  in  the  USA 
facilitated creation of new firms due to enhanced access to finance. Similarly, Black 
and  Strahan  (2002)  employ  USA  data  and  find  that  entry  of  new  firms  increased 
following deregulation. Jaramillo et al (1996), in a study of Ecuador’s manufacturing 
sector, report an increase in the flow of credit accruing to technically more efficient 
firms during post-liberalization period. Evidence for Mexico by Gelos and Werner 
(1999) suggests that liberalization of the financial system eased financing constraints 
of small firms, but not for large firms, which they attribute to the political economy 
considerations  that  large  firms  have  preferential  access  to  directed  credit  before 
deregulation.  In a study of 13 developing countries, Laeven (2003) finds evidence for 
the hypothesis that financial liberalization reduces financial constraints of firms and 
increases economic growth
40.  
 
However, other empirical results are less supportive of the findings as highlighted in 
the foregoing
41. Bonfiglioli (2005) use information for 93 countries and shows that 
financial  liberalization  only  marginally  affects  capital  accumulation.  In  a  study  of 
eight developing countries, Bandiera et al (2000) obtains results which suggest that 
savings rates actually fall, rather than increase, following the liberalization process; 
thereby contradicting the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis. In fact, Diaz-Alejandro (1985) 
argues that the Latin American experience shows that financial liberalization has not 
increased savings, and further that vulnerability of the financial system to collapse 
appears  to  have  been  augmented.  Ogaki  et  al  (1996)  observe  that  interest  rate 
elasticity  has  been  found  to  be  low  in  high-income  countries  and  negligible  in 
developing  countries;  thereby  concluding  that  financial  liberalization  could  simply 
lead  to  a  temporary  expansion  of  consumption  and  a  reduction,  rather  than  an 
increase, in savings. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) find that banking and currency 
crises  are  closely  linked  in  the  aftermath  of  financial  liberalization,  with  banking 
crises, in general, beginning before the currency collapse.  
                                                 
40 Similar  results  are  found by, among others, Cho (1988) and Koo and Shin (2004) for Korea; Gelos 
    and   Werner  (1999)   for  Mexico;   Guncavdi  et al  (1998)  for   Turkey;  and  Harris  et al   (1994)  
    and Siregar (1995) for Indonesia.   
41 Country-specific studies that find no positive effect of financial liberalization on growth as suggested  
    by the McKinnon-Shaw  hypothesis,  include those by  Capoglu (1991)  for Turkey;   Schiantarelli et  
    al  (1994)  and  Jaramillo et al (1996) for Ecuador, and Hermes (1996) for Chile. 
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Most importantly, a review of financial liberalization episodes in several countries, 
studies makes some crucial findings, specifically regarding credit allocation
42. These 
studies observe that despite interest rate liberalization, endogenous constraints in the 
credit  market,  such  as  those  resulting  from  imperfect  information;  persist  as 
significant barriers to efficient credit allocation. In fact, they note that most private 
sector firms, particularly small-scale enterprises, continue to face problems accessing 
credit  and  as  a  result  have  to  either  finance  their  investment  from  their  internal 
resources, or where this is not possible, most are forced to scale-down operations or 
even exit.  
 
 
3.3.4. Evidence beyond Economic Growth.  
 
Overall, the foregoing review of the literature suggests that theory as well as evidence 
on  the  relationship  between  financial  liberalization,  financial  development,  and 
economic growth gives mixed and inconclusive results. Besides, whilst much of the 
literature has focused on proving the financial  development and  economic growth 
nexus, less attention has been focused on understanding the channels through which 
finance works. Yet, there exist several other aspects or conditions of the economic 
system – affected by financial liberalization and financial development – that equally 
impact a country’s long-run ability to grow economically, such as competition and 
industry  structure.  For  instance,  the  literature  only  makes  occasional  reference  to 
investment  and  total  factor  productivity  growth,  despite  providing  some  evidence, 
albeit limited, on the possible implications of financial liberalization and financial 
development on these aspects
43.  
 
Arguably, the foregoing perspectives are particularly important in the designing of 
effective policies through which finance can promote growth. Cetorelli and Strahan 
(2004), and Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) contend that one way of achieving this 
objective is to focus on specific characteristics of financial markets that seem to affect 
                                                 
42  See, Cho and Khatkhate (1989) for Asia; Grabel (1995) for Southern Cone countries; Mosley (1996)     
     for Eastern Europe; Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998), and Nissanke (2001) for sub-Saharan Africa. 
43  See, for instance, Haber (1991); Guiso et al (2000); and, Cetorelli (2001).  75 
 
 
 
firms and industry; and, also specific characteristics of firms and industries that are 
especially affected by finance so that it eventually translates into higher economic 
activity. Zingales (2003) suggests that one approach in establishing the main channels 
is to derive some cross-sectional implications about which firms or industries would 
benefit the most from financial development. This is the approach followed by Rajan 
and Zingales (1998). In a very influential study, Rajan and Zingales use industry-level 
data  from  manufacturing  sector  to  study  the  mechanisms  through  which  financial 
development may influence economic growth. This study draws a lot from the Rajan 
and Zingales (1998) approach.  
 
 
3.4. FINANCE AND FIRMS’ INVESTMENTS. 
 
Research  on  how  financial  development  may  influence  investment  decision,  and 
subsequently the size distribution, of firms can be traced back at least to Karl Marx. 
On economic law of motion of modern society, Marx (1887) regards the capitalist 
system  simply  as  one  stage  in  its  development,  and  describes  the  general  rise  in 
industry concentration - or the accumulation of capital in a few establishments or 
entrepreneurs - as the ‘centralisation of capital’. A major factor in Marx’s theory of  
‘centralisation  of  capital’  is  technological  change  which  results  in  increasing 
importance  of  large  scale  production;  subsequently,  lower  prices  that  are  made 
possible by mass production drive out smaller, higher cost, competitors (ibid; p.586). 
However, Marx’s theory specifically expounds on the role of banks and non-bank 
financial institutions, as being catalytical in facilitating the process of ‘centralisation 
of capital’ because of the profits they earn in the formation of companies. According 
to Marx, it is the development of the financial system that allows large amounts of 
capital to be concentrated in one enterprise, thus making possible scales of production 
that would have been beyond the reach of individual capitalists. Thus, Marx observes 
that  whilst  increasing  industry  concentration  is  the  inevitable  outcome  of  a 
combination  of  technological  factors  and  the  increasingly  severe  crises  associated 
with  competition,  financial  factors  are  particularly  catalytical  in  this  process;  and, 
concludes that; “...the credit system…becomes a new and terrible weapon in the battle 
of competition and is finally transformed into an enormous social mechanism for the 
centralisation of capital” (Marx, 1887, Vol. 1: 587). 76 
 
 
 
  
Similarly, Schumpeter (1911) emphasises the inherent functions of financial systems, 
as  critical  in  encouraging  firms’  productive  investment  and  therefore  total  factor 
productivity.  Schumpeter’s monetary theory describes banks credit as capital, which 
constitutes the necessary premise for the realization of innovative processes planned 
by entrepreneurs and their imitators. The fundamental role of banks in this process is 
therefore  considered  to  be  creating  means  of  payment  to  finance  the  innovator-
entrepreneur. Schumpeter further describes the re-distributional function of financial 
system through the use of bank credit. Thus, according to Schumpeter, “...credit is the 
characteristic method of the capitalist type of society – and important enough to serve 
as its differentia specifica – for forcing the economic system into new channels, for 
putting its means at the service of new ends…it is as clear a priori as it is established 
historically that credit is primarily necessary to new combinations” (ibid, pp. 69 - 70). 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) also note that in perfect capital and credit markets, a 
firm’s financing decisions do not affect its investment behaviour. However, in the 
presence  of  market  imperfections,  any  financing  constraints  will  affect  firms’ 
investment decisions.  Empirically, financing constraints could be identified through 
the sensitivity of investment with respect to internal funds. According to Modigliani 
and Miller, the basic premise of such empirical design is that – due to information 
asymmetries – external funds are more costly than internal funds. Higher sensitivity of 
investment to internal funds suggests presence of financing constraints.   
 
Many researchers, however, attribute the effect of financial condition on investment to 
imperfections in financial markets – a phenomenon that seems to be overlooked in 
earlier studies, such as that by Modigliani and Miller (1958). And, a growing body of 
literature find that firms’ investment depends on availability of internal funds. One of 
the important explanations, in the literature, why investment is sensitive to internal 
funds in imperfect financial markets is the high cost of external funds that firms are 
expected to pay. As demonstrated by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981), the cost of external funds is higher than that of internal funds because of the 
asymmetry  of  information  between  borrowers  and  lenders.  Thus,  firms  face  a 
constraint  in  financial  markets  because  of  a  wedge  between  costs  of  internal  and 
external  funds.  Under  such  financial  constraints  therefore,  firms  tend  to  rely  on 
internal funds to finance investment. Among many others, Schiantarelli (1996) and 77 
 
 
 
Hubbard  (1998)  empirically  examine  whether  imperfections  in  financial  markets 
influence firm’ investment. Most studies interpret the cash-flow effect on investment 
as resulting from financial constraints. Fazzari et al (1988), show that investments of 
more constrained firms are more sensitive to changes in cash flow. Others have used 
various  segmenting  measures  to  identify  unobservable  degree  of  financial 
constraints
44.  
 
However,  extending  from  the  foregoing,  some  researchers  further  examine  what 
brings about temporal changes in the cash-flow sensitivity of investment. Notably, 
amongst other studies, Laeven (2003) relates financial liberalization to changes in the 
cash-flow  sensitivity  of  firms’  investment.  Meanwhile,  Love  (2003)  contends  that 
business cycle and financial development explain temporal changes in the cash-flow 
sensitivity of investment.  However, these studies reveal that, due to certain industry-
specific characteristics as well as financial system behaviours, the effect of financial 
liberalization  and  financial  development  on  credit  availability  and  access,  and  the 
subsequent  impact  this  process  has  on  firm’s  investment  decisions  and  economic 
growth  is  somehow  mixed.  As  a  further  extension  of  the  McKinnon  and  Shaw 
hypothesis it is therefore reasonable to assume that not all firms or entrepreneurs have 
equal access to the credit market; thereby suggesting variations in industry structures 
and performance patterns.  
 
 
3.5. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS LENDING CHARACTERISTICS AND 
       FIRMS ACCESS TO CREDIT 
 
While  numerous  studies  have  shown  that  entrepreneurship  is  bound  by  financial 
constraints, there has been little work focusing on how increasing competition in the 
financial  system  –  following  financial  liberalization  and  financial  development  – 
affects  the  lending  behaviour  of  credit  institutions,  and  how  this  influence  credit 
access by firms. 
                                                 
44 Such as: group   affiliation   in Hoshi et al (1991);   firm  size and age in Devereux and Schiantarelli 
     (1990); issuing commercial paper and bond ratings in Whited (1992); exchange listing in Oliner and 
     Rudebusch (1992); ownership structure in Schaller (1993); and country characteristics in Bond et al 
     (2003).  
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3.5.1. Credit Rationing. 
 
Studies of credit markets and the role they play in economic growth often focus on 
financial systems’ lending patterns. Financial institutions are viewed to be particularly 
important because, through their lending activities, they collect and provide valuable 
information on borrowers whose balance sheets lack sufficient transparency to allow 
direct  access  to  financial  markets.  Lending  to  such  opaque  borrowers  requires 
resolving information-related problems of adverse selection and moral hazard in the 
credit market. Adverse selection affects the ability of the markets to allocate credit by 
the lending rate (price) because it removes the lower-risk borrowers from the set of 
potential borrowers.  Moral hazard reduces the ability of prices to clear the markets by 
influencing actions of borrowers. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) observe that problems 
posed by adverse selection and moral hazard can result in credit rationing; thus, the 
inability to obtain a loan at any price
45. Consequently, lenders ration loans on some 
basis other than price, and there are firms who are unable to secure outside financing 
at any price. Thus, according to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), credit rationing can occur 
even in regimes where interest rates are liberalized. They further argue that rationing 
is bound to characterise credit markets with small-scale business borrowers because of 
lending institutions’ difficulty in getting sufficient information about them.  
 
It has been widely documented that small and new firms are more likely to suffer 
information  problems  in  the  financial  markets  –  both  in  developing  as  well  as 
developed
46 economies – and are, therefore, credit rationed. Notably, Aryeetey et al 
(1997), Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998), and Nissanke (2001) establish that, following 
financial liberalization in most sub-Saharan African countries, there has been little 
change  in  the  financial  institutions  lending  behaviours
47.  Financial  institutions 
continue to concentrate lending to their traditional, large, established customers and 
                                                 
45 The ‘credit rationing’  literature  follows the original lead of Jaffee and Russell (1976), who model 
    the concept as an equilibrium phenomenon where asymmetric information between borrowers and  
    lenders create the potential for adverse selection. 
46 For instance,  study results  by  Levenson and Willard (2000) for the USA; Cressy (1996) for United  
    Kingdom; EU (2005) for European Union; and,  Rao et al  (2006) for India,  provide credit rationing  
    experiences in developed countries. 
47 In a study of Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, and Tanzania, Aryeetey et al (1997), and also, Nissanke and 
    Aryeetey (1998),  separately  show that simply shifting policy from financial  repression to financial 
    liberalisation could not change lending patterns  by   financial   institutions in these countries. 79 
 
 
 
avoid new and small-scale enterprises. In fact, Aryeetey et al (1997) show that, in 
Malawi, small-scale enterprises received only 15.0 percent of total loan volumes in 
1992, while large-scale firms received 63.0 percent of total loans disbursed. Similar 
observations  are  made  in  other  sub-Saharan  African  countries
48.  Accordingly, 
Nissanke  (2001)  concludes  that,  “...[following  financial  liberalisation],  banks’ 
preferred  loan  composition  continues  to  be  heavily  weighted  against  small-scale 
enterprises and small farmers....banks perceive small borrowers as more risky, and 
they  often  charge  them  higher  interest  and  use  collateral  requirements  as  a  credit 
rationing device. Consequently, banks concentrate on lending to larger (often public) 
enterprises, whose performance is not necessarily rigorously screened and monitored” 
(ibid, p.348). Besides, as observed by Nissanke (2001) and Aryeetey et al (1997), 
sectoral  credit  distribution  remains  dominated  by  short-term  credit.  Despite  the 
emergence  of  non-bank  financial  institutions,  including  semi-formal  financial 
institutions, in several developing countries, particularly in the sub-Saharan Africa 
region, financing requirements of small-scale enterprises sector are still not addressed 
due to capacity limitations. Further, as Brownbridge and Harvey (1998) and Nissanke 
(2001)  note,  newly  established  banks  instead  compete  for  large  corporate  entities, 
where  good  and  quick  profits  are  assured.  Generally,  therefore,  despite  financial 
liberalization and attempts to introduce greater competition, as expected under the 
McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis, financial resources are not accessible to a broad section 
of the real economy, except for a few privileged borrowers.  
 
 
3.5.2. Lender – Borrower Relationships.  
 
Lending  relationships  within  the  financial  system  have  been  recognized  in  the 
literature  as  an  important  market  mechanism  for  reducing  credit  rationing.  In  an 
earlier study, Kane and Malkiel (1965) reach conclusions similar to Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981)  about  lending  institutions  rationing  credit,  but  further  suggest  that  lending 
relationships are a market response to information problems. Kane and Malkiel (1965) 
conclude  that  the  extent  to  which  borrowers  face  credit  rationing  depends  on  the 
strength of existing borrower-lender relationship. Thus, financial lending institutions 
                                                 
48  For  example,  similar  observations  are  made  by Aryeetey et al (1994)  in Ghana; Blanc (1997) in  
     Tanzania; and, Nissanke (2001) in Zimbabwe. 80 
 
 
 
are hypothesised to allocate credit to current and prospective borrowers in accordance 
with  the  strength  of  existing  bank-borrower  relationships  along  with  expectations 
about future profitability of those relationships.         
 
Accordingly,  literature  on  financial  intermediation  emphasizes  value  creation  of 
relationship between financial lending institutions and their client firms. In a context 
of  asymmetric  information  in  the  credit  markets,  lending  relationships  facilitate 
information exchange between borrower and lender through repeated interaction over 
the duration of the relationship and through provision of multiple financial services. 
According  to  Boot  (2000),  financial  lending  institutions  invest  in  generating 
information  from  their  client  firms  and  borrowers  are  more  inclined  to  disclose 
information. Allen et al (1991) and Nakamura (1993), separately establish that long-
term  relationships  between  lender  and  borrower  enable  banks  to  collect  private 
information  on  borrowing  firms  by  monitoring  their  performance  over  time  under 
credit  arrangements  and/or  through  provision  of  other  services  such  as  deposit 
accounts, and use this information in designing future credit contracts. The benefits of 
such relationships are many, ranging from ameliorating project-choice moral hazard 
(Diamond,  1991);  reduction  in  collateral  requirements  (Berger  and  Udell,  2002, 
1995), to more broadly restoring the desired behavioural incentives for borrowers, 
such  as  flexible  loan  contracting  terms  (Boot,  Greenbaum,  and  Thakor,  1993). 
Petersen and Rajan (1994), in a study of U.S. firms, indeed note that not only do firms 
borrow from banks, but they also tend to concentrate their borrowing at a single bank 
with which they have a long-term relationship.  They further establish that the cost of 
credit is reduced when banks forge relationships with firms. Berger and Udell (2002, 
1995), indeed find that borrowers with longer lending relationships pay lower interest 
rates and are less likely to pledge collateral.  
 
Further, Cetorelli (2001) argues that information gained over the course of time by the 
lender  can  be  used  to  make  value-enhancing  credit  decisions  –  thus,  whether  to 
expand credit or restrict credit to potential borrowers. As such, lending relationships 
affect  the  behaviour  of  lenders  vis-a-vis  potential  new  borrowers
49.  The  less 
competitive the conditions in the credit market, the lower the incentive for lenders to 
                                                 
49  See, for example, Spagnolo (2000); and, Helmann and Da Rin (2002) 81 
 
 
 
finance  new  comers.  Further,  the  relationship  lending  characteristics  have 
implications on allocation of capital. Northcott (2004) indicates that in relationship-
based  systems  price  signals  are  obscured;  usually,  with  the  consequence  of 
widespread and costly misallocation of resources. Accordingly, effective contribution 
of relationship lending to economic growth may only be realised if financial lending 
institutions provide credit to the most productive projects first. Nonetheless, this still 
implies that financial resources may not be equitably accessed.  
 
 
3.6. EXTERNAL FINANCE DEPENDENCE AND OTHER VARIATIONS IN  
       INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS. 
 
In the literature, differences in sensitivity of industrial specificities to different causal 
factors are further alleged to influence the degree of variation in firm’s responsiveness 
to  changes  following  financial  liberalization  and  financial  development.  Previous 
empirical studies find considerable cross-industry heterogeneity in policy sensitivity 
that is statistically related to differences in output durability, financial structure and 
firm size (see, for example, Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996). Further, any policy changes 
in the financial system, should most likely disproportionately impact those firms that 
are highly dependent on outside financing, than it does on those that mostly rely on 
internally generated resources. 
 
Empirically  it  has  been  established  that  whilst  an  effective  financial  system  is 
important  for  entrepreneurship  and  firm  growth,  the  effect  is  likely  to  be  more 
significant on those firms that rely heavily on external financing, than for those that 
are predominantly self-financed. Most notable contribution to this empirical literature 
is by Rajan and Zingales (1998). In their landmark study, Rajan and Zingales identify 
an industry’s external finance dependence under the assumption that, “...there is a 
technological  reason  why  some  industries  depend  more  on  external  finance  than 
others.  To  the  extent  that  the  initial  project  scale,  gestation  period,  cash  harvest 
period, and the requirement for continuing investment differ substantially between 
industries, this is indeed plausible” (Rajan and Zingales, 1998, p.563). 
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In their methodology, Rajan and Zingales (1998) use the ratio of domestic credit and 
stock market capitalization to GDP and country accounting standards as measures of 
financial development. Their analysis suggests that ex ante development of financial 
markets  facilitate  ex  post  growth  of  sectors  dependent  on  external  finance.  The 
evidence is consistent with the view that financial development lowers the cost of 
external  finance  and  exerts  a  positive  influence  on  industries  with  comparatively 
greater reliance on external finance. Upon observing that better-developed financial 
systems ameliorate market frictions that make it difficult for firms to obtain external 
finance, Rajan and Zingales argue that industries that are naturally heavy users of 
external  finance  should  benefit  disproportionately  more  from  greater  financial 
development than industries that are not naturally heavy users of external finance. 
Accordingly,  if  industries  that  are  naturally  heavy  users  of  external  finance  grow 
faster in economies with better-developed financial systems, then this supports the 
view  that  financial  development  spurs  growth  by  facilitating  the  flow  of  external 
finance. Further, Rajan and Zingales’ decompose the effect of financial development 
in its effect on growth in the number of establishments and growth in the size of 
existing  establishments.  Accordingly,  their  study  shows  that,  “...two-thirds  of  the 
growth  is  spurred  by  an  increase  in  the  average  size  of  establishments,  while  the 
remaining  third  is  accounted  for  by  an  increase  in  the  number  of  establishments” 
(Rajan  and  Zingales,  1998,  p.578).  This  approach,  unlike  other  previous  finance-
growth  nexus  investigation  methodologies,  facilitates  the  study  of  a  particular 
mechanism – external finance dependence – through which finance operates rather 
than  simply  assess  links  between  finance  and  growth.  Rajan  and  Zingales  (1998) 
argue that the methodology offers a valid and exogenous way to identify the extent of 
external  finance  dependence  of  an  industry  anywhere  in  the  world.  Further,  the 
methodology exploits within-country differences concerning industries.  
 
The Rajan and Zingales (1998) approach has been widely adapted in the literature, 
where, specifically their exact calculated external finance dependent ratios, have been 
directly adopted in identifying industry-level variations. For instance, Almeida and 
Wolfenzon  (2004)  estimate  the  efficiency  of  capital  allocation  as  a  function  of 
financial development and the external finance dependence of firms. Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt,  Laeven  and  Levine  (2005)  controls  for  external  finance  dependence  to 
investigate  whether  financial  development  enhances  economic  growth  by  easing 83 
 
 
 
constraints  on  industries  that  are  technologically  more  dependent  on  small  firms. 
Similarly, Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) examine whether industries whose younger 
firms are more external finance dependent  grow more or less rapidly  in countries 
where the banking sector is highly concentrated. Laeven, Klingebiel and Kroszner 
(2002)  investigate  whether  sectors  that  are  highly  external  finance  dependent 
experience  greater  contraction  in  value  added  during  a  crisis  in  deeper  financial 
systems than in countries with shallower financial systems. Carlin and Mayer (2003) 
use external finance dependence ratios to examine the association between structure 
of  financial  systems  and  the  types  of  activities  in  which  different  countries  are 
engaged. Fisman and Love (2004, 2003) investigate the relationship between financial 
development and inter-industry resource allocation in the short- and long-run, among 
external finance dependent industries. Fanelli and Keifman (2000) examine the extent 
to  which  finance  matters  in  explaining  the  degree  of  trade  success  or  failure  in 
external finance dependent sectors. Larrain (2004) investigates whether, with financial 
development,  volatility  of  industrial  output  is  reduced  in  more  external  finance 
dependent industries. Further, Do and Levchenko (2006) examines whether countries 
that produce and export external finance dependent goods experience a higher level of 
financial development than countries producing and exporting goods less dependent 
on external finance. Fonseca and Utrero (2006) examine whether frictions in labour 
and product markets hinder the documented positive effects of financial development 
on  firm  size,  especially  in  those  sectors  that  are  relatively  more  external  finance 
dependent.  Claessens  and  Laeven  (2006)  investigate  the  effect  of  competition  in 
banking system on  growth, and specific channels through which competition may 
affect growth in external finance dependent industries. In their analysis, Vlachos and 
Waldenstrom  (2002)  examine  whether  industries  highly  dependent  on  external 
financing experience a faster growth in countries with liberalized financial markets. 
Further, de Serres et al (2006) show that more external finance dependent industries 
are generally the ones that invest the most in R&D following financial development.  
 
Nonetheless, despite its wide applicability, the Rajan and Zingales (1998) external 
financing  dependence  methodology  is  not  flawless.  Notably,  Demirguc-Kunt  and 
Maksimovic  (1998)  questions  the  assumption  underlying  the  methodology  – 
specifically,  the  assumption  that  US  manufacturing  firms  are  representative  of 
manufacturing firms elsewhere in the world. They argue that it is important to allow 84 
 
 
 
for differences among countries in the amount of external financing needed by firms 
in  the  same  industry.  Ideally,  this  argument  should  equally  apply  to  different 
industries  within  the  same  country.  In  any  case,  as  Malerba  and  Orsenigo  (1996) 
observe,  there  are  bound  to  be  many  other  firm-specific  and/or  industry-specific 
differences between firms within an industry, between industries within a country, and 
between countries – thus, other differences that extend beyond merely variations in 
the level of external finance dependence. Accordingly, whilst the Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) ratios constitute a distinct characteristic of industry groups, at a finer level of 
disaggregation, significant differences across industry groups exist. As observed by 
Malerba and Orsenigo (1996), among others, there is persistence of diversity among 
firms  in  terms  of  their  characteristics.  Firms  are  markedly  heterogeneous  in 
capabilities, organization, strategies, and performance
50. As such, individual industries 
are expected to relate differently in the face of any competition enhancing policies. 
 
 
3.7. CONCLUSION. 
 
The  literature  is  divided  on  the  expected  effects  of  financial  liberalization  and 
financial development in engendering competitiveness and growth in the real sector. 
Meanwhile, less research has been undertaken on the impact of financial liberalization 
and financial development on industry structure and performance. As barriers to entry 
and growth into the domestic market fall following the liberalisation of the financial 
system, are there likely to be major changes in the structure of industry? For instance, 
is ownership likely to become more or less concentrated? Thus, are there likely to be 
any major effects on growth and size distribution of industry value-added, separate 
from such indicators of revealed performance as exports and economic growth? And, 
does this process induce firm creation and entry into industry, or even profitability 
regardless of characteristics such as firm size? Literature provides a limited number of 
studies that have attempted to answer the foregoing questions. And, following a study 
of Southern Cone countries, McKinnon (1989) – a pioneer of neoclassical financial 
                                                 
50 For instance,  these differences,   which  naturally  extend to  the industry level, concern: costs (Baily  
    and  Chakrabarty,  1985);  profitability   (Mueller,  1990; Geroski and Jacquemin, 1988); output and  
    innovative  activities (Griliches, 1986; Pavitt and Patel, 1991);  interest  rate  sensitivity and financial  
    requirements (Dedola and Lippi, 2005). 85 
 
 
 
liberalization theory and policy – endeavours to reinterpret the disappointing results of 
this policy experiment through the lens of new-Keynesian theory, and concludes that, 
 
 “...all  is  not  well  in  the  liberal  camp.  The  general  case  favouring  financial 
liberalization has been called into question by a series of bank panics and collapses ... 
That this attempted financial liberalization generally ended in failure – with an undue 
build-up of foreign indebtedness and government reintervention to prop up failing 
domestic banks and industrial enterprises – is well documented” (ibid. p.100). 
     
Accordingly, there certainly exists a gap in the literature where the effect of financial 
liberalization is also considered specifically in the context of its implications on the 
industry  structure  and  performance  of  low  income  developing  countries  of  sub-
Saharan African region, such as Malawi.  
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CHAPTER 4.0:      FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT, EXTERNAL FINANCE 
             DEPENDENCE, AND INDUSTRY STRUCTURE. 
 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION. 
 
Economic research has provided robust empirical evidence that developed financial 
systems are strongly associated, causally, with economic growth. Given this broad 
consensus, therefore, it is of great practical importance to understand the mechanism 
through which finance affects real economic activity. Specifically, it is important to 
identify the characteristics of the financial sector that affect or determine industry 
structures  and  production  capacities  in  the  real  sector.  Similarly,  it  is  worthwhile 
investigating the characteristics of industry that are especially affected by finance so 
that it eventually translates into higher economic growth. Recent years have witnessed 
burgeoning  empirical  research  in  this  context,  each  with  a  specific  focus
51. 
Nonetheless,  considerably  less  research  examines  the  cross-industry  distributional 
effects of financial development. This is despite the existence, within the literature, of 
a relationship between the efficiency with which an economy mobilizes and allocates 
financial resources, and the industrial structure that an economy develops
52.  
 
The  foregoing  suggests  that  financial  intermediaries  are  thus  considered  to  be 
catalytical in the development of industry structure. In any case, rarely if ever, are 
industrial firms able to internally generate in their normal operations the resources 
needed  to  finance  capital  expansions  or  working  capital.  As  such,  firms  will 
periodically require extra resources sourced externally, a process that may only be 
facilitated by an intermediary. A developed and well functioning financial sector will, 
therefore,  facilitate  efficient  mobilisation  and  allocation  of  resources,  portfolio 
diversification and access of firms to funds for productive investments. Arguably, a 
                                                 
51  For   cross-country studies see, King and Levine (1993a), Beck et al (1999), and Levine et al (2000); 
     while  firm-level    studies    are   by  Levine  (1997),   and  Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998). 
     Wurgler (2000) focus on industry-level studies. 
52  For example,  Gerschenkron   (1962)  refers to  the  influential  role  of   financial  institutions  in the   
     industrialisation  process  of 19
th century Europe.  Similarly, Davis (1966)  relates  the differences in  
     capital   mobilisation   between   the   19
th   century  US and the UK, to the marked contrasts in their  
     industrial structures. More recently, Levine (2005), as well as Da Rin and Hellman (2002) have also  
     established that domestic financial development has non-trivial implications on industry structure. 87 
 
 
 
liberalized financial system should facilitate the development of entrepreneurship in 
the  economy.  Thus,  existing  firms  will  be  able  to  attain  higher  profitability  and 
growth; and, many new investing firms will now be able to establish themselves, 
thereby  promoting  a  competitive  industry  structure.  Notably,  however,  despite 
growing  literature  on  the  consequences  of  financial  liberalization,  studies  that 
investigate its impact on industrial structure are scanty or non-existent. This chapter, 
therefore, endeavours to close this literature gap through the empirical investigation of 
the relationship between the development of the financial system through financial 
liberalization and structure of industry that evolves in this process. 
 
 
4.2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND TESTABLE HYPOTHESES. 
 
4.2.1. Background to Financial Development Effects. 
 
In recent years, a number of studies have questioned whether a firm’s access to credit 
improves with the development of the financial system, such as that which follows 
financial  liberalization.  Thus,  whilst  there  is  a  wide  acceptance  that  the  financial 
liberalization  policies,  if  appropriately  implemented,  increase  efficiency  in  the 
allocation and use of financial resources, their precise effect in inducing firm growth, 
as well as influencing the creation of new firms or facilitating increases in the number 
of  investing  firms,  has  nonetheless  been  a  subject  of  theoretical  and  empirical 
scrutiny. Contrasting views have emerged from this debate; and, despite substantial 
research efforts on the precise effect of financial liberalization on the industrial firm, a 
consensus on the empirical testing of its validity remains to be reached
53. 
 
 
4.2.1.1. Neoclassical Theorists versus Structuralists. 
 
Two schools of thought have evolved out of the financial liberalization effects debate; 
a neo-classical theorist’s paradigm and a structuralist’s paradigm. From a neoclassical 
                                                 
53  Most notable example is the study on the experience of the Southern Cone countries and the  related  
     econometric test results that have shown the limitations of the prescriptions that can be derived from 
     the theory.  For a comprehensive review on this issue, see Laeven (2003). 88 
 
 
 
point of view, liberalizing financial markets would stimulate savings, and enhance 
physical  capital-formation  (see,  Kapur,  1976,  1983;  Mathieson,  1980).  This  is 
hypothesised  to  influence  the  financial  systems  ability  to  provide  financial  capital 
needed for firms’ investments, and at a relatively affordable price
54.
 According to this 
argument, therefore, financial liberalization should facilitate the creation and entry of 
new firms into industry, as well as enhance the growth and expansion of incumbent 
firms (see, Vlachos and Waldenstrom, 2005). This view is further supported by Lyons 
(1988, p.64), who notes that ‘most entry barriers can be overcome by a sufficiently 
determined diversifying  entrant who is backed  by large financial resources’. Most 
important for this study is the assertion by Rajan and Zingales (1998, p.560), who 
suggest – much in conformity with the neo-classical theorists’ paradigm – that ‘the 
number  of  new;  and,  particularly  external  finance  dependent  firms,  entering  the 
industry  should  disproportionately  increase  following  financial  development’. 
Accordingly, the neo-classical theorists’ paradigm suggest that financial liberalization 
should lead to equitable industry growth as well as increasing number of firm creation 
and entries in an industry, thereby inducing competition. 
 
The structuralists’ paradigm
55, however, maintains that deregulation of interest rates, 
during  the  financial  liberalization  process,  raises  the  cost  of  borrowing,  thereby 
inhibiting entry/creation of new firms due to lack of access to capital. Further, this 
policy  leads  to  an  increase  in  incumbent  firms’  overall  cost  structures,  which 
adversely affects profits. They argue that firms usually have to make large advances 
from the financial system as working capital and to finance labour costs as well as 
intermediate goods. As such, deregulation of interest rates means that interest on these 
advances looms large in the firms’ statements of profit and loss; which often leads to 
firm destruction and ultimate exit from operations, as most incumbent firms may no 
longer  afford  to  raise  adequate  financial  resources  for  operations.  Taylor  (1983) 
further observes that investment demand responses to interest rate changes – as a 
consequence of financial liberalization – may take longer to build up than its effect on 
working capital costs, thereby discouraging firm entry. The structuralists’ paradigm 
                                                 
54  Empirically, Henry (2000a, b)  provides evidence  that  financial liberalization  actually  reduces the 
     capital  costs for industrial  firms. Moreover, Henry further shows that this has significantly positive 
     effects on the level of investment and of output growth. 
55  As propagated  by van Wijnbergen (1982, 1983a, b); Taylor (1983); Buffie (1984); Diaz-Alejandro, 
     (1985); Grabel (1995);  and, Adelman and Morris (1997). 89 
 
 
 
therefore suggests that, through interest rates deregulation, financial liberalization acts 
as a deterrent to entry for new firms, due to increased cost of loanable funds, and also 
destroys incumbent firms as they become unprofitable; thereby dampening industry 
growth and competition. 
 
 
4.2.1.2. The Effect of Relationship Lending. 
  
Empirical  debate  further  focuses  on  whether  increased  competition  within  the 
financial credit market has any implications on the lending behaviour of the financial 
credit institutions (see, Andersen and Tarp, 2003; Elyasiani and Goldberg, 2004). At 
the centre of this debate is the prevalence of lender-borrower relationships within the 
financial  intermediation  process
56.  Thus,  a  long-term  tie  between  a  financial 
institution and client firm is hypothesised to generate value and increase efficiency. 
This is expected to be achieved in terms of both credit availability and loan contract 
terms  such  as  loan  interest  rates  and  collateral  requirements.  This  phenomenon  is 
critical in the financial  liberalization, financial development and industry structure 
debate due to its relevance in determining firms’ access to credit, particularly those 
that are external finance dependent. However, debate on the exact implications of 
financial liberalization on the lending relationships remains inconclusive. Whilst some 
contend that higher competition, following financial liberalization, discourages the 
lending relationships, others argue the exact opposite. This question, therefore, forms 
another basis of this study, and expounds on two contrasting views that have emerged 
from this debate. 
 
The  first  viewpoint  is  that,  for  those  firms  that  are  external  finance  dependent, 
financial  development  and  increased  financial  sector  competition  means  less 
relationship lending and therefore more market-based credit allocation to firms, both 
old  and  new  entrants.  Arguably,  financial  development  results  in  reduced  or  no 
barriers  to  entry  by  banks  and  other  financial  intermediaries;  thereby  increasing 
competition  in  the  financial  system.  Thus,  banks  are  no  longer  protected  from 
competition  by  barriers  to  entry,  and  non-bank  financial  institutions  become 
                                                 
56 Modern   literature  on  financial  intermediation  emphasizes  the  value-creation function of lending 
    relationships; see, Boot (2000); Berger and Udell (1995); Boot, Greenbaum, and Thakor (1993). 90 
 
 
 
increasingly important providers of credit to new businesses. Credit should therefore 
be  widely  available  and  at  relatively  affordable  prices,  as  all  external  finance 
dependent  firms  have  access  to  several  alternative  sources  of  credit.  And,  as 
competition makes it easier for borrowers to switch lenders – either other banks or the 
financial market - this can reduce the incentive to invest in relationships at the outset 
(Andersen and Tarp, 2003; Berger and Udell, 2002; Cole, 1998). Thus, when banks 
anticipate  a  shorter  expected  lifespan  of  their  relationships,  they  may  respond  by 
reducing their relationship-specific investments. More specifically, anticipated shorter 
relationships  inhibit  the  reusability  of  information  and  thus  diminish  the  value  of 
information (Chan et al, 1986). Banks may then find it less worthwhile to acquire 
costly  proprietary  information;  thereby  making  relationships  unnecessary.  Further, 
conventional  analysis  of  market  power  predict  that  more  market  openness  and  an 
expansion of the number of competitors should lead to reduced costs of providing 
credit  on  average,  thereby  increasing  its  accessibility
57.  According  to  this  view, 
therefore,  financial  development  ought  to  enhance  entrepreneurial  activity  through 
growth  and  expansion  of  all  incumbent  firms  equally,  as  well  as  facilitate 
creation/entry of firms that are external finance dependent, through a wide and ready 
availability of cheap credit; which means increased competition in the industry. 
 
An  alternative  view  is  that,  for  the  external  finance  dependent  firms,  financial 
development and the subsequent increased banking sector competition lead to greater 
importance of relationships as a distinct competitive edge. Boot and Thakor (2000) 
argue  that  competition  may  raise  the  rewards  to  activities  that  allow  lenders  to 
differentiate themselves from other lenders, thereby raising the incentive to continue 
investing  in  relationships.  Thus,  a  more  competitive  environment  may  encourage 
banks to become more client-driven and customize services, thus focusing more on 
relationships.  Little  (1987)  also  argues  that  often  costs  of  lending  to  new  and 
particularly small borrowers are prohibitively high. This is because, even with highly 
competitive financial credit markets, lenders still have to assess the probability of 
repayment,  which  ideally  requires  intimate  knowledge  of  the  borrower and of the 
project for which the money will be used. Arguably, this may be achieved through 
risk assessments, which require undertaking prior investigations on the borrower and 
                                                 
57 For example, Jayaratne and Strahan (1998)  find  declines  in  average  loan  prices of about 40 basis 
    points, with increased bank competition, following overall branching deregulation in the US. 91 
 
 
 
the  related  project.  However,  Little  (1987)  observes  that,  in  principle,  there  is  an 
optimum amount to be spent on such character and project analysis, which obviously 
approaches  zero  with  very  small  loans.  As  such,  regardless  of  the  competitive 
conditions that may be prevailing in the financial credit market, lending is still largely 
confined to those that have long standing relationships with the banks or non-bank 
financial  institutions.  As  Stiglitz  (1994)  notes,  when  concerned  with  greater  risk, 
lenders resort to non-price rationing rather than raise interest rates when faced with 
excess  demand  for  credit.  As  a  result,  credit  rationing  may  characterize  market 
equilibrium even in the absence of interest rate ceilings and direct credit allocation. 
As such, even liberalized financial credit markets do not necessarily ensure Pareto-
efficient credit allocation. Further, in a study of selected African economies, Aryeetey 
et  al  (1997)  observe  that,  despite  some  evidence  of  competition  in  the  financial 
systems following financial liberalization, banks continue to concentrate lending to 
customers  with  whom  they  have  established  relationships.  Thus,  despite  the 
occurrence of financial reforms, whose main objective is to open up the credit market 
to make it accessible to a broad section of the real economy, the lending institutions 
prefer to continue dealing with their large and well-established clients.  Generally 
therefore, financial institutions have the tendency to preserve relationships with their 
older clients, which grow larger, at the expense of potential new entrants, especially 
those firms more in need of external finance; thereby resulting in an industry structure 
that is less competitive. Further, according to these arguments, one could conclude 
that  financial  development  perpetuates  entry  barriers  for  the  external  finance 
dependent  firms  as  credit  access  remains  a  privilege  of  those  with  long-standing 
relationships with the lenders. This leads to no or minimal firm creation, as well as 
zero competition. 
 
The foregoing contradicting views therefore suggest that the precise effect of financial 
development  on  industry  structure  and  competition  is,  therefore,  theoretically 
ambiguous.  Meanwhile,  little  empirical  evidence  exists  to  support  either  prior. 
Previous studies, albeit limited by their focus on specific countries, periods, economic 
and political circumstances, give the general impression that financial development 
should  have  distributional  consequences  on  industry  structure,  through  facilitated 
access to credit; thereby inducing equitable growth and expansion of the incumbent 
firms as well as enabling entry or creation of new firms. But, financial liberalization, 92 
 
 
 
working through financial development may also induce destruction and exit of firms. 
Nonetheless, informed by the aforementioned historical references and by theoretical 
as well as empirical uncertainty, the goal of this chapter therefore is then to derive 
further  empirical  evidence,  which  could  corroborate  either  effect  of  financial 
development on industry concentration and net firm entry.  
 
 
 4.2.2. Industry Structure: A Theoretical Framework. 
 
4.2.2.1. Firm Size Distribution. 
 
Theories of the firm, according to industrial organisation literature, are classified as 
technological, organizational and institutional; and, in a recent contribution, Kumar, 
Rajan,  and  Zingales  (2001)  test  several  implications  of  those  theories  regarding 
possible determinants of industry structure. In the process, several industry-specific 
and country-specific factors are identified such as the market size and its structure, 
capital  availability  and  capital  intensity,  which  are  all  likely  to  affect  the  size 
distribution of an industry. Further, the set of laws and regulation and the level of 
economic  and  financial  development  are  some  of  those  ‘environmental’  factors, 
common  across  industries  in  a  country,  which  are  also  considered  to  be  likely 
determinants of size distribution of firms. 
 
The  literature  therefore,  generally  hypothesises  that  a  combination  of  scale 
economies, barriers to entry, and size of the market mostly explain variations in the 
structure  of  an  industry
58.  Notably,  an  increase  in  scale  economies  causes  the 
minimum efficient scale at the firm level to increase and the number of firms required 
to  minimize  industry  production  costs  to  fall.  Consequently,  only  a  few 
disproportionately large firms survive in the long run, thereby resulting in increased 
concentration (see, for example, Sutton; 1991, 1999). Further, according to Gibrat’s 
‘Law  of  Proportionate  Effect’,  variable  growth  patterns  among  firms  can  shape 
                                                 
58 Various empirical studies (see, for example, Bain, 1968; Caves et al, 1980) have relied on these three  
    broad   categories   to   draw   a   combination  of variables to explain variations in industry structure, 
    mostly  by means of regression analysis. 93 
 
 
 
industry concentration
59. Gibrat (1931) asserts that in a market with a fixed number of 
firms that start out with equal market shares, firm growth is random and normally 
distributed with zero mean and a variance that is positive, constant, and independent 
of firm size. A question that is of particular relevance to the current study therefore, is 
what constitutes the random forces in the whole process? Thus, if the whole process 
relies on random forces to explain the firm size distribution, what can possibly explain 
its starting position?  Ijiri and Simon (1971) suggest that the nature of the stochastic 
growth process may depend on cost conditions. In another study Jovanovic (1982) 
demonstrates  that  random  shock  to  production  costs  can  cause  an  increase  in 
concentration.  And  more  recently,  Cabral  and  Mata  (2003)  also  suggest  that  a 
financial  constraint  could  characterise  the  firm’s  start-up,  and  therefore  entry  into 
industry. Similarly, Doraszelski and Markovich (2007) show that concentration may 
increase  if  some  firms  gain  a  marketing  advantage,  say  through  advertising.  This 
follows Demsetz (1973a, b) and Agarwal and Gort (1996), who separately argue that, 
variable  growth  patterns  among  firms  within  an  industry  may  result  from  a 
competitive advantage rather than purely random shocks.  They contend that, one firm 
may gain a cost or marketing advantage over its competitors, through a deliberate 
government  policy  related  to  the  firms’  inputs  or  market  structure  in  a  selected 
industry.  Such  government  policies  may  include;  granting  of  monopoly  rights  to 
specific  industries  for  a  number  of  years,  tax  breaks  over  a  specific  period,  and 
directed credit allocation to specific sectors of the economy. If an industry-specific 
competitive  advantage  endures,  then  this  obviously  influences  incumbent  firms’ 
growth and expansion, which could lead to increases in the firm’s market share and in 
industry concentration. Further, this may ultimately induce or facilitate entry of firms 
in those respective industries as they become more profitable. This study exploits this 
view, particularly as it relates to competitive advantage arising from a firm’s access to 
capital or finance. Hence, this study adopts a methodology that allows testing the 
validity  of  the  theoretical  priors  regarding  the  relationship  between  financial 
liberalization and financial development – and therefore enhanced credit availability – 
and industry structure, controlling for the simultaneous influence of other industry 
factors.  
 
                                                 
59 Refer   to  Appendix  4.1; also see Hay and Morris (1993: 537-541), for a thorough analysis of this  
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4.2.2.2. External Finance Dependence. 
        
Arguably,  finance  ought  to  matter  for  industry  concentration  and  net  firm  entry, 
particularly where incumbent firms and/or potential entrants are competing for credit 
resources. In sectors where incumbents are not dependent on external finance, there 
will  not  be  any  competition  for  resources  with  the  new  entrants.  Financial 
liberalization and financial development should thus not matter much as a determinant 
of industry concentration or net firm entry in those sectors. On the other hand, where 
industry incumbents are dependent on external finance, they will be competing for 
financial  credit  resources  with  prospective  entrants.  Here  is  where  financial 
development should matter, one way or another, for industry concentration or net firm 
entry. The model structure for this study, therefore, builds on the contribution by 
Rajan and Zingales (1998). In a cross-industry and cross-country analysis that uses 
industry  ratios  as  a  measure  of  external  finance  dependence  for  wide  range  of 
industrial sectors, Rajan and Zingales show that industries that are more dependent on 
external finance grow disproportionately faster in countries that are more financially 
developed. The Rajan and Zingales’ external finance dependency ratios are based on 
the assumptions that there are underlying technological reasons why industries differ 
in their use of external funds, and that these persist across countries (op. cit. p.563). 
They further note that when financial systems are frictionless, the supply of external 
financing will be elastic. The differences in the actual use of external financing in 
such an economy will hence mainly reflect differences in demand for this type of 
funding, which will, in turn, be reflected in variations among the respective industry 
ratios. In their model, Rajan and Zingales use United States data to derive the typical 
external financial dependence for a particular industrial sector. They argue that the 
financial  markets  in  the  US  are  the  most  frictionless,  therefore  allowing  firms  to 
achieve the desired financing for their respective industrial sector. This, according to 
Rajan and Zingales, offers a way of identifying the degree to which industries desire 
external financing anywhere in the world.    
 
However,  Rajan  and  Zingales  (1998)  argue  that  the  external  finance  dependence 
model in no way assumes a sector in two countries with the same degree of financial 
development to have exactly the same optimal external financing structures. Instead, 95 
 
 
 
local  conditions,  such  as  growth  opportunities,  are  allowed  to  differ  between 
countries. The model, therefore, assumes only that the rank order of optimal external 
financing needs across industries is similar across countries. Thus, Rajan and Zingales 
state  that,  “...while  there  are  enormous  differences  in  local  conditions  between 
countries,  all  we  really  need  is  that  statements  of  the  following  sort  hold:  If 
Pharmaceuticals require a larger initial scale and have a higher gestation period before 
cash flows are harvested than the Textile industry in the United States, it also requires 
a larger initial scale and has a higher gestation period in Korea.” (ibid, p.563) 
 
The  innovation  of  the  Rajan  and  Zingales  (1998)  approach  is  in  positioning  an 
interaction between a country characteristic (in this case, a proxy of the level of its 
financial development) and this benchmark (external finance dependence ratio of a 
given industry). It then investigates how industrial growth relates to this interaction 
term, thereby investigating whether industrial sectors that typically use more external 
financing grow faster in countries with greater financial sector development. In the 
regression results, Rajan and Zingales, find a positive sign for the interaction between 
the external financial dependence ratio and the level of financial development, thus 
demonstrating a positive impact of financial development on growth due to greater 
availability of external financing.  
 
Most  recently,  several  other  researchers  have  used  the  Rajan  and  Zingales  (1998) 
methodology
60. Specifically, these studies have employed the industry-level external 
finance  dependence  ratios  as  calculated  by  Rajan  and  Zingales,  to  investigate 
relationships  between  various  industry  characteristics  and  different  aspects  of 
financial development in predicting industry growth and performance. Whilst these 
research  studies  are  not  necessarily  exhaustive,  they  nonetheless  demonstrate  the 
extent  to  which  the  Rajan  and  Zingales’  (1998)  calculated  industry-level  external 
finance dependency ratios have been adopted. This study therefore exploits the Rajan 
and  Zingales  model  concept,  as  others  have  done,  to  complement  and  extend  the 
literature  by  investigating  the  link  between  financial  development  and  industry 
structure. The objective for this is to determine whether financial development has 
                                                 
60 These include:     Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine  (2008); Do   and   Levchenko (2006);    
     Fonseca and Utrero (2006);   Claessens and Laeven (2006);   Vlachos   and   Waldenstrom   (2005); 
     Almeida  and   Wolfenzon   (2004);    Larrain   (2004);  Fisman    and   Love   (2004);    Carlin   and   
     Mayer (2003); Laeven, Klingebiel and Kroszner (2002); and, Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) 96 
 
 
 
any cross-industry distributional ramifications, which could ultimately influence the 
structure of the industry in a country.  
 
 
4.2.3. Methodological Approach.  
 
In the literature on industry organisation, industry concentration and net firm entry 
constitute  two  fundamental  aspects  of  industry  structure.    Highly  concentrated 
industries are likely to have low levels of competition, thereby compromising on their 
effective contribution to the economic growth process. And notably, in the industrial 
organization  literature,  level  of  concentration  in  a  market  has  been  assigned  an 
important role in analysis of market structure, conduct and performance. It is often 
used as a summary measure of market structure (Scherer and Ross, 1990), and as an 
indirect measure of the intensity of competition (Baldwin and Gorecki, 1994). Thus, 
concentration  is  seen  to  measure  the  potential  for  collusive  or  anti-competitive 
behaviour  in  a  market.  Similarly,  a  high  firm  turnover  is  counter-effective  in 
contributing towards the economic growth process
61.  
 
Nonetheless,  there  are  some  disputes  in  the  industrial  organisation  literature,  on 
whether industry concentration encourages or discourages entry; thus whether these 
two industry structure measures are related
62. Notably, in the literature, this debate, on 
whether changes in the number of firms in an industry have any effect on industry 
concentration, is best explained in the context of the “contagion,” “feedback,” and 
organizational  ecology”  theories  of  industry  dynamics
63.  In  accordance  with  the 
hypotheses propagated under these theories, an industry is initially characterised by a 
small number of risk taking firms, and therefore with a highly concentrated industry 
structure. Through collusive pricing facilitated by the highly concentrated structures, 
industry profits increase and the industry is considered lucrative; thereby attracting 
secondary  entry  of  firms,  which  occurs  with  a  lag  because  information  about 
                                                 
61  For instance,   static  Cournot and Bertrand  models of oligopoly with product differentiation predict 
     that    pricing  will  become   more  competitive  as  the  number  of  rivals  increases. Oz Shy (1996)  
     extensively covers this phenomenon in “Industrial Organization (Economic Theory), MIT Press. 
62  For   instance,   Shapiro   and   Khemani   (1987),   report  that high industry  concentration   acts   to    
     deter    entry,    while   Rosenbaum   and   Lamont    (1992)  find  that   high  industry concentration  
     encourages entry through the potential for super normal profits. 
63  See, Geroski and Mazzucato (2001); Horvath et al (2001); van Kranenburg et al (2002) 97 
 
 
 
firm/industry  success  is  difficult  to  observe.  Once  success  becomes  apparent, 
however,  entry  takes  off,  which  may  negatively  affect  concentration.  These  same 
information lags then lead to excessive entry, falling profits, and eventual ‘shake-out’. 
The subsequent reduction in the number of firms through the ‘shake-out’ leads to 
increased concentration again. This suggests the existence of a degree of feedback – 
or ‘loop’ effect – between net firm entry and industry concentration, over time. Thus, 
while concentration may be high in the very early stages of an industry’s evolution, an 
increase  in  net  firm  entry  (thus,  increased  entry)  will  follow,  leading  to  less 
concentration. As the industry matures with its resulting ‘shake-out’, a decrease in net 
firm entry (thus, increased exits) occurs and concentration increases (see, Jovanovic 
and MacDonald, 1994; Klepper and Simons, 1997; Jovanovic and Tse, 2006).  
 
However, others do not support the foregoing perceptions, arguing that net firm entry 
may  only  influence  concentration  if  the  new  entrants  are  significantly  large  and 
therefore competitive within the industry. Yet, as observed by Evans and Jovanovic 
(1989), Wagner (1999), and Audretsch and Elston (2002), the bulk of firms entering 
and / or exiting from the industry or market tend to be small-scale enterprises. As 
MacDonald (1986) observes, small firms cannot survive the financial pressure of a 
low or even negative profit margin for a long time. Because they have lower sunk 
costs than large firms, they may also be less reluctant to exit the industry.  
 
Empirical  evidence  indicates  that  the  process  of  entry  and  exit  is  numerically 
dominated by what might be termed ‘noise-entrants/exits’; thus,  firms that enter, turn 
out to be inefficient – often for reasons related to scale and competition – and quickly 
exit
64. As such, turbulence involving small firms may not have any significant impact 
on  industry  concentration.  In  fact,  Curry  and  George  (1983)  mention  that 
concentration  should  not  necessarily  be  much  related  just  by  the  total  number  of 
firms, but more by the number of firms of “significant” size. Overall these priors and 
arguments suggest that it may not necessarily be a foregone conclusion that net firm 
entry  will  always  influence  industry  concentration.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  some 
                                                 
64 For instance, in a study of the United States,  Dunne et al (1988)  find that, on average, 61.5 percent  
    of all entrants exit  in the five years following the first census in which they are observed; whilst 79.6 
    percent   exit  within  ten  years. Nissanke (2001); Fisseha and Mcpherson (1991);   Parker and Aleke  
    Dondo (1991) also make similar observations for sub-Saharan Africa, including   Malawi, where exit  
    rates are found to be particularly the highest in the initial three years, and mostly  small-scale firms. 98 
 
 
 
empirical findings show no support for any relationship between net firm entry and 
industry concentration
65.  
 
In view of the foregoing, for completion, this study adopts a double-faceted approach, 
where both measures – industry concentration and net firm entry – are separately 
modelled  and  used  in  the  investigation  of  the  relationship  between  financial 
development and industry structure. Arguably, measuring as well as understanding the 
causes  and  consequences  of  industry  concentration,  as  well  as  analysing  the 
implications of net firm entry, following financial development, is crucial to assessing 
its  effects  on  economic  growth.  This  study  therefore  proposes  to  investigate  the 
empirical questions whether the policy and institutional innovations in the financial 
sector, such as those that precede the financial liberalization process, provide equal 
growth and expansion opportunities to all firms, and whether the process also induces 
the creation of firms and their entry into industry through easy and equitable access to 
capital. That is, whether financial development has any distributional ramifications on 
industry  structure;  particularly  in  sectors  where  firms  depend  more  on  external 
finance, than in those which are less in need of external finance.  
 
Related to specifics of the regression models therefore, there is an interaction term 
between  the  external  finance  dependence  of  firms  and  a  measure  of  financial 
development, following the methodology by Rajan and Zingales (1998), which has 
also been used widely by other researchers. Accordingly, using industry-level panel 
data over the period 1970 - 2004 for Malawi’s manufacturing sector, the study tests 
the influence of financial development on industry concentration levels and on net 
firm entry. The length of the time period of the sample facilitates investigations into 
dynamic  patterns  of  industry  structure.  This  facilitates  further  investigation  on 
whether  structural  breaks  in  terms  of  policy  changes  as  well  as  increased 
competitiveness – such as that following financial liberalization – has any relationship 
with subsequent changes in the levels of industry concentration or net firm entry.  
 
                                                 
65 Notably,  Das and Pant (2006) in a study of Indian manufacturing, conclude that since firm entry and 
    firm  exit   occur   at   the  lower  end  of  the  industry,  they  leave  the industry structure unaffected.  
    Similarly,  Ghemawat and Kennedy (1999) in  a  study  of   Polish  manufacturing, finds that net firm  
    entry  fails  to  affect  significantly  the  significance  of   industry concentration,  allegedly due to the 
    particular ‘noisiness’ of net firm entry in competitive environments. 
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In  terms  of  approach  therefore,  the  methodology  starts  with  an  economy-wide 
investigation, where a  financial development measure (i.e.  growth of credit to the 
manufacturing  sector  as  percent  of  GDP)  -  (FIN)  is  included  as  an  explanatory 
variable in the respective models for industry concentration and net firm entry. This 
facilitates  investigating  whether  financial  development  has  a  positive  or  negative 
effect  on  the  structure  of  industrial  sectors,  regardless  of  their  characteristics. 
However, since financial liberalization is hypothesised to reduce financing constraints 
for firms investments through easy access to credit, a financial liberalization dummy 
(FL) is therefore interacted with the financial development measure; thus( ) FIN FL ´ . 
This specification allows testing whether a regime change, from financial repression 
to financial liberalization, has any influence on credit access by firms, regardless of 
their individual characteristics.  
 
Whilst  the  foregoing  specifications  measure  the  economy-wide  effect  of  financial 
development,  sector-specific  implications  are  investigated  next.  Initially,  an 
interaction term is constructed between the industry’s external finance dependency 
ratio (ED) and the financial development measure; thus( ) FIN ED ´ , is included. This 
model specification allows testing whether there is, besides an economy-wide effect, 
also  a  sector-specific  effect  of  financial  development.  As  such,  if  financial 
development facilitates credit access by firms in the manufacturing industries, this 
effect  should  be  especially  noticeable  on  those  industrial  sectors  where  firms  are 
highly dependent on external finance. Next, an additional specification allows testing 
whether a regime change, from financial repression to financial liberalization, has any 
influence  on  the  sector-specific  effect  of  financial  development.    Similar  to  the 
economy-wide  model,  a  financial  liberalization  dummy  (FL)  is  also  added  to  the 
sector-specific  interaction  term  –  (FIN ED FL ´ ´ )
66.  This  specification  facilitates 
testing  whether  credit  access  by  those  industrial  sectors  where  firms  are  highly 
dependent on external finance, increase or decrease following the regime change from 
a repressed to a liberalized financial system.  
                                                 
66 It  may  be  argued  that financial liberalization was implemented at the same time as other reforms – 
    most   notably  trade  liberalization.  However,  in  order  to  remove  the effect of trade liberalization 
   from  the  financial   liberalization  dummy,   trade  variables  are  included  in  the  respective  model 
   specifications  –  which would  undoubtedly  first  reflect  the impact of trade reforms  –  among    the 
   control variables. This procedure is expected  to let the financial liberalization dummy (FL) to model 
   first and foremost the effect of  financial liberalization (see, Bakaert et al, 2005). 100 
 
 
 
  
4.3. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK. 
 
4.3.1. Model Specifications. 
 
4.3.1.1. Industrial Concentration. 
 
The  empirical  model  hypothesises  that  equilibrium  industrial  concentration,  is  a 
function of the level of financial development, through credit availability, which is, in 
turn, influenced by the financial liberalization process. And, in order to take care of 
industry specific differences, the model controls for growth in industry value added, 
changes in the share of the industry value-added in total manufacturing sector value-
added,  and  the  intensity  of  manufactured  imports  and  exports,  as  explanatory 
variables. Time dummies are also included, reflecting policy changes implemented 
over the study period. The model is therefore structured as follows; 
  
0 1 it t j i jt it CR FIN X b b d m = + + +                                                                               (4.1)                                                                                                                                              
 
where,  it CR represents industrial concentration at time t in industry i, which in this 
study is hypothesised to be a function of financial development, t FIN  and a number of 
explanatory variables, i jt X . And, it m is the usual error term. 
 
The  empirical  analysis  initially  investigates  the  economy-wide  effect  of  financial 
development on industry concentration; followed by tests whether there is evidence of 
any differential and industry-specific effect. In particular, the study examines whether 
or  not  financial  liberalization  promotes  competition  among  those  firms  that  are 
relatively more dependent on external finance, by facilitating credit access to them. 
This is followed by an investigation on whether liberalization of the financial sector 
brings a different dimension to the relationship between financial development and 
industry concentration. The study therefore estimates several variations of Equation 
(1) above, using panel data. 
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     (a) Baseline Model: Economy-wide Effect. 
 
A baseline model for the study is obtained by re-arranging Equation (4.1). Thus, in the 
first empirical analysis, the study uses the baseline model, Equation (4.2) below to 
investigate  the  economy-wide  effect  of  financial  development  on  industry 
concentration. Thus, whether regardless of specific industry characteristics, financial 
development has a negative or positive effect on industry concentration. Next, the 
study examines how this economy-wide effect of financial development on industry 
concentration changes in the face of financial liberalization. The following equations 
are therefore estimated: 
   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
( ) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 it it it t t t t it i t CR a CR SH GR MX MM FIN D b b b b b b b e - = + + + + + + + +    (4.2)                                                                                                                                            
( )
( )
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 1
7 8
it it it t t t i t
t t t it
CR a CR SH GR MX MM FIN
FIN FL D
b b b b b b
b b e
- = + + + + + +
+ ´ + +
                          (4.3)       
 
where, in Equation (4.3), an interaction of the financial development proxy and the 
financial liberalization dummy,( ) t t FIN FL ´ , is included in the model as an additional 
explanatory variable.  
 
 
     (b) Interaction Model: Industry-specific Effect. 
 
Whilst  Equations  (4.2)  and  (4.3)  facilitates  the  identification  of  an  economy-wide 
effect  of  financial  development,  common  to  all  industrial  sectors,  using  industry-
specific  information  helps  in  order  to  yield  a  deeper  sector-specific  effect.  Such 
specification facilitates the decomposition of the total effect of financial development 
in first, an economy-wide effect and second, a sector-specific effect. Thus, following 
the Rajan and Zingales (1998) methodology, the study includes an index of industry 
concentration  as  a  measure  that  could  be  explained  by  the  interaction  variable 
between  each  industrial  sector’s  external  financing  dependence  and  the  financial 
development variable,( ) t i FIN ED ´ , Equation (4.4) below.  Further, since financial 102 
 
 
 
development has distributional effects on industries more in need of external finance, 
a result not obvious ex ante, it may be appropriate to be convinced that this effect is 
indeed robust, by testing whether levels of industry concentration vary with financial 
liberalization  in  those  industrial  sectors  that  are  relatively  more  external  finance 
dependent. Thus, another interaction model is estimated which includes an interaction 
variable that combines the external finance dependency variations as well as allowing 
for the financial liberalization effect,( ) t i t FIN ED FL ´ ´  Equation (4.5) below.  The 
following equations are therefore estimated: 
 
 
( )
( )
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 1
7 8
it it it t t t i t
t t t it
CR a CR SH GR MX MM FIN
FIN ED D
b b b b b b
b b e
- = + + + + + +
+ ´ + +
                               (4.4) 
 
( )
( ) ( )
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 1
7 8 9
it it it t t t i t
t i t i t t it
CR a CR SH GR MX MM FIN
FIN ED FIN ED FL D
b b b b b b
b b b e
- = + + + + + +
+ ´ + ´ ´ + +
                                 (4.5) 
 
 
4.3.1.2. Net Firm Entry. 
 
Changes in the population of firms through entry  and  exits – or net firm entry – 
contribute  to  how  the  structure  of  an  industry  is  defined.  In  this  research, 
consideration of factors that are hypothesised to influence changes in the number of 
firms, follow the tradition established in the years after Bain’s (1956) definition of 
entry  barriers  and  Orr’s  (1974)  applied  work.  This  background  has  recently  been 
extended through numerous studies on the determinants of net firm entry. As Acs and 
Audretsch (1989, p.470) put it, “the empirical model used to estimate [net firm] entry 
has  by  now  become  quite  standard  with  only  minor  variations...In  general, 
explanatory  variables  representing  three  different  factors  are  included  –  market 
structure characteristics inhibiting entry or so-called barriers to entry, factors inducing 
entry,  principally  growth  and  profitability,  and  measures  of  the  technological 
environment.”  Thus,  net  firm  entry  is  generally  expected  to  depend  on 
macroeconomic  business  conditions,  which  are  gauged  by  how  lucrative  it  is  to 
operate in an environment. Specifically, profitability of business firms and increase in 
market demand, are considered to be key benchmarks in this process (see Appendix 103 
 
 
 
4.2). Further, there exist other industry and market-specific characteristics that may 
also  determine  firm  entry  or  exit.  As  such,  consistent  with  economic  theory,  and 
following previous studies
67, a relationship of the following form is hypothesised: 
 
( ) , , NFE f PCM MKD X =                                                                                       (4.6) 
 
where,  NFE  is  net  firm  entry  or  change  in  the  number  of  firms,  PCM  represents 
industry profitability (price-cost margins), MKD is growth in market demand, and X is 
a  vector  of  control  variables  that  account  for  industry  and  market-specific 
characteristics,  viz;    growth  in  industry  value-added  and  manufactured  imports 
intensity.  However,  in  this  study,  following  Rajan  and  Zingales  (1998)  who 
hypothesise that the number of new firms entering the industry should increase with 
financial development FIN, is introduced to the model as an additional explanatory 
variable. Like in the industry concentration investigation, the methodology applied in 
the net firm entry analysis begins with an economy-wide examination followed by an 
interaction  or  industry-specific  approach.  The  study  therefore  investigates  several 
variations of the relationship as depicted in Equation (4.6). 
 
 
     (a) Baseline Model: Economy-wide Effect. 
 
First is an investigation of the economy-wide effect or first-order effect of financial 
development on net firm entry at large, regardless of industry-specific characteristics.  
This is followed by an examination whether liberalizing the financial system adds any 
other dimension to this relationship. A model that reflects the influence of standard 
net  firm  entry  fundamentals,  including  financial  development,  may  therefore  be 
estimated  as  depicted  under  Equation  (4.7),  whilst  Equation  (4.8)  includes  an 
interaction  term  between  the  financial  development  proxy  and  the  financial 
liberalization dummy, ( ) t t FIN FL ´ .  
 
                                                 
67  See, for example; Jeong and Masson (1990); Geroski (1989, 1995); Fotopoulos and  Spence (1998);   
     Carree and Thurik (1996, 1999);  Agarwal  and Audretsch (1999); Holzl, Hofer and  Schenk (2001);  
     and Horvath et al (2001); Carree and Dejardin (2007); and, Arauzo et al (2007). 104 
 
 
 
( ) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 1
7
it it it t t t i t
t it
NFE NFE PCM GR MKD MM FIN
D
a b b b b b b
b e
- = + + + + + +
+ +
        (4.7) 
( )
( )
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 1
7 8
it it it t t t i t
t t t it
NFE NFE PCM GR MKD MM FIN
FIN FL D
a b b b b b b
b b e
- = + + + + + +
+ ´ + +
        (4.8)    
 
 
     (b) Interaction Model: Industry-specific Effect. 
 
Next, the study introduces heterogeneity across industrial sectors and tests whether 
there is evidence of an industry-specific effect. In particular, using the approach by 
Rajan  and  Zingales  (1998)  the  study  examines  whether  financial  development 
facilitates entry of firms in those industries that are primarily more in need of external 
finance, by facilitating credit access to these sectors. As above, the use of industry-
specific information yields instead a deeper exploration and understanding of the role 
played  by  financial  development  in  the  creation  of  new  firms.  This  is  done  by 
including  an  interaction  term  between  the  industry-specific  external  finance 
dependence ratio and the financial development proxy( ) t i FIN ED ´ , as depicted under 
Equation  (4.9)  below.  Additionally,  in  this  extended  specification  of  the  model,  a 
financial liberalization dummy is again interacted with the interaction term between 
financial development and external finance dependence ratio( ) t i t FIN ED FL ´ ´ . This 
should facilitate investigating whether financial liberalization enhances or dampens 
entry or exit of external finance dependent firms in the financial development process. 
Arguably, if financial liberalization, acting through financial development, removes or 
reduces barriers to external financing, industries highly dependent on external finance 
should register increases in net firm entry; thereby suggesting more firm entry than 
firm exits. This hypothesis is tested by estimating Equation (4.10);  
   
 
( )
( )
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 1
7 8
it it it t t t i t
t i t it
NFE NFE PCM GR MKD MM FIN
FIN ED D
a b b b b b b
b b e
- = + + + + + +
+ ´ + +
        (4.9) 
( )
( ) ( )
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 1
7 8 9
it it it t t t i t
t i t i t t it
NFE NFE PCM GR MKD MM FIN
FIN ED FIN ED FL D
a b b b b b b
b b b e
- = + + + + + +
+ ´ + ´ ´ + +
      (4.10)  105 
 
 
 
 
For all the Equations; (4.2) to (4.5), and (4.7) to (4.10), a subscript i indicate that the 
variable  refers  to  the  ith  industry  and  t  is  the  period  specification.  Further,  time 
dummies  t D  are included in all the regression equations to incorporate time-specific 
effects common to all industries. 
 
 
4.3.2. Variable Descriptions. 
    
The study uses industry Concentration Ratio ( it CR ), which is the oldest and most 
commonly  used  of  all  industrial  concentration  indices.    More  formally,  this  is 
commonly known as the ‘k- firm’ Concentration Ratio (CR or CRK) defined as the 
cumulative share of the Kth firm (Saving, 1970; Scherer, 1980; George and Curry, 
1983, Clarke, 1985; Carlton and Pearloff, 1994). Thus, a ‘k -firm’ concentration ratio 
gives the share of industry value-added by the largest ‘k’ firms. If there is one firm in 
an industry, then the one-firm concentration is 100.00 percent since all the value-
added  is  by  a  single  firm.  An  industry  with  ‘n’  firms  with  total  value-
added ( ) 1.... i x i n = , ranked from largest to smallest. Industry value-added is defined 
as
1
n
i
i
x x
=
=∑ , and hence the market share of the ith firm is
i
i
x
s
x
= . The ratio is therefore 
defined as follows: 
1 1
K K
i
i
i i
x
CRK s
x = =
= = ∑ ∑                                                                                                (4.11) 
According  to  the  aforementioned  literature,  whilst  the  choice  of  ‘k’  is  somewhat 
arbitrary; for studies of aggregate concentration, ‘k’ is frequently taken to be 100; and 
for  market  concentration,  values  between  3  and  8  are  usually  employed.  Further, 
Saving (1970) shows that if ‘k’ dominant firms collude to fix a price for the remaining 
firms, the value of the Lerner index is directly related to their combined market share. 
But, while the ‘k-firm’ concentration ratio remains the most widely used summary 
measure of market structure and competition, it is not a perfectly inclusive measure of 
these
68. Nevertheless, it is useful to employ this measure as a standard of comparison, 
                                                 
68  For a  review  on  the ‘k-firm’ concentration ratio and other comparative measures, see Scherer and  
     Ross (1990, pp.72-73), Curry and George (1983), and, Sleuwaegen  and  Dehandschutter (1986). 106 
 
 
 
and  also  because  of  its  measurement  of  the  approximation  of  the  industry  to  the 
monopoly – or correctly, small group oligopoly – model. 
 
In  this  particular  study,  the  3-firm  concentration  ratio  is  tested  as  the  dependent 
variable (thus, ‘k’ is equal to 3) following many others (see, for example, Jeong and 
Masson, 1990). In a small country like Malawi, where there are industries with very 
few firms, concentration ratios above 3-firm may be equal to 1.0 (or 100) in many 
cases, hence the application of 3-firm
69. In this study, therefore, this is estimated as 
the ratio of the total value-added for the 3 largest firms, to the final total value-added 
in the respective industry. However, an important consideration in the  analysis of 
concentration ratios is that the value is bound from above by 1.0 (or 100), and, below 
by 0. This should reduce the effectiveness of linear forms as explanations of their 
behaviour. Hence, non-linear structural forms of relationships – such as logarithmic 
transformations  –  should  fit  better  than  linear  forms.  In  this  regard,  therefore,  a 
logarithmically transformed 3-firm concentration ratio is adopted as the dependent 
variable throughout this study, following many other previous studies
70. 
 
The  initial  concentration  level,  here  defined  as  the  lag  of  the  dependent  variable 
( ( ) 1 i t CR - ) is, according to the literature, considered to be crucial in influencing the 
levels of concentration during the subsequent periods. Economic theory suggests that, 
ceteris  paribus,  leading  firms  in  highly  concentrated  industries  are  likely  to  lose 
market share over time, or to increase less rapidly than less concentrated industries, 
(Stigler,  1952,  p.  232;  Mueller  and  Hamm,  1974,  p.  514).  Thus,  there  are  two 
competing theories as to how the level of concentration would change over time in 
industries  that  were  initially  highly  concentrated.  Stigler  (1964)  argues  that 
oligopolists will tend to yield up part of their market share over time in the interest of 
maximizing profits. For by charging a high price in the short-run, future entrants to 
the  industry  are  encouraged  by  the  high  profits  that  are  being  earned;  and, 
subsequently, a lower price and a lower concentration results in the long run through 
                                                 
69  In  the  USA  the  lowest  is the 4-firm concentration ratio; 3-firm and 5-firm concentration ratios for   
     the UK; and 3-firm for Germany. 
70 See, for example,  Bottazzi  et al  (2007),   Campos and Iooty  (2007),  Matraves and Rondi (2007),  
     Das  and Pant (2006),   Ilmakunnas (2006),  Driffield (2001),  Cortes (1998),  Davies  and    Geroski  
     (1997), and Liebeskind et al (1996), among many others. 
 107 
 
 
 
entry of new firms into the industry. However, an alternative theory advanced by Bain 
(1966) suggests that firms will set a low ‘limit price’, such that the resulting dismal 
profit rate discourages potential entrants. As a consequence, the concentration level 
will not fall; and, may even increase if oligopolists use very low prices to drive small 
firms  out  of  business.  However,  Mueller  and  Hamm  (1974),  argue  that  the  ‘limit 
price’ model is not inconsistent with a decrease in concentration if ‘industries face a 
progressive rather than a constant general condition of entry’ and if ‘dominant firms 
frequently  miscalculate  the  height  of  entry  barriers’.  Altogether,  a  negative  and 
significant sign for the initial concentration variable ( ( ) 1 i t CR - ) in the regressions will 
reveal either a dominant strategy of short-run profit maximization for leading firms or 
an unsuccessful attempt at preventing potential entry; whereas, a positive sign (or a 
sign not significantly different from zero) will point towards a successful ‘limit price’ 
strategy.  Accordingly, no precise relationship is to be expected, a priori, from initial 
concentration levels. 
 
Financial Development ( t FIN ), is represented by the amount of credit issued to the 
manufacturing  sector  as  a  percentage  of  GDP.  According  to  the  literature  the 
commonly used indicator for financial development is private sector credit, defined as 
the  proportion  of  credit  allocated  to  private  enterprises  by  the  financial  system, 
expressed as a ratio to either total domestic credit or GDP
71. Thus, higher values of 
this measure are supposed to indicate more credit to the private sector. However, since 
this  study  is  investigating  the  link  between  financial  development  and  industrial 
concentration as well as net firm entry in the manufacturing sector, simply focusing 
on  private  sector  credit  may  be  inadequate  when  determining  credit  access  by 
manufacturing firms. This is because, apart from the manufacturing sector, private 
sector credit is also allocated to other economic sectors such as agriculture, mining, 
and services.  Arguably, therefore, an increase in the ratio of private sector credit to 
                                                 
71  See,    for  example  King and Levine (1993a 1993b); Beck, Levine, and Loayza (1999); and, Levine  
     et al (2000).    Advantage   of this   measure  over other monetary aggregates as a proxy for financial  
     development  is that it excludes credit to the public sector;   therefore represents more accurately the  
     role of financial intermediaries    in  channelling  financial  resources  to the private sector, and more   
     closely    related    to    the   efficiency   of   investment,   and   hence economic growth.  Besides,  in  
     developing   countries  a   significant   portion   of   financial    development occurs in  the   banking 
     system, unlike in the developed countries (see, for example Goldstein  et al, 1992).  Accordingly,  in 
     countries   like   Malawi,   the   amount   of   credit   to   the  private  sector   by the banking  system 
      is considered to be a better proxy for financial development. 108 
 
 
 
GDP may not necessarily mean an increase in credit accessibility by firms in the 
manufacturing sector; nor does this translate into increased investment, and therefore 
growth and expansion of firms in the manufacturing sector. Similarly, credit to the 
private sector may increase without any corresponding changes in the number of firms 
in industries in the manufacturing sector. This therefore explains why credit to the 
manufacturing sector is instead considered to be the most relevant and suitable proxy 
of financial development in this study. 
 
Financial Liberalization Dummy ( t FL ) is made up of 0 and 1 values associated with 
major  financial  reform  measures  implemented  in  Malawi.  This  approach  follows 
Laeven (2003), Bandiera et al (2000), and Williamson and Mahar (1998) who observe 
that financial liberalization take place in various ways and in stages, which require 
proper distinction. In Malawi, the pre-liberalization phase 1970 to 1988, the financial 
liberalization dummy takes the value 0; then, the period from 1989 which marks the 
beginning of the financial reforms, specifically the deregulation of interest rates as 
well as other major financial reforms, takes the value of 1. Theoretically, in cases 
where  financial  liberalization  makes  easy  firm’s  access  to  credit,  growth  and 
expansion of incumbent firms, as well as entry and creation of new firms should be 
facilitated. Otherwise, financial reforms could also strengthen the monopoly power of 
existing firms through disproportional growth opportunities; just as it could also result 
in summary exits of the incumbent firms.  
 
External Finance Dependence ( i ED ) is defined as the share of capital expenditures 
that the firm in the industry cannot finance through internal cash flow. According to 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) who authored this measure, external finance dependence is 
computed as capital expenditures minus cash flow from operations, divided by capital 
expenditures. Cash flow from operations is broadly defined as the sum of cash flow 
from operations plus decreases in inventories, decreases in receivables, and increases 
in payables (Rajan and Zingales, 1998: p.564). In their calculation of the external 
finance dependence ratios Rajan and Zingales employ data from Standard and Poor’s 
Compustat for United States firms. However, while this conceptual methodology has 
been widely accepted in the industrial organisation literature, it has one caveat – the 
cross-country applicability of the external finance dependence ratios as determined by 109 
 
 
 
Rajan and Zingales (1998). As such, in order to provide a more representative and 
country-specific framework, the industry-specific external finance dependency ratios 
that  are  applied  in  this  study  are  calculated  based  on  the  Rajan  and  Zingales 
methodology, but using Malawian data (see Appendix 4.3).         
 
Industry Growth ( it GR ), is measured by the changes in the ratio of industry value-
added to real GDP. Scherer (1970) argues that the more rapidly an industry grows, the 
more likely it is that increases in its size will outstrip increases in minimum optimal 
plant size and so the more feasible decreases in concentration will be.  Thus, there is 
supposed to be a negative relationship between the rate of growth of the industry and 
the change in concentration. However, Stigler (1964), in the oligopoly theory, predicts 
differently.  Stigler  asserts  that  the  stability  of  a  price  agreement  in  an  oligopoly 
depends on several factors. In particular, Stigler notes that the ‘the incentive to secret 
price cutting falls as the number of customers per seller increases’ and ‘rises as the 
probability of repeat purchases falls’. Stigler further identifies pooling of information 
as  a  way  to  detect  less  extreme  cases  of  price-cutting.  It  is  then  possible  that  in 
cartelized industries faced with a demand curve shifting rapidly to the right, through 
an increase in the number of buyers, cartel members may want to pool information 
completely (e.g. through mergers) and thus increase concentration of the industry. In 
this case, there would be a positive and significant relationship between concentration 
and industry growth. Thus the sign of the industry growth variable in determining 
industry  concentration  will  depend  on  the  relative  importance  of  the  two  effects 
aforementioned (see also, Geroski and Schwalbach, 1991). In regard to net firm entry, 
growth  in  industry  value-added  is  important  due  to  its  disturbance  effect  on 
competition in industry. Higher industry growth may provide more opportunities for 
new entrants. This is expected to have a positive impact on net firm entry, unless the 
opportunities  created  by  industry  expansion  are  being  exploited  by  expansion  of 
already established firms, rather than new entrants (Fotopoulos and Spence, 1998). 
 
Industry  Share  ( it SH )  is  calculated  as  the  ratio  of  industry  value-added  to  total 
manufacturing value-added; and, accounts for different sectoral sizes, and controls for 
the relative importance of a given industry group in the manufacturing sector. Hence, 
the  share  variable  controls  for  the  stage  in  which  an  industry  is  within  the 110 
 
 
 
manufacturing  sector  and  specifically  it  should  capture  the  different  intensity  in 
development due to lifecycle-specific  reasons.  This is important to the extent that 
industry  share  is  related  to  displacement  effects  within  industries  with subsequent 
implications on the level of concentration (see, for example, Shapiro and Khemani, 
1987;  and  Fotopoulos  and  Spence,  1998).  Thus,  the  average  share  of  firms  in  an 
industry is likely to be influenced by the relative size of the industry in the economy 
(Rajan and Zingales, 1998). A negative relationship is therefore hypothesised between 
industry share and concentration.  
 
Net  Firm  Entry  ( it NFE ),  is  measured  as  the  percentage  change  in  the  number  of 
companies  or  firms  in  an  industry.  Following  Jeong  and  Masson  (1990);  Geroski 
(1989,  1995);  Fotopoulos  and  Spence  (1998);  Carree  and  Thurik  (1996,  1999); 
Agarwal and Audretsch (1999); Holzl et al (2001); Horvath et al (2001); and, Peneder 
(2008), net firm entry is presented as:  
( ) ( )
( )
1
1
it i t
it
i t
n n
NFE
n
-
-
-
=                                                                                               (4.12) 
where, it n  is the number of firms in industry i during period t . 
 
Conceptually, changes in the number of firms are thought to reflect the conditions of 
entry into the industry. High barriers to entry will discourage entry of new firms, 
whilst low barriers to entry will assist new entrants. The effect depends upon the 
overall  state  of  the  industry  and  the  economy.  The  precise  effect  of  financial 
development in firm creation or in facilitating entry may therefore not be known a 
priori
 72. Meanwhile, inclusion of net firm entry lagged one year ( ( ) 1 i t NFE - ) follows 
the evidence provided in the industrial organisation literature (see, Geroski, 1995) that 
previous entry and/or exit influences current entry and/or exit. Johnson and Parker 
                                                 
72 Several alternative definitions of NFE have been suggested in the literature, including the following; 
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    However,   in  a   separate  study,   Fotopoulos  and  Spence  (1998)  find  all  these  definitions to be    
    conceptually the same, and therefore not leading to any significantly different results. 111 
 
 
 
(1994) also argue that past entry influences future entry and past exits influence future 
exits, through what they describe as a ‘multiplier effect’. Thus, the effect serves to 
perpetuate a trend of entries or exits over time
73. Further, as observed by Carree and 
Thurik (1999) and Gort and Komakayama (1982) that, through the ‘demonstration 
effect’, entry and/or exit decisions are likely to be related to the experience of others 
previously. Further, Carree and Thurik (1999) argue that even where there are no 
barriers to entry or exit, psychological, technological, and institutional reasons are all 
expected to contribute to delays between the decision to enter into industry or exit out 
of industry, and the actual entry or exit; hence, the expected effect of lagged net firm 
entry on current net firm entry.   
 
Price-Cost Margins ( it PCM ), is a proxy for industry profitability. This is calculated 
as the ‘operating’ surpluses in industry, and defined as value added minus labour costs 
(remuneration), and then divided by total value-added plus cost of materials. Thus, 
industry  price-cost  margins  provide  an  aggregate  measure  of  profit  before  taxes, 
financial charges, and depreciation. Even though it is sometimes regarded as a crude 
method  for  deriving  price-cost  margins,  it  is  nonetheless  broadly  interpreted  as 
representing a firm’s cash flow that is either paid to the shareholders, used for raising 
reserve assets, or for financing investments. Accordingly, PCM is the most commonly 
used measure of profitability in empirical studies of firm performance and indicates 
the ability of firms to elevate price above marginal cost, defined as; 
 
PCM it = 
Value added Payroll
Value added Costof Materials
-
+
                                           (4.13) 
High  profits  are  therefore  expected  to  induce  an  increase  in  new  firm  entry
74. 
However, although there is a strong theoretical argument of a positive impact of profit 
margins on net firm entry (Ilmakunaas and Topi, 1999), other empirical studies have 
                                                 
73 This   is   an   extension   of   the   ‘organizational ecology’   literature   that   focus   on the growth of  
    organizational  populations   that   consider   density   dependence – thus, dependence of entry on the  
    number  of   firms   already   in   the  industry or market – as a basic model (for an elaboration on this  
    concept, see Hannan and Freeman, 1989). 
74 See,  Podivinsky  and  Stewart  (2007);  Ilmakunaas  and  Topi   (1999);  Feeny  and  Rogers (1999);  
    MacDonald   and   Bloch   (1999);   Taymaz   (1997);  Prince   and   Thurik  (1995);  Domowitz et al  
    (1986a, 1986b);   Clarke et al  (1984);  Liebowitz  (1982);  Encaoua and Jacquemin (1980); Duetsch  
    (1975) and,  Collins and Preston (1968).   PCM is   also   analogous   to the difference  between price  
    and  average  variable   cost    divided    by   price;   and, is a proxy for the Lerner index (price minus  
    marginal cost divided by price (for a comprehensive review of this concept, see, Lerner, 1934)). 112 
 
 
 
usually failed to find support for this hypothesis (see. for example, Taymaz, 1997). As 
a matter of fact, Duetsch (1975) recognises the possibility of obtaining a negative 
coefficient  on  this  variable  when  net  firm  entry  rates  are  used,  due  to  effectively 
blockaded  entry  (see  also,  Khemani  and  Shapiro,  1987).  The  exact  effect  of  this 
variable may therefore not be determined a priori. 
 
Market Demand Growth ( t MKD ) is represented by real GDP growth. According to 
Carree and Thurik (1996, 1999) and Ilmakunnas and Topi (1999), the basic intuition 
is that as the economy grows, the market grows; demand for goods increases, industry 
profits increase, and given free entry, new firms will enter. The opposite is expected 
when there is a down-turn in economic activity. However, two hypotheses have been 
advanced in the literature on the possible influence of the general economic climate 
on net firm entry (see, Storey, 1991). The traditional view – also called the “pull” 
hypothesis – states that firms are more inclined to enter an industry when the demand 
is  high  and  the  state  of  the  economy  is  expected  to  remain  favourable.  Thus, 
according to this hypothesis, a high growth rate of real GDP improves the anticipated 
profitability of the possible new entrants, and consequently increases the number of 
entries. A positive relationship is therefore expected in this scenario. However, an 
alternative view – known as the “push” hypothesis – argues exactly the opposite. 
According to this view, a fall in macroeconomic activity actually induces entry and 
increases the creation of new firms, since a higher unemployment rate that normally 
follows a ‘slack’ in economic activity, reduces a potential entrant’s opportunity cost 
of starting a new business. Although the business prospects are probably not bright 
during  a  recession,  unemployment  or  even  risk  of  it  may  make  self-employment 
appealing.  In  addition,  a  recession  provides  potential  entrepreneurs  with  new 
opportunities, like lower labour and equipment costs, or attractive niches created by 
earlier  business  failures  and  withdrawals  of  multiproduct  enterprises  from  less 
profitable activities. A downturn in economic activity may therefore be associated 
with increased entrepreneurship and an increase in net firm entry (see, for example, 
Highfield and Smiley, 1987). The precise relationship between market demand and 
net firm entry may therefore not be known a priori.   
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Imports intensity ( t MM ), represents the growth in the ratio of manufactured imports 
to total merchandise imports; and, Exports Intensity ( t MX ), represents the growth in 
the  ratio  of  manufactured  exports  to  total  merchandise  exports.  According  to  the 
literature, it is important to take into account foreign trade in determining the structure 
of the domestic industry, in order to capture more accurately the extent of industry 
competitiveness; as it influences growth or expansion as well as exit of incumbent 
firms,  but  also  entry  or  creation  of  new  firms,  in  the  domestic  market  (see,  for 
example,  Caves  et  al,  1980).  However,  the  respective  effect  of  foreign  trade  on 
domestic  industry  structure  is  not  unambiguous,  since  it  is  difficult  to predict  the 
reaction  of  domestic  firms.  Increased  imports  intensity  would  increase  industry 
concentration if threats arising from import competition induce mergers of domestic 
firms
75.  Further,  a  ‘flush  out’  of  inefficient  firms  that  cannot  effectively  compete 
following  an  increase  in  imports  intensity  should  reduce  net  firm  entry.  But,  an 
increase in imports intensity may also reduce industry concentration and increase net 
firm entry if domestic producers were induced to improve efficiency and thereby raise 
the  number  of  efficient  firms;  hence,  increasing  competition.  Similarly,  if  an 
expansion in export opportunities reduces average costs because of scale economies 
from increased market size, producers engaged in export activities should be able to 
increase their market share, showing a positive relationship. This relationship is more 
likely  if  the  fixed  cost  of  entering  exporting  activities  is  high.  But  a  negative 
relationship  may  be  observed  if  the  fixed  cost  of  exporting  activities  is  low.  A 
negative relationship may also be observed if economies of scale in production or 
distribution  are  not  important  because  a  larger  market  size  resulting  from  export 
opportunities  can  support  more  producers.  While  plausible  in  theory,  empirical 
research  on  the  relationship  between  export  growth  and  industry  concentration  is 
limited and lacks conclusive findings (see, for example, Zhao and Zou, 2002). Whilst 
some studies have found a positive relationship between industrial concentration and 
exports intensity (see, Glesjer et al, 1980), others have found the opposite (see, for 
example, Koo and Martin, 1984).  According to the foregoing, therefore, the study 
cannot hypothesize a priori on the signs on the foreign trade coefficients.   
                                                 
75 Besides,  as  noted  by  Pickford (1991)  in  a study  of  domestic firms in New Zealand, the ability of  
    imports  to  constrain market power is at times rather limited; particularly where the dominant firm is  
    also the  major  importer  of  the product; thereby making it possible for these same firms to continue  
    exercising monopoly power over pricing. 114 
 
 
 
 
Changes in the general economic policy environment are also taken into account by 
including time dummies ( t D )
76. In Malawi, the period 1970 to 2004 was characterised 
by  several  other  policy  measures,  aimed  at  enhancing  the  economic  development 
process. Apparently, most of these policy efforts were competition-enhancing in the 
manufacturing sector; and, also aimed at fostering efficiency in the financial system. 
As such, their effects cannot be ignored in the empirical investigation of the possible 
link between financial development and industry structure. The dummies are in the 
form  of  binary  variables,  which  equal  to  1  for  each  year  during  the  respective 
economic reform period, otherwise zero. 
 
 
4.3.3. Estimation Technique. 
 
In  light  of  the  problems  associated  with  purely  cross-section  regressions,  panel 
techniques  are  used  in  this  chapter.  Compared  with  cross-section  approaches,  the 
panel approach has important advantages. The first benefit is the ability to exploit the 
time-series  and  cross-sectional  variation  in  the  data.  Thus,  moving  to  a  panel 
incorporates  the  variability  of  the  time-series  dimension,  exploiting  additional 
variability. The second advantage is that the approach controls for the presence of 
unobserved industry-specific effects. Third benefit of the panel technique is that it 
addresses the problem of potential endogeneity of all the regressors.  
 
Empirically, in a panel data framework (thus combined time-series and cross-section 
data) the model for Equations (4.2) to (4.5) and (4.7) to (4.10) above can be written in 
matrix-vector notation as follows: 
 
, 1 it i t it it y y x a b e - ¢ = + +                                                                                            (4.14) 
    1, 2, 1, 2, i N t N = = K K  
  
Where  the  individual  elements  of  the  y  (industry  concentration  or  net  firm  entry) 
vector are denoted as yit, thus industry concentration or net firm entry for industry i in 
                                                 
76 The  time  dummies  are  meant  to  be  merely  indicative,  as  policy implementation is a continuous  
    process with obvious overlaps between periods. 115 
 
 
 
year  t;  and,  α  is  a  parameter  to  be  estimated  with  respect  to  lagged  (industry 
concentration or net firm entry) variable;  it x¢ is a (1 x k) vector of regressors, and β is a 
(k x 1) vector of parameters to be estimated.  
 
However, according to the literature, when numerous individual units are observed 
over  time,  the  problem  of  specifying  the  stochastic  nature  of  the  disturbances, 
represented by the term  it e  in Equation (4.14) becomes conceptually difficult. For 
instance, some of the ‘omitted variables’ may reflect factors which are peculiar to 
both the individual industries as well as the time periods for which observations are 
obtained;  others  may  reflect  industry-specific  differences  which  tend  to  affect  the 
observations for a given industry; and still other variables may represent factors which 
are peculiar to specific time periods. As such, if these unobservable “other effects” are 
not  taken  account  of  in  the  estimation  process,  and  ordinary-least-squares  (OLS) 
method is instead applied to Equation (4.14), the estimates of the β’s in the equation 
may be both biased and inefficient (Nerlove, 1971). In order to incorporate those other 
causal  variables,  therefore,  Equation  (4.14)  transforms  to  the  following  error 
component model: 
 
, 1 it i t it i it y y x a b m n - ¢ = + + +                                                                                     (4.15)    
where; 
it i it e m n = +                                                                                                             (4.16) 
and,                   
[ ] 0 i it i it E E E m n m n     = = + =                                                                                (4.17) 
 
Thus,  i m denote  the  unobservable  individual  specific  effects  and  is  time-invariant, 
accounting for the special effect that is not included in the model – the fixed effects. 
The remainder disturbance varies with both individual and time – the idiosyncratic 
shock. The error of the model it e therefore becomes the sum of it n , the well-behaved 
error component and i m , the individual specific effects.  And it is further assumed that, 
i m  and it n , are independent for each i over all t. 
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Notably, Equation (4.15) has a lagged dependent variable to account for dynamics in 
the industry structure process and capture the fact that industry concentration and net 
firm entry are long-term processes. As such, the structure of Equation (4.15) rules out 
the use of certain estimation techniques. For example, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
approach cannot be used because the estimator is biased in the presence of lagged 
dependent variables or industry-specific effects on the right hand side of the equation. 
Fixed-Effects or Within Groups (WG) estimators can account for the industry-specific 
effects,  but  will  remain  biased  in  the  presence  of  lagged  dependent  variables. 
Furthermore, Within Groups estimator is not an appropriate technique to use in these 
circumstances because some components of the explanatory variables of interest – 
such  as  the  external  finance  dependence  ratios  –  are  time-invariant  and  their 
parameters  will  not  be  identified  using  this  estimator.  To  address  some  of  these 
econometric problems therefore, the study uses the System – Generalized Method of 
Moments estimator (SYS-GMM) developed for dynamic panel data estimation (see, 
for example, Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998; Bond et al, 2001; 
and, Roodman, 2005).  
 
The SYS-GMM was developed as a superior estimator as it controls for the industry – 
specific effects as well as the bias caused by the inclusion of the lagged dependent 
variable.  Furthermore,  unlike  the  first-difference  GMM  (DIF-GMM)  approach 
discussed in Arellano and Bond (1991), the SYS-GMM approach makes it possible to 
identify the parameters of the time-invariant variables in the model.  It combines the 
standard  set  of  equations  in  first-differences  with  suitably  lagged  levels  as 
instruments, with an additional set of equations in levels with suitably lagged first-
differences as instruments.  The basic idea behind this estimator is as follows: First, 
the unobserved fixed effects  i m  are removed by taking first difference of Equation 
(4.14) and obtaining the following equation; 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) , 1 , 1 , 2 1 it i t i t i t it it i it y y y y x x a b m n - - - - ¢ ¢ D - = - + - +D +D                                    (4.18) 
 
Second,  the  right  hand  side  variables  are  instrumented  using  lagged  values  of 
regressors,  and  the  equations  in  first  differencing  (Equation  4.18)  and  in  levels 
(Equation 4.15) are jointly estimated in a system of equations. Under the assumption 117 
 
 
 
that the error term  it e is serially uncorrelated, and the regressors  it X  are endogenous, 
valid instruments for the equation in first difference are levels of series lagged two 
periods  (Blundell  and  Bond,  1998).  In  addition,  assuming 
that ( ) , 1 it i t y y - D - and it X D are uncorrelated with i m , valid instruments for the equation 
in levels are lagged first differences of the series.  
 
Third, the validity of the instruments is tested using a standard Sargan/Hansen test of 
over-identifying  restrictions  and  a  test  for  the  absence  of  serial  correlation  of  the 
residuals,  since  the  moment  conditions  are  valid  if  the  error  term  is  not  serially 
correlated. The regressions include time dummies, which apart from their usual role 
of capturing deterministic trends in the data, may also serve as exogenous instruments 
in the model. Further, the SYS-GMM estimation can be based on either a one-step or 
a  two-step  estimator.  The  two-step  estimator  is  asymptotically  more  efficient  in 
presence of heteroskedasticity of the error term it e . However, Monte Carlo simulation 
in  Arellano  and  Bond  (1991)  and  Blundell  and  Bond  (1998)  shows  that  standard 
errors associated with the two-step estimates are downward biased in small samples. 
Historically therefore, researchers often tended to prefer making inference based on 
the  one-step  SYS-GMM  estimator  with  standard  errors  corrected  for 
heteroskedasticity,  even  though  it  is  not  as  efficient  as  the  two-step  SYS-GMM 
estimator. Recently, however, Windmeijer (2005) devised a small-sample correction 
for the two-step standard errors. Thus, in regressions on simulated panels, Windmeijer 
finds that the two-step efficient SYS-GMM performs somewhat better than one-step 
SYS-GMM in estimating coefficients, with lower bias and standard errors. And the 
reported two-step standard errors, with this correction, are quite accurate, so that two-
step estimation with corrected errors is currently considered to be modestly superior 
to robust one-step estimation.  In this study, both the one-step results, as well as the 
two-step results are reported. However, analysis is based on the two-step SYS-GMM 
regression results, where the specifications are considered to be more efficient, and 
therefore leading to more accurate inference. 
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Consequently,  Equations  (4.2)  to  (4.5),  and  (4.7)  to  (4.10)  above  are,  therefore, 
estimated using lags of all variables as instruments
77. Thus, it is hypothesised that 
both industry concentration as well as net firm entry, adjust with delay to changes in 
financial  development  –  such  as  increased  credit  access  following  policy  changes 
related to financial liberalization. Similarly, growth in a firm’s value-added resulting 
from, for instance, changes in market demand, will only lead to the firm’s expansion 
or contraction, with a lag. The same applies to the firm’s net entry as a response to 
foreign competition. Policy reforms are generally expected to take some time before 
making  any  impact  on  the  manufacturing  industry.  The  process  of  adjustment  to 
changes in these factors may therefore depend both on the passage of time – which 
argues for including several lags of these factors as regressors – and on the difference 
between equilibrium concentration levels and the initial concentration levels, as well 
as  equilibrium  net  firm  entry  and  previous  entry  and/or  exits  –  which  argues  for 
dynamic models in which lags of the dependent variables have also been included as 
regressors.  
    
 
 4.3.4. Data Specification. 
 
The  data  composes  of  annual  observations  for  the  period  1970-2004  covering  20 
industrial sub-sectors in the Malawian manufacturing industry. However, following 
Favarra  (2003),  Beck  and  Levine  (2002),  and  Levine,  Loayza,  and  Beck  (2000), 
among many previous studies that also use a panel data approach, the data is averaged 
into sub-periods of five-year intervals
78. As such, the dependent variables in all the 
models are therefore of the averaged five-year intervals. Similarly, all the explanatory 
variables are also averaged over the five-year intervals. Thus, using STATA 9, the 
                                                 
77 The SYS-GMM estimation technique is applied to equations in levels using the t-2, t-3and t-4 lagged 
     right-hand side variables as instruments.  Laeven (2002), Koo and Shin (2004), and Koo  and Maeng 
     (2005) separately apply a similar approach in their studies on  Korean firms.   Similarly, Tressel and  
    Detragiache (2008)   use up to   t-9   lagged  right-hand side variables as instruments. 
78 Averaging   reduces  the  “T”  relative  to  “N”  in  the panel data. Further, according to literature, the  
    system  GMM  estimator  (xtabond2)  is  applicable  to  “small T,  large  N”  panels.  Thus if “T” is a  
    significantly   higher  proportion  of  “N”,  the  dynamic  panel  bias  becomes  insignificant,  but the  
    Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test may be unreliable (Roodman, 2005). 119 
 
 
 
SYS-GMM  estimator  is  applied  to  a  panel  dataset  of  N  x  T  =  20  x  7  =  140 
observations
79.  
 
Summary statistics for the main variables used in this chapter are given in Table 4.1. 
These statistics refer to a panel with observations kept in yearly format. The top three-
firm concentration measure is on average 82.2 percent, but with significant variation, 
from a low of 29.5 percent (e.g. in food processing sub-sector) to a high of 100.0 
percent (e.g. in transport equipment sub-sector). This is consistent with observations 
made by Chirwa (2004) in a study of Malawian manufacturing enterprises using panel 
data over the period 1970-1997, where the average concentration level is 77.0 percent, 
with the lowest being 50.0 percent and the highest 100.0 percent. The change in the 
number  of  firms  is  insignificant.  On  average,  manufactured  imports  constitute  74 
percent of the country’s total imports, indicating that domestic manufacturing firms 
face  some  competition  from  foreign  firms.  However,  as  a  primary  commodity 
producer  the  country’s  manufactured  exports  are  low.  Over  the  period,  real  GDP 
growth  has  been  moderate,  averaging  about  3.8  percent.  Growth  in  real  industry 
value-added is 1.8 percent. As an agro-based economy, the highest share of industry 
value-added in total manufacturing value-added is food processing, which takes the 
maximum share of 44.0 percent. Average profitability of industries during the period 
is 18.0 percent. As a ratio to GDP, average credit to the manufacturing sector was 
between 0.01 percent and 0.44 percent, during the period 1970 to 2004. The average 
industry sub-sector requires 64.0 percent of external financing for its investment, with 
a low of 10.0 percent (food processing) and a high of 15.0 percent (paper and paper 
products). 
 
Table 4.2 is a pairwise correlations matrix for the variables of interest, and shows that 
there are some important correlations among the variables. Initial concentration level 
is positively correlated with the concentration ratio. Similarly, previous change in the 
number of firms is positively correlated with net firm entry. This suggests that, for 
both  industry  concentration  as  well  as  net  firm  entry,  there  are  some  path 
                                                 
79 Due to the small and longitudinal size of the sample, the series are assumed to be stationary without  
     conducting   unit   root   tests.   Besides, the estimator SYS GMM uses first differenced models, and  
     hence   the   unit  root  problem,  in case it existed,  is taken  into account, as first differences will be  
     stationary if the original variables are unit root non-stationary. 
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dependencies  in  these  processes.  The  manufactured  imports  variable  is  negatively 
correlated  with  the  industry  concentration  ratio,  whilst  exports  show  positive 
correlation. As shown in previous literature, there is a negative correlation between 
industry  share  and  industry  concentration.  Growth  in  industry  value-added  is  also 
negatively correlated with industry concentration; but, it is positively correlated with 
net firm entry. In addition, credit to the manufacturing sector is on average positively 
correlated with the level of industry concentration; whereas it appears to correlate 
negatively  with  net  firm  entry.  This  suggests  that  financial  development  may  not 
foster competition in industry. There is also a positive relationship between external 
finance dependence and industry concentration.  Whilst these raw correlations do not 
control for other industry characteristics, they nonetheless indicate that analysing the 
relationship  between  financial  development  and  external  finance  dependence  on 
industry concentration and net firm entry could well amount to different exercises.   
  
 
Table 4.1:  Summary Statistics of Main Regression Variables. 
 (Yearly Data: 1970-2004) 
Variable Description    Mean    Std. Dev.    Min.  Max. 
it CR   3-firm Concentration Ratio  82.202  18.065   29.45  100.00 
it GR   Industry Value-added growth as % of Real GDP    1.787    4.555  -14.16    11.25 
it NFE   Change in the Number of Firms     0.003    0.174   - 0.60      3.00 
it SH   Industry Value-added as % of Total Man. Value-added.    0.047    0.072     0.01      0.44 
it PCM   Industry Price-Cost Margins (Industry Profitability)    0.183    0.135   - 0.26      0.70 
t MKD   Growth in Market Demand (Real GDP growth)    3.822    5.395  -10.24    16.73 
t MM   Manufactured Imports as % of Total Merchandise Imports  73.637    3.148   63.39    80.77 
t MX   Manufactured Exports as % of Total Merchandise Exports    8.572    2.811     4.62    15.44 
t FIN   Credit to the Manufacturing Sector as % of Real  GDP    0.120    0.129     0.01      0.44 
i ED   External Finance Dependence    0.637    0.474     0.10      1.58 
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Table 4.2: Pairwise Correlation Matrix of the Regression Variables 
(Panel Data: 5 years Average). 
 
       it CR        ( ) 1 i t CR -       it NFE      ( ) 1 i t NFE -        it GR        it SH      it PCM     t MKD       t MM        t MX      t FIN      i ED  
it CR     1.000                       
( ) 1 i t CR -    0.765
***   1.000                     
it NFE   -0.115   0.012    1.000                   
( ) 1 i t NFE -    0.075   0.011    0.193
**     1.000                 
it GR   -0.252
*  -0.098    0.045     0.119    1.000               
it SH   -0.291
***  -0.329
***    0.174
**     0.155    0.400
***    1.000             
it PCM    0.421
**   0.169
*    0.160
*     0.247
**    0.134
*    0.181
**    1.000           
t MKD   -0.109
**  -0.069
***   -0.238
**     0.056    0.514
***   -0.001   -0.076   1.000         
t MM   -0.195
**  -0.308
***    0.178
**     0.003   -0.286
***   -0.011    0.165
*   0.623
***    1.000       
t MX    0.379
***   0.382
***   -0.021     0.132    0.394
***   -0.010    0.005   0.319
***   -0.411
***    1.000     
t FIN    0.601
***   0.389
***   -0.033     0.130    0.492
***    0.001    0.134   0.592
***   -0.186
**    0.448
***   1.000   
i ED    0.139
*   0.138    0.247
**     0.282
**   -0.003   -0.131    0.204
**   0.004   -0.001    0.023   0.009  1.000 
Note:     This table report the correlation matrix of the main regression variables. And, ***, **, * indicate significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Definitions   
  and data sources are provided above. 
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4.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS. 
 
4.4.1. Overall Results Diagnostics. 
 
Applying the econometric techniques and data outlined above, the regression results 
on the relationship between financial development, external finance dependence and 
industry concentration are presented in Table 4.3. Similarly, regression results for the 
relationship between financial development, external finance dependence and net firm 
entry are presented in Table 4.4. Both in Table 4.3 as well as in Table 4.4, Columns 
(1), (3), (5), and (7) refer to the one-step estimates; while Columns (2), (4), (6), and 
(8)  reports  the  two-step  estimates.  The  bottom  parts  of  the  tables  include  the 
regression diagnostics. 
 
In all the models, as depicted in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4, the F-tests show that the 
parameters are jointly significant (at the 1 percent level). Using the Hansen/Sargan 
tests for over- identifying restrictions we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
instruments used in all the models are uncorrelated with the residuals. Consequently, 
the tests suggest that the instruments used are valid. The test for AR (1) errors in the 
first difference equation rejects the null hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation 
as expected. Furthermore, as should be expected, the test for AR (2) errors suggests 
that we cannot reject the null of no second-order serial correlation in all the models.  
And, according to Arellano and Bond (1991, pp: 281-282), as long as there is no 
second - order autocorrelation, the GMM estimates are considered to be consistent. 
   
The study first presents results for the industry concentration model, followed by the 
results for the net firm entry model.  In both cases, evidence of an economy-wide 
effect  of  financial  development  is  initially  presented,  using  the  baseline  model 
specifications. Next, the study presents results for the differential effect of financial 
development across industries according to their needs for external financing – as 
captured  through  their  respective  external  finance  dependence  ratios  –  and  are 
estimated by applying the interaction model specifications. In both the economy-wide 
model regressions as well as the industry-specific model regressions, the estimations 
are checked for robustness by allowing for the effects of financial liberalization. This 123 
 
 
 
facilitates the examination of whether financial reforms have any implications over 
the relationship between financial development and industry structure.  
 
 
4.4.2. Industry Concentration Model Results. 
 
4.4.2.1. Baseline Model: Economy-wide Effect.  
 
Table 4.3 Column (2) presents the two-step system GMM regression results of the 
first-order effect of financial development, as specified in Equation (4.2) above. The 
dependent  variable  is  the  logarithm  of  the  three-firm  concentration  ratio.  The 
coefficient for the initial concentration variable is positive and significantly different 
from zero (at 1 percent level), as per theoretical priors. The coefficient for industry 
growth is significant (at 10 percent level) and with expected signs as per theoretical 
priors; whilst the coefficient for industry share also enters significantly (at 10 percent 
level).  The  manufactured  exports  variable  is  positive  and  significant  (at  1  percent 
level),  while  the  coefficient  for  imports  show  a  negative  sign  as  expected  and 
significant (at 1 percent level). More important for this analysis, however, is that the 
coefficient  on  the  indicator  of  financial  development  is  positive  and  statistically 
significant  (at  1  percent  level).  This  result  suggests  that,  controlling  for  other 
variables; the development of the financial system induces concentration in all the 
industries,  indiscriminately.  This  result  is  robust  to  the  effects  of  financial 
liberalization in the regression estimates. Column (4) of Table 4.3, which relates to 
Equation (4.3), shows that the interaction term between the  financial development 
variable and the liberalization dummy enters significantly (at 5 percent level), whilst 
the coefficient for financial development remains positive but insignificant. 
   
 
4.4.2.2. Interaction Model: Industry-specific Effect. 
 
Next,  in  Columns  (6)  and  (8)  of  Table  4.3,  the  results  show  that  the  regression 
estimates with the inclusion of an interaction term between a ratio representing the 
industry’s dependence on external finance and an indicator of financial development. 
This  specification  tests  whether,  besides  an  economy-wide  effect,  there  is  also  a 124 
 
 
 
sector-specific  effect  of  financial  development.  More  specifically,  if  financial 
development  mitigates  financial  constraints  for  firms  by  easing  credit  access,  this 
effect  should  be  especially  noticeable  on  those  industrial  sectors  where  firms  are 
highly  dependent  on  external  finance.  Columns  (6)  therefore  report  the  two-step 
system GMM regression results for the interaction model as specified under Equations 
(4.4). Again, the initial concentration variable is positive and statistically different 
from zero (at 1 percent level). Most importantly for this study, Column (6) of Table 
4.3 shows that the coefficient on the interaction term between financial development 
and external finance dependence is positive and statistically significant (at 5 percent 
level). Meanwhile, in this column, the coefficient for financial development alone is 
not significant; thereby suggesting that financial development has no or little effect on 
those firms that are disproportionately less or not at all dependent on external finance.  
This result is robust to the inclusion of the financial liberalization effect, as Column 
(8) of Table 4.3 again shows the coefficient for the interaction term between financial 
development, external finance dependence and financial liberalization to be positive 
and strongly significant (at 1 percent level). 
 
 
 
4.4.2.3. Overall Results Discussion. 
 
The  two-step  regression  estimates  in  all  the  models  in  Table  4.3  show  that  the 
coefficient on the initial concentration variable ( ( ) 1 i t CR - ) is positive and statistically 
significant  (at  the  1  percent  and  10  percent  level).  Thus,  the  results  indicate  that 
initially concentrated industries in the Malawi manufacturing industry either remain 
highly concentrated or become even more concentrated than before. Sawyer (1971) 
gets similar results using census data for the British manufacturing industry; and, de 
Melo  and  Urata  (1986)  also  observe  increasing  industry  concentration  following 
liberalization in Chile. These findings are therefore consistent with the Bain (1966) 
hypothesis, which asserts that high initial industry concentration levels may increase 
further if the dominant firms collude to forego  short-term profit gains in order to 
secure long-term market share. Bain argues that dominant firms will deliberately set a 
low  ‘limit  price’,  with  the  objective  of  discouraging  any  new  entrants  or  any 
incumbent  firm  with  expansion  plans,  thereby  perpetuating  industry  concentration 125 
 
 
 
(also see Osborne, 1964). In support of this hypothesis, Gaskins (1971) presents a 
model of dominant firms whose pricing policy affects the rate of entry of firms into 
the  industry.    The  optimal  strategy  for  the  dominant  firm,  according  to  Gaskins 
(1971), may be to set a price below the entry-deterring price (i.e. Bain’s ‘limit price’) 
and let its market share adjust over time, whilst discouraging any potential entrants. 
Gaskins  argue  that  the  dominant  firm’s  market  share  and,  hence,  industry 
concentration will meanwhile continue to increase until the market price equals the 
‘limit price’.  Long-run equilibrium will then obtain. Thus the joint profit maximizing 
position for oligopolists as a group may be modified toward relatively reduced short-
run profits in the interests of joint long-run profit maximization as well as long-run 
security in the market share. A model by Kamien and Schwartz (1971) implies similar 
results for colluding firms facing uncertain entry. Notably, however, this contradicts 
another view as argued by Brozen (1970, 1971), according to which high levels of 
concentration are found when a firm or group of firms expand to take advantage of 
unanticipated  change  in  demand  or  a  new  technology  while,  over  time,  industry 
concentration falls as smaller firms expand and new firms enter the industry. Thus, 
according to Brozen (1970, 1971), a high initial level of concentration is expected to 
be  a  temporary  state,  which  is  followed  by  a  decline  in  its  level  as  firms  adjust. 
However, Prescott and Visscher (1980), counter-argue that Brozen’s assertion may 
not hold in environments where access to capital or information about technology and 
market  conditions  is  not  guaranteed.    Thus,  Brozen  (1970,  1971)  assumes  either 
limited or no barriers to firm entry – for instance, a situation where there is equitable 
access to financial resources. Certainly, in the case of the manufacturing sector in 
Malawi, unequal access to finance has made it difficult for a large number of firms, 
particularly the small and medium-scale enterprises, to expand or for new ones to 
enter the industry as suggested by Brozen (1970, 1971). Further, in Malawi, the price 
de-control policy which was implemented within the industrial de-regulation phase of 
the structural adjustment program could facilitate collusion by the dominant firms to 
set up their own ‘limit-prices’ in a bid to safeguarding their market share in the long-
term. This, therefore, explains the positive relationship between initial concentration 
and subsequent concentration levels in the Malawian manufacturing sector. 
  
The  industry  growth  variable  GR  has  a  negative  coefficient  and  is  statistically 
significant (at 5 and 10 percent level) in all the models. The main mechanism is that 126 
 
 
 
fast  growth  encourages  new  entrants  into  the  industry  through  higher  profits  and 
because barriers to entry may appear less formidable in a growing industry. The result 
is consistent with the findings by Mueller and Rogers (1984), Hart and Clarke (1980) 
and Mueller and Hamm (1974). The result suggests that growth in industry demand 
influence opportunity for expansion of fringe firms already in the market. Meanwhile, 
the variable SH, representing industry share, has a negative coefficient in all the four 
regressions estimates and is moderately significant in all the regressions, except in 
Column (8). The negative result is consistent with the finding by Rajan and Zingales 
(1998),  who  establishes  that  concentration,  tends  to  be  negatively  associated  with 
industry share.    
 
The coefficients on imports intensity, MM are negative and significant (at 1 percent 
and 10 percent level) in all the regressions of Table 4.3, except in Column (8), which 
is positive but not significant. This is in support of similar findings by Caves et al 
(1980)  that  there  is  a  negative  relationship  between  import  growth  and  industry 
concentration. This reflects the removal of all controls, which enabled other firms to 
enter  the  market  and  establish  themselves  as  importers.  However,  the  sign  of  the 
coefficients change to positive and statistically insignificant in Column (8). Despite 
not entering significantly, this result is supported by a hypothesis by   Pickford (1991) 
which suggests that an increase in the level of imports, which account for competition, 
leads to an increase in industry concentration. In Malawi, this positive relationship 
phenomenon may be attributed to the long history of protection in Malawi in the form 
of tariffs, licensing and monopoly rights, which gave exclusive importing rights to 
some firms. Besides, with an exchange control regime that required prior approval 
from the central bank before being allocated foreign exchange to pay for imports, it 
was mostly the large and well-established firms that had the financial capacity and the 
influence that dominated the system. The coefficients for exports intensity MX are 
significant and positive in basically all regressions. Ideally, if exports are profitable, 
domestic  firms  become  more  competitive  and  a  faster  rate  of  adjustment  can  be 
expected  in  terms  of  their  sizes  and  distribution,  thereby  propagating  a  non-
concentrated industry. Further, in Malawi, even after liberalization and deregulation, 
the long years of pre-export licensing requirements continue to favour the large and 
long established firms, which already have secure markets and financial capabilities. 
This explains the positive coefficient on the exports intensity variable.              127 
 
 
 
  
More important for this analysis are the sign and significance on the coefficients on 
the financial development, FIN, and the interaction term,( ) FIN ED ´ , variables. The 
coefficient on the indicator for financial development, FIN, is positive and statistically 
significant (at 1 percent level) in Column (2) of the baseline model. However, in 
Column (4) when the effects of financial liberalization are included, the coefficient for 
FIN becomes insignificant even though still positive. Meanwhile, the coefficient for 
the  interaction  term  between  financial  development  and  financial 
liberalization,( ) FIN FL ´ , enters significantly (at 5 percent level), and it is positive. 
This is an interesting finding as it suggests that, controlling for other variables, the 
development  of  the  financial  system  induces  the  concentration  of  all  industries, 
indiscriminately.  It  further  shows  that  prior  to  financial  liberalization,  financial 
development had no effect on industrial concentration. This result can be explained by 
the financial policies that were adopted prior to the reforms, such as directed credit 
allocation  and  administered  interest  rates  which  tended  to  favour  a  few  selected 
industries.  However,  the  results  show  that  following  the  financial  reforms  entry 
barriers have been perpetuated in the form of lack of access to credit. Further, other 
related policies such as interest rate deregulation, and the introduction of the liquidity 
reserve ratio, have also contributed to the increase in entry barriers as the cost of 
funds has increased. This therefore explains the positive and significant coefficient on 
the interaction term in Column (4) of Table 4.3.    
 
But, if financial development induces industry  concentration, this effect should be 
especially  noticeable  on  those  industry  sectors  where  firms  are  disproportionately 
highly  dependent  on  external  finance,  than  where  firms  need  less  or  no  external 
finance at all. Thus, in the industry-specific model, results in Column (6) of Table 4.3 
show that the coefficient on the interaction term between financial development and 
the  external  finance  dependency  ratios,  ( ) FIN ED ´ ,  is  positive  and  statistically 
significant (at 5 percent level); while FIN is not significant. The result is robust to the 
effects of financial liberalization as reported in Column (8), where the coefficient for 
the interaction term allowing for financial liberalization,( ) FIN ED FL ´ ´ , is positive 
and enters strongly significant (at 1 percent level). This indicates that industries that 128 
 
 
 
rely relatively more on external finance become disproportionately concentrated with 
higher levels of financial development.  
 
Table 4.3:  System-GMM Estimation Results:  Industry Concentration. 
 
                            Baseline Model                          Interaction Model 
Estimates  not  allowing 
for  the  effects  of 
Financial Liberalization 
Estimates  allowing  for 
the  effects  of  Financial 
Liberalization 
Estimates  not  allowing 
for  the  effects  of 
Financial Liberalization 
Estimates  allowing  for 
the  effects  of  Financial 
Liberalization 
One Step  Two Step  One Step  Two Step  One Step  Two Step  One Step  Two Step 
 
 
 
Variables: - 
       (1)         (2)         (3)         (4)         (5)        (6)         (7)          (8) 
  CR(t-1)  
 0.529*** 
(0.147) 
 0.548*** 
(0.161) 
 0.529*** 
(0.146) 
 0.548*** 
(0.161) 
 0.499*** 
(0.132) 
 0.573*** 
(0.096) 
 0.339* 
(0.175) 
 0.379* 
(0.200) 
 SH 
-0.058 
(0.041) 
-0.059* 
(0.031) 
 -0.058 
(0.041) 
-0.059* 
(0.031) 
-0.057* 
(0.034) 
-0.059** 
(0.028) 
-0.041* 
(0.023) 
-0.051 
(0.039) 
 GR 
-0.222* 
(0.119) 
-0.235* 
(0.136) 
 -0.222* 
(0.119) 
-0.235* 
(0.136) 
-0.185** 
(0.090) 
-0.174** 
(0.079) 
-0.113* 
(0.063) 
-0.127** 
(0.058) 
 MX 
 0.129** 
(0.052) 
0.159*** 
(0.048) 
 0.070 
(0.047) 
 0.078* 
(0.042) 
 0.128** 
(0.045) 
 0.178*** 
(0.036) 
 0.180*** 
(0.045) 
 0.201*** 
(0.052) 
 MM 
-0.023*** 
(0.004) 
-0.025*** 
(0.004) 
-0.014 
(0.003) 
-0.013** 
(0.004) 
-0.013** 
(0.006) 
-0.017** 
(0.006) 
 0.011** 
(0.005) 
 0.009 
(0.007) 
 FIN 
 0.270*** 
(0.082) 
 0.339*** 
(0.082) 
 0.041 
(0.092) 
 0.026 
(0.087) 
 -0.048 
(0.125) 
 0.076 
(0.131) 
-0.108 
(0.091) 
-0.054 
(0.158) 
FIN FL ´  
     0.165** 
(0.079) 
 0.225** 
(0.089) 
       
FIN ED ´  
         0.014*** 
(0.003) 
 0.012** 
(0.004) 
 0.012** 
(0.004) 
 0.011** 
(0.005) 
FIN ED FL ´ ´  
             0.128*** 
(0.024) 
 0.120*** 
(0.018) 
 
F  Test   68.93 
(0.000) 
 52.51 
(0.000) 
 68.93 
(0.000) 
 52.51 
(0.000) 
207.85 
(0.000) 
313.88 
(0.000) 
161.95 
(0.000) 
130.29 
(0.000) 
Hansen /Sargan Test    5.01 
(0.833) 
  9.45 
(0.397) 
  5.01 
(0.833) 
  9.45 
(0.397) 
  6.76 
(0.662) 
  6.39 
(0.700) 
  9.41 
(0.401) 
  9.70 
(0.375) 
Test for AR (1) errors  -2.50 
(0.013) 
-2.52 
(0.012) 
-2.50 
(0.013) 
-2.52 
(0.012) 
-2.64 
(0.008) 
 -2.73 
(0.006) 
-1.60 
(0.110) 
 -1.83 
(0.068) 
Test for AR (2) errors  -1.09 
(0.277) 
-1.09 
(0.275) 
-1.09 
(0.277) 
-1.09 
(0.275) 
-1.08 
(0.279) 
 -1.26 
(0.206) 
-0.82 
(0.415) 
 -0.74 
(0.458) 
No. of Industries      20     20      20     20      20     20      20      20 
No. of Observations    120   120    120   120    120   120    120    120 
 Note:  Estimates of the intercept are not reported for economy of space. Significant at the 1% 
***, 5%
**, 
and 10%
*. Robust Standard Errors are in    parentheses. The Hansen / Sargan Test and Tests for AR 
errors are p - values for the null of instruments validity.  
 
These findings support the observations made by Aryeetey et al (1997), Nissanke and 
Aryeetey (1998), and Nissanke (2001) in the context of situations prevalent in Malawi 
and  most  sub-Saharan  African  economies,  particularly  following  financial 
liberalization. Aryeetey et al (1997) in their study of financial reforms in four sub-
Saharan African economies, including Malawi, observe that commercial banks tend to 
concentrate  their  lending  to  traditional  and  established  customers  (often  public 129 
 
 
 
enterprises and businesses with  good cash flow – usually large and modern),  and 
avoid those that are new and without any record. Evidently, Aryeetey et al establish 
that this lending behaviour characterize the Malawian banking system, particularly 
following  the  financial  liberalization  process  (op.  cit.  pp.210-211).  This  lending 
behaviour  stifles  competition,  thereby  increasing  industrial  concentration.  The 
findings  are  also  consistent  with  theoretical  priors  suggesting  that  with  the 
development  of  the  financial  system,  credit  or  lending  institutions  may  have  the 
tendency  to  preserve  relationships  with  their  older  established  clients  (Boot  and 
Thakor,  2000),  thereby  continuing  to  provide  privileged  access  to  credit  to  a  few 
dominant firms which grow larger, at the expense of potential new non-established 
entrants. However, this outcome, contradicts the orthodox view as propagated by the 
neo-classical  theorists  such  as  Kapur  (1976,  1983)  and  Mathieson  (1980)  that 
financial liberalization and financial development facilitates access to credit and at 
reasonably  lower  cost.  Instead,  these  results  seem  to  be  in  tandem  with  the 
structuralists’ views as advanced by Grabel (1995) and Adelman and Morris (1997), 
amongst others. Most importantly, these results run contrary to the predictions by 
Rajan and  Zingales (1998) who hypothesise that financial development has cross-
industry  distributional  consequences  and  maintenance  of  a  competitive  industrial 
sector. 
 
 
4.4.3. Net Firm Entry Models Results. 
 
4.4.3.1. Baseline Model: the Economy-wide Effect.  
 
In  Table  4.4,  Column  (2)  report  results  of  the  first-order  effect  of  financial 
development on net firm entry, as specified in Equation (4.7) above. The dependent 
variable for the model is the net firm entry.  The coefficient for the lagged net firm 
entry variable is positive and significantly different from zero (at 5 percent level). 
However, the price-cost margins variable is significantly different from zero but with 
a negative coefficient; and this result does not change even after allowing for financial 
liberalization effects in Column (4). The coefficient for market demand is significant 
with  a  negative  sign  in  Column  (2)  of  Table  4.4,  which  remains  unchanged  after 
allowing  for  financial  liberalization  effects,  in  Column  (4)  of  Table  4.4.  Industry 130 
 
 
 
growth enters significantly (at 10 percent level) and with a positive sign as expected; 
and the result is robust to the inclusion of financial liberalization effects in Column 
(4) of Table 4.4. The manufactured imports variable is positive and significant (at 1 
percent level) in Column (2) of Table 4.4; and the results remain the same even after 
allowing  for  the  effects  of  financial  liberalization  in  Column  (4)  of  Table  4.4. 
However, in Column (4), the coefficient for the financial development proxy as the 
main variable of interest, is not significant; while the interaction between financial 
development  and  the  liberalization  dummy,  as  depicted  under  Equation  (4.8),  is 
negative and significant (at 5 percent level). The results in Column (4) suggest that 
financial liberalization has a negative effect on net firm entry, that on average affect 
all industry groups indiscriminately. 
  
 
4.4.3.2. Interaction Model: Industry-specific Effect. 
 
In Table 4.4, Columns (6) and (8) show results for the interaction term between the 
industry’s dependence on external finance and an indicator of financial development. 
This  specification  tests  whether,  besides  an  economy-wide  effect,  there  is  also  a 
sector-specific effect of financial development in influencing firm entry and/or firm 
exit. More specifically, if financial development mitigates financial constraints for 
firm entry by easing credit access, or if it induces firm exits due to high costs of 
capital,  etc,  this  effect  should  be  especially  noticeable  on  those  industrial  sectors 
where firms are highly dependent on external finance. The coefficient for the lagged 
net firm entry variable is positive and statistically different from zero (at 1 and 5 
percent level). Most importantly for this study, in  Columns (6) the two-step system 
GMM regression results for the interaction model, as specified under Equations (4.9) 
is negative and statistically significant (at 5 percent level). Meanwhile, in this column, 
the coefficient for financial development alone is not significant; with a negative sign. 
The results indicate that the impact of financial development on net firm entry is not 
uniform across industry groups – a phenomenon that is elaborated further later. The 
result in Column (6) is robust to the inclusion of financial liberalization effects as 
shown in Column (8) of Table 4.4, which shows the coefficient for the interaction 
term  between  financial  development,  external  finance  dependence  and  financial 
liberalization to be positive and significant (at 1 percent level).  131 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4.3.3 Overall Results Discussion. 
 
All the models in Table 4.4 show a positive and significant coefficient of the lagged 
net firm entry variable; thereby suggesting a perpetuating effect of past net firm entry 
on future net firm entry. Thus, the result reflects the rate dependence phenomenon as 
suggested  under  the  organizational  ecology  literature  (Johnson  and  Parker,  1994; 
Hannan  and  Freeman,  1989).  Further,  these  findings  are  consistent  with  those  by 
Geroski (1995) and Cincera and Galgau (2005) that firm entry and firm exits tend to 
come in waves with periods in which there is a lot of firm entry and exit and periods 
when firm entry and exit decrease. Accordingly, the results in Columns (2), (4), (6), 
and (8) of Table 4.4, indicate that if there is a 1.0 percent increase in net firm entry 
rate in the previous year, it will lead to a current entry rate higher by 0.43 percent (as 
per  Column  (8))  to  0.54  percent  (as  per  Column  (6)).    This  result  supports  the 
‘multiplier  effect’  as  suggested  by  Johnson  and  Parker  (1994)  and  Hannan  and 
Freeman (1989). Theoretically, this occurs when entry cause future entry (and retards 
future exits), or when exits cause future exits (and retards future entry). As argued by 
Gort and Komakayama (1982), the perceptions of profit opportunities by entrants are 
positively  related  to  the  successful  experience  of  those  that  have  operated  in  that 
market before. 
 
In the Malawian manufacturing sector, policy changes have affected firms in different 
ways. Amongst other policy measures, the abandonment of granting monopoly rights 
and tax waivers, the deregulation of industrial licensing, the privatisation of public 
enterprises,  have  all  differently  contributed  to  firm  entries  and/or  exits.  Most 
prominent  have  been  the  changes  that  have  followed  the  financial  liberalization 
process. Whilst these policies have facilitated entry of firms into industry; in the main, 
the policies have also created a situation where it has become unprofitable for some of 
the incumbents to operate, thereby forcing them to exit. The cost of borrowing has 
increased  following  the  deregulation  of  interest  rates,  and  the  directed  credit 
allocation system has been abandoned; thereby exposing inefficiencies within some of 
the industries, which have prompted scaling down or even closures and exits. The 
summary  exit  of  firms  in  most  of  the  industry  groups  have  therefore  made  the 132 
 
 
 
respective industries appear to be less lucrative, thus stimulating further exits. These 
results are consistent with the findings by Parker et al (1995)
80.  
 
The price-cost margins variable PCM has a negative, moderately significant effect on 
the net firm entry. The variable is clearly insignificant in the industry-specific models 
(Columns  6  and  8  of  Table  4.4).  This  finding  is  consistent  with  the  results  by 
MacDonald (1986), Geroski (1995), among others, who find profitability to be an 
insignificant determinant of net firm entry. Similarly, Dunne and Roberts (1991) find 
that high profits attract entry but also high profits are associated with frequent exits in 
the US manufacturing industries. Fotopoulos and Spence (1997b) find a similar result 
on  Greek  manufacturing.  Khemani  and  Shapiro  (1997)  also  find  that  high  profit 
industries experience more exits. The effect is explained as high profits attracting 
more entrants who then displace some incumbents. The negative coefficient on this 
variable therefore indicates that both entry and exit are symmetrical in their response 
to higher price-cost margins. Further, if both entry and exit are positively related to 
PCM, then the negative sign of the net firm entry suggests that exit might be steeper 
than entry in its response to higher price-cost margins. In the Malawian manufacturing 
sector, problems of accessing credit and/or increasing cost of borrowing are possible 
explanations of this result, in both that this has  been a deterrent to entry, and an 
impediment to post-entry survival and mobility. Evidently, the result suggests that in 
the presence of entry barriers like access to credit or increased cost of borrowing entry 
is  less  discouraged  than  exit  is  forced,  probably  due  to  subsequent  exit  of  less 
qualified recent entrants or less efficient incumbents.  
 
Net firm entry is negatively related to increase in market demand MKD, as measured 
by real GDP growth, except in Column (4) of Table 4.4. This result suggests that 
macroeconomic  developments  have  been  related  more  to  exits  than  entries, 
particularly of those firms that are highly dependent on external financing for their 
operations.  Movements  in  a  host  of  macroeconomic  variables  explain  this 
development. Evidently, changes in interest rates and exchange rates following the 
financial liberalization process affected both firms’ productivity  as well as market 
                                                 
80 In   a   study   of   five   African   countries,   including   Malawi,   Parker et al (1995)   establish that  
     entrepreneurs’ prior experience in industry was one of the motivations for new firm start-ups. 
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demand. Industry growth GR exerts a significant and positive effect on net firm entry. 
This result is consistent with a similar finding by MacDonald (1986) in the study of 
forty-six American food industries. Similar results were also obtained by Acs and 
Audretsch (1986b) on US manufacturing industries, who established that growth in 
industry value-added remains by far the most important inducement to firm entry.  
Given the hypothesis that newer industries grow faster (White, 1982) these results 
seem important in supporting the notion that faster growing industries offer better 
grounds for new participants. This may imply that industry growth may be associated 
with  higher  industry  profitability  (Bradburd  and  Caves,  1982),  which  is  not 
necessarily accessible by entrants at the expense of existing firms. Imports MM are 
associated with higher net firm entry before the liberalization of the financial system 
in Malawi. Otherwise, following financial liberalization, there has been an influx of 
imported manufactured goods, both second-hand as well as new. This has posed stiff 
competition to the domestic firms, forcing them to either down-size their operations or 
close-down and exit the industry. 
 
The results for the economy-wide effect of financial development FIN on net firm 
entry  in  Column  (2)  show  a  negative  and  statistically  significant  coefficient  (at  1 
percent level). This result suggests that financial development has been associated 
more  with  firm  exits  than  entries,  for  all  firms  indiscriminately.  However,  when 
effects  of  financial  liberalization  are  allowed  in  the  model,  the  coefficient  for  the 
financial development variable is negative but not significant, whilst the interaction 
term,  between  financial  development  and  the  liberalization  dummy 
( ) FIN FL ´ remains negative and significantly different from zero (at 5 percent level). 
This  suggests  that,  somehow,  the  policies  that  were  implemented  during  financial 
liberalization  induced  more  of  firm  exits  than  firm  entry.  The  effect  is  more 
conspicuous when industry-specific effects are considered in Columns (6) and (8), 
through  the  interaction  terms.  The  coefficient  estimate  for  the  interaction  term 
between financial development and the industry-specific external finance dependence 
ratio ( ) FIN ED ´ is negative and significantly different from zero in Column (6). This 
result  indicates  that  there  are  more  exits  than  entries  among  those  firms  that 
disproportionately depend on external finance for their operations than those that do 
not.  The  result  is  robust  to  the  inclusion  of  financial  liberalization  effects,  as  the 134 
 
 
 
interaction term between financial development, external finance dependence ratio, 
and the financial liberalization dummy ( ) FIN ED FL ´ ´  is negative and significantly 
different from zero.          
 
This  result  suggests  that  whilst  exits  outstripped  entries,  among  external  finance 
dependent firms, during the pre-liberalization period, the situation got worse in the 
post-liberalization phase. This is confirmed through the magnitude of the coefficients 
of (FIN ED ´ , 1 percent) and (FIN ED FL ´ ´ , 10 percent) in Column (8) of Table 
4.4.  This  finding  is  consistent  with  theoretical  priors  suggesting  that  financial 
liberalization,  working  through  financial  development  may  influence  industry 
structure, especially in those industry groups where firms are more in need of external 
finance.  As  indicated  above,  this  is  achieved  through  establishment  and/or 
perpetuation of close ties between lending institutions and incumbent firms, which 
may be detrimental to new entrants. It is also achieved through changes to the cost of 
borrowing  as  well  as  unavailability  of  credit.  Following  financial  liberalization, 
Malawian firms were affected by high cost of finance due to high interest rates which 
followed the deregulation process. Lending rates increased to levels between 45.0 and 
50.0percent  following  financial  liberalization,  which  adversely  affected  incumbent 
firms and forced them to exit.    
 
Overall, the results in Table 4.4 do not seem to support the view that one channel 
through  which  financial  development  boosts  aggregate  economic  growth  is  by 
disproportionately  easing  financial  constraints  on  firms,  thereby  promoting 
entrepreneurship  through  the  creation  and  entry  of  new  firms  into  the industry  as 
hypothesised  by  the  neo-classical  theorists.  Finally,  these  findings  do  not  render 
support to the hypothesis that “financial development has almost twice the economic 
effect on the growth of the number of establishments”, as suggested by Rajan and 
Zingales (1998). 
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Table 4.4:  System-GMM Estimation Results:  Net Firm Entry. 
 
                            Baseline Model                          Interaction Model 
Estimates  not  allowing 
for  the  effects  of 
Financial Liberalization 
Estimates  allowing  for 
the  effects  of  Financial 
Liberalization 
Estimates  not  allowing 
for  the  effects  of 
Financial Liberalization 
Estimates  allowing  for 
the  effects  of  Financial 
Liberalization 
One Step  Two Step  One Step  Two Step  One Step  Two Step  One Step  Two Step 
 
 
 
Variables: - 
       (1)         (2)         (3)         (4)         (5)        (6)         (7)          (8) 
  NFE(t-1) 
 0.536*** 
(0.153) 
 0.507*** 
(0.166) 
 0.536*** 
(0.153) 
 0.507** 
(0.166) 
 0.512*** 
(0.126) 
 0.541*** 
(0.122) 
 0.378** 
(0.168) 
 0.431** 
(0.182) 
  PCM  
-0.142 
(0.107) 
-0.139** 
(0.059) 
 -0.142 
(0.107) 
-0.139** 
(0.059) 
-0.143* 
(0.088) 
-0.142** 
(0.068) 
-0.101* 
(0.057) 
 -0.109 
(0.097) 
 MKD 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
 -0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.003* 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
 GR 
 0.166* 
(0.092) 
 0.192* 
(0.105) 
 0.166* 
(0.092) 
 0.192* 
(0.105) 
 0.148** 
(0.071) 
 0.147* 
(0.078) 
 0.089* 
(0.044) 
 0.090* 
(0.044) 
 MM 
 0.022*** 
(0.004) 
 0.023*** 
(0.004) 
 0.013*** 
(0.003) 
 0.013*** 
(0.003) 
 0.013** 
(0.006) 
 0.015** 
(0.006) 
-0.008* 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
 FIN 
-0.241*** 
(0.067) 
-0.286*** 
(0.066) 
 -0.018 
(0.078) 
-0.013 
(0.063) 
 0.007 
(0.116) 
-0.057 
(0.124) 
 0.063 
(0.075) 
 0.003 
(0.128) 
FIN FL ´  
    -0.160** 
(0.075) 
-0.196** 
(0.067) 
       
FIN ED ´  
        -0.011*** 
(0.003) 
-0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
FIN ED FL ´ ´  
            -0.111*** 
(0.020) 
-0.103*** 
(0.014) 
 
F  Test   88.13 
(0.000) 
 73.12 
(0.000) 
 88.13 
(0.000) 
 73.12 
(0.000) 
 177.83 
(0.000) 
278.05 
(0.000) 
380.01 
(0.000) 
201.06 
(0.000) 
Hansen /Sargan Test     4.37 
(0.886) 
  7.04 
(0.633) 
   4.37 
(0.886) 
  7.04 
(0.633) 
   5.50 
(0.789) 
   6.96 
(0.641) 
   8.05 
(0.530) 
   8.52 
(0.483) 
Test for AR (1) errors   -2.50 
(0.012) 
 -2.52 
(0.012) 
 -2.50 
(0.012) 
 -2.52 
(0.012) 
 -2.65 
(0.008) 
 -2.70 
(0.007) 
 -1.69 
(0.090) 
  -2.02 
(0.044) 
Test for AR (2) errors   -1.43 
(0.153) 
 -1.30 
(0.194) 
 -1.43 
(0.153) 
 -1.30 
(0.194) 
 -1.22 
(0.221) 
 -1.22 
(0.221) 
 -0.93 
(0.354) 
 -0.93 
(0.350) 
No. of Industries      20     20      20     20      20     20      20      20 
No. of Observations    120   120    120   120    120   120    120    120 
Note: Estimates of the intercept are not reported for economy of space. Significant at the 1% 
***, 5%
**, 
and 10%
*. Robust Standard Errors are in  parentheses. The Hansen / Sargan Test and Tests for AR 
errors are p - values for the null of instruments validity. 
 
 
4.4.4. Robustness Checks. 
 
Although  the  foregoing  SYS-GMM  estimates  are  in  tandem  with  some  priors,  it 
remains  useful  to  assess  their  robustness,  particularly  on  the  effect  of  financial 
development.  Accordingly,  this  section  presents  sensitivity  tests  using  alternative 
panel data estimators, alternative combination of variables, as well as longer time 
period using disaggregated yearly data; and, checks whether the results change across 
the models.  136 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4.4.1. Alternative Panel Estimators. 
 
Tables 4.5a and 4.5b display the estimated coefficients for the industry concentration 
and net firm entry variables, respectively, using the following alternative estimators: 
Column  (1)  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS)  or  Prais-Winstein  estimator  with  panel-
corrected standard errors (PCSE) for linear cross-sectional time series models, which 
computes standard errors and the variance-covariance estimates under the assumption 
that  the  disturbances  are,  by  default,  heteroskedastic  and  contemporaneously 
correlated across panels (see, Kmenta, 1997); Column (2) is the population-averaged 
panel-data model estimator using generalized estimating equations (GEE), which fits 
general  linear  models  and  allows  specification  of  the  within-group  correlation 
structure for the panels (see, Liang and Zeger, 1986; Zeger, Liang , and Albert, 1988; 
Pendergast et al 1996); Column (3) is the Fixed Effects or Within Groups estimator 
(Baum,  2006).  Although  it  is  well  known  that  in  a  large  N  small  T  panel  these 
estimators  give  a  biased  estimate  of  the  autoregressive  coefficient,  precise  biases 
results have not yet been extended to the remaining parameters (i.e., β in Equation 
(4.13)  above)  when  the  regressors  are  endogenous.  It  is  therefore  perceived 
appropriate to compare the results across different estimators. The two-step System 
GMM regression results for the baseline model are however presented in Column (4) 
of both Tables 4.5a and 4.5b, for the sake of comparison. 
 
The  results  in  both  Tables  4.5a  and  4.5b  show  variations  in  the  sizes  of  the 
coefficients and even signs for some of the control variables. However, in regard to 
the  variable  of  interest  FIN,  there  are  minor  variations  in  the  coefficients  for  the 
financial  development  indicator.  In  Table  4.5a,  the  estimated  parameter  for  the 
variable FIN has a positive coefficient and enters significantly (at 1 percent and 5 
percent level) in all the estimators. Similarly, in Table 4.5b, the coefficient for the 
variable FIN is negative and significant (at 1 percent and 5 percent level) in all the 
estimators. Thus, overall, the statistical performance of FIN does not appear to change 
substantially across the different estimators. It remains in line with the indications 
from the two-step SYS-GMM estimator: financial development has a positive effect 
on industry concentration; and, has a negative effect on net firm entry. Both results 137 
 
 
 
are in conformity with the earlier findings, as per respective results in Tables 4.3 and 
4.4 above; and, further confirm the contradiction against the hypotheses by Rajan and 
Zingales (1998). 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.5a: Robustness Checks: Using Alternative Panel Estimators. 
(5-Year Averaged Data) 
 
Industry Concentration Model 
(Dependent Variable: CR) 
                                           Alternative  Estimators 
                 (1)                  (2)                 (3)                 (4)  Variables:- 
OLS  (Prais-Winsten: 
Panel Corrected SE’s) 
GEE 
(Population Averaged) 
      Fixed Effects        Two-Step 
      System GMM 
 CR(t-1) 
             0.729*** 
            (0.128) 
              0.836*** 
              (0.021) 
           0.551*** 
           (0.133) 
            0.548*** 
            (0.161) 
SH 
             0.000 
            (0.005) 
              0.000 
              (0.003) 
           -0.055 
           (0.045) 
           -0.059* 
            (0.031) 
GR 
            -0.027* 
           (0.016) 
              -0.006 
              (0.007) 
           -0.027 
           (0.020) 
           -0.235* 
            (0.136) 
MX 
            -0.038*** 
           (0.003) 
              -0.040* 
              (0.023) 
           -0.043* 
           (0.025) 
            0.159*** 
            (0.048) 
MM 
            -0.044*** 
           (0.003) 
              -0.047*** 
              (0.008) 
           -0.040*** 
           (0.007) 
           -0.025*** 
            (0.004) 
FIN 
            0.060** 
            (0.024) 
              0.023* 
              (0.017) 
           0.110*** 
           (0.034) 
            0.339*** 
           (0.082) 
 
R-squared               0.83                    -             0.77                - 
Hansen /Sargan Test                 -                    -                 -                 9.45 
             (0.397) 
Test for AR (1) errors                 -                    -                 -                 -2.52 
             (0.012) 
Test for AR (2) errors                -                    - 
 
               - 
 
               -1.09 
             (0.275) 
No. of Industries               20                  20                20                     20 
No. of Observations             120                120              120                   120 
Note:  Estimates of the intercept are not reported for economy of space. Significant at the 1% 
***, 5%
**, 
and 10%
*. Robust Standard Errors are in    parentheses. The Hansen Test and Tests for AR errors are 
p - values for the  null of instruments validity. 
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Table 4.5b: Robustness Checks: Using Alternative Panel Estimators. 
(5-Year Averaged Data) 
 
Net Firm Entry Model 
(Dependent Variable: NFE) 
                                                              Alternative  Estimators 
                 (1)                  (2)                 (3)                 (4)  Variables:- 
OLS  (Prais-Winsten: 
Panel Corrected SE’s) 
GEE 
(Population Averaged) 
        Fixed Effects        Two-Step 
      System GMM 
 NFE(t-1) 
             0.723*** 
             (0.107) 
             0.807*** 
            (0.019) 
            0.579*** 
            (0.127) 
            0.507*** 
           (0.166) 
 PCM  
             0.000 
            (0.012) 
             0.001 
            (0.007) 
            -0.140 
            (0.118) 
           -0.139** 
           (0.059) 
MKD 
            0.002*** 
           (0.001) 
             0.002* 
            (0.001) 
             0.002* 
             (0.001) 
           -0.006*** 
           (0.002) 
GR 
            0.018 
           (0.013) 
             0.002 
            (0.006) 
             0.020 
            (0.015) 
            0.192* 
           (0.105) 
MM 
            0.039*** 
           (0.002) 
             0.041*** 
             (0.007) 
             0.037*** 
             (0.006) 
            0.023*** 
           (0.004) 
FIN 
           -0.053*** 
           (0.018) 
            -0.040** 
            (0.020) 
             -0.090*** 
            (0.029) 
           -0.286*** 
           (0.066) 
 
R-squared              0.84                  -                 0.78                    - 
Hansen /Sargan Test                -                  -                     -                7.04 
           (0.633) 
Test for AR (1) errors                -                  -                     -               -2.52 
           (0.012) 
Test for AR (2) errors                - 
 
               - 
 
                   - 
 
             -1.30 
           (0.194) 
No. of Industries             20               20                  20                    20 
No. of Observations           120             120                120                  120 
Note:  Estimates of the intercept are not reported for economy of space. Significant at the 1% 
***, 5%
**, 
and 10%
*. Robust Standard Errors are in    parentheses. The Hansen Test and Tests for AR errors are 
p - values for the  null of instruments validity. 
 
 
 4.4.4.2. Alternative Variables. 
 
Tables  4.6a  and  4.6b  present  results  of  the  two-step  System  GMM  regression 
estimates  for  the  baseline  models  of  industry  concentration  and  net  firm  entry, 
respectively; but, using alternative variables – first, using the ratio of liquid liabilities 
to GDP, as an alternative proxy of the financial development indicator; and second, 
using  the  external  finance  dependence  ratios  as  calculated  by  Rajan  and  Zingales 
(1998) to determine the industry-specific impact of financial development on industry 
concentration  and  net  firm  entry.  In  each  case,  the  investigation  controls  for 
traditional industry-specific effects as well as market effects that, according to the 
literature, are hypothesised to influence industry concentration and net firm entry.  
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First,  in  Columns  (1)  and  (2)  of  Tables  4.6a  and  4.6b,  as  an  alternative,  another 
commonly used ‘non-credit-based’ measure of financial development – the ratio of 
liquid financial liabilities (M3) to gross domestic product (LLY), is instead used in the 
regressions.  This  approach  follows  other  previous  studies  which  have  used  this 
measure as a proxy for financial development (see, for example; Gelb, 1989; World 
Bank, 1989b; King and Levine, 1993a). The indicator LLY measures the amount of 
liquid  liabilities  of  the  financial  system,  including  liabilities  of  banks,  the  central 
bank, and other financial institutions. Determining financial development using this 
approach  accords  well  with  McKinnon’s  outside  money  model  in  which  the 
accumulation  of  lumpy  real  money  balances  is  necessary  before  self-financed 
investment can take place. Further, an increase in LLY should facilitate firm creation 
and entry. Thus, according to King and Levine (1993a), this indicator is meant to 
capture  the  overall  size  of  the  financial  sector  and  its  ability  to  provide  broad 
transaction  services.  Ideally,  an  increase  in  LLY  should  therefore  mean  a  more 
developed financial system and therefore broader transaction services availability for 
firms, trade related or otherwise, incumbents or new entrants. This should facilitate 
the incumbents firms’ growth and therefore increasing competition in the industry, 
leading  to  lower  concentration.  Further,  this  is  expected  to  facilitate  entry  of 
prospecting new investing firms
81. However, the results in Column (2) of Table 4.6a 
indicate  that  the  coefficient  for  LLY  is  positive  and  statistically  significant  (at  1 
percent level). This suggests that despite an increase in liquid liabilities following the 
financial  development  process,  the  financial  systems  transaction  services  are  only 
accessed by a privileged few who gain comparative advantage over those that do not 
have  such  access,  thereby  allowing  them  to  grow  disproportionately  larger  and 
inducing industrial concentration. Similarly, Table 4.6b Column (2) results show that 
the coefficient for the variable LLY is negative and significant (at 1 percent level) 
thereby suggesting that the increase in liquid liabilities has not facilitated the creation 
of new firms, or that it induced firm exits, presumably through the intensification of 
relationship-based client support by the financial institutions.  
                                                 
81 Some  researchers  argue  in  the  literature  that  during  periods  of  credit  booms,  often  preceding  
     financial  crises,  credit  over  GDP  may  overstate  the  level  of financial development or depth of  
     financial  system  (see,  for  example,  Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999).  This study therefore also use  
     credit  to  the  manufacturing  sector  as  a  ratio  to total domestic credit, as an alternative proxy for  
     financial development. However, the results (which are available on request from the author) are the  
     same.  
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Experiments are also conducted to check against any methodological errors in the 
determination of external finance dependence ratios of the respective sectors, which 
have been estimated using Malawian banking system data. Accordingly, Columns (3) 
and  (4)  of  Tables  4.6a  and  4.6b  present  results  of  regression  estimation  of  the 
interaction model; now using the industry-specific external finance dependence ratios 
as calculated by Rajan and Zingales (1998), and as applied in many other research 
studies  (i.e.  using  the  interaction  term  2 FIN ED ´ ).  Notably,  however,  except  for 
slight variations in the size of the coefficients, the results remain largely the same in 
both tables, in terms of direction of causation.  
 
Table 4.6a: Robustness Checks: Using Alternative Variables. 
(5-Year Averaged Data) 
 
Industry Concentration Model 
(Dependent Variable: CR) 
Estimating  Baseline  Model  using  Liquid 
Liabilities as Financial development proxy. 
Estimating  Interaction  Model  with  Rajan  and 
Zingales (1998) external finance dependence ratios.  
         One Step           Two Step               One Step               Two Step 
 
               (1)                 (2)                   (3)                   (4) 
 CR(t-1) 
             0.529*** 
            (0.147) 
            0.548*** 
           (0.161) 
              0.529*** 
             (0.147) 
                0.548*** 
               (0.161) 
SH 
            -0.058 
           (0.041) 
           -0.058* 
           (0.031) 
              -0.058 
             (0.041) 
               -0.059* 
                (0.031) 
GR 
           -0.222* 
           (0.119) 
           -0.235* 
           (0.136) 
             -0.222* 
             (0.119) 
               -0.235* 
                (0.136) 
MX 
           -0.068** 
            (0.032) 
           -0.088** 
           (0.033) 
               0.113** 
             (0.049) 
                0.137*** 
                (0.044) 
MM 
           -0.044*** 
           (0.009) 
           -0.051*** 
           (0.009) 
              -0.064** 
             (0.022) 
                -0.081*** 
                (0.025) 
LLY 
            0.024*** 
           (0.007) 
            0.031** 
            (0.007) 
   
FIN 
                   0.058 
             (0.086) 
                0.049 
               (0.080) 
2 FIN ED ´  
                   0.008** 
              (0.004) 
                0.011** 
               (0.004) 
 
F  Test             68.93 
         (0.000) 
           52.51 
          (0.000) 
               68.93 
             (0.000) 
                 52.51 
              (0.000) 
Hansen /Sargan Test               5.01 
         (0.833) 
            9.45 
         (0.397) 
                 5.01 
             (0.833) 
                   9.45 
                (0.397) 
Test for AR (1) errors             -2.50 
         (0.013) 
           -2.52 
         (0.012) 
                -2.50 
             (0.013) 
                   -2.52 
                (0.012) 
Test for AR (2) errors             -1.09 
        (0.277) 
           -1.09 
         (0.275) 
                -1.09 
             (0.277) 
                   -1.09 
                (0.275) 
No. of Industries                 20                 20                     20                         20 
No. of Observations               120               120                   120                       120 
Note:  Estimates of the intercept are not reported for economy of space. Significant at the 1% 
***, 5%
**, 
and 10%
*. Robust Standard Errors are in    parentheses. The Hansen Test and Tests for AR errors are 
p - values for the  null of instruments validity. 
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Table 4.6b: Robustness Checks: Using Alternative Variables. 
(5-Year Averaged Data) 
 
Net Firm Entry Model 
(Dependent Variable: NFE) 
Estimating  Baseline  Model  using  Liquid 
Liabilities as Financial development proxy. 
Estimating  Interaction  Model  with  Rajan  and 
Zingales (1998) external finance dependence ratios.  
         One Step           Two Step               One Step               Two Step 
 
               (1)                 (2)                  (3)                   (4) 
 NFE(t-1) 
            0.536*** 
           (0.153) 
            0.507*** 
           (0.166) 
             0.536*** 
            (0.153) 
               0.507*** 
              (0.166) 
 PCM  
           -0.142 
           (0.107) 
           -0.139** 
           (0.059) 
             -0.142 
             (0.107) 
              -0.139** 
               (0.059) 
MKD 
            0.003** 
           (0.001) 
            0.004*** 
           (0.001) 
            -0.004** 
             (0.002) 
              -0.005*** 
               (0.002) 
GR 
            0.166* 
           (0.092) 
            0.192** 
           (0.105) 
              0.166* 
             (0.092) 
               0.192* 
              (0.105) 
MM 
            0.040*** 
           (0.008) 
            0.045*** 
           (0.007) 
              0.061** 
             (0.022) 
               0.071*** 
              (0.019) 
LLY 
           -0.022*** 
           (0.006) 
            -0.026*** 
            (0.006) 
   
FIN 
                 -0.034 
             (0.072) 
              -0.033 
              (0.058) 
2 FIN ED ´  
                 -0.008** 
             (0.004) 
              -0.010** 
               (0.003) 
 
F  Test              88.13 
          (0.000) 
            73.12 
          (0.000) 
              88.13 
            (0.000) 
                73.12 
              (0.000) 
Hansen /Sargan Test                4.37 
          (0.886) 
              7.04 
          (0.633) 
                4.37 
            (0.886) 
                  7.04 
              (0.633) 
Test  for  AR  (1) 
errors 
             -2.50 
          (0.012) 
             -2.52 
          (0.012) 
               -2.50 
            (0.012) 
                 -2.52 
              (0.012) 
Test  for  AR  (2) 
errors 
            -1.43 
         (0.153) 
             -1.30 
          (0.194) 
               -1.43 
            (0.153) 
                 -1.30 
              (0.194) 
No. of Industries                  20                  20                     20                       20 
No. of Observations                120                120                   120                     120 
Note:  Estimates of the intercept are not reported for economy of space. Significant at 1% 
***, 5%
**, and 
10%
*. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. The Hansen Test and Tests for AR errors are p - 
values for the   null of instruments validity. 
 
 
Overall, despite some notable differences in the coefficients of the control variables, a 
comparison with the original estimates as depicted in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, the results in 
Tables 4.6a and 4.6b above indicate that using alternative variables has no material 
effect on the estimated impact of financial development on industry structure.  
 
 
   
4.4.4.3. Alternative Period of Estimation. 
 
A key caveat of using panel data is that estimation is normally based on data averaged 
over five-year periods. When the T size of the panel is reduced through averaging, 142 
 
 
 
however, the properties of some panel estimators are also affected. The problem with 
this  methodology  particularly  arises  as  we  seek  to  assess  whether  the  connection 
between financial development and industry structure is sustainable in the long-run. 
To the extent that five years does not adequately proxy for long-run variations in 
industry  structure,  the  regression  results  obtained  through  the  panel  methods  may 
have to be tested further for robustness by using alternative estimation methods that 
are  based  on  lower-frequency  data.  Next,  therefore,  the  study  estimates  the 
relationship  between  financial  development  and  industry  structure  –  industry 
concentration  as  well  as  net  firm  entry  using  yearly  data  as  opposed  to  five-year 
averaged data.   
            
Notably,  the  model  in  Equation  (4.15)  includes  as  one  of  the  regressors  a  lagged 
dependent variable. In this case, using the usual approach to estimating a fixed-effects 
or  the  least  squares  dummy  variable  estimator  (LSDV)  model  –  as  depicted  in 
Equations (4.2) to (4.5) and (4.7) to (4.10) above – generates a biased estimate of the 
coefficient. Nickel (1981) derives an expression for the bias of a  in Equation (4.15) 
when  there  are  no  exogenous  regressors,  showing  that  the  bias  approaches  zero 
asT ®¥ .  Thus,  the  LSDV  estimator  performs  relatively  well  when  the  time 
dimension of the panel is ‘large’. However, there exist several estimators that have 
been proposed to estimate Equation (4.15) when T is ‘not large’. Anderson and Hsiao 
(1981)  propose  two  instrumental  variable  procedures.  To  remove  the  fixed  effect, 
Equation (4.15) is first differenced to obtain; 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , 1 , 1 , 2 1 , 1 it i t i t i t it it it i t y y y y x x a b n n - - - - - ¢ ¢ - = - + - + -                                      (4.19) 
 
In the differenced equation, however, the errors  ( ) , 1 it i t n n - - are now correlated with 
the  one  of  the  independent  variables( ) , 1 , 2 i t i t y y - - - ,  and  they  recommend 
instrumenting  for  ( ) , 1 , 2 i t i t y y - - - with  either  , 2 i t y -   or  ( ) , 2 , 3 i t i t y y - - - which  are 
uncorrelated with the disturbance in Equation (4.19) but correlated with( ) , 1 , 2 i t i t y y - - - . 
Arellano (1989) shows that using the lagged difference as an instrument results in an 
estimator that has a very large variance. Arellano and Bond (1991) and Kiviet (1995) 143 
 
 
 
confirm the superiority of using the lagged level as an instrument with simulation 
results, which is the basis for the Anderson Hsiao estimator, given as;  
 
( )
1
AH Z X Z Y d
- ¢ ¢ =                                                                                                 (4.20) 
where,  Z   is  a  ( ) 2 K N T ´ - matrix  of  instruments,  X is  a  ( ) 2 K N T ´ - matrix  of 
regressors, and Y is a  ( ) 2 1 N T - ´  vector of dependent variables.  
However, as indicated above, the appropriateness of the estimator between the fixed 
effects or LSDV estimator and the Anderson and Hsiao estimator depends on the time 
dimension of the panel; whether  T is ‘large’ or ‘not large’. Since the literature does 
not provide the qualifying time dimension for a panel to be considered ‘large’ or ‘not 
large’, this study estimates using both methodologies, for the sake of completeness. 
  
Table 4.7a:  Alternative Estimation Results Using Yearly Data (1970-2004). 
Industry Concentration Model 
(Dependent Variable: CR) 
                            Baseline Model                          Interaction Model 
Estimates  not  allowing 
for  the  effects  of 
Financial Liberalization 
Estimates  allowing  for 
the  effects  of  Financial 
Liberalization 
Estimates  not  allowing 
for  the  effects  of 
Financial Liberalization 
Estimates  allowing  for 
the  effects  of  Financial 
Liberalization 
Fixed 
Effects 
Anderson- 
Hsiao 
Fixed 
Effects 
Anderson- 
Hsiao 
Fixed 
Effects 
Anderson- 
Hsiao 
Fixed 
Effects 
Anderson- 
Hsiao 
 
 
 
Variables: - 
       (1)         (2)         (3)         (4)         (5)        (6)         (7)          (8) 
 CR(t-1)  
 0.632*** 
(0.031) 
 0.671*** 
(0.042) 
  0.617*** 
(0.031) 
 0.657*** 
(0.040) 
 0.581*** 
(0.031) 
 0.618*** 
(0.040) 
 0.573*** 
(0.031) 
 0.608*** 
(0.040) 
GR 
-0.040*** 
(0.007) 
-0.037*** 
(0.008) 
 -0.045*** 
(0.007) 
-0.042*** 
(0.008) 
-0.033*** 
(0.007) 
-0.030*** 
(0.008) 
-0.037*** 
(0.007) 
-0.035*** 
(0.008) 
SH 
 0.267** 
(0.105) 
 0.265* 
(0.146) 
  0.245** 
(0.104) 
 0.241* 
(0.146) 
 0.242** 
(0.101) 
 0.233* 
(0.141) 
 0.269*** 
(0.102) 
 0.268** 
(0.136) 
MX 
 0.001 
(0.002) 
 0.001 
(0.002) 
 0.001 
(0.002) 
 0.001 
(0.002) 
 0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
 0.001 
(0.002) 
 0.001 
(0.002) 
MM 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.004 
(0.002) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.008 
(0.003) 
-0.008** 
(0.003) 
FIN 
 0.003*** 
(0.001) 
 0.003* 
(0.002) 
 0.003** 
(0.001) 
 0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
FIN FL ´  
     0.005*** 
(0.002) 
 0.005** 
(0.002) 
       
FIN ED ´  
         0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
 0.005*** 
(0.001) 
 0.005*** 
(0.001) 
FIN ED FL ´ ´  
             0.022** 
(0.011) 
 0.022*** 
(0.013) 
 
F  Test   173.05 
(0.000) 
     - 
 
 158.64 
(0.000) 
     - 
 
 171.04  
(0.000) 
     - 
 
156.67 
(0.000) 
     - 
 
R-squared     0.71       -     0.71       -     0.72       -     0.73       - 
No. of Industries      20      20      20      20      20      20      20      20 
No. of Observations    680    680    680    680    680    680    680    680 
Note:  Estimates of the intercept are not reported for economy of space. Significant at the 1% 
***, 5%
**, 
and 10%
*. Robust Standard Errors are in  parentheses.  144 
 
 
 
   
 
Table 4.7b:  Alternative Estimation Results Using Yearly Data (1970-2004). 
Net Firm Entry Model 
(Dependent Variable: NFE) 
                            Baseline Model                          Interaction Model 
Estimates  not  allowing 
for  the  effects  of 
Financial Liberalization 
Estimates  allowing  for 
the  effects  of  Financial 
Liberalization 
Estimates  not  allowing 
for  the  effects  of 
Financial Liberalization 
Estimates  allowing  for 
the  effects  of  Financial 
Liberalization 
Fixed 
Effects 
Anderson- 
Hsiao 
Fixed 
Effects 
Anderson- 
Hsiao 
Fixed 
Effects 
Anderson- 
Hsiao 
Fixed 
Effects 
Anderson- 
Hsiao 
 
 
 
Variables: - 
       (1)         (2)         (3)         (4)         (5)        (6)         (7)          (8) 
 NFE(t-1) 
 0.428*** 
(0.034) 
 0.453*** 
(0.037) 
 0.431*** 
(0.035) 
 0.455*** 
(0.038) 
 0.424*** 
(0.034) 
 0.448*** 
(0.037) 
 0.419*** 
(0.034) 
 0.443*** 
(0.038) 
 PCM  
-0.132** 
(0.043) 
-0.132** 
(0.052) 
-0.134** 
(0.043) 
-0.134** 
(0.052) 
-0.120** 
(0.043) 
-0.118** 
(0.054) 
-0.119** 
(0.043) 
-0.118** 
(0.054) 
MKD 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
 -0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
GR 
 0.140*** 
(0.016) 
 0.136*** 
(0.019) 
 0.141*** 
(0.016) 
 0.138*** 
(0.020) 
 0.148*** 
(0.016) 
 0.156*** 
(0.021) 
 0.159*** 
(0.017) 
 0.156*** 
(0.021) 
MM 
 0.011** 
(0.005) 
 0.011* 
(0.006) 
 0.011** 
(0.005) 
 0.012* 
(0.006) 
 0.011** 
(0.005) 
 0.022** 
(0.009) 
 0.022*** 
(0.007) 
 0.022** 
(0.009) 
FIN 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
 -0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
 -0.005 
(0.004) 
FIN FL ´  
    -0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
       
FIN ED ´  
         0.005** 
(0.002) 
 0.007** 
(0.003) 
 0.008*** 
(0.003) 
 0.007** 
(0.004) 
FIN ED FL ´ ´  
            -0.079*** 
(0.027) 
-0.078** 
(0.037) 
 
F  Test    41.71 
(0.000) 
     - 
 
  37.53 
(0.000) 
     - 
 
 36.50 
(0.000) 
     - 
 
  35.82 
(0.000) 
     - 
 
R-squared     0.37       -     0.37       -     0.37       -     0.38       - 
No. of Industries      20      20      20      20      20      20      20      20 
No. of Observations    680    680    680    680    680    680    680    680 
Note:  Estimates of the intercept are not reported for economy of space. Significant at the 1% 
***, 5%
**, 
and 10%
*. Robust Standard Errors are in  parentheses.  
 
 
Tables 4.7a and 4.7b show results for the fixed effects as well as the Anderson Hsiao 
estimators for industry concentration and net firm entry, respectively. The results are 
predominantly similar to those obtained using five-year averaged data. In Table 4.7a, 
the  coefficient  for  the  variable  of  interest  FIN  is  positively  related  to  industry 
concentration and statistically significant (at 1 percent level using the fixed effects 
estimator  and  at  10  percent  using  the  Anderson  Hsiao  estimator).  The  results  are 
robust  to  the  inclusion  of  financial  liberalization  effects  as  well  as  when 
considerations are made regarding industry-specifics; in particular external finance 
dependence. Both Columns (7) and (8) of Table 4.7a show positive coefficients that 
are statistically significant (at 1 percent and 5 percent level).  145 
 
 
 
 
4.5. CONCLUSION. 
 
Recent  empirical  studies  have  adequately  established  that  financial  development 
characterised  by  a  competitive  financial  system,  matters  for  economic  growth. 
However,  subsequent  research  efforts  focus  on  the  details  that  facilitate  this 
relationship. Of the various attributes of the financial system, efficient and equitable 
allocation of credit for firms’ investment, by banks and other lending institutions, is 
likely to have a qualifying impact on the finance-growth nexus.  Mitigating firms’ 
financing constraints, by easing their access to credit, and by extension, facilitating 
their entry and the development of a competitive industry sector is, in my opinion, one 
such attribute. 
   
This study has therefore investigated a new dimension of analysis of the finance and 
economic growth relationship. The findings in the study suggest a nontrivial impact of 
financial development on industry concentration. Following investigations conducted 
through regression  estimations, there is evidence that financial development has  a 
first-order  positive  effect  on  industry  concentration.  A  number  of  sensitivity  tests 
performed  on  the  baseline  regression  model  confirm  that  a  positive  relationship 
between financial development and industry concentration indeed exists and is robust 
to changes in the estimation method. This  confirms the theoretical prediction that 
despite  financial  liberalization  and  financial  development,  the  amount  of  credit 
available to the economy as a whole, does not necessarily increase. However, whilst 
the study finds this effect to be applicable economy-wide, it also finds evidence that 
financial  development  has  a  heterogeneous  effect  across  industries.  In  particular, 
evidence  from  a  cross-industry  panel  indicates  that,  controlling  for  industry  fixed 
effects, firms in sectors more in need of external finance become disproportionately 
more  concentrated  with  the  development  of  the  financial  system.  This  result  is 
consistent with theoretical priors suggesting that with the development of the financial 
system, banks and other financial institutions may concentrate lending to fewer firms, 
with whom they have already established long lasting relationships, thus restricting 
credit access to newer entrants; thereby increasing concentration in those industries. 
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The  results  have  obvious  policy  implications  for  Malawi  and  other  developing 
countries  that  have  equally  embraced  financial  liberalization  policies.  Clearly,  the 
findings of this study show that, in Malawi, the economic reform efforts taken in the 
past,  which  included  the  development  of  the  financial  system  through  financial 
liberalization,  with  the  objective  of  constraining  monopoly  power  in  the 
manufacturing sector and thereby improve competition in the domestic market, have 
not produced the expected results. These results further contradict the arguments by 
Rajan and Zingales (1998). Following their landmark study, Rajan and Zingales claim 
that  financial  development  affects  growth  in  both  the  average  size  of  existing 
establishments and in the number of new establishments in industries dependent on 
external finance (though disproportionately the former). Thus, according to Rajan and 
Zingales,  with  the  development  of  financial  markets,  more  firms  will  be  created; 
reducing the average size of firms; and, existing firms will be able to grow faster, 
increasing the average size of firms. However, the results in this investigation do not 
support this view. 
 
One caveat with the foregoing analysis though is that it is restricted to the static short-
term industry situation and does not consider questions related to the dynamics of the 
industry’s  life  cycle  or  long-term  evolution.  In  this  regard,  therefore,  it  may  be 
necessary,  for  a  well  informed  policy  debate,  to  further  investigate  whether  the 
relationship  between  financial  development  and  industry  structure  changes  its 
intensity with time; thus, whether there are variations between the short-run and long-
run. Further, it may also be necessary to examine whether the nature and causes of 
any such changes as well as the related period that might be required to undergo the 
adjustments,  applies  uniformly  across  all  industries.  These  issues,  and  more 
importantly the possible prevalence of heterogeneity across industries, are therefore 
examined in the next chapter. 
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Appendix 4.1: Stochastic Model of Industry Concentration: Gibrat’s Law. 
 
Stochastic models suggest that the size distribution of firms is not the outcome of 
systematic  forces  but  rather  the  result  of  a  large  number  of  random  influences 
affecting all firms. Thus, regardless of past history and initial size, actual growth rates 
will differ over any particular period simply because some firms will have more ‘luck’ 
than others. Repeated over some period, this process will create a small number of 
firms  that  will  attain  position  of  dominance;  thereby  lead  to  increase  in  industry 
concentration. Accordingly, in its simplest form, the principle that the growth of firms 
is an independent random variable is therefore known as Gibrat’s Law or the ‘Law of 
Proportionate Effect’ (L.P.E.). This phenomenon has been described in many ways by 
different researchers (amongst them, Hart and Prais, 1956; Champernowne, 1953; and 
Simon and Bonini, 1958). However, the description by Hart and Prais (1956) is the 
most  common;  where  they  take  the  proportionate  growth  of  a  firm  to  be  an 
independent random variable, 
,
, 1
i t
t
i t
x
U
x -
=                                                                                                                (4.1.1) 
where,  it x denotes the size of firm i  at time t. Growth is represented as a stochastic 
process in continuous space and discreet time. Dropping the subscript i, Hart and Prais 
re-write the above equation as, 
1
0
t t t t j
j
X X e e
¥
- -
=
= + =∑                                                                                           (4.1.2) 
where,  t X denotes log size at time t , and log t t U e = . It can then be seen that the 
model is a so-called ‘random walk’ in log size, and that the value of the process at 
time t is the sum of an infinite series of independent random shocks. According to 
Hart  and  Prais,  it  then  follows  from  the  Central  Limit  Theorem  that  t X   will  be 
Normally Distributed when t is large, and hence that the size distribution of firms will 
have the Log-Normal distribution. Thus, the speed at which industry concentration 
increases is positively related to the variation of growth rates (i.e., to the variance of 
the random variable t e ).   
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Appendix 4.2:      Firm Entry/Exit: The Profitability Nexus. 
 
Industrial organisation theory suggests profitability to be the main motivation behind 
firm entry/exit, such that positive profits attract future entry into industry while losses 
encourage exits (see, e.g. Dunne et al, 1988; Geroski and Jacquemin, 1985; Beesley 
and Hamilton, 1984; Hause and Du Rietz, 1984; and, Orr, 1974). Accordingly, a firm 
i  ‘s  decision  to  enter  the  industry  is  determined  by  its  assessment/perception  of 
expected post-entry profits π 
e
i ; and, cost of experimentation or the initial investment 
required to enter the market, F, (see, for example, Geroski, 1995); thus, 
 
E i = β (π 
e
i - F) + ε i                                                                                             (4.2.1) 
 
where, Ei represents entry or exit decision of firm i.  For simplicity, it is assumed that 
F is equal for all potential entrants within the same market. From a static point of 
view  with  perfect  competition  among  rational  and  homogenous  agents,  entry  will 
therefore occur as long as the discounted value of expected return from investment is 
higher  than  the  entry  costs,  i.e.  if  π
e
i  >  F.  As  firm  entry  is  bound  to  undermine 
collusive tendencies within the industry – and therefore depress the incumbents’ price 
setting power – profits slowly decline as entry increases. In equilibrium, expected 
post-entry profits net of entry costs would tend to be zero (π
e
i – F = 0) for all firms, 
and  entry  decisions,  Ei,  will  only  depend  on  stochastic  variations  without  any 
systematic  component.  As  such,  in  a  world  of  static  equilibrium  and  perfect 
competition  –  with  positive  entry  cost  but  no  strategic  interaction  –  the  baseline 
conjecture is to expect no significant differences in the average profitability and entry 
opportunities between firms. Competitive entry will occur as long as the discounted 
value of expected returns to investment is higher than the entry cost. Meanwhile the 
exit decisions of incumbent firms depend negatively on profitability as the likelihood 
to exit increases with lower (actual) profits or losses, i.e. when π
a
i < F (where π
a 
represents  ‘actual’  profits).  However,  in  equilibrium,  supernormal  profits  are 
competed away. Consequently, firms do not differ systematically in terms of average 
profitability. The start-up cost, or cost experimentation, becomes an effective barrier 
to entry (see, Bain, 1956; Schmalensee, 1989; Slade, 2004). Meanwhile, sustainability 
of firm profitability is hypothesised to depend on industry structure.  
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Appendix 4.3: Determination of Firms’ External Finance Dependence:   
                         Spearman Rank-Order Correlation Coefficient.        
 
Despite  its  wide  applicability,  the  Rajan  and  Zingales  (1998)  methodology  for 
determining the proxy for a firms’ external finance dependence has sometimes been 
questioned  in  the  literature  in  terms  of  its  applicability  as  an  indicator  for  other 
countries. Specifically, the underlying assumption that the same technological reasons 
that make a particular industry in the USA more dependent on external finance than 
other industries in the USA also make this particular industry more dependent on 
external  finance  in  all  other  countries  in  the  world,  has  been  contested.  Notably, 
Demirguc-Kunt  and  Maksimovic  (1998)  argues  that  it  is  important  to  allow  for 
differences among countries in the amount of external financing needed by firms in 
the same industry. Many developing countries, for instance, support certain industries 
through  subsidies,  for  strategic  reasons,  such  as  trade  or  food  security.  These 
industries may be less dependent on external finance than without those subsidies.  
 
In view of the foregoing arguments, therefore, whilst adopting the Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) methodology, this study instead uses data for three-digit ISIC level industries’ 
credit  as  extended  by  the  Malawi  banking  system  for  the  period  1996-2002,  and 
calculates external finance dependence ratios for Malawian firms, as the fraction of 
expenditures not financed with internal cash-flow from operations. Thus, total capital 
expenditure minus cash-flow from operations divided by total capital expenditure, to 
determine  Malawian  manufacturing  industry-specific  external  finance  dependence 
ratios. Next, using the Spearman’s Rank-Order test, a comparison is made between 
the ratios calculated using Malawi banking system data and those calculated by Rajan 
and  Zingales  (1998)  in  order  to  determine  if  the  two  rankings  are  significantly 
different.  
 
The Spearman Rank-Order Correlation Coefficient ( s r ) is a measure of association 
between two variables, which requires that both variables be measured in at least an 
ordinal scale so that the objects or individuals under study may be ranked in two 
ordered  series  (Siegel  and  Castellan,  1988;  Gibbons,  1985).  The  formula  for  the 
determination of the coefficient is given as follows; 150 
 
 
 
( )
( )
2
2
6
1
1
i
s
D
r
N N
= -
-
∑
                                                                                             (4.3.1) 
where; 6 is a constant, D refers to the difference between a subjects’ ranks on the two 
variables; and, N   is the number of subjects. Given the two rankings on external 
finance dependence ratios, (where the lowest value is ranked as number one); first as 
determined by Rajan and Zingales (1998) - (RZ) and second as calculated using bank 
loans data for Malawi - (MW), the above formula is therefore used to investigate the 
relationship between the two rankings.  
 
Manufacturing 
 Sub-Sector 
ED (rz)  
Ratio 
Rank 
  (X) 
ED (mw) 
Ratio 
Rank  
  (Y) 
  Di  
(X - Y) 
Di
2 
Tobacco manufacturing  -0.45    1  1.53  20    -19  361 
Leather  -0.14    2  0.15    4      -2      4 
Footwear  -0.08    3  0.37    9      -6    36 
Clothing and Apparel    0.03    4  0.43  10      -6    36 
Non-Metal Products    0.06    5  0.22    5       0      0 
Beverages    0.08    6  1.18  16    -10  100 
Food    0.14    7  0.10    1       6    36 
Paper Products    0.17    8  1.32  18    -10  100 
Textiles    0.19    9  0.59  13      -4    16 
Printing and Publishing    0.20  10  1.01  15      -5    25 
Rubber    0.23  11  0.13    3       8    64 
Furniture    0.24  12  0.34    8       4    16 
Fabricated Metal    0.24  13  0.26    6       7    49 
Industrial Chemicals    0.25  14  1.26  17       3      9 
Wood and Sawmill    0.28  15  0.11    2     13  169 
Transport Equipment    0.36  16  1.42  19      -3      9 
Machinery – General    0.60  17  0.31    7     10  100 
Other Chemicals    0.75  18  0.93  14       4    16 
Machinery – Electrical    0.95  19  0.53  11       8    64 
Plastic Products    1.14  20  0.55  12       8    64 
                                                                                                                                                     
                  ∑Di
2           =   1274 
 
From the foregoing the value of  s r  is therefore computed as follows; 
   ( )
( )
2
2
6
1
1
i
s
D
r
N N
= -
-
∑ ( )
( )
2
6 1274
1
20 20 1
= -
-
7644
1
7890
= - 0.031 =                                     (4.3.2) 
Thus,  assuming  the  RZ  rankings  are  denoted  as  X1,  X2,  X3  …XN,  and  the  MW 
rankings  represented  by  Y1,  Y2,  Y3,…YN the  Spearman  Rank  -  Order  Correlation 
Coefficient may be used to determine the relationship between the X’s and the Y’s. 
And, a perfect correlation between the two rankings would be considered only if the 151 
 
 
 
rankings are equal, that is if Xi = Yi for all ‘i’s, thus if each industry sub-sector was 
ranked equally in both calculations. Next, is testing the null hypothesis that the two 
rankings are not associated (i.e. they are independent), and the observed value of   s r  
differs  from  zero  only  by  chance.  Thus  we  test  the  hypothesis  H0:  there  is  no 
association between the ranking as determined by RZ and that by MW, against the 
hypothesis H1: there is association between the two rankings (two-tailed test). As the 
value of the calculated  s r  is 0.031, with N = 20 industry sub-sectors, referring to the 
table on Critical Values of  s r  (Siegel and Castellan, 1988, Table Q, pp. 360-361), the 
calculated Spearman Rank-Order Correlation Coefficient lies outside the significance 
region. Thus, we can conclude that the two rankings are significantly different from 
each other. This is further confirmed through the following computer-generated test 
results; 
 
 Spearman EMW ERZ, stats (rho p) 
 Number of obs =     700 
 Spearman's rho =       0.0436 
 Test of Ho: EMW and ERZ are independent 
 Prob > |t| =       0.2490 
 
This result therefore means that the two rankings may not be used interchangeably 
without  adverse  implications  on  our  analysis.  However,  notwithstanding  this 
statistical test result, there still exists some similarity between the two rankings. For 
instance, external finance dependence ratios for non-metal products, leather products 
and  transport  equipment  exhibit  no  or  insignificant  differences  in  their  rankings 
between the two calculations. Accordingly, whilst the study bases its investigations on 
the Malawian calculated external finance dependence ratios, the Rajan and Zingales 
(1998)  ratios  are  also  applied  for  robustness  checks  and  completeness  of  the 
investigations.  
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 CHAPTER 5.0:     FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION AND INDUSTRY  
                       RESPONSE HETEROGENEITY. 
 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION. 
 
The main objective of financial liberalization policy is to induce greater flexibility for 
economic agents, such as investing firms, in their choice of competitive strategies 
through  the  facilitation  of  access  to  financial  resources  for  investment.  Arguably, 
depending on changes in the financial institutions lending behaviour, before and after 
financial liberalization; as well as characteristics and capabilities of individual firms 
within the respective industries, the outcome of these competitive strategies is bound 
to  have  implications  that  vary  from  industry  to  industry.  Accordingly,  whereby 
industry  groups  with  efficient  firms  grow  or  expand  by  investing  to  enhance 
capabilities,  productivity  and  quality,  thereby  attracting  new  firm  entries;  instead, 
those industries that are characterised by less efficient firms contract, and ultimately 
register more firm exits. This should eventually lead to changes in the configuration 
of the economy-wide industry structure.  
 
This  chapter  adopts  a  disaggregated  approach  to  investigate  heterogeneity  in 
implications of financial liberalization on industry  structure. This industry-specific 
analysis  is  consistent  with  the  argument  by  Sutton  (1994)  who  contends  that 
economists and business historians can fruitfully interact to increase knowledge of 
industry evolutionary processes by focusing at studies that are structured at a single 
industry level. The approach is further in tandem with the theory that suggests that 
changes  in  industry  structure  will  be  affected  by  the  attributes  of  the  individual 
industry in question that are operationalizable in terms of the levels of different types 
of  sunk  costs  (see,  for  example,  Ghemawat  and  Kennedy,  1999).  This  is  also 
consistent with the argument by Dedola and Lippi (2005) that distributional effects of 
financial  sector  policy  can  most  easily  be  detected  by  exploiting  the  wide 
disaggregated cross-industry variations
82. Accordingly, it may therefore be argued that 
                                                 
82 Implications   of   variations   in   industry-specific  characteristics  on the  differences in response to  
    policy changes have been  reported  by,  for instance, Barth and Ramey (2001) in a study of the US 
    manufacturing; and, Peersman and Smets (2002) in a study of industries in  seven euro countries. 153 
 
 
 
the hypothesised distributional effects of financial liberalization policies should most 
easily be detected by exploiting the wide disaggregated cross-industry variations. Any 
observed heterogeneity of experience across industry groups should therefore suggest 
a different industry-specific approach for future policy reforms.  
 
As provided in the literature, financial liberalization implies increases in the role of 
market forces, which should, one way or another influence the level of competition, 
and  ultimately  the  structure  that  evolves  within  the  respective  industry  group. 
However, the precise direction of this relationship between different industry groups 
is not unambiguous. The effect may cause concentration to fall in industry groups 
where regulation had induced it to be artificially high and to rise in industry groups 
where it had been artificially low. Similarly, the process may induce new firm entry 
and/or  firm  exits,  differently  between  different  industry  groups.  According  to 
literature, the creation of new firms is by many considered to be a crucial source of 
industrial development and economic growth, and its relation to the availability and 
cost of capital is also straightforward. However, these processes are hypothesised to 
be  mostly  dependent  on  underlying  industry-specific  characteristics;  thereby 
suggesting  that  there  should  be  differences  across  industries  in  the  manner  the 
respective industry structures develop following financial liberalization. It is further 
hypothesised that the precise effect of financial liberalization policy should mostly be 
dependent upon whether the industry is financially constrained or not, as well as the 
extent to which the respective firms depend on external financing for their operations. 
These  perspectives  therefore  remain  to  be  empirically  investigated  further  in  this 
chapter in order to inform this debate. Currently, limited empirical literature seeks to 
examine these issues directly using a disaggregated industry-specific approach.  
 
 
5.2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
 
5.2.1. Conceptual Background. 
 
According to literature, implementation of financial liberalization policies should lead 
to the transformation of industry structures strictly through the behavioural responses 
from the individual industry-specifics – in respect of both incumbent firms as well as 154 
 
 
 
new entrants, and large-scale or small-scale – to the new competitive environment. 
Such policies shape market structures and allow greater scope for normal competitive 
processes so that industry dynamics should progressively be determined by individual 
industry-specific  characteristics  rather  than  external  influence.  And,  as  indicated 
previously  in  this  study,  changes  in  industry  concentration  and  net  firm  entry, 
underpin changes in industry structure. As such, these are useful summary statistics 
that provide some indications of the extent to which a particular industry group differs 
from the competitive benchmark, following policy changes.  
 
Arguably, whilst changes brought about by financial liberalization policy may have an 
impact  on  industry  structure,  in  one  way  or  another,  the  impact  may  be  different 
across  different  industry  groups.  Generally,  changes  brought  about  by  financial 
liberalization may allow some incumbent firms to increase their market dominance – 
through  disproportionately  increasing  their  share  of  value-added  in  the  industry  – 
thereby causing concentration to increase and reducing competition. In other industry 
groups, these very financial policy changes may erode the advantages of incumbency, 
resulting in increased entry of new investing firms and increasing competition. The 
precise impact of this policy change should therefore vary from industry to industry, 
and may not be charted in advance. Meanwhile, however, whilst the precise effects of 
financial liberalization on the real sector remain inconclusive, others like Kaminsky 
and Schmukler (2008) and Loayza and Ranciere (2006) also contend that the reason 
for this inconclusive evidence is that the effects of financial liberalization are time 
varying – with short run and long run effects.  
 
Further, frictions or imperfections in the financial system suggest that uncertainty and 
sunk  costs,  among  other  factors,  exacerbate  financing  constraints.  By  definition, 
according to Almeida et al (2004), among others, a firm is considered as financially 
constrained  if  it  retains  cash  out  of  its  cash  flow.  Financing  constraints  affect 
investments decisions of industry incumbents as well as new firms
83. Precisely, the 
immediate response of potential entrants and incumbents to a relaxation of financial 
constraints – as financial liberalization is hypothesised to achieve – could be increased 
investment, employment, research and development, imports and exports activity, in 
                                                 
83 See, for example, Cabral and Mata (2003); Gentry and Hubbard  (2000); Cooley and Quadrini  
    (2001); Fairlie (1999); Holtz-Eakin and Rosen (1999); and, Fazzari et al (1988) 155 
 
 
 
various combinations. However, for each industry, the extent of this responsiveness 
should therefore be dependent on the industry-specific characteristics. For instance, 
large-scale firms where operations are relatively more external finance dependent may 
also have the relative advantage of growing or expanding disproportionately larger 
than  small-scale  firms  that  are  equally  external  finance  dependent.  Similarly,  the 
influence of financial constraints on firm entry and exit in external finance dependent 
industries may vary with possible entrants’ access to credit markets. Overall, financial 
institutions  lending  pattern  following  financial  liberalization  is  pivotal  to  these 
processes.  Hence,  the  need  to  investigate  the  extent  to  which  the  hypothesised 
distributional  characteristic  of  financial  liberalization  is  uniformly  reflected  in  the 
individual industry groups.   
 
 
5.2.2. Methodology. 
 
Empirical studies of industry structure have mostly focused on the analysis of cross-
section data with industries as the unit of observation. While this approach  yields 
general implications for industrial organisation theory, little detail on the relationships 
and the structure of individual industries results. As such, whilst investigating the link 
between financial development and industry structure using an aggregated approach 
might  generally  be  acceptable  in  the  industrial  organisation  literature,  it  may 
nonetheless obscure specific effects and relationships. Thus, assuming homogeneity 
across industry groups implies that industries respond in a similar manner to policy 
changes. Yet, any change process is not likely to be uniform across industrial groups. 
As Curry and George (1983) observes; “...our understanding of the determinants of 
changes  in  [industry  structure]  has  not  been  greatly  enhanced  by  cross-section 
analysis of large number of industries... More fruitful approaches are the study of 
individual industries and the detailed analysis of individual causes of change” (ibid, 
p.227). A few examples of these characteristics should perhaps suffice to elaborate on 
the foregoing. 
 
In studies of industrial concentration, for instance, often overlooked is the fact that 
while the overall industry may not be highly concentrated at national level, many of 
the  individual  industries  could  be  dominated  by  a  few  large  chains.  Further,  the 156 
 
 
 
concentration  levels  in  the  respective  industries  may  be  a  result  of  a  different 
combination of factors,  which may not apply uniformly across all industries.  In a 
study  of  the  US  manufacturing  industry,  Mueller  and  Hamm  (1974)  observe  that 
whereas average concentration of industries shows an increase, the average conceals 
much  greater  variation  between  industry  groups.  In  fact,  Blair  (1972)  previously 
analysed  the  same  sample  of  US  industries,  and  the  results  had  shown  variations 
between industries. George (1975) and Sawyer (1971) separately establish that, on 
average, the five-firm concentration ratio for the United Kingdom shows an increase 
between 1953 and 1963; but both observe that this development is mostly due to only 
two-thirds of the sample of industries, as concentration in the rest show a decline. 
Weiss (1983), Caswell (1987), and Nissan (1998) separately study and conclude that 
mergers  explain  the  increase  in  aggregate  industrial  concentration  in  the  United 
States. However, O’Neill (1996) examines the same relationship in more detail and 
concludes  that  the  trends  in  mergers  results  in  rising  concentration  in  only  some 
sectors  of  the  economy,  and  that,  otherwise,  aggregate  concentration  in  the  US 
economy shows an overall decline during the period under study. This has important 
implications for, say, competition policies, as it sheds light on key determinants of 
concentration trends in particular industries. 
 
Similar variations are observed in studies regarding firm entry and exit. Most of the 
literature  has  tended  to  view  market  participants;  both  new  entrants  as  well  as 
incumbents,  as  equally  placed  in  making  decisions  each  period  to  enter,  exit,  or 
remain in the industry (see, Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991). However, as Toivanen and 
Waterson (2005) note, this assumes that all market participants are the same, and 
ignores differences among firms and the related sunk entry costs. Further, as noted by 
Feinberg  (2007)  this  literature  assumes  that  all  firms  have  access  to  the  same 
technology and same input prices, so have identical costs. Yet, empirical research 
reveals extensive variations between firms in regard to the entry and exit patterns and 
determinants. As argued by Fotopoulos and Spence (1998), perceived height of entry 
barriers is a notion related to the special characteristics of those who perceive it; such 
that, not all types of firms perceive entry barriers in the same way. Dunne et al (1988) 
also  find  that  there  is  significant  variation  in  the  firm  entry,  firm  exits,  and  size 
patterns  of  different  categories  of  entrants  as  response  to  changes  in  the  market 
environment. Their findings provide evidence of heterogeneity in firm entry and exit 157 
 
 
 
patterns  across  industries;  thereby  suggesting  that  there  are  industry-specific 
characteristics  that  cause  variations  in  firm  entry  and  exit  rates,  and  also  in  their 
determination. Dunne et al specifically observe that this variation in the intensity of 
the selection process by which incumbents are displaced by new entrants is explained 
by variation in profitability and growth, and by variation in the height of entry and 
exit  barriers.  In  a  study  on  Greek  manufacturing  industries,  Droucopoulos  and 
Thomadakis (1993) further find considerable differences in the effect of entry barriers 
for firms when size-class market shares are examined. Geroski (1991b) also report 
fairly unstable inter-industry variation over time on entry for seventy-nine three-digit 
UK manufacturing industries. Geroski compares inter-industry correlation coefficients 
of entry measures, including net firm entry, and establish that the proportion of total 
variation accounted by differences in industry specifics is 21.0 percent. Audretsch and 
Mahmood (1994) track through eleven thousand US manufacturing firms over a ten-
year  period  and  similarly  observe  that  the  start-up  and  entry  size  of  firms  varies 
substantially across manufacturing sectors.  
 
Overall, the foregoing case studies – on both industry concentration as well as net 
firm  entry  –    albeit  not  exhaustive,  demonstrate  that  there  is  likely  to  be  some 
heterogeneity in industry-specific characteristics which chart their responsiveness to 
policy  changes  in  the  market,  thereby  influence  the  structure  of  the  industry, 
differently across industry groups. Consistent with these priors, therefore, there is no a 
priori basis to assume that the effect of financial liberalization on industry structure is 
uniform  across  all  industry  groups.  Accordingly,  the  use  of  aggregated  data,  as 
observed by Levchenko (2005), and Broner and Ventura (2006), may in some cases 
lead to results that overshadow the most important effects of financial liberalization, 
and in others produce estimates that are not informative about the implications for the 
individual average establishment.  Instead, disaggregated industry-specific approach 
facilitates a deeper understanding of how financial liberalization typically affects the 
different  individual  agents  within  the  structure  of  an  industry  and  across  industry 
groups. As Weiss (1983) argues, each ‘explanatory variable’ comes with its own set 
of strengths and weaknesses, which might not uniformly explain changes in industry 
structure  across  all  industries.  More  recently,  a  similar  observation  is  made  by 
Peneder (2008), on the entry and exit of firms in any industry. Peneder argues that 
firms  may  not  be  homogenous  as  they  do  not  perceive  entry  barriers  and  other 158 
 
 
 
economic  determinants  in  the  same  way;  and  therefore  differ  in  their  competitive 
strengths and weaknesses. This, according to Peneder, is usually demonstrated, for 
instance, when competitive entrants displace incumbent firms that do not meet the 
elevated market standard.  
 
Accordingly, considering the obvious differences that may exist across industries, the 
study  focuses  its  investigations  on  changes  in  the  individual  industry  structures. 
Arguably,  such  a  disaggregated  approach  should  facilitate  the  exploration  of 
specificities of individual industry groups. This should particularly facilitate testing of 
whether  financial  liberalization  induces  higher  level  of  competition  –  through  a 
reduction  in  concentration;  and,  whether  this  process  induces  the  creation  of  new 
firms – more in some industries and less in others. The approach should also facilitate 
an industry-specific investigation on whether financial liberalization eases financing 
constraints;  particularly  more  in  those  industries  where  firms  are  relatively  highly 
dependent on external financing than in those that rely more on internally generated 
cash flow, as suggested by Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
 
 
5.3. A FRAMEWORK FOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS. 
 
5.3.1. Model Specifications. 
 
The study, as per the foregoing, first examines heterogeneity in the effect of financial 
liberalization on the evolution of industry structure, viz; industry concentration and 
net firm entry – in aggregated form, and then followed by disaggregated industry 
specific  examinations.  Next,  the  study  investigates  further  cross-industry 
heterogeneity by examining the financial liberalization effect on financing constraints 
for the firm, particularly with respect to their extent of external financing dependency. 
 
The empirical investigation therefore involves testing of whether there is evidence of 
any  distributional  effects  of  financial  liberalization  on  industry  structure;  and,  in 
particular, whether such effects are uniform across all different industry groups. A 
way to test this is to augment an industry structure regression model – where, the 
dependent variable is either industry concentration or net firm entry, as measures of 159 
 
 
 
industry  structure  –  with  an  interaction  term  between  a  measure  of  financial 
development and a financial liberalization dummy.  The financial liberalization effects 
are therefore hypothesised to give results that vary from industry to industry.  
 
Determination of the foregoing heterogeneity is expected to be achieved by initially 
establishing  an  all  encompassing  sector  response  to  policy  changes  using  an 
aggregated economy-wide approach, followed by a specific focus on single-industry 
investigations for twenty industry groups, with each examined over a 35 year period. 
Subsequently,  the  aggregated  result  forms  a  benchmark  against  which  individual 
industry  groups  are  measured  in  order  to  establish  policy  response  heterogeneity 
across various industry groups, following financial liberalization.  
 
The following model structures are therefore used in this chapter; 
 
  ( ) 0 1 2 it t j i jt it t CR FIN FIN FL X b b b z w = + + ´ + +                                                  (5.1)                                                                                                 
( ) 0 1 2 it t j i jt it t NFE FIN FIN FL X b b b d m = + + ´ + +                                                (5.2) 
 
where,  it CR   and  it NFE   represent  industrial  concentration  and  net  firm  entry, 
respectively; at time t in industry i, which is now hypothesised to be a function of 
financial development t FIN , an interaction term between financial development and 
the financial liberalization dummy  ( )t FIN FL ´ , as well as a number of explanatory 
variables, i jt X ,  pertaining  to  the  fundamentals  in  the  respective  models,  and  as 
specified earlier in the study; whilst  it w  and  it m , are the usual error terms. 
 
 
 5.3.2. Estimation Techniques. 
 
5.3.2.1. Evolution of Industry Structure. 
 
The impact of financial liberalization on industry structure dynamics may take effect 
both in the short-run as well as in the long run, particularly as firms in the respective 
industry groups adjust to new opportunities and risks. Accordingly, the underlining 160 
 
 
 
notion of equilibrium in this approach is intertemporal, as the path of the equilibrium 
process is influenced not only by the current value of fundamental determinants but 
also  by  expectations  about  the  future  evolution  of  these  variables.  Besides,  as 
observed by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008) among others, financial liberalization is 
followed by pronounced ‘booms’ and ‘crashes’ in the short-run; thereby supporting 
the models in which financial liberalization triggers risky behaviour and excesses in 
the financial market. Contrastingly though, Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008) find that 
in  the  long  run,  financial  cycles  become  less  pronounced;  thus,  the  financial 
institutions and the overall financial market improve and tend to stabilise. Similarly, 
Loayza and Ranciere (2006) establish that financial liberalization can both generate 
short-run  instability  and  higher  long-run  growth.  These  characteristics  have  some 
effect on financial institutions’ lending behaviour, with implications on the real sector 
of the economy. Accordingly, by focusing on the effects at different time horizons, 
the study sets the basis for an explanation of the apparent contradictory effects of 
financial liberalization on industry structure. Besides, by distinguishing the effects 
based  on  time  horizons,  the  approach  should  provide  an  additional  dimension  for 
examining heterogeneity between the industry groups.  As indicated earlier, there is 
no  reason  to  expect  that  the  effect  of  financial  liberalization  policy  on  industry 
concentration  or  net  firm  entry  should  be  the  same  or  even  similar  in  different 
industry  groups.    Accordingly,  it  is  perceived  important  to  employ  an  estimation 
methodology that incorporates slow adjustment and allows for different short-run and 
long run effects.  
 
In the literature, two econometric techniques that account for sectoral heterogeneity: 
the Random Coefficient (RC) and the Mean Group (MG) models, by Swamy (1970) 
and Pesaran and Smith (1995), are initially examined.  These two estimators differ 
only on the basis of their assumptions on the nature of heterogeneity – whilst the MG 
estimator assumes that sector-specific deviations from the mean are deterministic, the 
RC estimator assumes they are stochastic. Thus, the basic concept of the RC estimator 
is that the intercepts and the slopes of the regressions are random variables. As a 
result,  MG  implements a  simple  arithmetic  averaging  of  sector  specific  estimates, 
whereas RC requires a generalized least squares procedure that optimally accounts for 
the stochastic nature of heterogeneity. Hsiao and Pesaran (2004, p.12) shows that the 
two estimators are algebraically equivalent in the limit. This suggests that analytical 161 
 
 
 
results drawn on the basis of deterministic heterogeneity, become valid in the limit, 
even if heterogeneity is actually stochastic (see, Appendix 5.1 for more).  
 
Nonetheless, considering the importance of heterogeneity, Hsiao and Pesaran suggest 
that – as the difference between these estimators is akin to that between fixed effect 
and random effect, and can be tested accordingly – a Hausman (1978) type test of the 
difference between MG and RC estimators be done, particularly where both N and T 
are sufficiently large, such as is the case in this study – in order to determine which of 
the two is consistent and efficient.  However, in reported test results on whether MG 
or  RC  provides  a  better  representation  of  data,  the  joint  Hausman  test  statistic  is 
30.21(0.000) and is distributed ( )
2 6 c , and therefore the MG estimator is preferred
84. 
Following Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Pesaran, Smith, and Im (1996), the Mean 
Group estimator is derived from the fully heterogeneous coefficient model, which 
imposes no cross-industry parameter restrictions and can be estimated on an industry-
by-industry basis, provided that the time-series dimension of the data is sufficiently 
large. When the cross-industry dimension is also large, the mean of short- and long-
run coefficients  across industries can be consistently  estimated by the  unweighted 
average of the individual industry coefficients, which is the MG estimator
85. 
 
Accordingly, following others in the literature (see, for example, Law, 2007; Byrne 
and Davis, 2005; Hogan, 2004; Asteriou and Monastiriotis, 2004), using the Mean 
Group (MG) estimator as the basic econometric technique, the study first estimates an 
encompassing  baseline  model  of  short-run  and  long-run  effects  of  financial 
liberalization on industry structure using a panel of cross-industry and time series as 
observations.  Next,  since  this  econometric  methodology  allows  the  industry-by-
industry  estimation  of  both  short-run  as  well  as  long-run  effects  of  financial 
liberalization  on  industry  structure,  the  study  analyses  the  industry-specific 
                                                 
84 Besides  the  Hausman test,  the Random Coefficient estimator is not preferred on the grounds that  it  
    does not  provide  for  dynamic operators in its estimation; yet, both industry concentration as well as  
    net firm  entry  are  dynamic processes. Accordingly, static specifications would be erroneous as they  
    are unlikely to capture  essential  features  of  the  dynamic processes (see, Hsiao and Pesaran , 2004;  
    Pesaran and Smith, 1995)   
85 Pesaran and Smith (1995), show that the Mean Group estimator gives consistent estimates of the true  
    cross-industry average  effect.   Further,   Pesaran et al (1996) conduct Monte Carlo simulations and  
    find that the finite sample bias is smaller for Mean Group estimator for all sample sizes (they apply a  
    panel  of   the   size  N=24 and T=32, which they describe as ‘quite large’, ibid. p.1; which is more or  
    less the same as  the sample size used for this study,  N=20, T=35). 162 
 
 
 
relationships in order to establish the extent of response heterogeneity. Apart from 
examining the behaviour of each variable in the respective industry groups following 
financial  liberalization,  this  also  involves  the  use  of  results  from  the  aggregated 
economy-wide estimates as a benchmark, and subsequently comparing the dispersion 
of each explanatory variable from this benchmark. Further, the investigation focuses 
on the financing constraints reducing effects of financial liberalization, particularly 
whether this hypothesis is uniformly applicable across industry groups. Arguably, this 
approach  should  facilitate  determination  of  response  heterogeneity  across  industry 
groups following financial liberalization.   
 
The empirical framework to evaluate the effect of financial liberalization on industry 
structure is based on a dynamic model of the form; 
 
( 1) 1,2, , ; 1,2, it i i t it i it y y x i N t T r b m - ¢ = + + = = K K                             (5.3) 
 
where,  it x  is a  1 K ´ vector of exogenous variables,  i r  is the coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable, and the error term  it m  is assumed to be independently, identically 
distributed over t with mean zero and variance 
2
i s , and is independent across i. Next, 
let ( ) , i i i q r b ¢ ¢ = , where it is assumed that i q is independently distributed across i with; 
 
( ) ( ) , i i E q q r b ¢ ¢ = =                                                                                                (5.4) 
( )( ) i i i E q q q q   ¢ - - = D    
                                                                                        (5.5) 
 
Rewrite i i q q a = + , Equations (5.4) and (5.5) are equivalent to; 
 
( ) ( )
,
0,
0 .
i i j
if i j
E E
if i j
a a a
D = 
¢ = = 
¹ 
                                                                        (5.6)                    
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Pesaran  and  Smith  (1995)  and  Hsiao  and  Pesaran  (2004)  indicate  that  whilst 
maintaining  the  assumption  that ( ) 0 i it E x a ¢ = ,  it  may  no  longer  be  assumed 
that ( ) ( ) 1 0 i i t E y a - = . Through continuous substitutions, 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 2 1 1 1 1
0 0
j j
i i i i t i t j i t j
j j
y x r a b a r a m
¥ ¥
- - - - -
= =
¢ = + + + + ∑ ∑                                  (5.7) 
 
It follows that ( ) ( ) 1 0 i i t E y a - ¹ . 
Pesaran and Smith (1995) observe that the violation of the independence between the 
regressors and the individual effects i a implies that pooled least squares  regression 
of it y on ( ) 1 i t y - will  yield  inconsistent  estimates  ofq ,  even  for  T  and  N  sufficiently 
large.  Pesaran  and  Smith  note  that  asT ®¥ ,  the  least  squares  regression  of 
it y on ( ) 1 i t y - and  it x yield a consistent estimator of ˆ , i i q q . They suggest a Mean Group 
estimator of q by taking the average of  ˆ
i q across i, 
 
1
1
ˆ ˆ
N
MG i
i
N q q
-
=
= ∑                                                                                                        (5.8) 
 
When  the  regressors  are  strictly  exogenous  and  the  error  terms  are  independently 
distributed, an unbiased estimator of the covariance matrix of  ˆ
MG q  is computed as;
   
( )
1 ˆ ˆ
MG Cov N q
- = D                                                                                                    (5.9) 
where,  
1 1
1 1 1
1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
1
N N N
i j i j
i j j
N N
N
q q q q
- -
= = =
¢   
D = - -   
-    ∑ ∑ ∑                                                        (5.10) 
 
Pesaran  and  Smith  (1995)  and  Pesaran  et  al  (1996)  show  that  the  Mean  Group 
estimator is consistent when both N andT ®¥ . Further, Pesaran et al (1999) and 
Pesaran  and  Shin  (1999)  demonstrate  that  this  estimator  yields  super-consistent 
estimators of the long-run parameters even when the regressors are I (1).   
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Notably,  the  main  hypothesis  of  the  Mean  Group  estimator  is  to  allow  the  slope 
coefficients to vary across cross-section units (for example, industry groups, in the 
case  of  this  study)  both  in  the  short-run  as  well  as  in  the  long-run.  However,  an 
alternative approach due to Pesaran et al (1999) is the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) 
estimator,  which  can  be  thought  of  as  weighted  average  of  individual  group 
estimators, with weights proportional to the inverse of their variance. Unlike the MG 
estimator, the PMG estimator only allows for heterogeneous short-run coefficients but 
constrains long-run parameters to be the same across units, i.e. i q q = . Thus, the PMG 
estimator  averages  the  short-run  industry  parameters  and  pools  the  long-run 
parameters, thereby combining the efficiency of the pooled estimation while avoiding 
the  inconsistency  problem  of  pooling  heterogeneous  dynamic  relationships. 
Nonetheless, for the analysis in this chapter, the advantage of using the MG estimator 
and not the PMG estimator is that it permits for heterogeneous short-run as well as 
long-run  adjustments  across  industry  groups  to  changes  following  financial 
liberalization. It is probably unreasonable to assume that, in the long-run, the dynamic 
effects of industry concentration or net firm entry are the same across industry groups. 
Besides, Blackburne and Frank (2007), amongst others, note that the hypothesis of 
homogeneity of the long-run policy parameters in PMG estimation cannot be assumed 
a priori. This, according to Blackburne and Frank, is due to the fact that, often the 
hypothesis of slope homogeneity is rejected empirically. Accordingly, in PMG, the 
‘pooling’  across  industries  yields  efficient  and  consistent  estimates  only  when  the 
restrictions are true. Otherwise, if the true model is heterogeneous, the PMG estimates 
are  inconsistent;  the  MG  estimates  are  consistent  in  either  case.  The  poolability 
restriction of the long-run parameters is therefore tested using a Hausman type test 
(Hausman, 1978) applied to the difference between the MG and PMG estimators; and 
the calculated joint Hausman statistic rejects the hypothesis of homogeneity in the 
long-run parameters (see Appendix 5.2). For this study, therefore, the MG estimator is 
preferred. As expected, both industry concentration and net firm entry are long-term 
phenomena. Further, the direct effects of financial liberalization as well as related 
shocks take some time to make any impact. Accordingly, it would only make sense 
that the results also measure long-run heterogeneity – hence, the MG estimator. 
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Next, since this econometric methodology – the MG estimator – allows the industry 
by  industry  estimation  of  both  short-run  as  well  as  long-run  effects  of  financial 
liberalization  on  industry  structure,  the  study  analyses  the  industry-specific 
relationships in order to establish the extent of response heterogeneity. The behaviour 
of each variable in the respective industry groups is therefore examined. Accordingly, 
as a specific test for heterogeneity, the study also examines the degree of dispersion 
across industries by estimating how far each of the estimated coefficients is from the 
mean. Thus, following Boyd and Smith (2000), the study calculates the standardised 
coefficient score (Z-Score) given the value of the coefficients as determined by the 
Mean Group estimator. The following is therefore estimated for each variable; 
( ) ( )
( )
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=                                                                                                    (5.11) 
where,  
i b
N
b m =  ,  ( ) ( )
( )
2
2
1
i
i
b
s b
N
b m -
=
-
;  
thus,  ( ) Z b measures whether the variable coefficient is an outlier in the distribution 
of all the  i b . Standardised values greater than 1 therefore indicate a wide dispersion of 
individual industry values relative to the common value suggested by the mean group 
estimator.  Thus,  outliers  are  shown,  either  if  they  are  more  than  one  standard 
deviation from the mean. Where the standard deviations are large, this should indicate 
an economically significant divergence. Increased dispersion from the mean should 
therefore  suggest  presence  of  a  significant  degree  of  heterogeneity  between  the 
industries. 
    
 
5.3.2.2. Financing Constraints. 
 
In an attempt to unravel further the effects of financial liberalization on industry, the 
study  next  examines  the  extent  to  which  this  policy  ameliorates  firms’  financing 
constraints. As established in the literature, there exists a strong relationship between 
firms’  financial  health  and  investment  (see,  for  example,  Hubbard,  1998).  And, 
according  to  Love  (2003),  firms’  financing  constraints  are  generally  attributed  to 
capital market imperfections, stemming from such factors as asymmetric information 166 
 
 
 
and incentive problems, which result in difference between the costs of internal and 
external  financing.  Love  (2003)  therefore  draws,  within  the  financing  constraints 
theory,  the  factor
1 1
1
t
t
t
l
l
+ +  
Q =   +  
,  which  is  the  relative  shadow  cost  of  external 
finance during period t and period t +1. Thus,  t Q  is a function of the stock of liquid 
assets, especially stock of cash; where,  t l  is the shadow cost of external financing in 
period t, reflecting information- or contracting-related frictions that are exogenous to 
the firm (see, for example, Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Hart, 
1995).  If the shadow cost of external funds is higher in period t than it is in period 
1 t + (i.e.  t l ￿ 1 t l + ), then t Q ￿ 1 which makes current period funds more expensive to 
use than the next period funds, thereby inducing the firm to postpone or even reduce 
its investment. In this case the firm is said to be ‘financially constrained’, and  t Q  is 
the (degree of) financial constraint. Thus, in a perfect capital market,  1 0 t t l l + = =  for 
all t and hence  1 t Q =  and the firm is never constrained. Love (2003) contends that 
with capital markets imperfections,  t l  depends on a vector of state variables and 
other  firm-  and/or  industry-specific  characteristics,  all  of  which  may  influence  a 
firms’ financing constraints. Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) argue that a change in 
‘financials’ and ‘fundamentals’ should influence firms’ financing constraints.  
 
Accordingly,  following  several  previous  studies
86,  in  this  study,  it  is  argued  that 
financial liberalization should reduce firms’ financing constraints – as this will lead to 
an improvement in the functioning of financial markets and allow for easier access to 
external funds for firms – thereby result in an increase in cash stock for investment. 
As indicated earlier in this study, the presumption of the orthodox view on financial 
liberalization  suggests  that  freeing  interest  rates  from  controls  that  keep  them 
artificially low, would increase the supply of loanable funds, and alleviate problems 
of credit constraints (see McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). In turn, this process should 
induce more competition in the industry through the provision of equitable growth 
opportunities as well as creation and entry  of  new investing  firms, particularly in 
those industry groups where firms are relatively more dependent on external financing 
                                                 
86 See,  for  example,  Laeven  (2003);  Galindo, Schiantarelli and Weiss (2001);  Bekaert, Harvey, and  
    Lundbald  (2005); and, Henry (2000b). 167 
 
 
 
for their operations, as argued by Rajan and Zingales (1998). Nonetheless, whatever 
the  macro  effect  may  be,  it  is  not  conclusive  that  financial  liberalization  will 
necessarily  relax  financing  constraints  for  all  firms.  Arguably,  even  after  the 
elimination  of  administrative  constraints,  information  problems  remain  and  it  is 
possible  that  certain  firms  may  face  a  rise  in  the  premium  they  pay  for  external 
finance. Further, as argued earlier in the study, apart from increasing cost of capital, 
there are tendencies by the financial institutions to credit ration and only facilitate 
credit  access  to  a  selected  client  base;  particularly  those  with  whom  they  have 
longstanding relationships. In view of the inconclusiveness of this debate therefore 
there is a need to investigate further the effects of financial liberalization on financing 
constraints in order to inform the debate.  
 
Following Love (2003), the financing constraint factor is parameterised as a linear 
function of the cash stock, and presented as; 
 
0 ( 1) it i n i t Cash a a - Q = +                                                                          (5.12) 
 
where, 0i a is  an  industry-specific  level  of  financing  constraint,  which  enters  in  the 
industry fixed effect,  n a is the industry-specific cash coefficient, and ( ) 1 i t Cash - is cash 
stock (lagged one period, since decisions for period t investment is dependent on how 
much cash a firm has before embarking on the investment). This, according to Love 
(2003), has a direct effect on investment in the presence of asymmetric information. It 
allows firms to undertake projects, which they would pass if they do not have any 
internal funds.   
 
However, in this study, the cash coefficients  ˆ a are instead replaced with the industry-
specific  coefficients  for  the  interaction  term  between  the  financial  development 
indicator  and  the  financial  liberalization  dummy( ) FIN FL ´ ,  obtained  in  the  first-
stage  regression  estimations  of  Equations  (5.1)  and  (5.2),  for  each  industry 
(respectively presented in Table 5.3 and Table 5.6, below).  Next, these industry-
specific coefficients are regressed on industry-specific index of financial dependency, 
using Malawi data but based on the methodology by Rajan and Zingales (1998). This 
industry-specific measure represents the extent to which firms in industry ‘i’ will rely 168 
 
 
 
on  financial  resources  outside  their  own  internally  generated  cash  flow.  And,  as 
argued by Rajan and Zingales (1998), this measure varies from industry to industry, 
since, due to technological reasons, industries differ in their dependence on external 
finance.  In  this  study  this  concept  is  used  to  determine  industry-specific  level  of 
financial development and to distinguish between industry groups with respect to their 
degree  of  financial  dependence.  In  this  framework,  the  industry’s  sensitivity  of 
investment to the level of internal funds – thus, the industry’s financing constraint – is 
allowed  to  vary  with  the  industry-specific  ratio  of  external  finance  dependency 
(FDep). The following model is therefore estimated; 
 
0 1 ˆi i i b b FDep a e = + +                                                                           (5.13) 
   
The main hypothesis now is that, with financial liberalization, industries whose firms 
are  relatively  more  external  finance  dependent  should  become  less  constrained 
financially.  The  following  results  are  therefore  expected:  (i)  1 b ￿  0,  when  the 
coefficients applied are from the industrial concentration model results; and, (ii)  1 b ￿ 
0 when the coefficients applied are from the net firm entry model results. Thus, it is 
expected that the first stage regression estimates of the cash coefficients, ˆi a  from the 
industry  concentration  model  and  the  net  firm  entry  model,  are  negatively  and 
positively related, respectively, to the index of external finance dependency i FDep . 
The  second-stage  regressions  in  Equation  (5.13)  are  therefore  estimated  by  OLS; 
separately, for the industry concentration model and the net firm entry model. 
  
 
5.3.3. Data Specification. 
 
The main requirement to implement the mean group (MG) estimator is to have a large 
N, large T panel (see, Hsiao and Pesaran, 2004; Pesaran et al, 1996; Pesaran and 
Smith,  1995).  Accordingly,  this  chapter  use  three-digit  industry  data  for  twenty 
industrial groups of the Malawian manufacturing sector observed annually over a 35-
year  period  (1970-2004).  Thus,  instead  of  averaging  the  data,  the  study  estimates 
short-run and long-run effects using a panel of data with annual observations, where, 
N=20 and T=35; thus, 700 observations. The first estimates use aggregated annual 169 
 
 
 
panel data to obtain the average economy-wide results, followed by disaggregated 
estimation of the twenty individual industrial groups. As such, the data from which 
the  twenty  individual  industry  results  are  obtained  cover  35  observations  of  each 
variable. The individual industry results are therefore obtained within a panel context. 
The  STATA  version  9.2  command  for  estimating  dynamic  heterogeneous  panels, 
xtpmg (applying the Mean Group mode); created by Blackburne and Frank (2007) is 
used to conduct the regression estimates.  
         
In order to determine whether the model specifications are statistically adequate, the 
time-series properties of the data are also investigated, with the results presented in 
Table.5.1. The IPS test for unit roots in panel data indicates that the variables with 
cross-section as well as time dimension, viz; industry concentration, net firm entry, 
price-cost margins, industry growth, and industry share, are all stationary. The test 
rejects unit root at the 1 percent level of significance in net firm entry and price cost 
margins;  and,  on  industry  concentration  and  industry  share,  the  unit  root  test  is 
rejected 5 percent; whilst on value-added growth it is rejected at 10 percent. Further, 
the  ADF  unit  root  test  for  single  time  series  indicates  that  the  growth  in  market 
demand, and imports intensity as well as the growth in the financial development 
proxy are all stationary, at 5 percent; whilst exports intensity is stationary at 1 percent. 
These results therefore suggest that inferences resulting from estimation of the models 
are not spurious. The variable definitions and data sources are as provided in the 
previous chapter of this research study. 
 
Table 5.1: Tests for Non-stationarity of Series 
Variable  Level  First Difference  Test Type 
CRit  -1.884**  -3.504***  IPS 
NFEit  -2.730***  -4.585***  IPS 
PCMit  -2.490***  -3.699***  IPS 
GRit  -1.797*  -3.594***  IPS 
SHit  -1.962**  -3.769***  IPS 
MKDt  -3.518**  -4.726***  ADF 
MXt  -5.499***  -7.302***  ADF 
MMt  -3.085**  -4.103***  ADF 
FINt  -3.029**  -3.965***  ADF 
 Note: IPS indicates the Im-Pesaran-Shin test (Im et al., 2003) for unit roots in panel data. ADF is the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) for unit roots in single time series. For each 
test the null hypothesis is non-stationarity, and the alternative is that the variable was generated by a 
stationary process. The panel data test statistics are z distributed under the null. ***, **, * indicate 
significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.  
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5.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS ON EVOLUTION OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE. 
 
5.4.1. Overall Results Assessment. 
 
Tables 5.2 and 5.5 below show respective results on the aggregated economy-wide 
estimations of long- and short-run parameters linking financial liberalization, financial 
development,  and  other  industry  structure  determinants  –  for  the  industry 
concentration model as presented in Equation (5.1), and the net firm entry model as 
depicted  in  Equation  (5.2).  Further,  as  explained  in  the  section  on  econometric 
methodology,  the  study  test  the  null  hypothesis  of  long-run  slope  homogeneity 
through the Hausman (1978) test, based on the comparison between Mean Group and 
the Pooled Mean Group estimators. The Hausman statistic, which is distributed
2 c , 
and the corresponding p-value, for all the coefficients of the explanatory variables 
jointly, is 27.03 (0.0001) for the industry concentration model, and 21.97 (0.0012) for 
the net firm entry model (see, Appendix 5.3(a) and (b)). Hence, the null hypothesis of 
homogeneity of slopes in the long-run is rejected for all variables jointly, in both 
models. Thus, the Mean Group estimator – the consistent estimator under the null 
hypothesis  –  is  preferred.  Accordingly,  in  both  models,  analysis  focuses  on  those 
parameters  obtained  with  the  Mean  Group  estimator.  However,  for  comparison 
purposes, the study also presents the results obtained with the Pooled Mean Group 
estimator.  
 
Overall, except for the coefficient of the main variable of interest( ) FIN FL ´ , the 
Mean Group estimation results reveal that the signs of most of the coefficients in both 
models are consistent with theory. Further, as presented in Table 5.3 for the industry 
concentration model and Table 5.6 for the net firm entry model, the results exhibit 
considerable heterogeneity in the patterns across industries in both models. This may 
be observed by considering the differences across the industry groups, in the size of 
and signs on the coefficients, as well as in the different levels of significance, both in 
the short-run as well as in the long-run.  Generally, the results show that for most of 
the  industry  groups,  the  estimated  variables  in  the  respective  models  contribute 
significantly to the short run as well as long run evolution of industry concentration 
and net firm entry; albeit, differently for different industry groups and time spans. 171 
 
 
 
Further, whilst some of the variables are not statistically significant determinants of 
industry concentration or net firm entry in the aggregated results, they turn out to be 
statistically significant determinants of these industry structure measures in most of 
individual  industry  groups  when  the  results  are  disaggregated.  More  detailed 
heterogeneity  is  evident  in  the  analysis  of  dispersion  of  respective  variable 
coefficients from the mean, as represented in Table 5.4 for the industry concentration 
model, Table 5.7 for the net firm entry model.  
 
 
5.4.2. Industry Concentration. 
 
Table 5.2 shows that, in the long-run, the coefficients for both the industry share SH 
variable, and industry value-added growth GR variable have negative signs and are 
statistically  significant  determinants  of  industry  concentration.  Similar  results  are 
observed in the short-run. Meanwhile, the international trade variables, manufactured 
imports  MM  and  manufactured  exports  MX  show  no  relationship  with  industry 
concentration,  in  the  long-run.  However,  the  short-run,  the  coefficient  for  the 
manufactured imports variable turns out to be a statistically significant determinant of 
industry  concentration,  with  a  positive  sign;  thereby  suggesting  that  the  effect  of 
imports on competition in the industry is mostly in the short-run. These are generally 
standard results from the empirical industry organisation literature, and it is reassuring 
that this study is able to reproduce them using this methodology. 
 
Most important for this study, the results show that the interaction term between the 
financial development indicator and a financial liberalization dummy  ( ) FIN FL ´  is 
positively and significantly linked to industry concentration both in the short-run as 
well  as  in  the  long-run.  Notably,  the  coefficient  for  the  financial  liberalization 
interaction  term  ( ) FIN FL ´   variable  is  a  statistically  significant  determinant  of 
industry concentration, both in the short- and long-run. Interestingly, the Mean Group 
estimation  results  in  Table  5.2  are  not  significantly  different  from  those  obtained 
through the Pooled Mean Group estimator; thereby confirming the robustness of the 
findings. These findings further confirm the results reported earlier in this study (in 
Chapter  4)  that,  on  average,  and  contrary  to  theoretical  predictions,  industry 172 
 
 
 
concentration increased following financial liberalization. Thus, contrary to the claims 
that deregulation creates a more competitive environment, thereby lowering industry 
concentration, this is not supported by the results of this study, as the results in Table 
5.2  provide  evidence  that  industry  concentration  increases  following  financial 
liberalization – and this effect is evident both in the short- and log-run. Nonetheless, 
as  argued  by  Weiss  (1983)  average  results  such  as  these  are  bound  to  obscure 
variations  between  industry  groups  due  to  differences  in  industry-specific 
characteristics. A disaggregated approach is therefore necessary. 
 
Table 5.2:  Long-Run and Short-Run Effect of Financial Liberalization 
on Industry Concentration. 
                   Mean Group              Pooled  Mean Group 
Variables: 
Dependent Variable – 
Industry Concentration (CR)          Coefficient       Std. Error          Coefficient       Std. Error 
Long-Run Coefficients: 
 SH        -0.213***           0.067        -0.261***          0.025 
 GR        -0.182***           0.052        -0.272***          0.024 
 MM        -0.010           0.012        -0.025***          0.008 
 MX         0.022           0.022         0.004          0.003 
 FIN        -0.028           0.020        -0.002          0.002 
FIN FL ´          0.152***           0.026         0.149***          0.012 
 
Error-Correction Coefficient   ( фi)       -0.668***           0.044       -0.476***          0.056 
Short-Run Coefficients: 
  SH       -0.042**           0.019       -0.069***          0.020 
  GR       -0.075***           0.018       -0.086***          0.016 
  MM        0.221***           0.020        0.193***          0.021 
  MX       -0.005           0.010       -0.001          0.008 
  FIN        0.002           0.004       -0.010          0.009 
  FIN FL ´         0.046***           0.009        0.065***          0.009 
Hausman Test (χ
2) statistic, p-value                                                        27.03  (0.0001) 
Note: Estimates of the intercept are not reported for economy of space. ***, **, * indicate significance 
at 1.0, 5.0, and 10.0 percent levels, respectively. Hausman test of no difference between Mean Group 
and Pooled Mean Group estimates (see Appendix 5.3a)  
 
 
Next, focusing on the industry by industry estimation results, Table 5.3 shows that the 
long-run coefficients of the share of the industry in total manufacturing sector SH, are 
negative and statistically significant determinants of industry concentration in thirteen 
of the twenty industry groups; except for leather, footwear, wood and sawmill, and 
pharmaceuticals,  where  this  variable  is  not  a  significant  determinant  of  industry 173 
 
 
 
concentration.  However,  the  negative  relationship  suggests  that  in  the  thirteen 
industries, new entrants may steal market share from the leading firms through market 
expenditure  on,  for  instance,  advertising  (see,  for  example,  Kambhampati,  1996, 
pp.55-59; and, Ratnayake, 1999, p.1054, on similar findings). In fact, this result is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the larger the share of an industry, the lower the 
entry barriers (Jacquemin et al, 1980, p.134). Significant presence of relatively large 
multinationals and a long history of being granted monopoly rights characterise the 
tobacco manufacture, clothing and apparel, and transport equipment industries; hence, 
the positive and significant coefficients of the industry share variable in these industry 
groups. And, as expected, the short-run coefficients are not significant in the majority 
of  the  industry  groups  (except  in  furniture,  industrial  chemicals,  and  general 
machinery  industries),  presumably  because  the  effect  of  expanding  or  contracting 
industry shares is likely to take some time before making any impact on concentration 
levels. Similarly, the long-run coefficient for the industry value-added growth variable 
GR has negative signs as hypothesised, and is statistically significant in all, except in 
the tobacco manufacturing and footwear industries. However, in the short-run, the 
coefficient for the industry growth variable is a statistically significant determinant of 
industry  concentration  only  in  four  of  the  twenty  industry  groups  –  showing  a 
negative relationship in food processing, fabricated metal, and general machinery, as 
hypothesised in the theory; but, a positive relationship in industrial chemicals. The 
result  of  a  positive  relationship  between  growth  in  industry  value-added  and 
concentration is more in line with Levy (1985) who hypothesise that the growth effect 
on concentration could be positive if the large incumbent firms in the industry can 
expand  rapidly  to  expected  demand  growth.  As  expected,  with  the  high  capital 
requirements in the three industry groups, prospecting investors may only be able to 
exploit new opportunities in the market in the long-run. Meanwhile the incumbents 
take advantage of such situations and expand further; thereby increasing concentration 
in the short-run.   
 
Contrary to the insignificance of the foreign trade variables in the aggregated long-run 
results  reported  in  Table  5.2,  these  variables  show  to  be  statistically  significant 
determinants of industry concentration in most individual industry groups; albeit with 
mixed effects. For instance, the long-run coefficient for the imports intensity, MM, 
variable  has  the  expected  negative  sign  and  is  a  statistically  significant  important 174 
 
 
 
determinant of industry concentration in four industry groups (leather, furniture, non-
metal and general machinery industries); thereby suggesting that import competition 
reduces  concentration  in  these  industry  groups  by  acting  as  an  actual  or  potential 
threat  to  domestic  monopoly.  However,  again  in  the  long-run,  results  show  the 
coefficient for the same imports intensity variable to have a positive sign in four of the 
twenty industry groups (wood and sawmill, industrial chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and 
transport equipment industries), thereby suggesting that imports intensity influences 
an increase in concentration in these industries. This mostly arises from the fact that 
the dominant firms in these industries are also the major importers of the products and 
can therefore still exercise monopoly power. This is consistent with the findings by 
Pickford (1991) in a study for New Zealand manufacturing industries.  
 
Similarly, the coefficient for the exports intensity variable, MX, has different signs in 
different industries, which also show variations between the short-run and the long-
run.  Generally,  however,  the  coefficients  for  the  exports  intensity  variable  has  a 
negative  sign  and  is  also  a  statistically  significant  determinant  of  industry 
concentration in the majority of industry group, both in the short-run as well as in the 
long-run.  This  result  is  consistent  with  the  findings  by  Zhao  and  Zou  (2002)  on 
Chinese  manufacturing  sector,  and  Koo  and  Martin  (1984)  on  US  manufacturing. 
Notably,  the  bulk  of  Malawi’s  manufactured  exports  are  made  through  structured 
trade protocols – for example, the African Growth Opportunities Act (AGOA) of the 
USA  (textiles  exports),  the  ‘Everything-But-Arms’  (EBA)  of  the  EU  (any 
commodity), ACP/EU (sugar) – all of which demand adherence to set standards and 
codes  (see,  for  example,  World  Bank,  2004b),  and  mostly  facilitated  by  specially 
designed structures by government, such as the Malawi Export Promotion Council, 
the  Export  Processing  Zones,  etc.  Hence,  the  negative  and  statistically  significant 
relationship  between  exports  intensity  and  industry  concentration  in  most  of  the 
Malawian manufacturing industry groups is explained through these arrangements
87.  
 
Turning to the variables of interest; first, financial development, FIN, and next the 
interaction  term  between  financial  development  and  the  financial  liberalization 
                                                 
87 Through  government   intervention,   these   structured   trade   protocols  provide  guaranteed export  
    markets   for  a   broad   range  of   export  commodities   that   facilitate wide   participation; thereby   
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dummy,  ( ) FIN FL ´ ,  the  results  across  the  twenty  industries  in  Table  5.3  show 
different effects in different industry groups and time spans. Notably, in the majority 
of the industry groups, both in the short-run as well as in the long-run, the coefficient 
for the financial development variable has a negative sign, as hypothesised in the 
theory,  suggesting  that  financial  development  has  distributional  effects  on  the 
industry.  This  notwithstanding,  the  variable  is  not  statistically  significant  in 
explaining industry  concentration in most of the industry  groups, and  even where 
there is evidence of some effect, it is not persistent. For instance, in some industries 
(food processing, wood and sawmill, printing and publishing, industrial chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, general machinery), the results show that the financial development 
variable FIN is a statistically significant determinant of industry concentration only in 
the short-run; while in others (tobacco manufacturing, footwear, plastic, non-metal, 
transport equipment), the effect in the respective industries is noted in the long-run 
only.  It is only in the electrical machinery industry where the effects of financial 
development  remain  to  be  a  statistically  significant  determinant  of  industry 
concentration, regardless of the time span.  
 
Variations  in  industry  responsiveness  to  financial  development  are  particularly 
observed  when  the  financial  development  variable  is  interacted  with  the  financial 
liberalization  dummy;  which  is  specifically  designed  to  capture  the  effects  of  the 
financial  reforms  on  competition  in  the  manufacturing  industries.  The  industry 
concentration equation estimation results show that the interaction term ( ) FIN FL ´ is 
a statistically significant variable in explaining industry concentration in the majority 
of the industries; albeit differently in different industry groups and time spans. Of 
significance  to  this  study  is  the  finding  that  whilst  the  short-run  results  show  the 
financial  liberalization  interaction  term  variable  to  be  influencing  an  increase  in 
industry concentration in five of the industries; in the long-run results, the coefficient 
for this variable has a positive sign and is a statistically significant determinant of 
industry  concentration  in  fourteen  of  the  twenty  industry  groups.  Except  for  four 
industry  groups  (food  processing,  printing  and  publishing,  general  machinery, 
electrical  machinery)  where  the  coefficient  for  the  interaction  term  ( ) FIN FL ´   is 
significant and has the same sign both in the short-run and long-run, in the rest of the 
industry groups, there are marked variations between industries as well as within the 176 
 
 
 
respective industry groups, in terms of the direction of relationships and timeframe.  
This  suggests  that,  consistent  with  the  observations  by  Kaminsky  and  Schmukler 
(2008) and also Loayza and Ranciere (2006), financial liberalization has time varying 
implications, which also differ between the different industry groups, presumably due 
to  the  widespread  degree  of  heterogeneity  in  the  underlying  parameters.  Some 
industries with a positive coefficient for  ( ) FIN FL ´  in the long-run tend to have a 
negative coefficient in the short-run, and vice-versa. Notably, the quantitative effects 
of the financial liberalization interaction term on the respective industry groups are in 
all cases, non-uniform, suggesting variations both within as well as across industry 
groups.  For  instance,  among  those  industries  where  the  financial  liberalization 
interaction term ( ) FIN FL ´ is a significant determinant of industry concentration, the 
magnitude of the long-run coefficient vary between -0.077 for paper and printing , to 
0.798 for the transport equipment industries. Similar quantitative variations may be 
observed in the short-run coefficients for this variable, which range between -0.366 
for transport equipment, and 0.563 for the fabricated metal industry.  
 
Following a methodology by Boyd and Smith (2000) and Athreye and Kapur (2006), 
and as specified under Equation (5.11), Table 5.4 details considerable heterogeneity in 
the  patterns  across  industries.  The  results  in  this  table  show  the  extent  of 
heterogeneity through the dispersion of the values of the variable coefficients relative 
to the group average as presented in Table 5.2. Standardised values greater than 1 
(shown  in  bold  typeface)  indicate  a  wide  dispersion  of  individual  industry  values 
relative  to  the  common  value  suggested  by  the  Mean  Group  estimator.  For  each 
coefficient at least two industries are outside the range indicated by the Mean Group 
Estimator.  Accordingly,  the  average  long-run  coefficient  for  the  financial 
liberalization interaction term( ) FIN FL ´ is 0.152, which is higher than that for the 
short-run,  recorded  at  0.046.  This  suggests  that  the  full  impact  of  financial 
liberalization on industry concentration will be more in the long-run than in the short-
run. Notably, three and five industry groups are more than one standard deviation 
from the mean, in the short-run and long-run, respectively. Further, it is found that 
industries that deviate from the mean are not necessarily the same for each coefficient, 
thereby confirming the extent of heterogeneity between the industry groups.   
 177 
 
 
 
Table 5.3: Long- and Short-Run Effect of Financial Liberalisation on Industry Concentration in Individual Industry Groups.                                                                                                                  
(Annual Data: 1970-2004) 
 
Industry 1  Industry 2  Industry 3  Industry 4  Industry 5  Industry 6  Industry 7  Industry 8  Industry 9  Industry 10                                                                
Variables: 
    Dependent Variable – 
    Industry Concentration (CR) 
Food  
Processing  Beverages 
Tobacco 
Manufacture  Textiles 
Clothing  & 
Apparel  Leather  Footwear 
Wood &  
Sawmill  Furniture 
Paper &  
Products 
Long-Run Coefficients: 
 SH   -1.367**    -0.562***     0.021***   -0.744***     0.012***     2.509    -0.005   -0.467   -0.456***    -0.634*** 
 GR   -1.079***    -0.535***     1.443   -0.718***    -0.076*    -0.236**     1.990   -0.501***   -0.509***    -0.667*** 
 MM   -0.016    -0.016    -0.014   -0.007    -0.021    -0.039**    -0.170    0.048*   -0.016*    -0.018 
 MX    0.022    -0.091***     0.009   -0.001    -0.034**    -0.322    -0.630    0.920**   -0.109***    -0.026 
 FIN   -0.230     0.010    -0.021*    0.032    -0.002     0.087    -0.182***   -0.008   -0.006    -0.005 
FIN FL ´     0.117*     0.077***    -0.240    0.716***     0.017     0.109***     0.420*    0.231***    0.067***    -0.077* 
 
Error-Correction 
Coefficient   ( фi)   -0.371*    -0.888***    -0.679***   -0.626***    -0.820**    -0.765***     -0.531**   -0.648***   -0.889***    -0.609*** 
Short-Run Coefficients: 
  SH   -0.243     0.149     0.172    0.030     0.003    -0.116     0.035   -0.097    0.177*   - 0.020 
  GR   -0.276*     0.186    -0.083    0.033    -0.219    -0.024    -0.229   -0.008    0.152    -0.087 
  MM    0.211     0.205     0.153    0.415*     0.202     0.306     0.303   -0.032**    0.210     0.205 
  MX   -0.015**     0.215    -0.011*   -0.008    -0.001    -0.026    -0.002   -0.616***    0.252**    -0.024* 
  FIN   -0.029**    -0.004    -0.008    0.111     0.145    -0.047    -0.046   -0.030**    0.005    -0.010 
  FIN FL ´     0.104***    -0.025*    -0.015    0.102    -0.004    -0.037**    -0.019**   -0.022   -0.021*     0.115 
 Note:   (i) Estimates of the intercept are not reported for economy of space. (ii) “***”; “**”; and “*” indicates statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
level, respectively.  
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Table 5.3: Long- and Short-Run Effect of Financial Liberalisation on Industry Concentration in Individual Industry Groups.                                                                          
(Annual Data: 1970-2004) 
 
Industry 11  Industry 12  Industry 13  Industry 14  Industry 15  Industry 16  Industry 17  Industry 18  Industry 19  Industry 20                                                                
Variables: 
 Dependent Variable – 
 Industry Concentration (CR) 
Printing &  
Publishing 
Industrial 
Chemicals 
Other 
Chemicals  Rubber  Plastic 
Non-Metal 
Products 
Fabricated 
Metal 
Machinery- 
General 
Machinery- 
Electrical 
Transport 
Equipment 
Long-Run Coefficients: 
 SH   -0.716***    -0.156***   -0.045   -0.475***    -0.341***    -0.637***    -0.470*   -0.104***   -0.352**     0.723** 
 GR   -0.678***    -0.177***   -0.177*   -0.456***    -0.355***     0.400***    -0.543**   -0.161**   -0.361**    -0.241*** 
 MM   -0.006     0.012*    0.111***   -0.029    -0.020    -0.039*     0.042   -0.004   -0.048*     0.043** 
 MX    0.013    -0.290***   -0.688*   -0.006     0.594***     0.341     0.025   -0.181**   -0.012    -0.360** 
 FIN   -0.020    -0.015   -0.008    0.010    -0.052***    -0.086***    -0.034    0.011   -0.022*    -0.020*** 
FIN FL ´     0.069**     0.051**    0.182**    0.099***     0.008     0.125**    -0.268   -0.014*    0.071*     0.798*** 
 
Error-Correction 
Coefficient   ( фi)   -0.613***    -0.833***    -0.594**   -0.684***    -0.599***    -0.616***    -0.415**   -0.949***   -0.436**    -0.787*** 
Short-Run Coefficients: 
  SH   -0.053     0.041*     0.008    0.079    -0.027     0.074    -0.265   -0.309***   -0.122    -0.347 
  GR   -0.077     0.066**    -0.047    0.016    -0.045     0.074    -0.340*   -0.558***   -0.115     0.087 
  MM    0.224    -0.003    -0.011    0.312     0.414**     0.523**    -0.023*    0.208    0.619**    -0.017 
  MX   -0.005     0.200**     0.318*   -0.004    -0.393***    -0.445**    -0.020**    0.128**    0.007     0.343* 
  FIN   -0.024*     0.010*     0.017*   -0.004     0.002    -0.009    -0.004   -0.011**   -0.031***     0.012 
  FIN FL ´     0.071**     0.016     0.015   -0.026*     0.011**    -0.022     0.563**   -0.029***    0.512***    -0.366* 
 Note:   (i) Estimates of the intercept are not reported for economy of space.  (ii)“***”; “**”; and “*” indicates statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
level, respectively.  
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Table 5.4: Deviations from the Mean Group Estimator in the Industry Concentration Model for Twenty Industry Groups. 
Industry 1  Industry 2  Industry 3  Industry 4  Industry 5  Industry 6  Industry 7  Industry 8  Industry 9  Industry 10                                                                
Variables: 
 Dependent Variable – 
 Industry 
 Concentration (CR) 
Mean 
Group 
Estimator 
Food  
Processing  Beverages 
Tobacco 
Manufacture  Textiles 
Clothing  & 
Apparel  Leather  Footwear 
Wood &  
Sawmill  Furniture 
Paper &  
Products 
Long-Run Coefficients: 
 SH    -0.213     -1.51     -0.46        0.81     -0.69       0.79       2.56        0.27     -0.33       -0.32  -0.55 
 GR    -0.182     -1.24     -0.49        2.25     -0.74       0.75      -0.08        2.01     -0.44       -0.45  -0.67 
 MM    -0.010     -0.11     -0.61       -0.07      0.06      -0.20      -0.54       -2.01      1.10       -0.61  -0.14 
 MX     0.022      0.00     -0.31       -0.03     -0.06      -0.15      -0.94        1.66      2.45       -0.36  -0.13 
 FIN    -0.028     -2.89      0.55        0.10      0.86       0.37       1.65       -2.21      0.29        0.32  0.33 
FIN FL ´      0.152     -0.14     -0.30        0.36      2.28      -0.45      -0.17        1.08      0.32       -0.34  -1.03 
 
Error-Correction 
Coefficient   ( фi)    -0.668      1.83     -1.36       -0.07      0.26      -0.94      -0.60        0.84      0.12       -1.37  0.36 
Short-Run Coefficients:- 
  SH    -0.042    -1.31      1.24        1.39      0.46       0.29      -0.48        0.50     -0.36        1.42         0.14 
  GR    -0.075    -1.13      1.46       -0.05      0.60      -0.81       0.28       -0.86      0.37        1.27        -0.07 
  MM     0.221    -0.06     -0.09       -0.37      1.06      -0.10       0.46        0.45     -1.38       -0.06        -0.09 
  MX    -0.005    -0.04      0.91       -0.02     -0.01       0.02      -0.09        0.01     -2.52        1.06        -0.08 
  FIN     0.002    -0.67     -0.13       -0.22      2.32       3.04      -1.05       -1.03     -0.69        0.06        -0.26 
  FIN FL ´      0.046     0.30     -0.37       -0.31      0.29      -0.26      -0.43       -0.34     -0.35       -0.35  0.35 
       Note:  Mean Group Estimator
1
i i
n
b q = ∑ . Bold figures indicate coefficients are outliers.  
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Table 5.4: Deviations from the Mean Group Estimator in the Industry Concentration Model for Twenty Industry Groups. 
 
Industry 11  Industry 12  Industry 13  Industry 14  Industry 15  Industry 16  Industry 17  Industry 18  Industry 19  Industry 20  Variables: 
Dependent Variable – 
Industry    
Concentration (CR)                                                         
Mean 
Group 
Estimator 
Printing &  
Publishing 
Industrial 
Chemicals 
Other 
Chemicals  Rubber  Plastic 
Non-Metal 
Products 
Fabricated 
Metal 
Machinery- 
General 
Machinery- 
Electrical 
Transport 
Equipment 
Long-Run Coefficients: 
 SH    -0.213  -0.66  0.07  0.22  -0.34  -0.17  -0.55  -0.34  0.14  -0.18  1.22 
 GR    -0.182  -0.69  0.01  0.01  -0.38  -0.24  0.81  -0.50  0.43  -0.25  -0.08 
 MM    -0.010  0.08  0.42  2.29  -0.35  -0.18  -0.54  0.99  0.12  -0.71  1.00 
 MX     0.022  -0.02  -0.85  -1.94  -0.08  1.56  0.87  0.01  -0.55  -0.09  -1.04 
 FIN    -0.028  0.12  0.19  0.29  0.55  -0.34  -0.83  -0.09  0.56  0.09  0.12 
FIN FL ´      0.152  -0.34  -0.41  0.12  -0.21  -0.58  -0.11  -1.70  -0.67  -0.33  2.61 
 
Error-Correction 
Coefficient   ( фi)    -0.668  0.34  -1.02  0.46  -0.10  0.42  0.32  1.56  -1.74  1.43  -0.74 
Short-Run Coefficients: 
  SH    -0.042  -0.07  0.54  0.32  0.78  0.09  0.75  -1.45  -1.74  -0.52  -1.98 
  GR    -0.075  -0.01  0.79  0.15  0.51  0.17  0.83  -1.48  -2.70  -0.23  0.90 
  MM     0.221  0.02  -1.22  -1.27  0.65  0.90  1.65  -0.90  -0.50  2.17  -1.30 
  MX    -0.005  0.00  0.85  1.33  0.01  -1.60  -1.81  -0.06  0.55  0.05  1.44 
  FIN     0.002  -0.56  0.17  0.31  -0.13  -0.01  -0.24  -0.13  -0.28  -0.71  0.21 
  FIN FL ´      0.046  0.13  -0.16  -0.16  -0.37  -0.18  -0.35  2.66  -0.39  2.40  -2.12 
      Note:  Mean Group Estimator
1
i i
n
b q = ∑ . Bold figures indicate coefficients are outliers.  
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5.4.3. Net Firm Entry. 
 
Table 5.5 repeats the Mean Group estimation with net firm entry as the dependent 
variable, as represented  under Equation (5.2). The table presents estimates for the 
long-run  and  short-run  parameters.  According  to  the  results,  the  coefficient  for 
industry  profitability  PCM  is  insignificant.  The  insignificance  of  profits  as  an 
explanatory variable in the net firm entry equation is consistent with results in many 
other studies, and the finding alludes to entrepreneurs’ own expectations and over-
confidence  (see,  for  example,  Geroski,  1995;  Camerer  and  Lovallo,  1999).  These 
findings are similar to those obtained by Dunne and Roberts (1991) on United States 
manufacturing industries. In the literature, lack of significance of the profit variable in 
the net firm entry model is mostly explained by the prevalence of entry barriers (see, 
for example, Duetsch, 1975; and, Fotopoulos and Spence 1998). In this case, financial 
constraints may explain why entry might have been overshadowed by exits in some of 
the industry groups. Further, presence of significant sunk costs increases the incentive 
for incumbents to retaliate through under-pricing, with negative effect on net firm 
entry. Similarly, on  average, the industry  value-added  growth variable  GR has no 
effect  on  net  firm  entry,  presumably  suggesting  the  presence  of  entry  barriers  for 
prospecting  firms;  while  market  demand  MKD  variable  emerges  as  a  statistically 
significant  determinant  of  net  firm  entry  in  both  time  spans.  Meanwhile,  the 
coefficient for manufactured imports MM has a negative sign in the short-run, only to 
change to a positive sign in the long-run. Thus, in the short-run, increased competition 
from  imports  must  have  led  to  exits,  particularly  of  those  firms  that  were  in  the 
fringes. However, the long-run result testifies to the effect that, on average, increased 
import opportunities induced domestic producers to improve efficiency, thereby raise 
the number of efficient firms and therefore increased entry. This is consistent with 
Bernard et al (2003) who highlights that imports induce the exit of the least efficient 
firms, leaving only the most productive higher mark-up firms in the market.   
 
However, as in the industry concentration model, the results for the main coefficients, 
financial  development  FIN,  and  the  interaction  of  financial  development  and  a 
financial  liberalization  dummy  ( ) FIN FL ´ ,  show  that,  on  average,  the  short-run 
policy changes associated with financial development and/or financial liberalization 182 
 
 
 
do not have significant effects on firms’ entry and exit decisions. In contrast, in the 
long-run,  the  results  show  that,  on  average,  financial  development  and  financial 
liberalization, leads to more exits than entries. The coefficient for the interaction term 
between financial development and the financial liberalization dummy( ) FIN FL ´ , is 
significant  with  a  negative  sign,  thereby  suggesting  that,  following  financial 
liberalization,  there  are  more  firm  exits  than  firm  entries  in  the  industry.  This 
contradicts the theoretical predictions as suggested by the literature; in particular, the 
neoclassical theorists. This result is also not consistent with the argument by Rajan 
and Zingales (1998) that financial development will lead to an increase in the number 
of new establishments in industry. Instead, this finding confirms findings reported 
earlier in this study, that financial liberalization does not induce firm creation nor does 
it facilitate firm entry. Thus, contrary to the orthodox view, financial liberalization 
heightens entry barriers and discourages competition. However, given that the process 
of  financial  liberalization  is  bound  to  have  non-uniform  effects  across  industry 
groups, it is expected that there will be response heterogeneity to this policy change.  
 
Table 5.5: Long-Run and Short-Run Effect of Financial Liberalization 
on Net Firm Entry. 
                     Mean Group                Pooled Mean Group 
Variables: 
Dependent Variable – 
Net Firm Entry (NFE)          Coefficient       Std. Error          Coefficient       Std. Error 
Long-Run Coefficients: 
 PCM          -0.623          0.508        0.793***           0.141 
 MKD          -0.343***          0.106       -1.169***           0.195 
 GR           0.056          0.149       -0.003           0.096 
 MM           0.464**          0.186        1.851***           0.256 
 FIN           0.487**          0.206       -0.006           0.020 
FIN FL ´           -0.128*          0.073       -0.665***           0.107 
 
Error-Correction Coefficient   ( фi)          -0.577***          0.063       -0.259***           0.091 
Short-Run Coefficients: 
  PCM          -0.041          0.060       -0.227**           0.109 
  MKD           0.600***          0.198        0.644***           0.205 
  GR           0.095          0.079        0.104*           0.063 
  MM          -0.523***          0.178       -0.673***           0.176 
  FIN          -0.003          0.008        0.098***           0.034 
  FIN FL ´           -0.110          0.082       -0.083**           0.039 
Hausman Test (χ
2) statistic, p-value                                                      21.97  (0.0012) 
Note: Estimates of the intercept are not reported for economy of space. ***, **, * indicate significance 
at 1.0, 5.0, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The Hausman test of no difference between Mean Group 
and Pooled Mean Group estimates (see Appendix 5.3b)  183 
 
 
 
 
Tables  5.6  show  the  industry-by-industry  estimation  results  for  the  net  firm  entry 
model, as specified under Equation (5.2). Similar to the observations made on the 
industry  concentration  model  estimations,  the  net  firm  entry  results  exhibit 
considerable  heterogeneity  in  the  patterns  across  industries,  as  may  be  observed 
through the variations in the signs on the coefficients as well as the different levels of 
significance,  both  in  the  long-run  as  well  as  in  the  short-run.  Despite  some 
insignificant results on some of the explanatory variables in the short-run, in the long-
run results are as hypothesised. 
 
As hypothesised in the literature, the long-run effect of profitability PCM, on net firm 
entry is positive and statistically significant in eight industry groups (food processing, 
beverages,  leather,  wood  and  sawmill,  rubber,  plastic,  fabricated  metal,  transport 
equipment); thereby confirming that profitability acts as an incentive for entry in these 
industries. This result is consistent with a similar finding by Ilmakunaas and Topi 
(1999), who argue that profitability of an industry determines its attractiveness for 
new firms to enter. Surprisingly though, the results also show that the coefficient for 
the  profitability  variable  has  a  negative  sign  and  is  a  statistically  significant 
determinant of net firm entry in five of the twenty industry groups (footwear, paper 
and  products,  printing  and  publishing,  other  chemicals,  non-metal).  This  negative 
effect,  which  is  consistent  with  findings  by  Khemani  and  Shapiro  (1987)  and 
Fotopoulos and Spence (1998), is explained as high profits attracting more entrants 
who then displace some incumbents. Generally though, the variability in the direction 
of  the  relationship  is  somehow  odd  considering  the  primary  importance  of  this 
variable  in  theoretical  work.  Nonetheless,  the  differences  are  a  reflection  of  the 
inherent industry specificities; in particular, fixed ‘sunk’ costs, and access to financial 
resources.  
 
Growth in market demand MKD has a disproportionate effect on different industry 
groups, in the long-run. In ten out of the twenty industry groups the coefficient of this 
variable is positive; but, it is a statistically significant of net firm entry in five of the 
groups  (beverages,  furniture,  paper  and  products,  industrial  chemicals,  fabricated 
metal). However, the coefficient for the market demand variable has a negative sign in 
ten industry groups; albeit, statistically significant in five of the groups; thereby not 184 
 
 
 
supporting the theoretical importance of growth in market demand, in inducing firm 
entry. Generally, therefore, the link between net firm entry and market demand does 
not seem to be very strong, suggesting that factors such as institutional barriers to 
entry – which are, in principle, not related to the changes in the level of economic 
activity – may be playing a larger role in explaining the level and the dynamics of 
these  net  entry  rates.    Relatedly,  in  the  Malawian  manufacturing,  varied  reasons 
further  explain  this  unexpected  outturn.  First,  facing  decreasing  demand,  due  to 
economic  downturn,  firms  with  relatively  high  irrecoverable  capital  commitment 
(sunk  costs),  may  decide  to  terminate  a  number  of  employees  in  order  to  bound 
overheads, instead of exit from the industry. This might also offer an explanation for 
the  insignificant  results  found  on  this  variable  in  some  of  the  industry  groups. 
Evidently,  massive  ‘lay-offs’  have  dogged  the  tobacco  and  textile  industries  in 
Malawi for a long-time following financial liberalization.   Second, new firm creation 
might  be  facilitated  during  downturns  because  prospective  firm  proprietors  would 
otherwise have faced serious hazards of being unemployed and because of greater 
supply of cheaper labour (see, for example, Storey, 1991) and cheaper second-hand 
equipment released due to demand shortages leading to closure of many firms (see, 
Binks  and  Jennings,  1986a).  This  reasoning  may  be  applicable  in  those  industry 
groups where the coefficient for market demand is significant but negative (such as in; 
clothing  and  apparel,  leather,  rubber,  non-metal  products,  general  machinery, 
electrical  machinery,    and  transport  equipment  industries);  and,  conforms  to  what 
Highfield and Smiley (1987) describe as an “opportunistic” scenario. In their time 
series analysis for United States manufacturing Highfield and Smiley observe that 
sluggish macroeconomic conditions and high growth in unemployment rate relate to 
higher rates of new firm creation.  
 
The industry value-added growth variable GR shows mixed results in the net firm 
entry  estimation.  According  to  the  long-run  results,  the  variable  is  a  statistically 
significant determinant of net firm entry in fourteen industry groups – with a positive 
coefficient  in  eight  industry  groups  (food  processing,  beverages,  tobacco 
manufacturing, leather, footwear, furniture, paper and products, industrial chemicals). 
Contrastingly,  the  coefficient  has  a  negative  sign  in  six  industry  groups  (textiles, 
clothing  and  apparel,  other  chemicals,  rubber,  general  machinery,  transport 
equipment). The positive coefficient is consistent with findings by Taymaz (1997, 185 
 
 
 
p.106) and Ilmakunaas and Topi (1999, p.285), and it is explained by the fact that 
high profit opportunities manifest themselves as a response to rapid industry growth. 
It is therefore expected that new firms will prefer to enter rapidly growing industries. 
Industries that are growing slowly, or declining, are likely to create a particularly 
difficult  “displacement  problem”  for  new  entrants.  However,  when  an  industry 
registers remarkable growth, new firms face a less difficult displacement problem, 
which has the effect of reducing entry barriers. Note that in the long-run, the growth 
variable  represents  anticipated  growth  as  distinct  from  (short-run)  unanticipated 
growth (see, Lucas, 1967). However, according to Levy (1985), even when growth is 
anticipated, there may be different rates of expansion by large than by smaller entrants 
because  of  different  costs  of  acquiring  capital  or  accessing  financial  resources. 
However, a negative coefficient is also expected under two possible conditions: first, 
where  the  opportunities  created  by  industry  expansion  are  being  exploited  by 
expansion of already established firms, rather than new entrants; and second, when 
industry growth prospects result in an overreaction of potential entrants which leads to 
higher firm turnover and thus eventually to lower net firm entry (see, e.g. Bresnahan 
and  Reiss,  1991;  Taymaz,  1997;  Ilmakunaas  and  Topi,  1999).  In  the  Malawian 
manufacturing the former explanation is more plausible. Considering the oligopolistic 
structures that prevailed prior to the financial liberalization process, partly perpetuated 
through  governments  deliberate  policy  of  granting  monopoly  rights  to  protected 
sectors, in some instances the already established firms indeed took advantage of the 
opportunities created by the financial reforms. This discouraged any entry by new 
prospecting investors; a situation aggravated by inequitable lending practices by the 
financial  institutions,  increase  in  the  cost  of  borrowing,  as  well  as  exchange  rate 
volatility, following the deregulation process.  
 
The coefficient on the imports intensity variable, MM, shows mixed effects both in the 
long-run as well as in the short-run. As reflected in the aggregated results, under the 
industry-specific approach, results in the long-run show that the coefficient for the 
imports  variable  has  a  positive  sign,  thereby  suggesting  that  imports  intensity  is 
associated  with  an  increase  in  new  firm  entry;  but,  it  is  a  statistically  significant 
determinant of net firm entry only in two out of the twenty industry groups (footwear, 
printing and publishing). Theoretically, an increase in imports intensity may increase 
net firm entry only if domestic producers were induced to improve efficiency and 186 
 
 
 
thereby raise the number of efficient firms; hence, increasing competition. However, 
contrary  to  the  observations  made  under  the  aggregated  results,  industry-specific 
results reveal that this option does not seem to have been evident in many of the 
industry groups in the Malawian manufacturing. In fact, Chirwa (2004) observes that 
increased import intensity in the Malawian manufacturing could be an indication of 
inefficiencies in the domestic industry relative to firms abroad. As such, firms may 
exit not because of foreign competition but due to inefficiencies. Arguably, lack of 
credit access as well as increasing cost of capital explains the increase in inefficiency 
in the industry.  
  
On  the  effects  of  financial  development  FIN,  and  the  financial  liberalization 
interaction  term,( ) FIN FL ´ ,  as  the  variables  of  interest,  the  results  are,  notably, 
mixed  as  expected.  Like  in  the  industry  concentration  model  estimations,  the 
contributions of these variables vary between the short-run and the long-run, as the 
variable coefficients change signs for different industry groups.  The effect of FIN on 
net  firm  entry  is  ambiguous.  The  long-run  results  show  that,  across  the  twenty 
industries, the coefficients are negative in eight industry groups (textiles, clothing and 
apparel, wood and sawmill, furniture, paper and products, other chemicals, non-metal, 
electrical machinery); and, except for clothing and apparel, and other chemicals, FIN 
is a statistically significant determinant of net firm entry in these industry groups. This 
suggests that in these industries, financial liberalization has led to relatively more firm 
exits  than  entries.  In  the  rest  of  the  industry  groups  where  FIN  has  a  positive 
coefficient, it is statistically significant in seven industries (food processing, leather, 
footwear, industrial chemicals, rubber, plastic, fabricated metal). These differences 
are  further  noted  on  the  effects  of  financial  development  following  financial 
liberalization.  
 
The long-run coefficient for the interaction term between financial development and 
the financial liberalization dummy( ) FIN FL ´ , is positive and significant in four of 
the twenty industry groups (food processing, non-metal products, general machinery, 
and electrical machinery); thereby suggesting that financial liberalization has induced 
more entry and creation of new firms in these industries. It has been observed that 
despite  the  discontinuation  of  directed  credit  policies,  which  in  Malawi  mostly 187 
 
 
 
favoured the agro-processing industries prior to financial liberalization, some of the 
remaining government policies and development agendas indirectly continue to act in 
favour of certain industry groups, after financial liberalization. For instance, in a bid 
to promote food security in the economy, the food processing industry gets relatively 
more financial favours from the system, either through donor programs or directly 
through  government  credit  programmes,  all  of  which  is  processed  through  the 
domestic  financial  institutions;  hence,  the  positive  coefficients.  However,  the 
coefficient for the interaction term is negative  and statistically significant in eight 
industry groups (tobacco manufacturing, textiles, leather, paper and products, printing 
and publishing, pharmaceuticals, rubber, fabricated metal); an indication that there 
have  been  more  firm  exits  than  entries  in  these  industries,  following  financial 
liberalization.  
 
In  the  short-run  estimation  results,  however,  the  effects  of  both  FIN  as  well  as 
( ) FIN FL ´ on net firm entry are different from the long-run effects for most industry 
groups. Both the coefficient signs as well as the significance have tended to vary from 
industry  to  industry;  and,  between  the  short-run  and  long-run  within  the  same 
industry. Like in the industry concentration model, among those industries where the 
financial  liberalization  interaction  variable  has  emerged  to  be  a  significant 
determinant of net firm entry, the coefficient magnitude varies widely between the 
industry  groups.  In  the  long-run  the  range  of  the  magnitude  of  the  coefficient  is 
between -0.900 for fabricated metal and 0.378 for non-metal products; whilst in the 
short-run the range is between -1.063 for electrical machinery, and 0.208 for rubber 
industries. Further, like in the industry concentration model, some industries with a 
positive (negative) coefficient in the short-run, change to negative (positive) in the 
long-run. This confirms the contrasting effects of financial liberalization as argued by 
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008), but also Loayza and Ranciere (2006).   
 
More  detailed  heterogeneity  is  exhibited  in  Table  5.7,  following  specifications  of 
Equation (11), which examines the dispersion of the coefficient values relative to the 
Mean Group average as reported under Table 5.5. As in the industry concentration 
model, standardized values greater than 1 (shown in bold typeface) are an indication 
of how far that particular coefficient is from the benchmark as suggested by the Mean 188 
 
 
 
Group estimator. Accordingly, there is considerable dispersion between the variable 
coefficients;  thereby  confirming  heterogeneity  as  hypothesised  by  Peneder  (2008). 
Further,  as  Geroski  (1995)  observes,  structural  variables  often  employed  to  assist 
inference on the determination of inter-industry structure of net entry measures – such 
as profitability and other entry barriers – may not be stable in time. In the Malawian 
manufacturing  it  is  clearly  evident  through  Table  5.7  that  there  exists  a  lot  of 
instability in the significance, the signs, as well as the magnitude of the estimated 
variable  coefficients  for  the  key  determinants  of  net  firm  entry  over  time  within 
industry groups, but also between the industry groups. Notably, in the log-run, the 
average coefficient for( ) FIN FL ´ , the interaction term, is -0.128, and seven out of 
the twenty industry groups (food processing, clothing and apparel, footwear, plastic, 
non-metal, fabricated metal, and electrical machinery) are more than one standard 
deviation from the mean. However, in the short-run, the average coefficient for this 
variable is slightly lower, at -0.110. This suggests that the impact of the interaction 
term is, on average, higher in the long-run than it is in the short-run. Here too, five out 
of  the  twenty  industry  groups  (printing  and  publishing,  rubber,  fabricated  metal, 
electrical  machinery,  and  transport  equipment)  are  outside  the  range.  These 
dispersions from the mean group estimator clearly suggest presence of a significant 
degree of heterogeneity between the industry groups.  
 
Overall, the most notable finding is that, whilst there are changes in the number of 
competitors following financial liberalization, it is also interesting to note that the 
responsiveness  of  net  firm  entry  is  so  variable  across  the  industry  groups.  Fairly 
unstable  inter-industry  variation  over  time  on  net  firm  entry  has  been  reported  in 
previous  work  for  Germany  (Wagner,  1994),  and  the  United  Kingdom  (Geroski, 
1991b). In a study of Lower Saxony in Germany, Wagner (1994) finds that net firm 
entry differs for the various groups of firms, and that there are also variations between 
industries  in  a  year.  Similarly,  whilst  studying  firm  entry  in  the  United  Kingdom 
manufacturing, Geroski (1991b) establish large cross-section differences in net entry 
rates. Besides, Geroski (1995) observe that, while net firm entry “can be an important 
influence on the evolution of industry structure ... it is so only selectively” (p.437). 
Arguably, in Malawi, the response heterogeneity of net firm entry across industry 
groups  is  due  to  the  inequitable  access  to  capital  for  firms’  investments. 189 
 
 
 
Table 5.6: Long- and Short-Run Effect of Financial Liberalisation on Net Firm Entry in Individual Industry Groups.                                                                                   
(Annual Data: 1970-2004) 
 
Industry 1  Industry 2  Industry 3  Industry 4  Industry 5  Industry 6  Industry 7  Industry 8  Industry 9  Industry 10                                                                                              
Variables: 
Dependent Variable – 
Net Firm Entry (NFE) 
Food  
Processing  Beverages 
Tobacco 
Manufacture  Textiles 
Clothing  & 
Apparel  Leather  Footwear 
Wood &  
Sawmill  Furniture 
Paper &  
Products 
Long-Run Coefficients: 
 PCM    0.045*    1.944**    0.530   -2.455   -1.006    0.262**   -3.071**    0.051***    0.144   -2.945*** 
 MKD   -1.673    0.920**   -1.523    0.168   -0.453*   -1.015*   -1.055   -0.915    0.187*    0.359** 
 GR    1.390***    0.947*    0.118**   -0.607**   -0.302**    0.123***    0.256**   -0.182    0.111***    0.550*** 
 MM    0.078    0.014   -0.009   -0.142   -0.015    0.812    2..126*    0.546    0.600    1.716 
 FIN    0.112*    0.542    0.712   -0.385*   -2.009    1.723***    1.148***   -0.066**   -0.023*   -1.235** 
FIN FL ´     0.305*   -0.211   -0.175***   -0.092**    0.319   -0.084***   -0.452    0.077   -0.032   -0.274** 
 
Error-Correction 
Coefficient   ( фi)   -0.860***   -0.754***   -0.572***   -0.531***   -0.267**   -0.411***   -0.257***   -0.392***   -0.548**   -0.369*** 
Short-Run Coefficients: 
  PCM    0.019    0.455    0.034    0.659*    0.015*   -0.220    0.541**   -0.508    0.072    0.045 
  MKD    0.841    0.971   -0.087   -1.005    0.046**   -0.980   -0.027**    1.921    1.955   -0.101*** 
  GR   -0.595    0.670   -0.018   -0.632**   -0.026   -0.630*   -0.230***   -0.160*    0.730    0.870 
  MM    0.009   -0.599   -1.010*   -0.560   -0.410   -1.006*   -1.020**   -0.710   -0.914*   -1.011 
  FIN   -0.157*    0.007    0.020**    0.089    0.040**   -0.006    0.067**   -0.032   -0.006    0.088*** 
  FIN FL ´     0.052    0.026   -0.004    0.030   -0.041*    0.017***    0.015   -0.113**   -0.004    0.071** 
 Note:   (i) Estimates of the intercept are not reported for economy of space. (ii) “***”; “**”; and “*” indicates statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
level, respectively.  
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Table 5.6: Long- and Short-Run Effect of Financial Liberalisation on Net Firm Entry in Individual Industry Groups.                                                                               
(Annual Data: 1970-2004) 
 
Industry 11  Industry 12  Industry 13  Industry 14  Industry 15  Industry 16  Industry 17  Industry 18  Industry 19  Industry 20                                                                
Variables: 
Dependent Variable – 
Net Firm Entry (NFE) 
Printing &  
Publishing 
Industrial 
Chemicals 
Other 
Chemicals  Rubber  Plastic 
Non-Metal 
Products 
Fabricated 
Metal 
Machinery- 
General 
Machinery- 
Electrical 
Transport 
Equipment 
Long-Run Coefficients: 
 PCM   -1.761***   -1.009   -2.334**    0.235**    1.876***   -2.664**    1.120*    0.019   -1.914**    0.483** 
 MKD   -0.954    0.542***    0.055    0.245    0.016   -1.663**    0.144***   -0.036***   -0.200**   -0.016** 
 GR   -0.271    0.395**   -0.152**   -0.492**    0.090   -0.011   -0.053   -0.072**   -0.044   -0.680*** 
 MM    2.185*   -0.019    0.098    0.183    0.119   -0.023    0.041    0.005    0.042    0.917 
 FIN    1.052    1.083*   -0.027    1.093*    0.167**   -0.158**    0.098*    1.004   -0.164***    1.045 
FIN FL ´    -0.315*   -0.239    0.080   -0.344**   -0.629    0.378**   -0.900*    0.014***    0.254***   -0.245 
 
Error-Correction 
Coefficient   ( фi)   -0.919***   -0.390***   -0.617***   -0.813***   -0.981***  -0.433***   -0.898***  -0.697***  -0.468***  -0.344** 
Short-Run Coefficients: 
  PCM   -0.703    0.006   -0.047   -0.046   -1.623**    0.697**    0.864   -0.007    0.559**   -0.730 
  MKD   -0.810   -0.119*   -1.710   -0.560*   -0.800    1.096***   -0.137**   -0.812    0.094***   -0.009 
  GR   -0.391   -0.105**    0.630    0.852    0.303    0.080   -0.836**    0.043***    0.051    0.041 
  MM   -0.551**   -0.502   -1.012   -0.036   -0.033   -0.010   -0.025   -1.001   -0.029   -0.029* 
  FIN   -0.011*   -0.016    0.016    0.018   -0.134*    0.089***   -0.132**   -0.101    0.099***    0.011 
  FIN FL ´     0.353   -0.074*    0.115*    0.208**   -0.059   -0.218**   -0.918    0.006**   -1.063**   -0.493* 
 Note:   (i) Estimates of the intercept are not reported for economy of space. (ii) “***”; “**”; and “*” indicates statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
level, respectively.191 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.7: Deviations from the Mean Group Estimator in the Net Firm Entry Model for Twenty Industry Groups. 
Industry 1  Industry 2  Industry 3  Industry 4  Industry 5  Industry 6  Industry 7  Industry 8  Industry 9  Industry 10                                                                
Variables: 
Dependent Variable – 
Net Firm Entry (NFE) 
Mean 
Group 
Estimator 
Food  
Processing  Beverages 
Tobacco 
Manufacture  Textiles 
Clothing  & 
Apparel  Leather  Footwear 
Wood &  
Sawmill  Furniture 
Paper &  
Products 
Long-Run Coefficients: 
 PCM    -0.623  0.42  1.63  0.73  -1.17  -0.24  0.56  -1.56  0.43  0.49  -1.48 
 MKD    -0.343  -0.98  1.65  -1.54  0.67  -0.90  -0.88  -0.93  -0.75  0.69  0.92 
 GR     0.056  2.70  0.90  0.13  -1.34  -0.72  0.14  0.41  -0.48  0.11  1.90 
 MM     0.464  -0.53  -0.61  -0.65  -0.83  -0.65  0.48  2.27  0.11  0.19  1.71 
 FIN     0.487  -0.48  0.07  0.29  -1.11  1.94  1.57  0.84  -0.70  -0.65  -2.19 
FIN FL ´     -0.128  1.34       -0.26  -0.14  0.11  1.38  0.14  -1.00  0.63  0.30  -0.45 
 
Error-Correction 
Coefficient   ( фi)    -0.577  -1.23  -0.77  0.02  0.20  1.34  0.72  1.39  0.80  0.13  0.90 
Short-Run Coefficients: 
  PCM    -0.041  0.10  -0.71  0.13  1.20  0.10  -0.31  1.00  -0.80  0.19  0.15 
  MKD     0.600  0.33  0.50  -0.93  0.55  -0.75  0.51  -0.85  1.79  1.83  -0.95 
  GR     0.095  -1.36  1.13  -0.22  -1.44  -0.24  1.06  -0.64  -0.50  1.25  1.53 
  MM    -0.523  1.26  -0.18  -1.15  -0.09  0.27  -0.90  -1.18  -0.68  -0.93  -1.16 
  FIN    -0.003  -2.01  0.12  0.29  1.19  0.55  -0.04  0.91  -0.38  -0.04         1.18 
  FIN FL ´     -0.110  0.17  0.40  0.31  0.41  0.20  0.37  0.36  -0.01  0.31  0.53 
               Note:  Mean Group Estimator
1
i i
n
b q = ∑ . Bold figures indicate coefficients are outliers.  
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Table 5.7: Deviations from the Mean Group Estimator in the Net Firm Entry Model for Twenty Industry Groups. 
    
Industry 11  Industry 12  Industry 13  Industry 14  Industry 15  Industry 16  Industry 17  Industry 18  Industry 19  Industry 20                                                                
Variables: 
Dependent Variable –  
Net Firm Entry (NFE) 
Mean 
Group 
Estimator 
Printing &  
Publishing 
Industrial 
Chemicals 
Other 
Chemicals  Rubber  Plastic 
Non-Metal 
Products 
Fabricated 
Metal 
Machinery- 
General 
Machinery- 
Electrical 
Transport 
Equipment 
Long-Run Coefficients: 
 PCM    -0.623  -0.72  -0.25  -1.09  0.55  1.59  -1.30  1.11  0.41  -0.82  0.70 
 MKD    -0.343  -0.80  1.16  0.52  0.77  0.47  -1.73  0.64  0.40  0.19  0.43 
 GR     0.056  -0.66  0.69  -0.42  -1.11  0.07  -0.13  -0.22  -0.26  -0.20  -1.49 
 MM     0.464  2.35  -0.66  -0.50  -0.38  -0.47  -0.66  -0.58  -0.63  -0.58  0.62 
 FIN     0.487  0.72  0.76  -0.65  0.77  -0.41  -0.82  -0.49  0.66  -0.83  0.71 
FIN FL ´     -0.128        -0.58        -0.34  0.64  -0.67  1.54  1.56  -2.38  0.44  1.18  -0.36 
 
Error-Correction 
Coefficient   ( фi)    -0.577  -1.48  0.81  -0.17  -1.02  -1.83  0.62  -1.39  -0.52  0.47  1.01 
Short-Run Coefficients: 
  PCM    -0.041  -1.14  0.08  -0.01  -0.01  -2.72  1.27  1.56  0.06  1.03  -1.18 
  MKD     0.600  0.88  -1.64  0.90        -0.90  0.27  0.67  -0.99  0.29  -0.68  -0.82 
  GR     0.095  -0.96  -0.40  1.06  1.49  0.41  -0.03  -1.84  -0.10  -0.09  -0.11 
  MM    -0.523  -0.07  0.05  -1.16  1.41  0.90  1.49  0.90  -1.13  1.44  0.90 
  FIN    -0.003  -0.11  -0.18  0.24  0.27  -1.71  1.53  -1.98  -0.98  0.98  0.18 
  FIN FL ´     -0.110  1.25  0.10  0.66  1.03  0.15  -0.32  -2.36  0.34  -2.78  -1.12 
               Note:  Mean Group Estimator
1
i i
n
b q = ∑ . Bold figures indicate coefficients are outliers.  193 
 
 
 
 
5.5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS ON INDUSTRY FINANCING CONSTRAINTS. 
 
Table  5.8  reports  the  results  of  estimating  Equation  (5.13)  based  on  the  industry 
concentration model, as well as the net firm entry model. In both models, the external 
financing dependency variable is statistically significant (at 5.0 percent level), in the 
short-run as well as in the long-run. Interestingly though the sign on the coefficient for 
the financing dependency variable, is positive in the regression where coefficients 
from the industry concentration model results are applied; and negative where the 
coefficients from the net firm entry model are applied. Notably, in both models, the 
extent of financing constraints as experienced by firms is more in the long-run than in 
the  short-run,  as  suggested  by  the  relatively  higher  magnitudes  of  the  long-run 
coefficients  for  FDep  variable  when  compared  to  those  for  the  short-run.  This 
confirms the time-varying effects of financial liberalization as observed by Kaminsky 
and Schmukler (2008) and Loayza and Ranciere (2006)
88. These results suggest that 
industries  with  firms  that  rely  more  on  external  finance  become  more  financially 
constrained,  following  financial  liberalization;  thereby  inducing  more  industry 
concentration, as well as more firm exits relative to entries. This finding therefore 
contradicts  the  orthodox  view  on  the  financing  constraints  reducing  effects  of 
financial liberalization as advanced by Laeven (2003), or Galindo, Schiantarelli, and 
Weiss (2001), amongst many others. Thus, the results do not support the view that 
financial liberalization increase the supply of loanable funds, and alleviate problems 
of credit constraints, which, in turn, induce more competition in the industry. 
 
Table 5.8: Financing Constraints and External Finance Dependency:  OLS estimation 
Industry Concentration Model       Net Firm Entry Model   
    Short-run      Long-run      Short-run      Long-run 
FDep        0.280** 
     (0.117) 
     0.376** 
    (0.171) 
    -0.163** 
    (0.072) 
    -0.185** 
    (0.080) 
R
2        0.29       0.32       0.31       0.21 
           Note:   ***, **, * indicate significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively  
                        heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors in parentheses.  
                                                 
88 According   to   Love   (2003),   despite   the  advantages of this approach, the standard errors of this  
     second-stage   regressions   may   not   be   asymptotically   correct,   since  the dependent variable is  
     estimated   in  the first-stage regressions (i.e. in this case Eqs. (1) and (2); thereby suggesting  results  
     from this methodology   may arguably be viewed as ‘informal’ and therefore only complimentary to  
     the formal inference   performed  in   the   first   part   of   this   empirical investigation. Nonetheless,  
     Davidson and MacKinnon   (2003)   observe   that   as  it is the dependent variable that is a generate  
     variable (i.e.  it   is   not a regressor); hence, the error term may take account of the fact that it is not  
     measured directly. As such, with the strong significance, these results are considered robust.  
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5.6. OVERALL RESULTS ANALYSIS. 
 
Overall, for both the industry concentration model as well as the net firm entry model, 
it is worth noticing that although in some of the industry groups some regressors are 
not significant, the majority of the control variables have the expected sign. The only 
exception, and of particular relevance to this study, is the behaviour of the coefficient 
for the interaction term between the financial development indicator and a financial 
liberalization  dummy  ( )t FIN FL ´ ,  which,  in  the  long-run,  is  predominantly 
significant  with  a  positive  sign  in  the  industry  concentration  estimation,  and 
significant but with a negative sign in the net firm entry model estimation. However, 
apart  from  exhibiting  considerable  heterogeneity  in  the  patterns  across  industries, 
generally the results show that in some of the industry groups, the short-run average 
relationship regarding the interaction term take different directions compared to those 
depicted in the long-run relationships; and, the related coefficients are not significant 
in the majority of the industry groups. This suggests that, in most industry groups, 
short-term policy changes as a result of financial liberalization do not have significant 
effects on the short-term behaviour of industry concentration or on firms’ entry and/or 
exit decisions. Accordingly, comparing the long-run and short-run estimates within 
each industry group, a first broad conclusion is that the sign and significance of the 
relationship  between  industry  concentration,  net  firm  entry,  and  financial 
liberalization, depends on whether their movements are temporary or permanent.  
 
Some recent theories on the aftermath of financial liberalization attempt to explain the 
contrast  between  the  short-run  and  long-run  effects  of  this  policy  change.  In  the 
financial  intermediation  literature,  Grabel  (1995)  and  Crotty  (1993)  observe  that 
financial  liberalization  induces  speculative  investment  following  ‘boom-euphoric’ 
expectations and/or competitive pressure to engage in profit-seeking activities. In such 
circumstances therefore, Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004a, 2004b) argue that many 
‘new’ and ‘untested’ projects request financing; and, the financial lending institutions 
do not have strong incentives to screen its pool of applicants, such that, in the short-
run, except for a few long established clients, there will either be too much credit or 
the majority will not have access to credit. Accordingly, Dell’Ariccia and Marquez 195 
 
 
 
 
(2004a, 2004b) view financial liberalization as a period marked by lending volatility, 
as the credit institutions’ screening incentives are not at par with the rapid growth for 
credit  demand,  from  both  incumbent  firms  as  well  as  new  prospecting  investors. 
Hence the increasing incidents of counterintuitive results and lack of significance of 
the financial liberalization term in the short-run for both models. Over time, however, 
as most potential borrowers are tested, lending institutions’ screening incentives and 
practices are restored and – either through credit rationing and/or traditional lending 
relationships – normal lending resumes and stabilise in the long-run. Then, whereas 
the short-run of financial liberalization is marked with volatility and temporary and 
insignificant relationships, in the long-run financial liberalization is bound to reflect 
its  true  and  permanent  effects  on  competition  in  the  industry.  Accordingly,  a 
statistically  significant  long-run  relationship  between  financial  liberalization  and 
industry structure is predicted; and that, instead, in the short-run, the relationship may 
not be significant as it may not be clear through which channels this might occur. 
 
However, Wynne (2002) asserts that the difference between the long-run and short-
run effects of financial liberalization is due to the fact that it takes time and effort for 
firms to build financial reputation and public knowledge about the quality of their 
investment  projects.  This  is  mostly  critical  due  to  the  intrinsic  asymmetry  of 
information  between  potential  borrowers  and  creditors.  Firms  create  ‘information’ 
capital  only  gradually  through  higher  survival  rate  and  wealth  accumulation. 
Following financial liberalization, this information is used in the allocation of capital, 
and  there  are  inevitable  risks  of  credit  misallocation,  which  may  not  yield  the 
expected  or  significant  result.  In  the  long-run  though,  good  and  reputable  firms 
emerge, with ‘proper’ credit allocation and significant results. 
 
Further, the financial lending institutions in developing countries like Malawi tend to 
serve the short end of the market. This has been evident even in periods following 
financial liberalization. As Nissanke (2001) and Aryeetey et al (1994) observe, the 
unstable and high-risk political and economic environments that are characteristic of 
most of the countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa, influence the composition of private 
investment. Most prefer investing in short-term and liquid assets to the high yield and 
long-term investments. As such the implications of financial liberalization may be 196 
 
 
 
 
different between the short run and the long run, with most of the impact expected, 
but not necessarily confined, to the former time span. Nonetheless, whilst financial 
liberalization  efforts  are  designed  to  address  these  problems,  the  results  from  this 
study  reveal  that  the  short-run  and  long-run  differences  take  different  patterns  in 
different industry groups as evidenced by the differences in the signs and levels of 
significance for both industry concentration as well as net firm entry. 
  
The foregoing is quite plausible as constraints to entry and exit, such as access to 
credit and/or prevalence of sunken capital imply that industries respond differently 
between the short- and long-run, to policy changes such as financial liberalization. For 
instance, manufacturing prices usually adjust slowly to changes in costs in the long-
run, as the process is in the most part determined by structural variables that do not 
change rapidly over time (see, for example, Bloch and Olive, 1996). For instance, 
until the early 1990s, most of the Malawian industries, such as the beverages, clothing 
and apparel, and textiles, utilized material inputs sourced cheaply through high tariff 
protection,  and  also  enjoyed  financial  success  through  a  history  of  being  granted 
monopoly  rights  and  therefore  being  treated  preferentially  in  the  financial  credit 
markets. Besides, these industries have mostly been characterised by foreign-owned 
large-scale firms, which are considered creditworthier by the lending institutions than 
small-scale  operators  (see,  Mhoni,  2002).  And,  as  observed  by  Lall  (1979)  a 
multinational’s  presence  in  a  domestic  industry  may  influence  the  industry’s 
responsiveness  through  its  aggressive  conduct  and  possession  of  intangible  assets. 
Similarly,  Caves  (1996)  and  UNCTAD  (1997)  indicate  that  performance  of 
multinational enterprises is relatively superior due to advantages arising from firm-
specific assets, access to a wider array of financial resources and their ability to reap 
economies  of  scale.  This  enables  them  to  respond  differently  to  changes  in  their 
operational  environment  between  the  short-run  and  long-run,  compared  to  those 
industries  that  are  wholly  locally  owned.  Notably,  in  a  study  on  Malawian 
manufacturing enterprises, Chirwa (2004) establish that technical efficiencies are 12.0 
percentage points higher in enterprises in which majority shareholding is attributed to 
multinational corporations.  
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Finally, these results further confirm the earlier findings from the aggregated data that 
financial  liberalization  has  no  competition-inducing  effects  on  industry  that,  on 
average, applies to all industry groups indiscriminately. The effect is further evident 
when the dimension of the intensity of external financial dependence is introduced in 
the firms’ financing constraints analysis. This finding is consistent with the theoretical 
prior that, following financial liberalization,   financial lending institutions prefer to 
lend to the large and established firms with whom they have lending relationships, as 
opposed  to  the  new,  small  and  relatively  un-established  firms.  Accordingly,  this 
enables the large firms to grow disproportionately larger and therefore attain more 
market power, which leads to higher concentration. Similarly, these lending practices 
act as entry barriers to new investors and an impediment to the creation of new firms; 
thereby adversely affecting competition in the industry.  
 
 
5.7. CONCLUSION. 
 
In this chapter, the study investigates the relationship between financial liberalization 
and industrial structure in individual industry groups. Specifically, the study focuses 
on the distributional characteristics of financial liberalization in the industrialization 
process  using  disaggregated  data  methodology.  The  disaggregated  data  contains 
useful information that enables the understanding of industry specifics, and therefore 
facilitates  the  study  of  heterogeneity  across  industries.  The  process  entails  an 
examination  of  the  responsiveness  of  respective  industry-specifics  to  financial 
development  policy  changes,  in  the  short-run  and  long-run;  and,  is  a  cardinal 
scientific interest for understanding the evolution of structures in respective industries.  
 
The central finding of the study is that financial liberalization has ambiguous effects 
on  industry  structure;  thus,  there  exists  significant  cross-industry  heterogeneity  of 
policy effects. These results are consistent with the predictions by Weiss (1983), and 
Peneder (2008). The effects are positive for some industries and, surprisingly negative 
for others, and differently between the short-run and the long-run, thereby suggesting 
that  the  effects  of  financial  liberalization  differ  considerably  across  industries  and 
with  time.  The  results  display  no  obvious  pattern  as  per  orthodox  predictions, 198 
 
 
 
 
regarding the competition enhancing effects of financial liberalization. Specifically, 
whilst the interaction term variable between financial development and the financial 
liberalization  dummy  has  greater  significance  in  explaining  patterns  of  industry 
structure in the period following the reforms, the study findings do not conform to the 
predictions in the majority of the industry groups. The study results fail to support the 
orthodox predictions on the distributional effects of financial liberalization. 
 
On  industry  concentration,  the  results  show  that  following  financial  liberalization, 
while  concentration  show  increasing  trends  in  most  industry  groups,  it  is  also 
declining in others; albeit, in sixteen of the estimated twenty industry  groups, the 
financial  liberalization  coefficients  in  the  industrial  concentration  equation 
interestingly have positive values, and even those with signs in the expected direction, 
only  two  are  significantly  within  range  with  respect  to  statistical  significance.  In 
regard to net firm entry, the financial liberalization interaction term coefficient has a 
negative sign in fifteen industry groups, and statistically significant in eight of them. 
In the rest of the industries, financial liberalization has had no significant effect at all. 
These  results  suggest  the  ineffectiveness  of  financial  liberalization  to  induce 
competition among the twenty industry sectors in Malawi. This is much in contrast 
with  the  orthodox  view  as  propagated  by  the  neo-classical  theorists  regarding  the 
effect  of  financial  liberalization  in  promoting  competition  in  the  market.  More 
specifically,  the  results  contradict  the  predictions  by  Rajan  and  Zingales  (1998), 
which suggest that financial development enhances competition. Further, the study 
results  do  not  support  the  arguments  by  Rajan  and  Zingales  that  the  number  of 
establishments  in  those  industries  where  the  need  for  external  finance  is 
disproportionately  high,  increases  following  financial  development.  Instead,  as 
evidenced through the study results, in most of the industries, concentration increased 
and the number of firms declined following financial liberalization.  
 
Finally, the results clearly support a notion of structural diversity across industrial 
sectors,  in  tandem  with  the  old  intuition  of  ‘structuralist’  approaches  to  industrial 
analysis from the 1950s and 1960s (Bain, 1956). Most importantly, the results provide 
compelling empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that financial liberalization 
has varied profound impact in the industry dynamics. As in Weiss (1983), Barth and 199 
 
 
 
 
Ramey (2001) and Dedola and Lippi (2005), and Peneder (2008), among many others, 
it  may  be  argued  that  the  results  in  this  study  corroborate  their  hypotheses  that 
industry-specific  factors  –  for  example,  those  that  systematically  relate  to  capital 
requirements,  durability,  industry  demand  features,  firm  or  industry  size,  and  the 
extent of financing constraints – lead to policy response heterogeneity. As such, the 
observed  heterogeneity  –  the  fact  that  implications  of  financial  liberalization  for 
industry structures differ across industry groups – makes a strong case for industry-
specific approach to public policy. 
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Appendix 5.1:    A Brief on Random Coefficients Estimator versus Mean Group  
                            Estimator.        
 
Following Swamy (1970), Pesaran and Smith (1995), and Hsiao and Pesaran (2004), 
the RC estimator is defined as a weighted average of the OLS estimators ˆ
i q , with 
weights  inversely  proportional  to  their  covariance  matrices.  In  particular,  the  best 
linear unbiased estimator of the mean coefficient vector is given by; 
1
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ˆ ˆ
N
RC i i
i
N W q q
-
=
= ∑                                                                                                   
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Accordingly,  ˆ
i q D+S captures the dispersion of the industry-specific estimates, such 
that  i W  will optimally act to associate a large weight to sectors where the estimates 
are precise. Further, as presented by Hsiao and Pesaran (2004), the RC and the MG 
estimators are in fact algebraically equivalent for T sufficiently large, namely; 
  ( )
ˆ ˆ lim 0 RC MG T q q
® ¥ - = .                                                                                             
Hausman Test of no difference between RC an MG estimates. 
hausman mg rc, equation(1:1) 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
                  |      (b)             (B)                  (b-B)         sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
                  |       mg             rc                Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           SH |      -.2128    -.1537123       -.0590877        .0581905 
          GR |   -.1820969    -.1493175       -.0327795        .0430349 
        MM |   -.0099084     .0237722       -.0336807        .0089588 
         MX |    .0215605     .0041885         .017372        .0188161 
         FIN |    -.027718    -.0125658       -.0151522        .0143735 
  FIN_FL |    .1521348     .1389382        .0131966        .0184153 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtpmg 
             B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtrc 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                              =       30.21 
             Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
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Appendix 5.2: Graphs by Industry Code. 
  
1.Food Processing    6.Leather Products  11.Printing and Publishing  16.Non-Metal Products 
2.Beverages    7.Footwear  12.Industrial Chemicals  17.Fabricated Metal 
3.Tobacco Manufacture    8.Wood and Sawmill  13.Pharmaceuticals  18.Machinery-General 
4.Textles    9.Furniture  14.Leather Products  19.Machinery-Electrical 
5.Clothing and Apparel  10.Paper and Products  15.Plastic Products  20.Transport Equipment 
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Appendix 5.3:     Hausman test of no difference between Mean Group and Pooled  
                             Mean Group Estimates:  
 
(a). Industry Concentration Model. 
hausman mg pmg 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
                 |      (b)                 (B)                (b-B)              sqrt (diag (V_b-V_B)) 
                 |      mg                pmg              Difference      S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           SH |   -.2128         -.2614023         .0486023        .0620765 
          GR |   -.1820969    -.2720443        .0899473        .0458777 
         MM |   -.0099084    -.0247858        .0148773        .0094322 
         MX |    .0215605      .0038228        .0177376        .0218834 
         FIN |   -.027718      -.0024159       -.0253022         .020114 
  FIN_FL |    .1521348      .1487945        .0033404        .0230138 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtpmg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtpmg 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                              =       27.03 
          Prob>chi2    =      0.0001 
 
 
(b). Net Firm Entry Model. 
hausman mg pmg 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
                 |      (b)                (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
                 |       mg              pmg         Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       PCM |     -.623195       .7938348     -1.41703        .4880369 
      MKD |     -.3427984   -1.168671       .8258722               . 
          GR |      .0561001    -.0025659      .058666        .1143839 
        MM |     .4638695     1.85098        -1.38711               . 
         FIN |     .486682       -.0056478      .4923298        .205069 
  FIN_FL |    -.1283573     -.6651551      .5367978               . 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtpmg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtpmg 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                              =       21.97 
              Prob>chi2 =      0.0012 
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CHAPTER 6.0:      FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION, FIRM SIZE AND  
             INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE.  
 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION. 
 
Financial liberalization, as one of the most profound policy reforms in recent years, is 
hypothesised  to  transform  firms’  output  and  input  markets,  thereby  altering  their 
incentives  for  profit-maximization  and/or  cost-minimisation.  Nonetheless,  whether 
such  performance-enhancing  consequences  of  financial  liberalization  vary  across 
firms  of  different  sizes  is  an  empirical  question,  which  this  chapter  attempts  to 
investigate. As observed by Beck et al (2005), whilst firm size is considered to be a 
very important factor in how firm growth is constrained by different factors, current 
literature remains inconclusive about how the state of a country’s financial institutions 
affect firms of different sizes (see, Beck et al, 2001b). Some theories of industrial 
organisation argue that financial development is particularly beneficial to large firms. 
Others  predict  that  financial  development  is  especially  important  for  lowering 
transaction costs and informational barriers that hinder small firm growth. Further, in 
the  literature,  among  many  other  researchers,  Getler  and  Rose  (1994)  claims  that 
financial  liberalization  has  failed  to  meet  the  hypothesised  efficiency  gains  in  a 
number of countries, because accompanying a general rise in interest rates, following 
the deregulation process, has been a rise in the cost of capital for a substantial class of 
borrowers – particularly, small-sized enterprises. It is also argued that the elimination 
of  subsidized  credit  programs,  as  another  key  feature  of  financial  liberalization 
process, has led to increases in the financing constraints of those firms that previously 
benefited  from  the  directed  credit  system;  particularly  since  financial  institutions 
continue  to  be  characterised  by  credit  rationing  and  relationship-based  lending 
patterns,  which  have  often  been  in  favour  of  large-sized  firms.  Arguably,  these 
developments  are  therefore  likely  to  also  have  a  profound  influence  on  firm 
performance; albeit, differently for different firm sizes. Accordingly, at the firm or 
industry level, the effect of financial liberalization on the performance of different 
sizes  of  firms  is  theoretically  ambiguous  –  hence,  the  need  for  further  empirical 
investigation.  204 
 
 
 
 
 
Apart from assessing the afore-mentioned theoretical dispute, policy considerations 
also motivate this study. If, for instance, financial liberalization benefits small-size 
enterprises more than large-size ones, then even if financial liberalization helps all 
firms,  large  firms  might  oppose  reforms  that  diminish  their  comparative  power
89. 
However, instead of focusing on political lobbying by firms, this study specifically 
examines the question whether financial liberalization indiscriminately impacts firms’ 
profitability and real output growth, regardless of their size. Notably, governments 
and development agencies, both in the developed as well as developing economies, 
spend  a  lot  of  resources  subsidizing  small-scale  firms  –  who  are  perceived  to  be 
‘marginalized’ in terms of accessing financial resources in the financial system – with 
the expressed goals of, inter alia, inducing the performance of the smaller-size firms; 
thereby encouraging equitable entrepreneurship and balanced economic growth (see, 
Beck et al, 2008). As a matter of fact, in terms of public policies, the World Bank 
(1994b, 2002, 2004a) argues that small-size firms foster competition, innovation, and 
employment to a greater degree than large firms; and, has therefore devoted a lot of 
resources promoting small-sized firms
90. This is because it is believed that the small-
scale enterprise sector is crucial for job creation, economic development and poverty 
alleviation, and that small entrepreneurs face greater financial constraint. Similarly, as 
observed  by  Pagano  and  Schivardi  (2003),  many  advanced  economies  feature 
programs of public subsidies that target small-size firms, based on the thesis that they 
are essential for innovation but may face financing constraints due to credit market 
imperfections.  Yet,  notwithstanding  all  this  policy  effort,  some  research  studies 
suggest that subsidizing small-scale firms does not have these hypothesised beneficial 
effects (see, for example, Beck et al 2005). As such, results from this study should 
contribute  in  guiding  future  public  policy.  In  particular,  if  financial  liberalization 
impacts on the performance of small sized firms in the same way it does on large size 
firms, then future policy option may necessitate a shift away from subsidising the 
                                                 
89 A large literature examines the political economy of financial policies  (see, for example, Perotti and  
     von Thadden, 2006;  Pagano and Volpin, 2005;  Rajan and Zingales, 2003;   Kroszner and Strahan,  
     1999; and, Kroszner and Stratmann, 1998) 
90 According  to  the  World Bank Group Review  of  Small  Business  Activities (2002),  the Bank had  
     approved  about   US$10.0 billion  in  Small  and  Medium  Enterprises support programs during the  
     period between 2000 and 2005; of which, about US$1.5 billion was approved in 2005 alone.  
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small-scale enterprises; and, instead, concentrate on the development of the financial 
system, as argued by Beck et al (2007) and Levine (2005).  
 
 
6.2. SMALL FIRM VERSUS LARGE FIRM SIZE INDUSTRY DYNAMICS.    
 
One  of  the  most  consistent  and  striking  empirical  phenomena  in  industrial 
organisation  economics  is  the  persistence  of  an  asymmetric  size  distribution  of 
industries that are comprised of a relatively small number of large firms and heavily 
skewed toward a large number of small firms
91. However, a commonly held view is 
that, large-size firms or firms with high market shares possess certain advantages over 
small-size firms or those firms with low market shares (see, for example, Gale, 1972). 
A firm may obtain a large market share – implicitly large relative to the industry 
average firm size – due to efficiency advantages, derived from either its ability to 
learn from experience or ability to produce a given quantity at a lower cost than its 
rivals (see, Malerba, 1992). And, as argued by Feeny and Rogers (1999), if a firm 
achieves larger market share or size, this suggests that economies of scale can occur in 
cost components such as capital; thereby reinforcing efficiency advantages. However, 
others like Woo and Cooper (1981), and Hamermesh et al, (1978), do not agree with 
this view, arguing that low market share or small firm size is not always associated 
with inferior performance. Similarly, Chen and Hambrick (1995) and Tushman and 
Romanelli (1985) contend that small-size firms are flexible and have  niche-filling 
capabilities,  which  translates  into  efficiency,  as  they  are  relatively  quicker  in 
responding  to  the  dynamics  of  economic  environments.  Further,  according  to  the 
theory  of  strategic  niches,  small-size  firms  will  actually  exhibit  higher  levels  of 
profitability by occupying product niches in strategic groups that are inaccessible to 
their larger counterparts (see, for example, Audretsch et al, 1999)
92.  
 
The foregoing perceived differences, between large- and small-size firms, often go 
along  with  differences  in  scales  of  activity;  and,  hence,  variation  in  performance 
                                                 
91 According   to   Audretsch et al  (1999), this skewed firm size distribution has been found to persist  
    across industries, countries, and overtime with remarkable tenacity. 
92 Also, in  a  study  of Taiwanese industries, Yang and Huang (2005) find that small-size firms have  
    more flexible operations with lower capital-labour ratios and innovative activities. These attributes  
    are found to enhance the efficiency of the small-size firms. 206 
 
 
 
 
levels.  As  Porter  (1979),  and  Bradburd  and  Ross  (1989)  separately  note,  these 
systematic  differences  lead  to  variations  in  price-cost  margins  and  output  growth 
between large and small firms, as changes in the economic environment impact on 
firms of varying sizes differently. Focus of this study extends from these perspectives. 
In  particular,  whilst  some  theories  imply  that  financial  development 
disproportionately enhances the performance of small firms than large firms, others 
suggest the opposite.  
 
According to Beck et al (2005), large-size firms are most likely to tax the resources of 
an underdeveloped financial system, since they are more likely than smaller-size firms 
to depend on long-term financing and on larger loans. It is therefore possible that 
financial  development  can  disproportionately  reduce  the  effect  of  institutional 
obstacle on the largest firms. Further, Haber et al (2003) as well as Greenwood and 
Jovanovic  (1990)  argue  that  if  fixed  costs  prevent  small  firms  from  accessing 
financial services, then improvements to the financial system will disproportionately 
benefit  large  firms.  Further,  according  to  Laeven  (2003),  large  firms  are  likely  to 
perform better than smaller firms, following financial liberalization. This, as Laeven 
(2003) argues, is because large-size firms are less financially constrained than small-
size firms, as lenders are likely to have more information about large firms, to whom 
most  credit  will  therefore  be  directed.  Those  borrowers  are  also  likely  to  have 
relatively  more  collateral  wealth.  Size  considerations  may  also  affect  the  directed 
credit programs at subsidized rates, because such programs often favour exporting 
firms,  which  are  often  large  firms,  and  because  large  firms  often  have  stronger 
political as well as financing connections   As such, lending institutions, especially in 
poor developing countries, such as Malawi, prefer to be dealing with their large and 
well-established  clients,  as  opposed  to  the  small  and  usually  newly  established 
firms
93. Evidently, Wagner (1999, p. 259) observes that the bulk of firms exiting from 
the industry due to financial constraints tend to be new and small-scale enterprises. 
Similarly, Audretsch and Elston (2002) and Evans and Jovanovic (1989) observe that 
small-scale newcomers usually face liquidity constraints that precipitate closure and 
exit. Forbes (2003) also finds that smaller size firms experience significant financial 
constraints and these constraints decrease as firm size increase. Furthermore, Love 
                                                 
93 See, for example, Aryeetey et al (1994); Aryeetey (1996); Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998); Nissanke  
    (2001), for a comprehensive review on this issue; particularly for sub-Saharan African countries. 207 
 
 
 
 
(2003) establishes that small size firms are disproportionately more disadvantaged in 
less financially developed countries than are large size firms. According to this view 
therefore, larger-sized firms are arguably less likely to be financially constrained and 
should  perform  disproportionately  better,  following  financial  development  than 
smaller-sized firms.  
 
In contrast, however, an opposing prediction is made by Cestone and White (2003), 
Aghion  and  Bolton  (1997),  Banerjee  and  Newman  (1993),  and  Galor  and  Zeira  
(1993),  which  suggests  that  financial  development  eases  financial  constraints,  and 
enhances the performance of small size firms more than larger sized firms. According 
to this view, if smaller, less wealthy firms face higher credit constraints than large 
firms face – due to greater information barriers or high fixed costs associated with 
accessing  financial  systems  –  then  financial  development  that  ameliorates  market 
frictions will exert an especially positive impact on smaller firms. Moreover, Beck et 
al  (2005)  observe  that  large-size  firms  internalize  many  of  the  capital  allocation 
functions  carried  out  by  financial  markets  and  intermediaries.  As  such,  financial 
development should disproportionately benefit small size firms. Further, Berger et al 
(2001) and Petersen and Rajan (2002) find that small size firms are more likely to 
depend  on  the  domestic  financial  market  than  larger  size  firms.  Accordingly,  any 
policy changes in the domestic financial markets – such as financial liberalization – 
should benefit smaller size firms more than large size firms. For instance, in a study of 
Mexico,  Gelos  and Werner  (1999)  find  that  financial  constraints  are  eased  during 
financial liberalization, but only for small size  firms and not for large  size firms. 
Guiso et al (2004) also find that financial development benefits small-scale more than 
large-scale  firms  in  Italy.  Laeven  (2003),  study  thirteen  liberalizing  developing 
countries  and  finds  that  financial  liberalization  affects  small-scale  and  large-scale 
firms differently. Laeven argue that financial liberalization causes variations in the 
cash-flow sensitivity of investment which should affect small- and large-size firms 
differently.  While  smaller-sized  firms  become  less  financially  constrained  after 
financial liberalization, larger-sized firms tend to be more financially constrained as 
financial liberalization proceeds. Similar observations are made by Beck et al (2008) 
that financial development exerts a disproportionately positive effect on small firms 
than  on  large  firms.  Accordingly,  this  suggests  that  smaller-sized  firms  should 208 
 
 
 
 
perform  disproportionately  better  following  financial  liberalization,  compared  to 
larger-sized firms. 
 
The foregoing, therefore, demonstrates that the debate on the exact impact of financial 
liberalization on firms of different sizes remains inconclusive. Accordingly, it may 
further be argued that the effects of financial liberalization on industry performance 
may be sensitive to whether it is the large-size firms which exploit this policy change 
to enhance their performance through higher price-cost margins and output growth, 
thereby further increase their market shares; or, whether smaller-size and relatively 
newer firms exploit the opportunities created by these financial reforms to enter and 
build up capacity, as well as enhanced performance, thereby claim part of the market 
and pose effective competition in the industry. However, this phenomenon needs to be 
investigated further, within the context of the documented orthodox ‘performance-
inducing’ attributes of financial liberalization – and, therefore, forms the basis of this 
study. Specifically, if the price-cost margins as well as output growth of “small-firm 
industries”  –  industries  naturally  composed  of  small  size  firms  for  technological 
reasons – increase disproportionately faster than in “larger-firm industries”, following 
financial  liberalization,  this  suggests  that  financial  liberalization  boosts  the 
performance of small-firm industries more than large-firm industries. In contrast, the 
study might find that financial liberalization disproportionately boosts performance of 
large-firm industries or that financial liberalization fosters balanced performance.    
 
Accordingly, in order to achieve the foregoing, the study explicitly considers whether 
the  structural  break  –  in  terms  of  policy  as  well  as  increased  competitiveness, 
following  the  implementation  of  the  financial  liberalization  policy  –  change  the 
impact that the market structure, or specifically firm’s size, has on price-cost margins 
and  real  output  growth.  Notably,  however,  there  has  been  scanty  research  on  the 
relationship between firm size and industry performance for the developing countries 
of the sub-Saharan African region. Yet, these countries present different challenges 
and  opportunities  for  testing.    For  instance,  as  was  established  to  be  the  case  by 
Tybout (2000) and Audretsch et al (1999), for many economies such as Malawi, the 
manufacturing economic history underlines a duality characterised by a large number 209 
 
 
 
 
of  small-scale  firms,  and  by  a  small  number  of  large-scale  firms
94.  However,  in 
Malawi,  following  the  implementation  of  financial  liberalization  policies,  the 
manufacturing sector has been characterised by an increase in firm closures and exits 
–  more  particularly  of  small-scale  enterprises  than  large  sized  enterprises.  Whilst 
economic theory predicts different welfare outcomes for different firm sizes through 
price and non-price behaviours, this study is motivated by the need to assess how such 
behaviours change with financial liberalization in the Malawian manufacturing sector. 
To the author’s knowledge, this is the first study on the explicit modelling between 
firm size and industry performance, following financial liberalization in Malawi.  
 
 
6.3.      EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK.   
 
The  study  follows  the  approaches  by  Cowling  and  Waterson  (1976),  Clarke  and 
Davies (1982), Machin and van Reenen (1993), where the conjectural variation of 
industry performance – specifically, profitability and real output growth – is modelled 
as being influenced by relative firm sizes, as well as by financial liberalization. This 
facilitates the testing of whether financial liberalization has disparate effects on price-
cost margins and real output growth between industries that are, for technical reasons, 
characterized by predominantly small-firms, and those industries with large-firms.  
 
 
6.3.1. Theoretical Background. 
 
Economic  literature  on  industry  performance  has  focused  heavily  on  the  role  of 
industry concentration and market share (see, for example, Hay and Morris, 1991). 
The potential influence of these two variables on industry performance arises directly 
from  the  economic  theory  of  the  firm  and  the  structure-conduct-performance 
paradigm. The paradigm suggests that industry performance depends on its conduct, 
which, in turn, depends upon the market in which it operates. Thus, a positive market 
share-profitability underlies the positive concentration-profitability relationship found 
empirically. The theoretical background to market share distinguishes dynamic factors 
                                                 
94 This  duality,   inherited  from  the  colonial  period  had,  hitherto,  been  sustained and reinforced by  
    government intervention (see, for example UNCTAD, 2006). 210 
 
 
 
 
from  static  factors.  Dynamic  factors  are  those,  which  lead  to  improved  firm 
efficiency,  and  thus  higher  market  share.  Static  factors  are  those,  which  reinforce 
efficiency advantages once a large market share has been achieved.  Accordingly, in 
the theoretical literature
95, the profitability of a firm in the basic model of oligopoly is 
given as; 
   
( ) i P MC
P
-
 =  1
i i
i
s dQ
dq e
 
+  
 
                                                                                       (6.1) 
where, P is price, MC is marginal cost, ε  is the market elasticity of  demand, si  is firm 
i’s  market  share,  qi    is  firm  i’s  output,  and  Qi    is  industry  output  excluding  i’s 
production. This equation is derived from assuming the firm maximises profit. The 
derivative 
i
i
dQ
dq
is called a firm’s conjectural variation; thus, the output reactions of the 
firm’s rivals to its output change (see, Scherer and Ross, 1990, p.230). In the Cournot-
Nash model
96, the effect of a change in output by  one firm on industry  output is 
assumed to be one for one since firms output is unchanged (hence  
i
i
dQ
dq
 = 1). This 
means a firm’s profit is related to its market share and the elasticity of demand. Thus, 
the profit margin of the ith firm as a proportion of its price is given by;  
 
( ) i P MC
P
-
 = mi = 
i s
e
                                                                                                (6.2) 
where, ε  is the market elasticity of  demand, si  is firm i’s market share.  
 
In the literature, Feeny and Rogers (1999), Demsetz (1973a, b), and Brozen (1971), 
among many other researchers, suggest that a positive relationship between profits 
and market share at a firm level will imply a positive profit-concentration relationship 
at the industry level. In further explanation, Scherer and Ross (1990) also observe that 
highly concentrated industries have high profits due to individual firms’ high market 
                                                 
95 See, for example, Scherer and Ross (1990, pp.227-233); and Hay and Morris (1991, pp.209-212). 
96 In Cournot-Nash equilibrium,  each  firm  considers  the output of all the other firms and sets its own  
    output  in  a  way  that   maximizes  its  profits  when  selling to a price-responsive demand curve. In  
    equilibrium, each  firm is producing at its profit-maximizing output, given the output of all the  other  
    firms (see, Tirole, 1988, for a comprehensive review of the Cournot-Nash concept). 
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shares. Accordingly, the industry price-cost margin will be the sum of the individual 
firms’ profit margins, each weighted by the firm’s market share (si), and yields; 
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 where,  MC d is the weighted average of the sellers marginal costs, and  H is the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index
2
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97. This suggests that, in an unconcentrated 
industry or where industries are characterised by firms with small market shares, then 
profitability  will  be  low;  whilst  in  a  concentrated  industry,  or  industries  with 
predominantly large market share firms, profits will be higher. Thus, in the literature, 
the  structure-conduct-performance  hypothesis  has  been  a  basis  for  analysing  firm 
performance given the structure of the market. The hypothesis postulates that market 
share  or  size  inequalities  among  the  incumbents  influence  the  behaviour  of  firms 
through, for instance, pricing and investment policies, and this in turn translates into 
performance.  This  model  assumes  that  certain  market  structures  are  conducive  to 
monopolistic  conduct,  and  this  conduct  enables  firms  to  raise  prices  above  costs 
thereby making abnormal profits and growth.  Therefore, the link between market 
structure and profitability is through firms pricing behaviour. In perfectly competitive 
markets where firms face a perfectly elastic demand, theoretically the model predicts 
that  there  will  be  lower  profitability  compared  with  all  other  markets  where  the 
demand is less elastic. 
 
Further,  it  is  argued  that  the  positive  relationship  between  market  share  and 
profitability reflects the superior performance of large firms (see, Bain, 1956). A firm 
captures a large market share and earns above average profits by establishing a cost 
advantage  over  its  rivals.  Thus,  differences  in  firm-specific  efficiencies  within 
markets create unequal market shares and high concentration. The hypothesis is the 
market  share-profitability  relationship
98.  The  implicit  assumption  under  this 
hypothesis is that the differing efficiencies among firms lead to unequal market shares 
                                                 
97 In the empirical literature, where data to determine  the Herfindahl-Hirschman index is unavailable,  
    the   standard   approach   is   to   use the k-firm concentration ratio (see, for example, Conyon and  
    Machin, 1991; Haskel and Martin, 1994) 
98 See, Demsetz (1973a, b); McGee (1974); Peltzman (1977);Brozen (1982); Gale and Branch (1982). 212 
 
 
 
 
and high levels of concentration, and are causally due to factors that reduce costs. 
Thus, the hypothesis implies that the causal link will be between concentration and 
profits. However, in addition to concentration, Bain (1951) and Mann (1966) found 
certain  barriers  to  entry,  such  as  economies  of  scale,  market  growth,  product 
differentiation, and capital requirements, to have an independent influence on industry 
performance
99.  
 
 
6.3.2. Firm Size and Performance. 
 
As industry performance is central to any explanation to the growth of an economy, it 
is  therefore  not  surprising  that  so  many  reasons  have  been  suggested  to  explain 
industry profitability and output growth (see, for example, Hart and Oulton, 1996). 
Hence, analysis of the performance of industries – of different structures and firm 
sizes  –  is  of  core  interest  to  economists  and  policymakers  as  it  adds  to  the 
understanding of competitive forces and, ultimately, the allocation of resources for 
economic growth (see, Feeny et al, 2005). However, one caveat with the firm size-
performance models discussed above is that they ignore the role of barriers to entry in 
an  industry.  For  instance,  as  Hay  and  Morris  (1991,  p.224)  state  “...even  if 
[concentration or market share] is a necessary condition for higher profitability, it is 
probably not sufficient. If there are few or no barriers to entry, then we would expect 
supernormal profits to be competed away by new entrants”. Arguably, as indicated 
above, financial development or financial liberalization should influence firms’ entry 
barriers through its effects on the input and output markets. Evidently, in a study of 
how institutional factors affect the performance of firms of different sizes and, hence, 
act as constraints to economic growth, Kumar et al (2001) identify, amongst others, 
‘financial  channels’  through  which  institutions  in  an  economy  may  influence  the 
performance of firms. Thus, according to Kumar et al, if the availability of external 
funds is important for firms to perform better and grow, firm size should therefore be 
positively correlated with financial development, and, more generally, with any policy 
initiatives aimed at promoting the development of the financial system. As Rajan and 
                                                 
99 Due to lack of information about some of these variables in Malawi, this study has been constrained  
     to only relating price-cost margins to the capital-output ratio and market demand growth. 
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Zingales (1998) establish, financial development influences growth in value-added of 
existing  establishments  and  in  the  number  of  new  establishments  in  industries 
dependent  on  external  finance.  As  such,  a  la  Rajan  and  Zingales,  with  the 
development  of  the  financial  system,  firms  should  be  able  to  perform  better  by 
increasing their price-cost margins  as well  as output. Nonetheless, whether this is 
uniformly  applicable  to  small  size  firms  as  it  is  to  large  size  firms  is,  therefore, 
ultimately an empirical question, which needs to be investigated. 
 
Further, Beck et al (2005) observes that the differences between large size firms when 
compared  to  small  size  firms  become  clearer  when  specific  focus  is  made  on 
financing obstacles that face these two categories of the manufacturing industries. 
According to Beck et al, in the financial system, the only obstacle that affects large 
size firms is that caused by high interest rates. Otherwise, large size firms are found to 
be  unaffected  by  collateral  requirements,  bank  bureaucracies,  or  any  credit  access 
issues that characterise financial markets of most economies. In contrast, smaller size 
firms are significantly and negatively affected by collateral requirements, high interest 
rates, lack of any connections or relationships with the lending institutions, banks’ 
lack of loanable funds, and generally lack of access to credit facilities
100.  
 
According  to  the  foregoing  literature,  financial  market  imperfections  provide 
conceptual  argument  to  support  size  related  differences  in  firm  and  industry 
performance. The basis for this argument is that financial markets may overstate the 
risks associated with small firms and charge interest rates that more than compensate 
the  lender  for  any  actual  risk  differential.  Reinganum  and  Smith  (1983)  find  that 
lenders charge risk premiums of small firms that exceed what is justified by increased 
risk of default. Further, whilst the large firms have credit access to domestic as well as 
international financial markets, small firms are only confined to the domestic financial 
market. Besides, the financial markets usually prefer lending to the large established 
firms as opposed to the small new borrowers. Meyer (1967) cites these differences in 
                                                 
100 As     earlier     presented     in    this   study,   Aryeetey et al (1997),  Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998),  
    Nissanke   (2001)    review   these   issues   for sub-Saharan   African   countries,  including Malawi.       
    Similarly, Weiss (1981) and Stiglitz (2000)  on credit rationing; and, Boot (2000), Boot and Thakor       
    (2000), and Boot et al (1993) on relationship-based  lending  by financial institutions. Further, as an        
    example, in a study for India, Kochar (1997) observe that larger firms have more credit access than       
    small firms; and, that credit availability is strongly correlated with productivity. 
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borrowing  patterns  and/or  lending  characteristics  as  a  source  of  variations  in 
performance between large and small firms. And, within the theoretical literature that 
directly or indirectly deals with firm size, there exist various other arguments that 
demonstrate  the  complexity  of  the  firm  size-performance  link,  partly  because  of 
dynamic and static factors.  
 
One  of  the  arguments  on  firm  size-performance  differentials  is  made  by  Mancke 
(1974), amongst many others, who incorporate the Gibrat process in the explanation 
(refer to Appendix 4.1 on the concept). Mancke postulates that a positive firm size-
profitability will exist due to luck, not some inherent dynamic efficiency or economies 
of  scale.  Similarly,  according  to  the  predictions  made  by  the  Gibrat’s  law  of 
proportionate effect, all firms’ real output, irrespective of size, grow each year by 
some random draw from the distribution of growth rates. Generally, however, the 
Gibrat process has itself been subjected to testing in several studies, with somewhat 
controversial results. Thus, while several findings lend support to the Gibrat’s law 
(see, for example, Klette and Grilliches, 2000; Hart and Prais, 1956), some studies 
conclude that smaller firms become more profitable and have higher output growth 
than their larger counterparts
101. Simon and Bonini (1958) argue that the expected 
profitability and output growth, is independent of firm size only for firms in a given 
size  class  that  firms  are  larger  than  the  minimum  efficient  scale.  Further,  Sutton 
(2000) also points out the role played by scale on explaining the variance of firm 
growth. Lotti et al (2003) find that Gibrat’s law fails to hold for small firms in the 
years immediately following start-up, while the law applies when they achieve a size 
large enough to overcome the minimum efficient scale. As a matter of fact, Caves and 
Porter  (1977)  did  test  Gibrat’s  law  based  on  Mancke’s  (1974)  hypothesis  and 
established that the positive firm size-performance relationship was mostly due to 
product  differentiation  and  business  strategy  than  a  Gibrat-like  process.  Besides, 
Mancke’s  hypothesis  does  not  consider  the  role  of  entry  barriers  in  influencing 
starting positions for different firms. Accordingly, the fact that a positive firm size-
profitability or output growth will exist due to ‘luck’, may not be valid. 
 
                                                 
101 See, for example, Hart and Oulton (1996); Dunne and Hughes (1994); and, Hall (1987). Also see  
       Sutton (1997) for a comprehensive survey. 
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As  Scherer  and  Ross  (1990),  Hay  and  Morris  (1991),  Gale  and  Branch  (1982) 
separately  establish,  following  the  seminal  analysis  of  firm  profitability  by  Bain 
(1951, 1956), barriers to entry are instead considered to be critical determinants of 
industry performance. According to Bain, barriers to entry are identified as high levels 
of  sunk  costs,  absolute  cost  advantages  of  existing  firms  arising  from  privileged 
access to resources (thus, the greater the cost of entry, the easier it is for existing firms 
to maintain monopoly profits); and, the existence of scale economies, both in relation 
to firm size and in absolute terms. Nonetheless, the exact direction of the relationship 
between firm size and industry profitability or industry output growth is however not 
unambiguous, and hence the need for further research. 
  
 
6.3.3. Methodological Approach. 
 
In the literature, it is argued that industries that are characterized by large firms also 
possess high market shares in total industry value-added and employment. Similarly, 
in industries where the optimal firm size is small, the market shares will also be low. 
Accordingly, in these industries, there should be more competition and more entry, 
since barriers to entry are small when the optimal size of the firm is smaller (see, 
Guiso et al 2004). Consequently, such industries will be relatively more competitive.  
 
There exist many criteria for measuring firm size in the literature, mostly based on 
either value-added or employment, particularly following earlier work of Shephered 
(1964, 1972). However, the most commonly used measure in many empirical studies 
is  the  latter  –  employee  numbers
102.  Besides,  Kumar  et  al  (2001)  notes  that 
coordination costs, which are present both in the technological and the organizational 
theories of the firms, are in terms of number of employees.  This therefore argues for 
a measure based on number of employees. The study follows this approach, as others 
have done, where the share of the market in terms of employment numbers, represent 
a measure of firm size inequality. As such, as the objective of the study is to examine 
                                                 
102 In the literature,  this  methodology is followed, for example, by Yang and Huang  (2005);Dedola  
      and   Lippi   (2005);   Dhawan   (2001);   Kumar et al (2001);   Audretsch et al (1998); Dean et al  
      (1998);   Gale and Branch  (1982); among many  others.  As  argued by Kumar et al  (2001),  this   
      measure  has  a  long  intellectual tradition (see, for example, Pashigian, 968). 216 
 
 
 
 
the effects of financial liberalization on the relationship between performance and a 
measure of firm size; there is a need to measure each industry’s firm size.   
 
Extending from the foregoing arguments, and following You (1995), Sutton (1991), 
and Coase (1937) who observe that differences in productive technologies, capital 
intensities, and scale economies influence an industry’s technological firm size, Beck 
et al (2008) construct measures of each industry’s ‘natural’ or ‘technological’ share of 
small firms based on United States census data on number of employees. As argued 
by Beck et al (2008), the United States is used to form the benchmark measure, on the 
assumption that it has relatively frictionless financial markets and most developed 
financial systems in the world by many measures (see, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 
2001). Further, according to Beck et al (2008), the United States has the full spectrum 
of human capital skills. Besides, comparative studies of United States and European 
labour markets suggest that the United States has many fewer policies distorting firm 
size beyond the financial sector. Beck et al also notes that due to its size, the US is 
characterized by a relatively huge internal market, which is comparatively open to 
international trade. Finally, as observed by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006), amongst 
others, the United States has a superior contracting environment and well-developed 
institutions. In view of all these attributes therefore, Beck et al (2008) argue that the 
United  States  represents  a  natural  benchmark  for  providing  a  ranking  of  each 
industry’s technological share of small firms, as a measure of firm size.  
 
However, Beck et al (2008) note that the empirical methodology does not require that 
the  US  has  perfect  financial  markets,  labour  markets,  contracting  systems,  or 
institutions. Instead, the methodology only requires that policy distortions and market 
imperfections  in  the  US  do  not  distort  the  ranking  of  industries  in  terms  of  the 
technological  share  of  small  firms  within  each  industry.  According  to  the 
methodology,  therefore,  Beck  et  al  (2008)  constructs  each  industry’s  ‘natural’  or 
‘technological’  i Small Firm Share ( ) i SFS as industry i’s share of employment in firms 
with less than 20 employees in the United States, obtained from census data. This 
study follows this methodology used by Beck et al (2008), with particular focus on 217 
 
 
 
 
small  firm  size
103.  Specifically,  it  develops  an  analytical  framework  based  on  the 
foregoing,  within  which  an  attempt  is  made  to  conjecture  the  consequences  of 
financial liberalization on small firm share in order to establish its influence on the 
hypothesised link between firm size and profitability. Accordingly, in this research, 
financial  liberalization  constitutes  a  critical  component  determining  the  course  of 
price-cost  margins  for  firms  of  different  sizes.  This  is  achieved  by  including 
interaction terms between a financial liberalization dummy  ( ) t FL and a measure of 
small firm share index( )it SFS FL ´ , in an industry’s profitability model where the 
dependent variable is price-cost margins( ) it PCM , representing industry profits.  
 
Next, besides investigating whether financial liberalization has differential effects on 
the  performance  of  large-  and  small-firm  industries  by  examining  profitability  as 
measured  through  industry  price-cost  margins,  the  study  conducts  a  similar 
investigation,  but  using  industry’s  real  output  growth( ) it GO as  the  measure  of 
industry  performance.  Thus,  the  study  examines  whether  the  development  of  the 
financial  system  has  any  implications  on  the  manufacturing  industry  performance 
patterns,  by  examining  industry  output  growth,  as  suggested  in  the  literature  by, 
among others, Beck et al, 2008; Levine, 2005; Vlachos and Waldenstrom, 2005; and, 
Rajan  and  Zingales,  1998.  In  this  particular  part  of  the  study,  the  objective  is  to 
specifically  test  whether  the  financial  liberalization  process  shapes  industry 
performance  by  increasing  the  proportion  of  production  output  accounted  for  by 
small-firm industries.  This is done for two related reasons. First, building on previous 
research, a large literature examines the relationship between financial development 
and  industry  growth.  This  provides  a  natural  framework  for  the  analyses  and 
facilitates  comparisons,  and  identification  of  relationship  between  financial 
liberalization,  working  through  financial  development,  and  the  output  growth  of 
small-firm  industries  relative  to  large-firm  industries,  additional  to  the  effects 
established by past work. Second, focusing on growth links helps relate this study to 
an extensive body of theoretical and empirical work on the finance-growth nexus. In 
the  literature,  many  theoretical  models  predict  that  a  higher  level  of  financial 
                                                 
103  However, firm-level census data from Malawian manufacturing sector, obtained through Annual  
      Economic surveys, is used instead in the determination of small firm size index.  218 
 
 
 
 
development  will  induce  a  faster  rate  of  economic  growth  (see,  Levine,  2005). 
Specifically, the theory suggests that market imperfections, as well as information and 
incentive problems raise the cost of external funds especially due to underdeveloped 
financial  systems.  These  may  constrain  firm’s  ability  to  fund  investment  projects, 
which may, in turn, adversely affect industry growth (see, Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
Besides,  Demirguc-Kunt  and  Maksimovic  (1998)  show  the  importance  of  the 
financial  system  for  relaxing  firm’s  external  financial  constraints  and  facilitating 
industry  growth.    Rajan  and  Zingales  (1998)  use  industry-level  data  to  show  that 
industries  that  are  dependent  on  external  finance,  grow  faster  in  countries  with  a 
developed financial system. Beck et al (2005) employs survey data for 54 countries, 
to  investigate  whether  financial  obstacles  affect  industry  growth.  They  show  that 
underdeveloped  financial  systems  could  obstruct  industry  growth
104.    However, 
although  the  existing  literature  seems  to  provide  many  elements  on  the  effects  of 
finance  on  industry  output  growth,  some  important  financial  factors  and  industry 
characteristics  are  still  unexplored.  The  study,  therefore,  extends  this  literature  by 
investigating whether financial liberalization might exert a disproportionately positive 
effect on the output growth rate of particular type of industries, such as industries 
naturally  composed  of  small  firms  facing  high  informational  asymmetries.  This, 
therefore, motivates the separate focus on industry output growth as a measure of 
industry  performance.  The  approach  involves  the  inclusion  of  an  interaction  term 
variable( )it SFS FL ´ , in the industry’s output growth ( ) it GO model estimation.    
 
Overall, therefore, the study estimates two separate industry performance models; the 
profitability  ( ) it PCM model,  and  the  real  output  growth  ( ) it GO model.  However, 
whilst the study conducts these investigations by applying the methodology used by 
Beck et al (2008), determination of a measure of an industry’s technological share of 
small  firms  is  primarily  based  on  data  from  Malawian  manufacturing  industries. 
Arguably, whilst the US may be considered to be the perfect benchmark economy, 
and therefore providing a reliable measure of small firm share, as argued by Beck et 
al (2008), Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001) and Barth et al (2006), it might still be 
inappropriate for some  countries, particularly the developing countries  of the sub-
                                                 
104 Also see, Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004), Beck et al (2000), Levine et al (2000), and Greenwood  
      and   Jovanovic   (1990). 219 
 
 
 
 
Saharan Africa region, such as Malawi. As a matter of fact, Beck et al (2008), notes 
that, beyond financial sector distortions, there are other country-specific factors that 
may  affect  an  industry’s  technological  firm  size  in  an  economy.  In  this  case,  for 
instance, in Malawi the level of economic development, R&D, and industrialization in 
general,  may  not  be  comparable  with  the  US.  Firms  in  the  US  may  not  employ 
technologies  similar  to  those  in  countries  like  Malawi  due  to  different  levels  of 
economic and technological development. As such, in order to capture the country-
specific traits, whilst industry’s technological share of small firms is determined by 
the methodology as suggested by Beck et al (2008), instead, the study uses Malawian 
census data. Further, unlike Beck et al (2008) who take 1992 as the only reference 
year, the Malawian data is averaged over the entire study period (1970-2004), in order 
to determine the approximate period average industry’s share of small firms for the 
respective industries in the Malawian manufacturing sector.  
 
 
6.4. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY. 
 
6.4.1. Model Specification. 
 
As indicated in the foregoing, in order to capture the multi-dimensional characteristic 
of  industry  performance,  two  models  using  different  indicators  of  industry 
performance  as  dependent  variables,  are  estimated.  Accordingly,  focus  is  first  on 
price-cost margins (profitability), and then followed by real output growth.  
 
  
6.4.1.1. Price-Cost Margins Model. 
 
Theoretically,  a  typical  profit  model  framework,  and  also  drawing  from  the 
presentation under Equation (6.3) above, may be specified as follows: 
 
( ) , , , PCM f CR KO MKD X =                                                                                  (6.4) 
where,  PCM  is  price-cost  margin  as  the  profitability  measure,  CR  is  industry 
concentration as a measure of market structure, KO is capital-output ratio, MKD is 220 
 
 
 
 
growth in market demand. And, X is a vector of control variables that account for 
other industry-specific and market-specific characteristics. Traditionally, the control 
variables are to allow for variations in industry characteristics by including structural 
and conduct variables – including economies of scale, labour market variables, and 
trade variables – and, generally, other variables that influence both prices and costs 
(see, Conyon and Machin, 1991; Geroski and Jacquemin, 1985). However, lagged 
profit margins  ( ) 1 i t PCM - are also included to the specification in Equation (6.4), since 
past  industry  performance  may  affect  future  output  decisions.  An  additional 
justification  for  the  inclusion  of  a  lagged  dependent  variable,  according  to  the 
literature, is to allow for partial adjustment to shocks in the persistence of profits
105. 
This is based on the idea that competition is a dynamic process. Individual firms are 
thought  of  as  experiencing  ‘shocks’,  which  move  them  away  from  their  long  run 
equilibrium profitability, with the intensity of competition determining how fast they 
return to equilibrium.   
 
Accordingly, the study use the foregoing background to investigate the impact of firm 
size  on  industry  profitability;  specifically  whether  industries  that  are  naturally 
composed of small firms perform better following financial liberalization, the study 
includes  an  industry  characteristic  –  each  industry’s  technological  Small  Firm 
Share( ) i SFS . This should facilitate the examination of whether there is a positive or 
negative relationship between small-firm industries and profitability; and, particularly 
whether  smaller-sized  firms  are  relatively  more  profitable.  The  model  extends  to 
investigate whether financial liberalization affects the relationship between firm size 
and price-cost margins, by also including in the model an interaction term between 
i SFS   and  a  financial  liberalization  dummy( ) t FL ;  thus,( )it SFS FL ´ .  As  indicated 
earlier,  changes following the financial liberalization process are  expected to alter 
firm’s  incentives  for  profit-maximization  and/or  cost-minimisation.  Arguably, 
financial liberalization ushers in a lot of policy changes which, in turn, transform a 
firm’s independence to respond to other firms – by either introducing or removing 
constraints on their actions. These reforms differently affect competition among firms 
of different sizes as well as the way in which they react to the actions of other firms 
                                                 
105 As discussed in Goddard and Wilson (1999), Waring (1996); Machin and van Reenen (1993),  
     Mueller and Cubbin (1990); and, Geroski and Jacquemin (1988), among many others. 221 
 
 
 
 
and  therefore  their  conjectural  variations.    Accordingly,  from  Equation  (6.4),  an 
estimable price-cost margin equation may therefore be presented as follows; 
 
( )
0 1 1 2 3 4
5 6
it it it it t
i k kit it it
PCM PCM CR KO MKD
SFS SFS FL X
b b b b b
b b b m
- = + + + +
+ + ´ + + ∑
                                      (6.5) 
                 1, , ; 1, , , i N t T = = K K  
where, the subscripts i and t refer to industry and time respectively. Following the 
model as presented in Equation (6.5) through which change in price-cost margins may 
be explained, the study considers the effects of other variables that may be changing 
in  the  real  world  and  that  may  need  to  be  taken  into  account  in  the  empirical 
investigation. In this case, the study includes imports intensity, exports intensity and 
inflation. 
 
The focus of the analysis of results from the estimation of Equation (6.5) is mainly on 
the sign and significance of the coefficients for the variable i SFS ; and, particularly on 
the interaction between financial liberalization and small firm share( )it SFS FL ´ . In 
particular,  if  the  value  of  6 b is  greater  than  0,  and  significant,  this  suggests  that 
financial  liberalization  exerts  a  disproportionately  positive  effect  on  the  price-cost 
margins of small-firm industries relative to those of large-firm industries. Thus, this 
should suggest that financial liberalization improves small firms financing constraints 
and therefore lead to an increase in their profitability. Otherwise, if  6 b  is less than 0, 
and  significant,  this  is  an  indication  that  small  firm  industries  continue  to  be 
financially constrained following financial liberalization, with adverse implications on 
their price-cost margins.  
 
 
6.4.1.2. Output Growth Model. 
 
The study also investigates industry performance through output growth by extending 
the works of Beck et al (2008), Gallego and Loayza (2001), and Rajan and Zingales 
(1998). Following these studies, industry performance is therefore examined through 222 
 
 
 
 
a model with a dependent variable that is measured by growth in industry’s value 
added
106. The model may therefore be presented as follows, 
 
( ) , , , GO f SH KO LP Z =                                                                            (6.6) 
where, GO is the industry’s real output growth (thus, nominal output deflated using 
the GDP deflator), SH is the share of the industry in total manufacturing sector, KO is 
capital-output ratio, and LP is labour productivity, measured as employees per value-
added. And, Z is a vector of control variables that account for other industry-specific 
and  market-specific  characteristics.  These  include  market  demand  growth, 
international trade, and inflation trends.  
 
Like  in  the  profitability  model,  the  study  investigates  whether  industries  naturally 
composed of small firms for technical reasons have higher or lower productivity than 
large firm industries, by including a measure of small firm size  i SFS is to Equation 
(6.6).  This  should  facilitate  investigating  whether  smaller-sized  firms  grow  more 
rapidly  and  improve  productivity.  The  study  further  examines  whether  financial 
liberalization shapes industry performance by increasing the proportion of production 
output  accounted  for  by  small-firm  industries.  Accordingly,  an  interaction-
term( )it SFS FL ´ ,  as  defined  earlier,  is  also  included  to  the  model  in  order  to 
determine  whether  financial  liberalization  affects  the  firm  size  and  output  growth 
relationship. The following equation is therefore estimated, 
 
( )
0 1 1 2 3 4
5 6
it it it it it
i k kit it it
GO GO SH KO LP
SFS SFS FL Z
a a a a a
a a a h
- = + + + +
+ + ´ + + ∑
                                           (6.7) 
          1, , ; 1, , , i N t T = = K K  
where,  the  subscripts  i  and  t  refer  to  industry  and  time  respectively.  The  initial 
(lagged)  output  growth 1 it GO - is  included  to  capture  convergence  effects  to  the 
industry’s steady-state output. And, Z stands for variables, including firm size, as well 
as other control variables that capture industry specific characteristics. It also captures 
macro, financial outcome and policy variables.  
 
                                                 
106 In  the literature, ‘net sales’ have also been used as an alternative measure of industry performance.  
     However, value added is most commonly used measure due data availability (see,  for example,  Liu  
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Similar  to  the  analytical  approach  taken  on  the  profitability  model,  of  particular 
interest in the estimation of Equation (6.7) is the value  6 a ; specifically, whether it 
turns  out  to  be  greater  than  0,  and  significant,  which  may  suggests  that  financial 
liberalization exerts a disproportionately positive effect on the growth of small-firm 
industries  relative  to  those  of  large-firm  industries.  Thus,  this  should  suggest  that 
financial  liberalization  improves  the  performance  of  small-firm  industries  by 
increasing their productivity prospects relative to those of the large-firm industries. 
An opposite result may otherwise be an indication that small firm industries continue 
to be financially constrained following financial liberalization, with adverse effects on 
their  productivity  prospects  and  overall  performance  compared  to  the  large-firm 
industries.  
 
 
6.4.2. Variable Description. 
 
The Price-Cost Margins( ) it PCM  represent an index of profitability (also presented as 
π it, in the literature). The price-cost margin is the most commonly used measure of 
profitability in empirical studies of firm/industry performance and indicates the ability 
of  firms  to  elevate  price  above  marginal  cost.    However,  whilst  the  appropriate 
empirical  measurement  of  the  price-cost  margins  that  arises  from  theory  has 
sometimes been a contentious issue in the literature, in many previous studies where – 
as is the case in this study – manufacturing census data is being used
107, the price-cost 
margins are defined as: 
 
PCM =   
Value added Payroll
Valueadded Costof Materials
-
+
                                                        (6.8) 
According  to  the  literature,  price-cost  margins  is  also  analogous  to  the  difference 
between price and average variable cost divided by price; and, is a proxy for the 
Lerner index (price minus marginal cost divided by price)
108. Further, lagged price-
                                                 
107 See, for example, Feeny et al (2005); Feeny and Rogers (1999); McDonald (1999); MacDonald and  
     Bloch (1999); Prince and Thurik (1995);  Domowitz et al, (1986a, b); Clarke et al (1984); Bradburd  
     and Caves  (1982);  Liebowitz (1982); and, Encaoua  and  Jacquemin  (1980). 
108 Notably, in   the  literature,  the alternative use of accounting rates of return as a measure of industry  
     profitability  has been extensively criticised (see, for example, Fisher and McGowan, 1983; Phillips,  
     1976). Problems cited include difficulties in measuring depreciation, taxes, and inventories. 224 
 
 
 
 
cost  margins( ) 1 it PCM -   are  also  included  as  an  explanatory  variable,  in  order  to 
capture  the  effects  of  previous  profitability.  As  argued  by  Goddard  and  Wilson 
(1999),  Waring  (1996),  Machin  and  van  Reenen  (1993),  and  Muller  and  Cubbin 
(1990), among others, the reason for the inclusion of lagged profits is due to the 
empirically observed serial correlation in profit margin time series; the theoretical 
need to capture departures from and subsequent returns to, long run equilibrium; and 
the fact that current output conjectures may depend on previous performance. This 
approach differs from the previous traditional profit studies, which have been nested 
within a static structure conduct performance framework, under the assumption that 
the industry is in equilibrium. However, Geroski (1990, p.17) and Schmalensee (1989, 
p.356) criticise the static approach on the grounds that the data used to estimate the 
related models are not generated from equilibrium positions and may be generated 
during random or temporary departures from equilibrium. Accordingly, while a policy 
to control profits in a highly concentrated industry may seem reasonable, it may only 
reinforce  an  already  existing  error-correction  mechanism  which  functions  to  bid 
excess profits away through increased entry. Following these arguments, price-cost 
margins are mostly modelled within a dynamic setting, in order to capture both inter-
industry and intra-industry differences, particularly in response to cyclical demand 
shifts (see also, Conyon and Machin, 1991a; Geroski and Jacquemin, 1988). Further, a 
much more fundamental reason for including lagged price-cost margins is that past 
industry profitability has traditionally been viewed as an influential factor to future 
profits  through  entry  and/or  exit  of  firms  (see,  Siegfried  and  Evans,  1994).  The 
argument is that, if past industry profitability induces more firm entry, then this might 
lead to lower profits in future as they are competed away; and, the opposite is true.  
 
Industry  Output  Growth( ) it GO –  this  is  represented  by  annual  growth  in  industry 
value added as a measure of industry performance. Several empirical investigations 
have sought to determine whether there is any relationship between output growth and 
firm size
109. The results vary widely. Besides, there is stronger and more consistent 
evidence rejecting the Gibrat assumption that standard deviations of output growth 
                                                 
109 See, for example, Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys (2002); Liu and Hsu (2006); van Biesebroeck (2005);  
     Dhawan  (2001);  Bartelsman  and Doms  (2000);  Grilliches and Regev (1995); Dunne and Hughes  
     (1994); Variyan and Kraybill  (1992); Dunne et al (1989); Evans (1987a,b); Hall (1987); Singh and  
     Whittington (1975). 225 
 
 
 
 
rate are independent of firm size. Further, a finer-grained analysis by Scherer and 
Ross (1990) suggests that the variability of industry output growth rates may differ 
not only with firm size, but also from industry to industry, depending upon the nature 
of the product and the character of competition (also see, Beck et al, 2008; Vlachos 
and Waldenstrom, 2005; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Singh and Whittington, 1975). 
Further,  consistent  with  the  predictions  of  Jovanovic’s  (1982)  model  of  industry 
dynamics,  lagged  growth  of  industry  output  ( ) 1 it GO - is  also  included  as  an 
explanatory variable in the estimation of industry output growth model. Based on the 
premise that true production costs are only learnt by firm managers through time spent 
in  operation,  firms  choose  a  level  of  output  each  period  corresponding  with  their 
initial expected costs, based on the outcome of output growth for the previous period; 
hence, inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in the output growth model. 
 
Industry  Concentration( ) it CR   –  This  is  a  measure  of  market  structure  and  is 
represented  by  the  three-firm  concentration  ratio.  It  is  hypothesised  to  facilitate 
collusion between firms and thereby increase profitability. Embedded in the structure-
conduct-performance  perspective  is  the  view  that  the  firm  attempts  to  control  the 
output in the market by either colluding with other firms to drive up prices and profits, 
or exercising monopoly power. Therefore, more concentrated industries are expected 
to be more profitable (see, for example, Domowitz et al, 1986a; Martin, 1983; Weiss, 
1974).  However, whilst theory indicates a relationship between the level of output 
controlled by a few of the largest firms and performance, it offers no information on 
the absolute number or size distribution of firms necessary to exercise market power. 
An overwhelming number of researchers have somewhat arbitrarily used the three-
firm concentration ratio (see, for example, Cowling and Waterson, 1976; Dansby and 
Willig, 1979; Encaoua and Jacquemin, 1980; and Gilbert, 1984). This study therefore 
uses the three-firm concentration ratio, as others have done. A positive relationship is 
expected between concentration and profitability. 
 
Capital-Output Ratio( ) it KO  – is represented by the ratio of total capital assets to 
output,  as  a  measure  of  the  degree  of  capital  intensity  in  the  industry.  It  is 
hypothesised that performance varies across industries in accordance with the degree 226 
 
 
 
 
of  capital  intensity.  The  aim  of  including  this  variable  therefore  is  to  pick  up 
technological  heterogeneity.  Besides,  traditionally,  empirical  studies  that  use  the 
price-cost  margins  as  the  dependent  variable  also  include  capital  intensity  as  an 
explanatory variable (see, for example, Prince and Thurik, 1995; Domowitz et al, 
1986a,  1986b).  Two  reasons  are  advanced  in  the  literature  for  this  approach.  The 
pragmatic reason is that the price cost margin is calculated without taking into account 
the cost of capital in production. As such, capital intensity is included to capture this 
effect. The theoretical reason is that it is also a proxy for barriers to entry. A high 
capital-output ratio may reflect the existence of large sunk costs that act as a barrier to 
entry into industry and therefore insulate any existing incumbents from the potential 
competition  of  new  entrants,  so  give  rise  to  monopoly  profits  (see,  for  example, 
McDonald, 1999; House, 1973; Collin and Preston, 1966). A positive association is 
therefore expected between entity profitability and capital intensity. However, a high 
capital-output ratio may also lead to constrained output growth. As such, a negative 
relationship is also hypothesised between capital output and growth in output. 
 
Market Demand Growth( ) t MKD  – represented by growth in real GDP. As observed 
by  Kwoka  (1990),  a  review  of  the  literature  reveals  that  typically,  industry 
performance studies incorporate the effect of demand changes
110.  As observed by 
Kwoka  (1990),  it  is  commonly  argued  in  the  literature  that  contraction  in  market 
demand, results in price and profits decline. Further, Bradburd and Caves (1982) note 
that the profits-market demand growth relationship is often related to windfalls that 
result when actual demand turns out to differ from planned production – if output 
emerges  with  a  lag  –  or  capacity.  Rapid  growth  in  market  demand  may  create 
conditions for rising prices and/or a reduction in unit cost due to greater capacity 
utilization.  Thus,  markets  experiencing  high  rates  of  demand  growth  can  be 
characterized by high marketing costs, rising productivity, increased investment to 
keep pace with growth, low or negative cash flow, and high levels of buyer spending. 
The net effect of these cost reductions and increases and rising profit margins and 
sales  is  increased  profits  (see,  for  example,  Buzzell  and  Gale,  1987).  Besides,  a 
growing demand creates an environment for a  continual opportunity  for new firm 
                                                 
110 See, for example, Carree and Thurik (1996, 1999); Ilmakunnas and Topi (1999); Dean et al (1998);  
     Hay and Morris (1991);  Bradburd and Caves (1982, 1980);   Grabowski and Mueller (1978); Porter  
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investments and higher returns. However, according to Hay and Morris (1991), rapid 
market demand growth can also have other internal effects within an industry. It could 
increase  margins  through  maintenance  of  pressure  on  capacity  or  as  Bain  (1956) 
suggested, reduce margins because oligopolistic discipline will be harder to maintain. 
Thus,  the  coefficient  on  market  demand  growth  might  be  positive  or  negative 
depending on which effects dominate. Nonetheless, as observed by Hay and Morris 
(1991),  in  over  three-quarters  of  all  empirical  studies,  a  significant  positive 
association emerged between profitability and market demand growth, whilst in the 
remainder, no significant relationship was found. 
 
Industry Share  ( ) it SH – is the ratio of industry value-added to total manufacturing 
value-added. This variable is included in the output growth model in order to control 
for differences in growth potential across industries (see, for example, Beck et al, 
2008;  Claessens  and  Laeven,  2005;  Vlachos  and  Waldenstrom,  2005;  Rajan  and 
Zingales, 1998). As argued by Cetorelli (2001), industry share should capture factors 
that determine the market structure of one particular industry. As hypothesised in the 
traditional industrial organisation literature, large industries, or those industries with 
large  shares  grow  faster  than  smaller  industries  due  to  economies  of  scale  (see, 
Sheffrin, 2003). A positive relationship is therefore expected between industry share 
and industry growth. However, Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Cetorelli and Gambera 
(2001),  also  observe  that  whilst  industry  shares  are  a  result  of  accumulated  past 
growth in real output, the industry share variable also consistently predict that sectors 
that had grown substantially in the past, and therefore are already relatively large, 
grow less in the future, which suggests a negative relationship. The exact relationship 
between industry share and real output growth may there not be known, apriori.    
 
Labour Productivity ( ) it LP – is a measure of output per worker and is often thought to 
be a major cause of disparities in growth of output between industries. This variable is 
calculated  as  employees  per  value-added  thus,  the  ratio  between  the  value-added 
originating in an industry and its employed labour force (see, Szirmai, 1994; Leonard, 
1971).  However,  in  the  literature,  earlier  studies  have  used  working  hours  and 
educational qualifications to determine labour productivity (see, Kendricks, 1961). As 
technological  shifts  involves  the  use  of  more  labour  –  measured  through  either 228 
 
 
 
 
number of employees, man hours, or level of education – for the same units of output, 
this  should  suggest  that  labour  productivity  is  on  the  decline.  The  opposite  is 
hypothesised to be true when less labour is required. Accordingly, increase in the 
mechanisation  of  many  production  processes,  coupled  with  development  in 
information technology, suggests a positive relationship between labour productivity 
and output growth.  
 
Small Firm Share  ( ) i SFS – in this study this is measured by each industry’s natural 
small firm share, which is equal to industry i’s share of employment in firms with less 
than  20  employees,  following  the  methodology  used  by  Beck  et  al  (2008),  with 
particular focus on small firm size. This is constructed as a measure of each industry’s 
“natural” or technological share of small firms based on an extensive body of research 
on the theory of the firm, as discussed by Coase (1937) and Sutton (1991); where, 
differences in productive technologies influence an industry’s technological firm size. 
However, in industrial economics literature, empirical investigations on the impact of 
firm size on profitability have given varying results. For instance, whilst Hall and 
Weiss (1967) find a positive association between firm size and profitability, Osborn 
(1970) and Steckler (1964) either find a weak negative relationship or none at all. 
Schmalensee  (1989b),  seeking  to  determine  whether  systematic  changes  in  intra-
industry profitability occurred over time, find that large-size firms in general are more 
profitable  than  small-size  firms  within  the  same  industry.  Yet,  earlier  works  by 
Schmalensee  (1987)  found  that  firm  size  and  profitability  were  not  strongly 
correlated. So, conflicting results are reported by the same researcher. Nonetheless, in 
the literature, economies of scale provide one theoretical justification for a positive 
relationship between firm size and profitability, according to the prominent works of 
Scherer (1973), Hall and Weiss (1967), and Steckler (1964). Scale economies may be 
related to profit by virtue of their propensity to serve as entry barriers and the implied 
cost disadvantages imposed on smaller firms operating at sub-optimal scale (see, for 
example, Scherer and Ross, 1990). However, in a study of US industries, Waldman 
and Jensen (2001) find no evidence of scale economies as a source of size-related 
differences in profits. An alternative explanation is advanced by Demsetz (1973a, b) 
who argues that, over time, the more efficient firms are rewarded with both growth 
and  elevated  profits.  Amato  and  Wilder  (1988)  observe,  though,  that  Demsetz’s 229 
 
 
 
 
(1973a, b) findings are not supported by more rigorous empirical testing. Providing 
yet another conceptual argument to support size related differences in profitability, are 
Reinganum and Smith (1983) and Meyer (1967), who contend that capital market 
imperfections are the basis of this relationship. On this, Amato and Wilder (1985) 
observe that while competition would be expected to equalize rates of return across 
firm sizes in the long run, the market power and access to capital markets of large 
firms  may  give  them  access  to  investment  opportunities  that  are  not  available  to 
smaller  firms.  The  potential  for  a  negative  relationship  between  firm  size  and 
profitability is presented by Amato and Wilder (1985), which focus on alternative 
theories of a firm’s motivation.  
 
Similar controversy characterises the hypothesised relationship between firm size and 
industry  output  growth.  In  a  study  of  US  manufacturing  firms  between  1970  and 
1989, Dhawan (2001) examines the relationship between firm size and productivity 
and finds that large size firms have lower productivity than small size firms; thereby 
suggesting a negative relationship. Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys (2002) also cite a large 
number of sources  from both developed  and developing  countries confirming that 
large size firms grow at significantly slower rates.   In contrast, a recent study by 
Bartelsman and Doms (2000) find that large size firms enjoy high growth of output 
and higher likelihood of survival than small size firms, which suggests a positive 
relationship between firm size and industry output growth. Similarly, van Biesebroeck 
(2005) find that size is positively correlated with output growth and, that large size 
firms  unambiguously  grow  more  rapidly  and  improve  productivity  faster.  Van 
Biesebroeck also observes that large size firms remain large, more productive and 
remain at the top of the distribution. Meanwhile, small size firms are found to be less 
productive and have a hard time advancing in the size or productivity distribution. 
This is consistent with findings by Liu and Hsu (2006), and Grilliches and Regev 
(1995), who observe higher output growth rates for large size firms in Taiwan and 
Israel, respectively. Singh and Whittington (1975) examine the relationship between 
firm size and industry output growth for nearly 2000 UK firms between 1948 and 
1960 and find that firm size has a significant positive effect on output growth. Evans 
(1987a, 1987b), Hall (1987) and Dunne et al (1989) apply the theoretical model of 
Jovanovic  (1982)  to  test  the  relationship  among  the  US  manufacturing  industry 230 
 
 
 
 
growth and firm size. They find that industry output growth decreased with firm size, 
thereby suggesting a positive relationship. Variyan and Kraybill (1992) and Dunne 
and  Hughes  (1994)  also  obtain  similar  results  using  US  manufacturing,  sales  and 
services firms’ data and the UK manufacturing data, respectively. 
 
Overall,  the  foregoing  literature  suggests  that  whilst  the  firm  size-performance 
relationship may be positive over some firm size ranges and negative for others, it 
may also be non-existent. Thus, there may be positive or negative or no relationship 
between firm size and price-cost margins or output growth. This ambiguity suggests 
that, in both models, the exact relationship between small firm share and performance 
may not be known a priori.  
 
Imports intensity( ) t MM and Exports intensity( ) t MX – measured as growth in the ratio 
of manufactured imports to total merchandise imports, and manufactured exports to 
total  merchandise  exports,  respectively.  It  is  imperative  that  the  effects  of 
international trade effect are considered in the case of a small-open economy like 
Malawi. However, the expected relationship between the two foreign trade variables 
and  price-cost  margins  is  ambiguous.  Imports  intensity  –  A  number  of  studies; 
including Ghosal (2000), Katics and Petersen (1994), Caves (1985), Urata (1984), 
Geroski and Jacquemin (1981), and Pugel (1980), support the hypothesis that imports 
have an increasing influence on industrial price-cost margins. However, others like de 
Melo and Urata (1986) and Jacquemin et al (1980) contend that a high rate of imports 
will negatively affect the price-cost margins. They argue that increased imports may 
reveal a comparative disadvantage and thus be associated with lower profits. More 
importantly, they observe that in industries faced with significant degrees of ‘actual’ 
import competition, the ability of domestic firms to maintain prices above average 
cost  is  reduced.  On  Exports  Intensity  –  the  expected  relationship  with  price-cost 
margins  is  also  ambiguous.  Whilst  studies  have  shown  that  competition  in  export 
markets is likely to squeeze profit margins, it is equally possible that exports may 
actually increase a firm’s experience and allow it to learn faster. If this were the case, 
exports may increase profit margins in the medium term. Empirically, this variable 
has therefore produced  conflicting results in terms of its relationship with profits. 
Theoretically, as observed by de Melo and Urata (1986), a negative relationship will 231 
 
 
 
 
obtain if one assumes that export activities constrain non-competitive oligopolists to 
behave  competitively  as  long  as  the  oligopolists  cannot  discriminate  between 
domestic  and  foreign  markets.  The  manufacturing  exports  of  most  developing 
countries, like those from Malawi, consist of undifferentiated products for which the 
scope  for  discrimination  across  markets  is  likely  to  be  small.  So,  exports  can  be 
expected to depress profitability.  But exporting firms must be rewarded by  a risk 
premium if there is greater uncertainty in dealing with foreign markets. In that case, 
industries with higher export sales may have higher rates of return. However, the 
general presumption is that export activities have a constraining influence on pricing 
behaviour especially if exports are not differentiated, as is likely to be the case for a 
predominantly  primary  commodity  exporting  country  like  Malawi.  Empirically, 
Khalilzadeh-Shiraz  (1974)  and  Pugel  (1978)  find  positive  relationship  between 
exports and profits in the United Kingdom and United States, respectively; but Pugel 
(1980) and Jacquemin et al (1980) find little support for this result. Yamawaki (1986), 
in a survey of previous empirical studies on the influence of exports on price-cost 
margins, which have been performed for several countries, also find diverse results. 
Hence, the exact effect of exports intensity on profits may not be determined a priori. 
 
Inflation Rate  ( ) t INF – is measured  as annual percentage  change in the consumer 
price  index.  Notably,  the  importance  of  inflation  to  managers  and  policy  makers, 
within both the economic growth and finance literature, has generated considerable 
research  effort  in  the  study  of  industry  performance.  However,  within  these  two 
scenes of academic inquiry – thus, within the economic growth and finance literature 
– the debate as to whether industry performance is helped or hindered by inflation has 
resulted in ambiguous conclusions. Both positive and negative effects of inflation on 
industry price-cost margins as well as output growth have been identified in both 
schools  leaving  the  net  effect  to  further  debate  and  empirical  investigation. 
Theoretical  literature  linking  inflation  and  price-cost  margins  suggests  a  negative 
relationship  as  predicted  by  Diamond  (1993),  as  well  as  a  positive  association  as 
observed by Wu and Zhang (2001) and Tommasi (1994). Wu and Zhang (2001) find 
that inflation decreases  the number and size of firms in an industry. The reduced 
competition leads to higher price-cost margins in their model. Further, van Hoomissen 
(1988)  and  Tommasi  (1994)  establish  that  inflation  lowers  the  informativeness  of 232 
 
 
 
 
current prices about future prices. Prices become outdated quickly, which leaves the 
consumer  less  informed.  According  to  this  view,  less  informed  consumers  permit 
firms to raise their mark-ups, which result increased profits. Regarding the effect of 
inflation on output growth,  Logue  and Sweeny (1981) find a positive  relationship 
between these variables. However, in a study of OECD countries, Katsimbris (1985) 
and  Thornton  (1988)  find  both  positive  as  well  as  an  insignificant  relationship 
between inflation and output growth. Meanwhile, Grier et al (2004) and Fountas et al 
(2001) report that inflation has a negative effect on output growth. In view of the 
foregoing, the relationship between inflation and industry performance could either be 
positive, negative, or non-existent, and may therefore not be charted a priori.  
 
Financial Liberalization Dummy ( t FL ) is made up of three parts each associated with 
one of three major financial reform measures implemented in Malawi. This approach 
follows Laeven (2003), Bandiera et al (2000), and Williamson and Mahar (1998) who 
observe that financial liberalization takes place in various ways and in stages, which 
require proper distinction. In Malawi, the pre-liberalization phase 1970 to 1986, the 
financial liberalization dummy takes the value 0; then, the period from 1987 which 
marks the beginning of the financial reforms, specifically the deregulation of interest 
rates, takes the value of 1; and, finally, from 1989, when major financial reforms were 
seriously implemented, takes the value of 2. Theoretically, in cases where financial 
liberalization makes easy firm’s access to credit, growth and expansion of incumbent 
firms  should  be  facilitated.  Otherwise,  financial  reforms  could  also  strengthen  the 
monopoly power of existing firms through disproportional growth opportunities; just 
as it could also result in summary exits of the incumbent firms, due to increased cost 
of capital resulting from interest rates deregulation.  
 
 
6.4.3. Estimation Technique. 
 
Recognising the possibility of a dual effect of financial liberalization on economic 
growth in general as observed by, among others, Loayza and Ranciere (2006); but 
also  in  order  to  facilitate  investigation  of  its  hypothesised  contrasting  effects  on 
industry  performance,  the  study  conducts  a  variety  of  estimations  based  on  an 233 
 
 
 
 
encompassing model of short- and long-run effects using a panel of cross-industry and 
time series observations. In any case, in industrial organisation literature there exists 
many  compelling  reasons  why  the  input  and  output  markets  may  adjust  to  the 
financial  liberalization  policy  shocks  with  a  lag  rather  than  instantaneously.  For 
example,  time-to-build  constraints  (Kydland  and  Prescott,  1982),  adjustment  costs 
(Lucas,  1967),  financial  constraints  (Kalecki,  1937),  and  habit  formation  (Phlips, 
1972) can cause delayed response to a shock. Analysis of both the causes of sluggish 
adjustment and the implied short- and long-run dynamics are of intrinsic interest in 
this particular study. Accordingly, by focusing on effects at different time horizons, 
the approach sets a basis for an explanation of the apparently contradictory effects of 
financial liberalization on the performance of industries with different firm sizes, in 
both the short-run as well as the long-run. The models as depicted in Equations (6.5) 
and (6.7) above are therefore estimated using a methodology designed by Pesaran, 
Shin and Smith (1999), and widely applied in many other research studies
111.  
 
According to Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999), there are two traditional methods for 
estimating  panel  models:  averaging  and  pooling.  The  former  involves  running  N 
separate  regressions  and  calculating  coefficient  means  (Pesaran  and  Smith,  1995). 
However, a drawback to averaging is that it does not account for the fact that certain 
parameters may be equal over cross sections. Alternatively, pooling the data typically 
assumes that the slope coefficients and error variances are identical. This is unlikely 
to  be  valid  for  short-run  dynamics  and  error  variances,  although  it  could  be 
appropriate for the long-run. Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999), therefore proposed the 
Pooled Mean  Group  (PMG) estimator, which is an intermediate case  between the 
averaging and pooling methods of estimation, and involves aspects of both. The PMG 
estimation  method  restricts  the  long-run  coefficients  to  be  equal  over  the  cross-
section, but allows for the short-run coefficients and error variances to differ across 
groups  on  the  cross-section.  Pooled  long-run  coefficients  and  averaged  short-run 
dynamics can therefore be obtained as an indication of mean reversion.   
 
                                                 
111 See, for example: Elbadawi et al (2008); Law (2007); Goswami and Junayed (2006); Loayza and  
       Ranciere (2006); Martinez-Zarzoso  and  Bengochea-Morancho (2004);   Byrne and Davis (2003);  
       and, Favara (2003).  
 234 
 
 
 
 
The PMG estimation is based on an Autoregressive Distributive Lag, ARDL (p, q ...q) 
type of model; 
1 0
p q
it i j it j i j it j i it
j j
y y x l g m e - -
= =
= + + + ∑ ∑                                                                    (6.9) 
                 i = 1, 2…N; t = 1, 2...T. 
where, yit is a scalar dependent variable, xit (kx1) is the vector of explanatory variables 
for group i,  i represents the fixed effects, the coefficients of the lagged dependent 
variables (λ ij) are scalars and γij are (kx1) coefficient vectors. T must be large enough, 
as is arguably the case in this study, in order for the model to be estimated for each 
cross-section. Equation (6.9) can be re-parameterised as: 
 
1 1
' * *
1 1
1 0
p q
it i it i it i j it j i j it j i it
j j
y y x y x j b l g m e
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= =
D = + + D + D + + ∑ ∑                              (6.10) 
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It is assumed that the disturbances εit ’s are independently distributed across i and t, 
with zero means and variances σ
2
i > 0. Further assuming that φi < 0 for all i, therefore 
there exists a long-run relationship between yit and xit, defined by; 
 
'
it i it it y x q h = +                                                                                                        (6.11) 
where; 
'
' i
i
i
b
q
j
= -   is  the  kx1vector  of  the  long-run  coefficients,  and  η΄it’s  are 
stationary  with  possibly  non-zero  mean    (including  fixed  effects).  Since  Equation 
(6.10) can be re-parameterized as: 
 
1 1
' '
1
1 0
p q
it i it i j it j i j it j i it
j j
y y x j h l g m e
- -
- - -
= =
D = + D + D + + ∑ ∑                                            (6.12) 
where, η it-1, is the error correction term. Hence, i j , is the error correction coefficient 
measuring the speed of adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium.  
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According to the literature, he estimated coefficients in the model are not dependent 
upon whether the variables are I (1) or I (0)
112. The key feature of the PMG estimator 
is to make the long-run relationships homogeneous while allowing for heterogeneous 
dynamics and error variances.  
 
Apart from the PMG, for robustness of the results, the study also conducts other two 
panel data estimations – the Mean Group (MG) estimation proposed by Pesaran and 
Smith (1995) that averages the error correction coefficients and the other short run 
parameters, allows for heterogeneity but imposes no long-run homogeneity; and the 
Dynamic  Fixed  Effects  (DFE)  estimation,  which  assumes  that  all  parameters  are 
constant across industries, except for the intercept, which is allowed to vary across 
industries. The choice between PMG, MG, and DFE estimation entails a trade-off 
between consistency and efficiency. The DFE estimator dominates the other two in 
terms of efficiency if the restrictions are valid. If not valid, then DFE estimates will 
generate inconsistent estimates and will be dominated by the PMG and MG estimates.  
 
Arguably,  for  this  study,  the  PMG  estimator  is  considered  to  offer  the  best 
compromise between consistency and efficiency, because one would expect the long-
run path for profitability and output growth to be determined by a similar process 
across industries while the short-run dynamics around the long-run equilibrium path 
may differ from industry to industry, mainly due to idiosyncratic news and shocks to 
fundamentals. For instance, as argued by House (1973), among others, since price-
cost margins are observations for one year only, high margins may be the result of 
short-run changes in demand, which, over time, would be eroded by the competitive 
adjustment  process.  Specifically,  the  PMG  approach  may  be  seen  in  industry 
dynamics as modelling the supply side, whereby firms have similar long run reactions 
to economic variables, given a common objective of profit maximization in the long 
run, while in the short run institutions may play a role – such as scope of liquidity 
provided by relationship lending and other credit rationing characteristics – thereby 
                                                 
112 According to Pesaran et al (1999), the existence of a long-run relationship, for Equation (9),   is not  
     contingent  on  cointegration.  Because  right-hand-side  variables  can combine stationary and non- 
     stationary  variables,  the  equation  can  be  embedded in a dynamic  error-correction model. Pooled  
     Mean Group  estimation  hence  does  not require pre-testing for unit roots and cointegration. All the  
     variables in  the  equation  were  constructed as index numbers, trend deviations, or shares, implying  
     that they are stationary in the long run. 236 
 
 
 
 
leading to differing dynamics. Thus, the PMG estimator in this study should allow for 
financial liberalization to have similar effects on price-cost margins across industries 
in the long run, while permitting heterogeneous short run adjustments across groups to 
variations in firm sizes, as well as changes in  the level of financial development. 
However, the hypothesis of homogeneity of the long-run parameters is not assumed a 
priori and is tested empirically in all specifications. Thus, the effect of heterogeneity 
on the means of the coefficients is determined by a Hausman-type test (Hausman, 
1978) applied to the difference between the PMG and MG estimators, where under 
the  null  hypothesis,  the  difference  in  the  estimated  coefficients  obtained  from  the 
PMG  and  MG  estimators  is  not  significantly  different,  in  which  case  the  PMG 
estimator is more efficient.  
 
 
6.4.4. Data Specification. 
 
According  to  Pesaran  et  al  (1999),  the  main  requirement  to  implement  the  PMG 
estimator is to have a panel in which the number of groups (N) and the number of 
time-series observations (T) are both large. In contrast with most empirical studies in 
the industrial organisation literature, it is therefore necessary to use a panel of data 
with annual observations. This study therefore uses annual data from 1970-2004 for 
20 three-digit SIC Malawian manufacturing industries; thus, a panel of size N=20 and 
T=35,  therefore  with  700  observations  for  each  variable
113.  Estimations  are  made 
using a Stata module xtpmg by Blackburne and Frank (2007). 
 
Table  6.1  present  descriptive  statistics  of  the  key  variables  of  this  empirical 
investigation. Price-cost margins suggest an average profitability of industries during 
the period of 18.0 percent; whilst the mean manufacturing output growth, in terms of 
net sales, stands at about 38.0 percent. Further, the pairwise correlations matrix for the 
variables of interest is reported in Table 6.2 using panel data, and shows that there are 
some important correlations among the variables. The signs are as expected in most of 
the relationships. For example, the industry price-cost margins correlates positively 
                                                 
113 Arguably, this is large enough for the PMG estimation method, according to Pesaran et al (1999).  
       In fact,  Pesaran et al    uses     a   panel  of  size  N=24 and T=32 (768 observations), which is not  
       significantly different from the sample size used for this study (which is 700 observations). 237 
 
 
 
 
with industry concentration and growth in market demand. Notably, in both the price-
cost margins as well as output growth variables, there is a positive relationship with 
their lagged values. This suggests that, for both industry price-cost margins as well as 
industry  output  growth,  there  are  some  path  dependencies  in  these  processes.  In 
addition,  the  small  firm  size  index
114  –  which  represents  industries  naturally 
composed  of  small  firms  for  technological  reasons  –  is  on  average  negatively 
correlated with both price-cost margins and industry output growth.  
 
However, whilst the aforementioned raw correlations do not control for other industry 
or  macroeconomic  characteristics,  they  nonetheless  indicate  that  analysing  the 
relationship  between  firm  size  and  industry  performance  could  well  amount  to 
different exercises.  
 
 
Table 6.1:  Summary Statistics of the Main Regression Variables – Annual Data: 1970-2004. 
  Variable Description    Mean    Std. Dev.      Min.     Max. 
it PCM   Industry Price-Cost Margins (Industry Profitability)    0.183    0.135   - 0.26      0.70 
it GO   Growth of Industry Output (as % of Real GDP)    0.378    1.630  -24.64    18.13 
it CR   Three-Firm Concentration Ratio  82.202  18.065   29.45  100.00 
it KO   Industry Capital-Output Ratio (Capital Intensity)    0.277    0.304     0.91      2.43 
it LP   Labour Productivity  ( Employee per Value-Added)    2.313    0.458     1.56      3.17 
it SH   Share of Industry Value Added to Total Man. Value-Added.    0.047    0.072     0.01      0.70 
t MKD   Market Demand Growth (Real GDP Growth)     3.822    5.395  -10.24    16.73 
i SFS   Industry’s Small Firm Share (Firm Size)    0.047    0.072     0.01      0.70 
i ED   External Finance Dependence    0.637    0.474     0.10      1.58 
t MM   Manufactured Imports as % of Total Merchandise Imports  73.637    3.148   63.39    80.77 
t MX   Manufactured Exports as % of Total Merchandise Exports    8.572    2.811     4.62    15.44 
t INF   Inflation Rate (Annual  % change in Consumer Price Index)   17.489  15.716     1.70    83.33 
 
                                                 
114 Notably,   the correlation  coefficient between Small Firm Size and External Finance Dependency is 
     negative   and  very  small  (-0.011),   but   also   insignificant.    This   suggests   that   the   industry 
     characteristics   explaining   firm  size  distribution are not the same as the characteristics explaining  
     technological  dependence  on  external finance as per the influential findings of Rajan and Zingales  
     (1998). This confirms the fact that the firm size channel of financial liberalization being investigated 
     in this chapter  is  different from  the  external  finance channel that has been examined earlier in the 
     study.  
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Table 6.2: Pairwise Correlation Matrix of the Main Regression Variables. 
 
(Annual Panel Data: 1970-2004) 
 
 
it PCM    ( ) 1 i t PCM -
 
      it GO      ( ) 1 i t GO -         it CR        it KO        it LP      it SH   t MKD      i SFS   i ED     t MM       t MX     t INF  
it PCM     1.000                           
( ) 1 i t PCM -    0.591
***   1.000                         
it GO    0.167
***   0.308
***    1.000                       
( ) 1 i t GO -    0.093
**   0.171
***    0.128
***    1.000                     
it CR    0.225
***   0.156
**   -0.512
***   -0.361
***     1.000                   
it KO   -0.132
***   0.615
***    0.516
***   -0.384
***     0.794
***    1.000                 
it LP    0.151
***   0.149
***    0.231
***    0.113
***     0.127
***   -0.264
**    1.000               
it SH    0.232
***   0.113
***    0.351
**    0.168
**    -0.273
***   -0.249
***   -0.163
***    1.000               
t MKD    0.241
***   0.077
**  -0.093
**    0.133
***    -0.027   -0.122
**   -0.076
**    0.144
***    1.000           
i SFS   -0.241
***  -0.078
**   -0.063
*   -0.005    -0.093
**   -0.027    0.014    0.001    0.001    1.000         
i ED    0.203
*   0.199   -0.004  -0.001     0.135
*    0.791
***    0.232
*   -0.136    0.006   -0.011     1.000       
t MM    0.019   0.033    0.003    0.023     0.224
***    0.877
***   -0.001   -0.079
**    0.191
***    0.068
*    -0.001    1.000     
t MX    0.127
***   0.153
***    0.318
***    0.188
**     0.316
***    0.529
***    0.001   -0.066
*   -0.129
*    0.130
***     0.025   -0.397
***    1.000   
t INF    0.012   0.051   -0.046   -0.024     0.480
***    0.737
***    0.736
***   -0.020    0.606
***  -0.173
***     0.001   -0.173
***   -0.070
*       1.000 
Note:    This table report the correlation matrix of the regression variables. And, ***, **, * indicate significance levels of 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Definitions   
  and data sources are provided above. 239 
 
 
 
6.5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS. 
 
Tables  6.3a  and  6.3b  below,  present  the  results  on  specification  tests  and  the 
estimation of long- and short-run parameters linking industry performance – measured 
separately  through  two  performance  indicators,  viz,  price-cost  margins  and  output 
growth, respectively – with firm size, financial liberalization, and other performance 
determinants.  The  analyses  emphasize  the  results  obtained  using  the  pooled  mean 
group  (PMG)  estimator,  which  is  preferred  given  its  gains  in  consistency  and 
efficiency over other panel error-correction estimators. For comparison purpose, the 
study also presents the results obtained with the mean group (MG) and the dynamic 
fixed effects (DFE) estimators.  
 
However, as indicated in the previous section, the consistency and efficiency of the 
PMG is conditional on the long-run parameters being the same across industries. And, 
as further indicated in the section on econometric methodology, this involves testing 
the  null  hypothesis  of  homogeneity  through  a  Hausman-type  test,  based  on  the 
comparison between the PMG and MG estimators. In Tables 6.3a and 6.3b, the study 
results for the models as depicted in Equations (6.5) and (6.7), respectively, present 
the Hausman test statistic and the corresponding p-values for the coefficients, jointly. 
In both models, the homogeneity restriction is not rejected jointly for all parameters. 
A  further  condition  to  the  existence  of  a  long-run  relationship  requires  that  the 
coefficient  on  the  error-correction  term  be  negative.  Regarding  the  estimated 
parameters, therefore, analyses focus on those obtained with the PMG estimator.  
   
 
6.5.1. Price-Cost Margins Model. 
 
Table  6.3a  presents  estimation  results  for  the  price-cost  margins  (or  profitability 
model) as depicted in Equation (6.5). The dependent variable for the analysis of this 
model is the theoretically preferred price-cost margin obtained from manufacturing 
census  data.  This  follows  many  other  empirical  studies  in  the  applied  industrial 
organisation literature (see, for example, Feeny et al, 2005; Feeny and Rogers, 1999; 240 
 
 
 
McDonald, 1999)
 115. According to the results in Columns (3) of Table 6.3a, in both 
the short-run as well as in the long-run, price-cost margins are positively related to 
industry  concentration.  There  is  also  a  positive  and  significant  relationship  with 
market  demand,  industry  share,  and  imports  intensity,  in  the  short-run;  albeit,  not 
significantly  so  in  the  long-run.  Notably,  the  coefficient  for  the  exports  intensity 
variable is positive strongly significant in the long-run, whilst in the short-run this 
variable  suggests  a  negative  influence  on  price-cost  margins.  These  are  standard 
results  from  empirical  industry  profitability  literature,  and  are  generally  consistent 
with results from numerous studies in the structure-conduct-performance tradition (for 
a  review  of  recent  empirical  literature,  see,  for  example,  Lipczynski  et  al,  2005; 
McDonald,  1999;  Hay  and  Morris,  1991;  Buzzel  and  Gale,  1987).  As  such,  it  is 
reassuring that the study is able to reproduce the results with this methodology. 
 
Most importantly for the purpose of this study is the finding that price-cost margins 
are negatively and significantly linked to the measure of firm size – small firm share –
i SFS ,  in  the  long-run  (-0.042)  and  in  the  short-run  (-0.010).  Interestingly,  this 
relationship  does  not  change  with  financial  liberalization  as  the  interaction  term 
between  small  firm  share  and  financial  liberation( )it SFS FL ´   has  a  negative  and 
significant coefficient both in the long-run (-0.044), as well as in the short-run (-
0.062). This suggests that ‘small-firm industries’ – industries naturally composed of 
small firms for technological reasons are less profitable, and the situation does not 
improve  with  financial  liberalization.  Another  observation  is  that  the  short-run 
average relationship between price-cost margins and the interaction between small 
firm  share,  as  the  measure  of  firm  size,  and  the  financial  liberalization  dummy 
( )it SFS FL ´   appears  to  be  strongly  negative,  with  a  point  estimate  several  times 
larger than that of the long-run effect of firm size. Thus, comparing the long- and 
short-run  estimates,  a  first  broad  conclusion  is  that  the  sign  of  the  relationship 
between  industry  performances,  as  measured  by  price-cost  margins,  and  the 
interaction term depends on whether their movements are temporary or permanent. 
                                                 
115 In the literature, oligopolistic firms  are  often  observed  to  aim  at  target ‘price-cost margins’ as a  
       pricing  rule  of  thumb  (see, Hall and Hitch, 1939), in which case the  margins  must  be  a   better    
       dependent   variable  in  regression analysis for firms’ profitability. Further, the  data  for the price- 
       cost  margin  ratios  is  traditionally  obtained  from  the  same  source  as  that  for   many  of   the  
       explanatory variables (Census of Manufacturing); thus, minimising biases. 
 241 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.3a: The Long-Run and Short-Run Effect of Financial Liberalization on 
Firm Size and Price-Cost Margins Relationship 
(Annual Panel Data: 1970-2004) 
 
       (1)         (2)       (3) 
Variables:-  
 Dependent Variable: 
Price-Cost Margins (PCM) 
Dynamic 
Fixed 
Effects 
Mean    
Group 
Pooled 
Mean 
Group 
CR 
   0.226*** 
  (0.057) 
  0.246*** 
 (0.057) 
  0.192*** 
 (0.043) 
KO 
  -0.047 
  (0.035) 
 -0.242 
 (0.156) 
 -0.055** 
 (0.028) 
MKD 
   0.049*** 
  (0.016) 
 -0.063 
 (0.076) 
  0.018 
 (0.014) 
SH 
  0.008 
  (0.023) 
  0.476** 
 (0.213) 
  0.004 
 (0.018) 
MM 
 -0.114 
  (0.201) 
 -0.059 
 (0.113) 
 -0.201 
 (0.148) 
MX 
  0.351*** 
  (0.124) 
  0.103* 
 (0.061) 
  0.437*** 
 (0.102) 
INF 
  0.026*** 
  (0.007) 
  0.011 
 (0.007) 
  0.031*** 
 (0.006) 
SFS 
  -0.041*** 
  (0.013) 
  0.007 
 (0.020) 
 -0.042*** 
 (0.010) 
SFS FL ´  
  -0.004 
  (0.013) 
  0.099 
 (0.118) 
 -0.044*** 
 (0.012) 
 
Error-Correction Coefficient   ( фi)   -0.357*** 
 (0.032) 
 -0.683*** 
 (0.067) 
 -0.292*** 
 (0.038) 
 
 CR 
   0.083*** 
  (0.029) 
 -0.010 
 (0.033) 
  0.070** 
 (0.026) 
 KO 
   0.028 
  (0.018) 
  0.033** 
 (0.016) 
  0.008 
 (0.015) 
 MKD 
   0.053*** 
  (0.007) 
  0.047*** 
 (0.012) 
  0.054*** 
 (0.011) 
 SH 
   0.078*** 
  (0.012) 
  0.024 
 (0.030) 
  0.168*** 
 (0.036) 
 MM 
  0.043 
 (0.052) 
  0.120*** 
 (0.036) 
  0.066** 
 (0.027) 
 MX 
 -0.037* 
 (0.023) 
 -0.015 
 (0.022) 
 -0.033* 
 (0.019) 
 INF 
 -0.008*** 
 (0.002) 
 -0.009*** 
 (0.002) 
 -0.008*** 
 (0.001) 
 SFS 
  -0.017*** 
  (0.005) 
 -0.009 
 (0.006) 
 -0.010* 
 (0.005) 
 SFS FL ´  
 -0.026*** 
 (0.006) 
 -0.025 
 (0.028) 
 -0.062** 
 (0.028) 
No. of Observations        678        678        678 
Hausman Test (χ
2) statistic 
                                p-value 
                                       3.43 
                                    (0.9449) 
Note: Estimates of the intercept are not reported for economy of space. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at 1percent, 5percent, and 10 percent levels,   respectively. 
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 6.5.2. Output Growth Model. 
 
Table 6.3b presents panel estimation results from the DFE, MG, and PMG estimators 
for the output growth model as depicted in Equation (6.7) above. As can be seen from 
the results, all the three panel estimations provide theoretically consistent signs of all 
the coefficients for most of the explanatory variables. Notably, in the short-run, output 
growth is positively related to industry share, market demand, and imports. However, 
in the long-run, the results show a positive relationship between output growth and 
industry  share,  market  demand  and  labour  productivity;  whilst  relationships  with 
capital  intensity,  imports,  and  inflation,  are  all  significant  but  with  negative 
coefficients.  Again,  these  are  standard  results  from  empirical  industry  growth 
literature, it is therefore reassuring that the study is able to reproduce the results with 
this methodology. 
 
However, of particular interest to this research study is the result between small firm 
measure and output growth. The small firm size variable has a negative coefficient 
and is significant determinant of industry output growth, according to the long run and 
short run results in Column (3) of Table 6.3b. This finding is consistent with the 
results by Evans (1987a, b), Dunne et al (1989), and Doms et al (1995) who find that 
industry growth is negatively related to firm size using U.S. data. Similar findings are 
made by Dunne and Hughes (1994) using U.K. data; and, by Nurmi (2002) in Finnish 
manufacturing.  However,  the  relationship  does  not  change  with  financial 
liberalization, as results of estimating Equation (6.7) still show a negative relationship 
between small firm share, as the measure of firm size, and the financial liberalization 
dummy  ( )it SFS FL ´  and output growth, both in the short-run (-0.060) as well as in 
the long-run (-0.037). Notably, in the short-run, the quantitative effects of small firm 
share are much larger with financial liberalization than before the reforms, thereby 
suggesting  the  devastating  effects  of  financial  liberalization  policy.  Generally,  the 
results indicate that industries whose organisation is based more on small firms than 
on large firms grow less following financial liberalization. These results run contrary 
to the orthodox predictions about the influence of financial development on industry 
growth, and contradict the findings by, among others, Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
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Table 6.3b: The Long-Run and Short-Run Effect of Financial Liberalization on 
Firm Size and Output Growth Relationship 
(Annual Panel Data: 1970-2004) 
 
       (1)         (2)       (3) 
Variables:-   
Dependent Variable: 
Output Growth (GO) 
Dynamic 
Fixed 
Effects 
Mean    
Group 
Pooled 
Mean 
Group 
SH 
   0.010 
  (0.022) 
   0.024 
  (0.213) 
  0.057*** 
 (0.009) 
KO 
  -0.193*** 
  (0.041) 
  -0.240** 
  (0.105) 
 -0.120*** 
 (0.016) 
LP 
   0.464*** 
  (0.078) 
   0.438** 
  (0.190) 
  0.131*** 
 (0.032) 
MM 
 -0.974*** 
 (0.229) 
 -0.894** 
 (0.350) 
 -0.853*** 
 (0.099) 
MX 
  0.235** 
 (0.103) 
  0.192 
 (0.137) 
 - 0.002 
 (0.044) 
MKD 
  0.057*** 
 (0.015) 
  0.028 
 (0.059) 
  0.036*** 
 (0.011) 
INF 
 -0.003*** 
 (0.001) 
 -0.004** 
 (0.002) 
 -0.003*** 
 (0.001) 
SFS 
 -0.019 
  (0.013) 
  -0.029 
  (0.023) 
 -0.011 
 (0.010) 
SFS FL ´  
 -0.024* 
 (0.013) 
 -0.197*** 
 (0.101) 
 -0.037*** 
 (0.006) 
 
Error-Correction Coefficient   ( фi)   -0.375*** 
 (0.032) 
 -0.734*** 
 (0.082) 
 -0.334*** 
 (0.060) 
 
 SH 
   0.076*** 
  (0.012) 
   0.021 
  (0.037) 
  0.145*** 
 (0.034) 
 KO 
   0.055*** 
  (0.019) 
   0.058* 
  (0.020) 
  0.019 
 (0.019) 
 LP 
  -0.044 
  (0.058) 
  -0.014 
  (0.074) 
  0.112 
 (0.052) 
 MM 
  0.169*** 
 (0.050) 
  0.211*** 
 (0.048) 
  0.142*** 
 (0.039) 
 MX 
 -0.026 
 (0.023) 
  -0.018 
 (0.023) 
  0.014 
 (0.017) 
 MKD 
  0.039*** 
 (0.007) 
  0.042*** 
 (0.014) 
  0.032*** 
 (0.011) 
 INF 
  0.000 
 (0.001) 
  0.001 
 (0.001) 
  0.001 
 (0.001) 
 SFS 
  -0.024*** 
  (0.005) 
  -0.021** 
  (0.008) 
 -0.017*** 
 (0.005) 
 SFS FL ´  
 -0.022*** 
 (0.006) 
   0.014 
  (0.018) 
 -0.060** 
 (0.026) 
No. of Observations        678        678       678 
Hausman Test (χ
2) statistic 
                                p-value 
                                        2.28 
                                     (0.9862) 
Note: Estimates of the intercept are not reported for economy of space. ***, **, * indicate     
significance at 1percent, 5percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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6.6. ROBUSTNESS TESTS. 
 
This section presents sensitivity analyses of the results. The study uses a different 
measure  and  definition  of  firm  size.  Further,  an  alternative  estimator  is  used  to 
examine the influence of financial liberalization on the relationship between firm size 
and price-cost margins and output growth. 
 
 
6.6.1. Alternative Measure of Firm Size. 
 
As a sensitivity test the study  estimates the models as depicted in Column (3) of 
Tables 6.3a and 6.3b, using an alternative definition of firm size. Instead of defining 
firm  size  through  small  firms  share,  it  is  determined  by  using  a  commonly  used 
measure of firm size in the empirical literature – the average number of employees 
(see, for example, Yang and Huang, 2005; Dedola and Lippi, 2005; Kumar et al, 
2001;  Audretsch  et  al,  1998;  Dean  et  al,  1998;  Davis  and  Henrekson,  1997).  
However,  as  observed  by  Kumar  et  al  (2001),  whilst  a  simple  average,  obtained 
through dividing the total employment in an industry by the total number of firms in 
that  industry,  is  widely  used  in  the  literature,  it  is,  albeit,  inappropriate  for  two 
reasons.  First, it ignores the richness of the data on the distribution of firm size. 
Second, it would give a number that has little bearing on the size of the firm that is 
‘typical’ of the sector or has the greatest share in the sectors production. As such, 
using  the  simple  average  could  lead  to  wrong  interpretation  of  the  relationships. 
Instead, following Kumar et al (2001), the study calculates the size of the typical firm 
by,  first  locating  the  industry  in  which  the  median  employee  of  the  overall 
manufacturing sector works. Next, the total employment in that industry is divided by 
the number of firms in that industry to get the average firm size. The study therefore 
uses the log of the average firm size
med
i AFS , calculated based on median employment 
numbers, as the variable representing firm size in the regressions.  Thus, according to 
Kumar et al (2001), the average firm size is defined as follows; 
 
med i i
i
i i
n e E
AFS
N n N
    = =    
   ∑                                                                   (6.13) 245 
 
 
 
 
where,
med
i AFS is average firm size (based on the median employment numbers),  i e  is 
the total number of employees in industry i, E is the total number of employees in the 
entire manufacturing sector,  i n  is the total number of firms in an industry. However, 
one  caveat  of  using  the  median  of  the  sample  to  determine  an  average  firm  size 
med
i AFS applicable to the entire industry is that it may sometimes not be considered to 
be  representative,  particularly  where  the  distribution  of  firms  is  highly  skewed. 
Therefore, the study also determines an alternative average firm size measure based 
on the 75
th percentile of employment numbers to distinguish between small (below the 
75
th  percentile)  and  large  firms  (above  75
th  percentile)
75th percentile
i AFS .  In  order  to 
examine the influence of financial liberalization on the relationship between firm size 
and price-cost margins and output growth, interaction terms are calculated using the 
two alternative measures of average firm size and a financial liberalization dummy, 
viz;  ( )
med
it AFS FL ´   and  ( )
75th percentile
it AFS FL ´ ,  which  are  also  included  in  the 
respective models, and estimated through Equations (6.5) and (6.7). Column (1) and 
(2) of Tables 6.4a and 6.4b show the results for estimations using average firm size, 
based on the median, as well as 75
th percentile employment numbers, respectively. 
Like in the main regression estimations, of interest is the sign and significance of the 
average  firm  size  measures,  particularly  the  interaction  terms.  A  positive  and 
significant  coefficient  should  suggest  that  as  the  average  firm  size  increases,  it 
becomes more profitable or that its output grows disproportionately faster. A negative 
and significant coefficient should suggest the opposite.   
 
According to the results in Column (1) of Tables 6.4a and 6.4b, both in the short-run 
as  well  as  in  the  long-run,  average  firm  size,  measured  based  on  the  median 
employment numbers  Median AFS , has a positive and significant coefficient in the two 
models.  Further,  for  both  models,  the  results  do  not  change  with  financial 
liberalization, as depicted by the positive coefficient on the interaction term between 
the average firm size measure and the financial liberalization dummy( )
med
it AFS FL ´ . 
However, the study results are virtually unchanged even after changing cut-off points 
from median to 75
th percentile. In fact, the results in  246 
 
 
 
           Table 6.4a: Price-Cost Margins Model: Pooled Mean Group Estimation using 
 Alternative Measures of Firm Size 
(Annual Panel Data: 1970-2004) 
                Firm Size Measure 
            (1)             (2) 
Variables:-   
Dependent Variable: 
Price-Cost Margins (PCM)  AFS(Median)  AFS(75th percentile) 
CR 
0.075 
(0.058) 
0.051 
(0.058) 
KO 
-0.094*** 
(0.030) 
-0.087*** 
(0.030) 
MKD 
 0.033** 
(0.015) 
0.020 
(0.014) 
SH 
 0.017 
(0.013) 
0.037** 
(0.014) 
MM 
-0.542*** 
(0.161) 
-0.404** 
(0.156) 
MX 
 0.330*** 
(0.107) 
0.243** 
(0.099) 
INF 
 0.045*** 
(0.008) 
0.034*** 
(0.007) 
Median AFS     0.046** 
(0.018) 
 
Median AFS FL ´   0.023*** 
(0.017) 
 
75th percentile AFS     0.050*** 
(0.017) 
75th percentile AFS FL ´     0.037*** 
(0.012) 
 
Error Correction Coefficient  ( ф)  -0.281*** 
(0.033) 
-0.300*** 
(0.038) 
 
 CR 
 0.054* 
(0.031) 
0.062** 
(0.030) 
 KO 
 0.022** 
(0.011) 
0.012 
(0.013) 
 MKD 
 0.057*** 
(0.010) 
0.058*** 
(0.010) 
 SH 
 0.213*** 
(0.035) 
0.190*** 
(0.039) 
 MM 
0.114*** 
(0.031) 
0.100*** 
(0.028) 
 MX 
-0.023 
(0.017) 
-0.011 
(0.016) 
 INF 
-0.010*** 
(0.001) 
-0.008*** 
(0.001) 
  Median AFS   0.026*** 
(0.027) 
 
Median AFS FL ´   0.024* 
(0.013) 
 
  75th percentile AFS     0.017** 
(0.007) 
  75th percentile AFS FL ´     0.067** 
(0.026) 
No. of Observations  678  678 
Note: Estimates of the intercept are not reported for economy of space. ***, **, * indicate significance 
at 1percent, 5percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 6.4b: Output Growth Model: Pooled Mean Group Estimation Results using  
Alternative Measures of Firm Size. 
(Annual Panel Data: 1970-2004) 
                Firm Size Measure 
            (2)             (3) 
  Variables:-  
 Dependent Variable: 
 Output Growth (GO)  AFS(Median)  AFS(75th percentile) 
SH 
0.042*** 
(0.014) 
0.059*** 
(0.010) 
KO 
-0.140*** 
(0.026) 
-0.104*** 
(0.017) 
LP 
0.229*** 
(0.066) 
0.032 
(0.036) 
MM 
-0.895*** 
(0.137) 
-0.764*** 
(0.094) 
MX 
0.196** 
(0.074) 
-0.004 
(0.044) 
MKD 
0.049*** 
(0.010) 
0.029** 
(0.010) 
INF 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
Median AFS    0.059*** 
(0.013) 
 
Median AFS FL ´   0.003** 
(0.001) 
 
75th percentile AFS     0.039*** 
(0.010) 
75th percentile AFS FL ´     0.029*** 
(0.007) 
 
Error Correction Coefficient  ( ф)  -0.342*** 
(0.044) 
-0.357*** 
(0.060) 
 
 SH 
0.234*** 
(0.035) 
0.143*** 
(0.036) 
 KO 
-0.019 
(0.014) 
0.010 
(0.015) 
 LP 
0.141** 
(0.061) 
0.136** 
(0.060) 
 MM 
0.163*** 
(0.035) 
0.129*** 
(0.039) 
 MX 
-0.036** 
(0.016) 
0.006 
(0.016) 
 MKD 
0.038*** 
(0.012) 
0.040*** 
(0.011) 
 INF 
-0.011** 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
  Median AFS   0.001 
(0.001) 
 
Median AFS FL ´   0.006** 
(0.001) 
 
  75th percentile AFS     0.017** 
(0.008) 
  75th percentile AFS FL ´     0.077*** 
(0.026) 
No. of Observations  678  678 
Note: Estimates of the intercept are not reported for economy of space. ***, **, * indicate significance 
at 1percent, 5percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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In fact, the results in Column (2) of Tables 6.4a and 6.4b are qualitatively similar, but 
stronger from a statistical point of view, to the results based on the sample median. 
This  is  particularly  evident  in  the  magnitudes  of  the  interaction  term  coefficients. 
Comparing the magnitudes of the coefficients for the interaction term, the short-run 
result of Table 6.4a shows that the firm size effect is much larger for firms above the 
75
th percentile of the sample (0.067) than for firms above the median of the sample 
(0.024). Similar observations are made in Table 6.4b where the firm size effect is also 
much larger for firms above the 75
th percentile of the sample (0.077) than for firms 
above the median of the sample (0.006). This suggests that the larger firms – those 
above the 75
th percentile – perform better in terms of both price-cost margins as well 
as  output  growth,  than  the  smaller  firms,  or  those  below  the  75
th  percentile.  This 
suggests  that  as  firm  size  increases,  industry  performance  –  whether  measured 
through  price-cost  margins  or  output  growth  –  also  increases  with  financial 
liberalization; and, therefore further suggests that the larger the firm the more it stands 
to  benefit  in  terms  of  performance  following  financial  liberalization.  This  result 
renders support to the main findings reported earlier, which contradict the predictions 
in the literature by Cestone and White (2003), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Banerjee 
and  Newman  (1993),  and  Galor  and  Zeira  (1993),  among  others,  that  financial 
development eases financial constraints, and enhances the performance of small-size 
firms more than larger-size firms.    
 
 
6.6.2. Alternative Panel Estimator. 
 
The analysis so far has used a novel empirical estimator to distinguish between short-
run  and  long-run  effects  of  firm  size  on industry  performance  following  financial 
liberalization. This methodology uses the time-series dimension of the data at least as 
intensively as the cross-section dimension. It represents a departure from the typical 
empirical industrial organisation literature in which high-frequency movements in the 
data are averaged out prior to estimation. As indicated earlier in this study, typical 
panel data studies work with data averaged for periods of 5 or 10 years and, therefore, 
is  likely  to  combine  short-  and  long-run  effects.  Whilst  averaging  has  the 
disadvantage  of  leading  to  loss  of  potentially  useful  information  on  year-on-year 249 
 
 
 
changes in – for instance, profits or output growth for a firm – it nonetheless removes 
year-on-year volatility, or ‘noise’ which – in the case of profitability studies, is mostly 
due to changes in accounting procedures between years; and on output growth, ‘noise’ 
could be due to weather changes or any other macroeconomic shocks – all of which 
do not reflect real changes in a firm’s activities. Accordingly, in order to provide 
further support to the arguments developed in the earlier part of this study, a typical 
panel data regression framework is therefore used next, to analyze whether firm size 
is also a relevant determinant of industry performance; and, particularly whether this 
relationship is influenced by financial liberalization.  
 
In this section, therefore, the study uses an estimation method for panel data that deals 
with dynamic regression specification, controls for unobserved time- and industry-
specific effects, and accounts for some endogeneity in the explanatory variables. This 
is the generalized method of moments (GMM) for dynamic models of panel data 
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995), which were 
explained earlier in this study. Thus, the models as specified under Equations (6.5) 
and (6.7) above may be represented as follows; 
 
( ) 1 1 it it it it it i y y y X SFS l b d n - - ¢ - = + + +                                                              (6.14) 
 
( ) 1 1 it it it it it it y y y X SFS FL l b d n - - ¢ - = + + ´ +                                           (6.15) 
          
          it i t it n m h e = + +                                                                        (6.16) 
 
 
where,  it y  represents the industry performance measure (price-cost margins or output 
growth)  in  industry  i  in  period  t,  Xit  is  vector  of  ‘fundamental’  determinants  of 
industry performance, which, following the analyses above, includes small firm share 
( i SFS )  as  a  measure  of  firm  size,( )it SFS FL ´   an  interaction  term  between  the 
measure of firm size and a financial liberalization dummy, it n  a general disturbance; 
including an industry-specific unobservable effect i m , a time-specific factor  t h , and an 
idiosyncratic disturbance it e .  
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The results for the estimation of Equations (6.5) and (6.7) using this methodology are 
reported in Tables 6.5a and 6.5b, respectively. The results are based both on a one-
step  and  two-step  estimator  (for  a  review  on  the  one-step  and  two-step  GMM 
estimators, see, Arellano and Bond, 1991). In the one-step estimator, the error term 
it e  is assumed independent and homoskedastic across industries and time, in the two-
step  estimator,  the  residual  of  the  first  step  are  used  to  estimate  consistently  the 
variance-covariance  matrix  of  the  residuals,  relaxing  the  assumption  of 
homoskedasticity. However, the study reports both the one-step as well as the two-
step estimation results for the sake of comparison, even though the analyses will be 
based on the two-step estimator results, which are considered robust. This follows 
Windmeijer (2005) who devised a small-sample correction for the two-step standard 
errors. Thus, in regressions on simulated panels, Windmeijer finds that the two-step 
efficient  SYS-GMM  performs  somewhat  better  than  one-step  SYS-GMM  in 
estimating coefficients, with lower bias and standard errors. And the reported two-
step  standard  errors,  with  this  correction,  are  quite  accurate,  so  that  two-step 
estimation with corrected errors is currently considered to be modestly superior to 
robust one-step estimation.   
 
In all the models, as depicted in Equations (6.5) and (6.7) above, the respective results 
shown  in  Table  6.5a  and  Table  6.5b,  the  F-tests  indicate  that  the  parameters  are 
jointly significant (at the 1 percent level). Further, for each model results, the bottom 
part of the table includes p-values for the Hansen/Sargan tests for over- identifying 
restrictions. According to the results, the study cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
the  instruments  used  in  all  the  models  are  uncorrelated  with  the  residuals. 
Consequently, the tests suggest that the instruments used are valid. The test for AR (1) 
errors in the first difference equation rejects the null hypothesis of no first-order serial 
correlation as expected. Furthermore, as should be expected, the test for AR (2) errors 
suggests that we cannot reject the null of no second-order serial correlation in all the 
models.  And, according to Arellano and Bond (1991, pp: 281-282), as long as there is 
no second - order autocorrelation, the GMM estimates are considered to be consistent. 
The  two-step  estimation  results  are  shown  in  Column  (2)  of  Tables  6.5a  (for  the 
profitability model), and 6.5b (for the output growth model). In both cases, the small 
firm share variable ( i SFS ), has a negative and significant coefficient. This, therefore, 251 
 
 
 
confirms the earlier finding that small-firm industries – industries naturally composed 
of  small  firms  for  technical  reasons  –  perform  poorly  than  large-firm  industries. 
However, this does not change with financial liberalization, as the interaction term 
between small firm share and a financial liberalization dummy ( )it SFS FL ´ maintains 
a negative relationship in both models.  
 
 
 
 
Table 6.5a: Price-Cost Margins Model – System GMM Regression Estimation Results                                                                                        
(5-Year Average Panel Data: 1970-2004) 
 
    One-Step      Two-Step  Variables:-  
Dependent Variable: 
Price-Cost Margins (PCM) 
          (1)            (2) 
 L.PCM 
 0.382*** 
 (0.100) 
 0.406*** 
 (0.117) 
 CR 
 0.301*** 
 (0.088) 
 0.362*** 
 (0.065) 
 KO 
-0.029** 
 (0.012) 
-0.025*** 
 (0.007) 
 MKD 
 0.038** 
 (0.017) 
 0.046** 
 (0.016) 
SH 
 0.275 
 (0.196) 
 0.267 
 (0.266) 
MM 
-0.007 
 (0.005) 
-0.010** 
 (0.005) 
MX 
 0.144** 
 (0.046) 
 0.175*** 
 (0.032) 
INF 
-0.286 
 (0.194) 
-0.297 
 (0.276) 
 SFS 
-0.044** 
 (0.023) 
-0.043** 
 (0.019) 
SFS FL ´  
-0.800*** 
 (0.021) 
-0.098*** 
 (0.013) 
Diagnostics: 
F - Test   70.47 
(0.000) 
 93.90 
(0.000) 
Hansen /Sargan test   5.24 
(0.513) 
 5.39 
(0.494) 
Test for AR (1) errors  -2.58 
(0.010) 
-2.47 
(0.014) 
Test for AR (2) errors  -1.22 
(0.221) 
-1.30 
(0.194) 
No. of Industries          20          20 
No. of Observations        120        120 
Note: Estimates of the intercept are not reported for economy of space. ***, **, * indicate significance 
at 1percent, 5percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The Hansen / Sargan Test and Tests for AR 
errors are p - values for the null of instruments validity. 
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Table 6.5b: Output Growth Model – System GMM Regression Estimation Results                                          
(5-Year Average Panel Data: 1970-2004) 
 
    One-Step      Two-Step  Variables:-  
 Dependent Variable: 
 Output Growth (GO)  
          (1)            (2) 
 L.GO 
  0.487*** 
  (0.158) 
  0.488** 
 (0.196) 
 SH 
   0.021*** 
  (0.005) 
  0.024*** 
 (0.004) 
 KO 
 -0.014** 
  (0.006) 
 -0.013** 
 (0.006) 
 LP 
  0.459*** 
  (0.125) 
  0.515*** 
 (0.125) 
MM 
 -0.692*** 
  (0.178) 
 -0.778*** 
 (0.167) 
MX 
  -0.009 
  (0.030 
  0.001 
 (0.023) 
MKD 
  0.112*** 
  (0.029) 
  0.126*** 
 (0.027) 
INF 
  0.002 
  (0.006) 
 -0.001 
 (0.005) 
 SFS 
 -0.027* 
  (0.014) 
 -0.021 
 (0.013) 
SFS FL ´  
 -0.252*** 
  (0.064) 
 -0.285*** 
 (0.061) 
Diagnostics: 
F - Test     41.32 
  (0.000) 
   63.00 
 (0.000) 
Hansen /Sargan test       2.29 
  (0.892) 
     5.12 
 (0.528) 
Test for AR (1) errors      -2.40 
  (0.016) 
    -2.26 
 (0.024) 
Test for AR (2) errors      -1.11 
  (0.268) 
    -1.04 
 (0.300) 
No. of Industries          20          20 
No. of Observations        120        120 
Note: Estimates of the intercept are not reported for economy of space. ***, **, * indicate significance 
at 1percent, 5percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The Hansen / Sargan Test and Tests for AR 
errors are p - values for the null of instruments validity. 
 
 
Notably, the quantitative effects of financial liberalization on firm size and industry 
performance are quite significant in both models. For instance, according to results in 
Column (2) of both Tables 6.5a and 6.5b, the coefficients for the interaction term 
between small firm share, as the measure of firm size, and the financial liberalization 
dummy  ( )it SFS FL ´  appears to be strongly negative, with a point estimate several 
times  larger  than  that  without  financial  liberalization.  Apart  from  confirming  the 
earlier findings on the effects of firm size on industry performance, the results on both 
models therefore stand in stark contrast to the orthodox predictions on the effects of 
financial liberalization on industry performance. 253 
 
 
 
6.7. CONCLUSION. 
 
The  study  examines  the  differential  impact  of  financial  liberalization  on  the 
performance of firms of different sizes using panel data for 20 industry groups for the 
period 1970 to 2004; and, establishes that financial liberalization affects small and 
large firms differently.  
 
The  results  indicate  that  profitability  of  the  Malawian  manufacturing  firms,  as 
measured by price-cost margins, depends very much on a firm’s size as determined by 
the  number  of  employees.  The  results  show  that  it  is  the  smallest  firms  that  are 
consistently the most adversely affected following financial liberalization. Thus, the 
study finds no evidence that small firm industries become more profitable than large 
firm industries following financial liberalization. Financial liberalization leads to an 
increase in the price-cost margins of large size firms than it does for small size firms. 
Similarly, the findings also suggest that, following financial liberalization, small firm 
industries  encounter  certain  barriers,  which  create  greater  difficulties  for  them  to 
achieve significant output growth. Thus, running contrary to the orthodox views on 
financial  liberalization  theory  expectations;  industries  characterized  by  small  sized 
firms  do  not  register  output  growth  following  financial  liberalization.  Growing 
industry niches and high growth rates, while attractive to both small- and large-sized 
firm industries, appear to be more conducive to large-size firm industries. 
    
The study therefore establishes that financial liberalization has no positive effect on 
the performance of “small-firm industries”, or industries naturally composed of small 
firms for technological reasons. These findings are in line with earlier work that has 
found that small-size firms are more likely to suffer from financing constraints (see, 
for  example,  Schiantarelli,  1996),  and,  among  many  other  case  study  results,  are 
similar to those of Gelos and Werner (1999) in the case of Mexico who argue that 
large-size  firms  may  have  had  better  access  to  directed  credit  before  financial 
liberalization;  and,  even  more  preferential  access  to  credit  after  financial 
liberalization. Thus, in Malawi, like elsewhere where financial liberalization has been 
implemented,  the  positive  effect  of  more  efficient  financial  system  following  the 
reforms – such as the discontinuation of directed credit and interest rate deregulation 
– may have been offset for the small-size firms by the negative effects of continued 254 
 
 
 
increase  in  information  and  transaction  costs  after  interest  rates  deregulation  and 
credit  rationing,  as  well  as  proliferation  of  relationship-based  lending  practices. 
Alternatively, large-size firms might suffer less from the negative effects of increased 
transaction and informational asymmetries, apart from benefiting from relationship 
lending practices by the financial institutions, and thus have better access to credit in 
general.  Accordingly, the results provide a useful link for future policy research on 
the implications of financial sector reforms on the real sector; and more specifically 
on the industry environment and small or new firm phenomena. It sheds new light on 
the  traditional  financial  liberalization  policy  expectations,  and  underscores  the 
importance of incorporating differences in the nature of competition as well as the 
implications of such policies among firms of varying sizes.   
 
Overall, therefore, it may be concluded that a successful financial liberalization needs 
to consider other aspects of the credit market beyond policies like discontinuation of 
directed  credit  programs  and  interest  rate  deregulation.  Financial  liberalization 
requires both the political will and ability to stop the preferential treatment of well-
connected firms, firms that often tend to be disproportionately large.  
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Appendix 6.1: Hausman Test between Mean Group and Pooled Mean Group  
                         Estimation: Price Cost Margins Model 
 
hausman mg pmg 
 
  ---- Coefficients ---- 
    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt (diag (V_b-V_B)) 
               mg          pmg         Difference          S.E. 
   
CR  .2458471     .1915829        .0542643        .0363316 
KO  -.2422238    -.0553779       -.1868459        .1536566 
MKD  -.0626304     .0182718       -.0809022        .0743287 
SH  .476059    -.0040852        .4801442        .2121611 
MM  -.0585591    -.2009077        .1423486               . 
MX  .1025312     .4370345       -.3345034               . 
INF  .0106298     .0306735       -.0200437        .0043247 
SFS  .0067008    -.0422355        .0489362        .0172188 
SFS_FL  .0994029    -.0435952        .1429981        .1173806 
   
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtpmg 
B =inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtpmg 
 
Test:  Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
  chi2 (9)      = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B) ^ (-1)] (b-B) 
                    =        3.43 
  Prob>chi2 =      0.9449 
   
 
Appendix 6.2: Hausman Test between Mean Group and Pooled Mean Group  
                         Estimation: Output Growth Model 
 
. hausman mg pmg 
 
---- Coefficients ---- 
                 (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt (diag (V_b-V_B)) 
                mg          pmg         Difference          S.E. 
 
SH     .0238432     .0574688       -.0336257        .2125517 
KO    -.2403027    -.1195135       -.1207893        .1034579 
LP     .4375612     .1312254        .3063359        .1869758 
MM    -.8939776    -.8530467       -.0409309        .3353341 
MX      .191724    -.0020715        .1937954         .129238 
MKD      .027899     .0359243       -.0080253         .057468 
INF    -.0035378    -.0032175       -.0003203        .0017273 
SFS      -.02926     .0111477       -.0404077        .0227887 
SFS_FL    -.1972427     -.036588       -.1606548        .1008507 
 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtpmg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtpmg 
 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
chi2 (9)      = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B) ^ (-1)] (b-B) 
                 =        2.28 
Prob>chi2 =      0.9862 
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CHAPTER 7.0: CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS. 
 
 
7.1. SUMMARY OF STUDY FINDINGS. 
 
The literature on financial liberalization in developing countries has been identified 
with  a  number  of  mechanisms  through  which  this  process  should  affect  resource 
mobilisation, resource allocation and economic growth. Following deregulation, for 
instance, increases in the real interest rate should induce more savings; a relaxation of 
liquidity constraints through increased and broad-based access to credit and financial 
deepening  should  facilitate  private  investment;  and  subsequently,  this  relaxation, 
coupled with decentralization of banking, should improve the allocation of financial 
resources at the micro level. These processes are therefore hypothesised to enhance 
competition and growth among both small as well as large firms, which influence the 
industry structure that evolves in the real sector. The empirical relevance of these 
effects  to  Malawi’s  financial  liberalization  efforts  have  been  investigated  in  this 
research study, with particular focus on industries in the manufacturing sector.  
 
While theory does not paint a clear picture about how financial liberalization ought to 
affect  competition  in  industry,  the  empirical  work  does.  Much  contrary  to  the 
orthodox view that financial liberalization induces competition, the results from this 
study show that financial liberalization – working through financial development – 
does not necessarily lead to a competitive industry structure. Financial liberalization 
has  been  associated  with  increasing  industry  concentration,  an  indication  that  the 
much-hypothesised distributional ramifications of this policy reform have, in fact, not 
taken  effect  in  the  Malawian  manufacturing  sector.  Instead,  this  policy  has  been 
detrimental to competition in the industry, as it disproportionately facilitates growth 
and expansion of selected firms at the expense of others. The results further show that 
financial liberalization does not always enhance competition by inducing creation of 
new firms and/or facilitating firm entry in the industry. Rather, the policy has induced 
an increase in entry barriers, and in some instances even prompted the closure and 
exit  of  firms  from  the  industry.  Net  firm  entry  has  mostly  recorded  a  negative 
relationship with financial liberalization, according to the results of this study; thereby 
suggesting  that  there  have  been  more  firm  exits  than  new  entrants  following  this 257 
 
 
 
policy reform. Accordingly, the study findings show that financial liberalization leads 
to  the  expansion  of  existing  establishments  rather  than  the  creation  of  new 
establishments. Thus, in addition to the disproportionate effect on certain industries, it 
appears  that  liberalizing  the  financial  system  benefits  the  existing  firms  in  these 
industries rather than facilitating the entry of new firms. The study also finds that 
financial liberalization disproportionately boosts profitability and growth of large-firm 
industries more than small-firm industries. In industrial organisation literature, some 
theories argue that financial development is beneficial to large firms, whilst others 
predict  that  financial  development  is  especially  important  for  lowering  transaction 
costs  and  information  barriers  that  hinder  small  firm  profitability  and  growth. 
However,  the  findings  from  this  study  are  consistent  with  the  latter  view,  that 
financial liberalization is particularly detrimental to the profitability and growth of 
industries characterised by firms with 20 employees or less. 
 
The foregoing results appear to emerge out of credit rationing practices as well as 
relationship-lending behaviour, as perpetrated by the financial institutions in Malawi 
– a characteristic typically prevalent in most of the developing countries, particularly 
those in sub-Saharan Africa – where larger and more established firms are accorded 
preferential  access  to  credit  at  the  expense  of  new  and  smaller  establishments. 
Apparently, in Malawi, a World Bank (2004b) report on private sector development 
indicate  that  one  of  the  major  constraints  to  entrepreneurship  is  finance  which 
includes, inter alia, poor access to credit, high and volatile real interest rates, as well 
as unpredictable changes in the real exchange rates (ibid, p.61). Further, results from 
this study have established that the financial liberalization effects have been most 
prevalent in industries where firms are highly dependent on external finance than in 
those where operations are mostly financed through internally generated cash flow or 
self-financed. Thus, these findings contradict the widely documented predictions by 
Rajan  and  Zingales  (1998)  that  industries  where  firms  are  more  external  finance 
dependent  grow  disproportionately  faster  following  financial  development.  The 
results  also  do  not  support  the  notion  that  one  avenue  through  which  financial 
development promotes economic growth is by facilitating the creation and entry of 
new firms in the industry and therefore promoting competition. 
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These outcomes somehow corroborate the doubts that have previously been expressed 
in the literature regarding whether financial liberalization policies would establish a 
competitive industry. This literature has advanced three important factors as the basis 
for such pessimism (see, for example, Zattler, 1993). First, the structural conditions of 
the  economy  matters.  In  particular,  as  indicated  by  Mosley  and  Weeks  (1993), 
economies like Malawi that have predominantly been primary exports dependent and 
that only have an incipient, high-cost industrial sector – a situation shared by most of 
the countries in sub-Saharan Africa – cannot be expected to adjust easily following 
liberalization.  Malawi  is  a  predominantly  agricultural  based  economy  with  90.0 
percent  of  its  foreign  exchange  earnings  generated  through  exports  of  agricultural 
produce; mainly tobacco, sugar, tea, and cotton. Second, it is argued that a large debt 
overhang may lead to uncertainty, which hampers private investment in promising 
new activities.  In Malawi inflation and interest rates have been high  and volatile, 
which create an uncertain environment for businesses by crowding out private sector 
investment, increasing costs, and eroding profit margins.  Third, is low responsiveness 
of  domestic  production  to  price  changes,  due  to  infrastructural  bottlenecks,  or 
generally  lack  of  institutions.  Most  importantly,  studies  by  Borner  et  al  (1995), 
Sheahan  (1994),  Stein  (1994),  and  Zattler  (1993),  point  to  a  lack  of  attention  to 
institutions as the reason for lack of response to price signals by economic agents. 
Lack of or uncertainty about institutions such as regulatory framework, business laws 
and customs, may seriously affect private investment and so dampen the effects of 
financial liberalization on competition and growth in the real sector. Recent literature 
indicates increasing concern on this particular aspect – the role of institutions – in 
influencing  competition  in  the  economy.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  role  played  by 
institutions, particularly financial institutions, in regard to enterprise development, is 
specifically  identified  in  the  industrial  organisation  literature  (see,  for  example, 
Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996, pp.53-54).   
 
The foregoing perspectives are extended in this study, where it is established that 
financial institutions lending behaviour after financial liberalization, lead to increased 
credit rationing, much to the detriment of the small-scale entrepreneurial sector of the 
economy – perhaps, in part, to protect the profitability of their large established and 
relationship-based  borrowers.  A  trend  has  been  established  among  lending 
institutions, both in developed as well as developing countries, that lending to firms 259 
 
 
 
requires the lender and borrower to forge a long-term relationship. Information gained 
over the course of time by the lender is subsequently used to make value-enhancing 
credit  decisions;  thus,  whether  to  expand  credit  or  restrict  credit  to  potential 
borrowers.    Spagnolo  (2000)  and  Cestone  and  White  (2003)  have  presented 
theoretical frameworks in which existing lending relationships do indeed affect the 
behaviour of lenders vis-a-vis potential new borrowers (also see, Helman and Da Rin, 
2002; Boot and Thakor, 2000; and, Bhattacharya and Chiesa, 1995). These frameworks 
also established that the less competitive the conditions in the credit market, the lower 
the incentive for lenders to finance new comers. Notably, Aryeetey et al (1994, 1997), 
Nissanke  and  Aryeetey  (1998),  and  Nissanke  (2001)  observe  these  lending 
characteristics for sub-Saharan developing countries, including Malawi. 
 
Further, the increase in interest rates following the deregulation process has tended to 
promote  investment  in  the  financial  sector  itself  and  in  less  risky  commerce  and 
service  activities,  at  the  cost  of  investment  in  real  sector  productivity.  Whilst  the 
neostructuralists  contend  that  financial  liberalization  induces  a  vicious  cycle  of 
stagflation, reduces the  availability of loanable  funds, thereby impeding growth, a 
post-Keynesian perspective extend this view by including ‘speculative investment’ to 
the  framework.  According  to  this  perspective,  financial  liberalization  induces 
misallocation of credit towards speculative activities prompted by what Grabel (1995) 
describes as ‘boom-euphoric’ expectations and / or competitive pressures to engage in 
profit-seeking activities (ibid, p.131). As indicated, in Malawi, the post-liberalization 
period is characterized by high interest rates. Whilst the banking system is free to set 
its own rates, these have mostly been structured in tandem with the rates set by the 
government  borrowing  from  the  market  in  the  form  of  Treasury  bills.  And,  high 
inflation in Malawi has been accompanied by high interest rates. As such, since 1998, 
with 3-month Treasury bill rates fluctuating between 40.0 and 70.0 percent, at the 
going rate of inflation – this implies a high real interest rate of about 20.0 percent. The 
high real interest rates have been accompanied by high spreads between lending and 
borrowing rates (see, Mlachila and Chirwa, 2002). In turn, as observed by the World 
Bank  (2004b),  these  characteristics  have  been  detrimental  to  the  development  of 
private  sector  businesses  in  Malawi,  as  increased  government  borrowing  through 
Treasury bills has provided commercial banks and other institutional creditors with a 
safe  and  high  return  financial  asset.  Business  lending  has  instead  declined,  on 260 
 
 
 
average, from 51.0 percent of the commercial banking system’s total assets in the first 
six months of 2000 to 36.0 percent in the last six months of 2001. Over the same 
period, holdings of government paper have increased from 8.0 to 16.0 percent of the 
commercial banking system’s total assets (RBM, various years).    
 
This study, therefore, demonstrate that financial liberalization policies do not foster 
competition,  as  is  claimed  by  proponents  of  financial  market  deregulation  in  the 
literature.  In  fact,  such  policies,  which  are  traditionally  applied  wholesale,  create 
significant barriers to new firm start-up; and, do not provide equal opportunities to all 
investors. These policies in Malawi have led to the revival of old and creation of new 
private monopolies and oligopolies in industry. Further, the study results indicate that 
the effects of financial liberalization are not uniform across industries, but rather that 
depending on firm-specific characteristics within the respective industry – some firms 
benefit  while  others  lose.  Accordingly,  this  analysis  suggest  that  contrary  to  the 
prognostications of the orthodox theory, neither did financial liberalization lead to a 
higher level of competition, nor change the oligopolistic structure of the industry in 
the Malawian manufacturing sector.  
 
In conclusion, therefore, the results corroborate both the neostructuralists as well as 
the  post-Keynesian  arguments  against  the  impact  of  financial  liberalization  which 
stress on, inter alia, a reduction in loanable funds, a general increase in the cost of 
borrowing, and  risky investment practices following  financial liberalization (Buffe 
1984; Taylor 1983; and van Wijnbergen 1982, 1983a) – and consistent with the views 
by  Fitzgerald  and  Vos  (1989),  Kolodko  et  al  (1992),  Zattler  (1993),  and  Grabel 
(1995). It is argued, for instance, that financial liberalization lead to higher interest 
rates following the deregulation policy. These high interest rates will increase firms’ 
operational costs and costs of investment, and so will reduce real demand for money. 
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 1987) monetary approach, this 
will necessitate tightening money supply, which results into a vicious circle, leading 
to a recession. In fact, Stein (1992) suggests that local currency devaluation – another 
key  policy  that  is  traditionally  prescribed  within  the  economic  liberalization 
framework  by  the  Brettonwoods  institutions  –  will  add  to  this  effect,  by  further 
increasing operational costs.   
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This is an important insight, which updates the conventional wisdom that financial 
liberalization  is  either  good  or  bad.  Overall,  the  study  results  demonstrate  that, 
financial  liberalization,  as  a  device  to  raise  the  level  of  competition  in  the 
manufacturing sector, may be necessary but not sufficient, mostly due to financial 
market imperfection, as exhibited through the financial institutions lending behaviour. 
 
  
7.2. CONTRIBUTIONS TO LITERATURE. 
 
The study makes a contribution to four strands of literature. 
 
First, in this study panel data is employed in estimation to take advantage of time 
varying financial measures and macroeconomic policy shocks, as well as available 
industry-specific characteristics. These industry specific characteristics are important 
from  credit  accessibility  and  competition  point  of  view.  Previous  attempts  relied 
either  on  aggregated  time  series  or  on  purely  cross-section  data  or  were  just 
descriptive. Allowing for variability at a disaggregated level has the added advantage 
of generating  even more meaningful results. As suggested by  Baltagi  (2000, p.5), 
investigating in a panel data context is more informative – because, benefits from 
more variability, more degrees of freedom, and more efficiency, are derived. These 
benefits are unavailable within time series or strictly cross-sectional based studies.      
 
Second, it contributes to the industrial organisation literature by estimating industry 
structure and dynamics and confirming the presence of financing constraints for a 
broad  range  of  industry  types  and  groups,  in  a  low-income  developing  country 
context. The study extends the existing literature on the few known country-specific 
studies on the relationship between financial liberalization, financial development and 
industry structure
116. Evidently, though, these studies focus mostly on the experience 
of middle-income developing countries. Otherwise, the current literature offers very 
limited empirical research on the impact of financial liberalization on low-income 
developing countries such as Malawi. In fact, to the author’s knowledge, there exist 
                                                 
116  These being:  Yenturk-Coban  (1992),  for Turkey; Diehl (1995), for Vietnam; Aswicahyono et al  
       (1996) for Indonesia; Dijkstra (1996) for Nicaragua; Nordas (1996) for South Africa; and Sharma  
       (2000) for Nepal) 262 
 
 
 
no known studies in this respect that focus on any of the least developed countries in 
the sub-Saharan African region. This study therefore may be the first to conduct such 
a comprehensive analysis.  
 
Third,  whilst  many  previous  studies  have  broadly  investigated  the  relationship 
between financial development and economic growth, this study differs because it 
investigates microeconomic channels through which this relationship might exist. It is 
argued  that  with  the  worldwide  adoption  and  implementation  of  economic 
liberalization policies, competition in industry has become one of the most important 
variables of interest in many economies. As such, firm’s response to policy change, in 
particular its size distribution has become a critical indicator monitored by policy-
makers  regarding  the  performance  of  the  economy.  Now  emerging  as  a  critical 
component of antitrust and competition policies in many economies, as observed by 
Sokol (2007), is the need to control for the evolution of industry structures; hence, the 
need  for  a  microeconomic  approach,  such  as  the  one  adopted  in  this  study,  to 
investigate the finance and growth nexus.  
 
Fourth, and more important from a policy perspective, this research study contributes 
to the economic development and growth literature by showing empirical results that 
run contrary to the orthodox view that financial liberalization diminishes financing 
constraints by reducing information asymmetries. Instead, the study demonstrates that 
financial  liberalization  has  the  potential  to  perpetuate  financing  constraints  by 
selectively  facilitating  access  to  financial  resources  in  favour  of  large  and  long 
established enterprises. Thus, loanable funds available in the local credit market for 
firms’ investments are not flowing in significant amounts to small-scale enterprises, 
which appear to be squeezed out of the mainstream financing circuit. At one extreme 
of the credit market are the large, reputable corporations with access to a broad range 
of products to raise capital, from banks or financial markets, in local or international 
markets.  At  the  other  extreme  are  small-scale  enterprises.  Further,  lending  to  the 
small-scale  enterprises,  where  available,  is  aggravated  through  the  tendency  by 
financial lending institutions to heavily rely on collateral as a means of mitigating 
principal-agent problems. As a result, most small-scale enterprises have no or limited 
access  to  credit,  which  implies  that  a  higher  share  of  their  investment  has  to  be 
financed  with  retained  earnings  or  suppliers  credit.  Consequently,  this  market 263 
 
 
 
imperfection is fuelling the development of oligopolistic structures that do not price 
competitively.  
 
 
7.3. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE  
       POLICY RESEARCH. 
 
A number of policy issues emerge out of this study; arguably, not only relevant to 
Malawi,  but  to  the  whole  sub-Saharan  Africa  region  as  well  as  other  developing 
countries, particularly where financial liberalization policies have been implemented 
under  the  IMF/World  Bank  steered  structural  adjustment  programs.  These  results 
should also be applicable in some developed economies where the literature provides 
evidence of financing constraints being experienced by a significant proportion of the 
private sector, particularly new and small-scale enterprises.  
 
In general, therefore, results from this study seem to be consistent with enough that is 
known from such other similar studies to enable one to hazard the supposition that the 
outcome from this study is not sample specific. The problems arising from financial 
market imperfections and the implications this anomaly has on the individual firms in 
particular, and to the industry-wide structure in general, are therefore real and have 
characterized  both  developing  as  well  as  developed  countries  alike.    Accordingly, 
whilst  the  differences  that  have  been  identified  across  industries  in  the  Malawian 
manufacturing sector are significant in and of themselves, they nonetheless serve to 
magnify  the  importance  of  understanding  what  different  indicators  of  industry 
dynamics are tapping into when exploring this in other countries. For instance, as 
demonstrated  by  Bain  (1966)  and  Pryor  (1972),  industries  with  high  or  low 
concentration  in  one  nation  tend  to  have  similar  or  low  concentration  in  all 
industrialized nations they studied. In a study of ten Latin American countries, Meller 
(1978) compare a number of identical industries, and show that all of these countries 
have similar concentration hierarchies among their industries: the industries that have 
high concentration levels in one country tend to have high concentration levels in the 
rest of the countries as well. Scherer et al (1975) find similar results in a comparison 
of  twelve  industries  in  six  industrialised  countries.  In  the  words  of  Schmalensee 264 
 
 
 
(1989,  p.992)  this  finding  “suggests  that  similar  processes  operate  to  determine 
concentration levels elsewhere.”  
 
The following issues are therefore observed: 
   
       ⇒   (i). Fundamentally, from a policy perspective, these research findings raise 
the  question  whether  financial  liberalization  facilitates  equitable  growth  through 
easing  of  access  to  credit  for  small  and  medium  firms  that  typically  face  credit 
constraints.  Disappointingly,  the  results  do  not  support  this  policy  expectation. 
Instead, the financial policy reforms are showing that although macro-level economic 
reform is essential for private sector growth, it is not enough. There are constraints 
that continue to inhibit the growth of existing firms and impede the entry of new ones; 
thereby  suppressing  competition,  despite  the  reform  efforts.  In  changing  market 
conditions, the effects of more intense competition on firm conduct, market structure , 
and industry performance are hard to distinguish, and often times not in conformity 
with the orthodox paradigms. As observed by Symeonidis (2002) in a study of the 
United  Kingdom,  that  whilst  policies  aimed  at  promoting  competition  lead  to  a 
reduction  of  restrictive  practices  and  increase  price  competition,  this  is  however 
followed  by  an  increase  in  concentration.  A  key  analysis  of  Symeonidis  is  the 
argument that excess profits are eliminated following these policies; since, an increase 
in  price  competition  depresses  profits  and  leads  to  firm  mergers  and  firm  exits, 
thereby increasing concentration ratios. Accordingly, for financial liberalization to be 
effective,  it  would  be  important  to  consider  the  implementation  of  accompanying 
economic reforms, such as industry deregulation, and increased competition in the 
banking  system,  that  could  have  complementary  impact  on  new  firm  entry  and 
growth. 
 
       ⇒   (ii). In accordance with the static model of industrial organization, entry of 
new firms into industry is crucial as it is expected to provide an equilibrating function 
in  the  market.  Conceptually,  in  the  presence  of  market  power,  additional  output 
provided by the new entrants is expected to restore the levels of profits and prices to 
their long-run competitive equilibrium. Notably, most of the new entrants operate at 
such  a  small  scale  of  output  that  they  are  confronted  with  an  inherent  cost 
disadvantage. Policies that mitigate barriers to start-up of new firms as well as to the 265 
 
 
 
survival and efficiency of incumbent firms should therefore be an equally important 
component of competition policies. By encouraging entry of new firms side by side 
with promoting survival of incumbents, such a policy can generate new competition 
in  the  form  of  a  greater  number  of  firms  experimenting  with  a  greater  variety  of 
approaches, both new as well as old (see, Cohen and Klepper, 1992; Audretsch and 
Thurik, 1999).  
 
Yet, this study, like many other previous empirical studies, has established that among 
critical barriers to firm start-up in the context of most developing countries, and even 
some developed countries, include access to capital
117. Evidently, in many economies 
this has therefore prompted a shift in emphasis towards reducing barriers to accessing 
start-up  capital  or  any  entry  barriers.  These  efforts  have  mostly  been  effective  in 
developed economies
118. As observed by De la Torre et al (2007), following these 
initiatives, some of the developed economies have registered  increases in commercial 
microfinance, driven by the development of innovative lending techniques, significant 
technological advances – such as scoring methods and e-banking – and the growing 
presence of credit bureaus. Accompanying these trends in business lending has been 
strong growth in consumer credit in emerging market economies (see, for example, 
BIS, 2005), particularly as competition in the lending market for large corporations is 
on the increase – reflecting financial globalization and the expansion of local financial 
markets. However, De la Torre et al (2007) note that, in the process, small-scale and 
medium-scale enterprise segments are sometimes being neglected in favour of the 
large corporate. Brownbridge and Harvey (1998) and Nissanke (2001) observe similar 
lending  characteristics  in  the  developing  countries  of  sub-Saharan  Africa,  where 
newly established banks instead compete for large corporate clients, where good and 
quick profits are assured, at the expense of loans to small-scale enterprises. 
 
                                                 
117 Results from a recent survey commissioned by the European Union (EU,  2005),  regarding SME’s  
       access to finance in the European Union, clearly demonstrate that the problem of credit access by  
       small-scale enterprises is not peculiar to the developing economies alone. 
118 Notable  initiatives  in  the  developed  world include; (a) the Small Business Innovation Research  
       (SBIR)  in   the US,  a program which provides over $1.4 billion annually to new  high-technology  
       small  firms  (See;  http://www.grants.nih.gov/grants/funding/sbirsttr_programs.htm); and (b) the  
       European-based   Business and Policy Research facility  (EIM,  1998)   which implements a broad  
       range of programs, spanning financial assistance, training, and administrative burdens.  
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Notwithstanding,  similar  approaches  could  be  adopted  in  Malawi,  resources 
permitting. As an additional possible policy option, this could involve the offering of 
flexibility  in  interest  rates  charged  on  new  borrowing  by  the  lending  institutions. 
Specifically, a framework where new entrants are allowed to borrow at a preferential 
rate may provide a mechanism to compensate for higher costs due to an inefficient 
size. Preferential rates may, in fact, be an essential instrument of dynamic competition 
policy by facilitating the start-up of new firms that otherwise would be deterred.   
 
       ⇒   (iii).The results of this study suggest that some degree of state participation 
should  be  allowed  in  institutional  building,  particularly  in  the  designing  and 
sequencing of the financial reforms, as not all intervention may be adverse. The role 
of  the  state  is  particularly  essential  when  there  are  pervasive  market  failures, 
including imperfect information asymmetries, externalities and economies of scale 
that characterize sub-Saharan African countries such as Malawi. A ‘neostructuralist 
consensus’  (see,  Sheahan,  1989)  advocates  selective  credit  restrictions  in  order  to 
protect productive activities vis-a-vis commercial activities and speculation. Similarly, 
Mosley (1993) suggests that a more active role for the government is necessary to 
stimulate and carry out investment. In specific regard to the manufacturing sector, 
critics  of  IMF  and  World  Bank-supported  programs  argue  that  the  sector  is  too 
important for long-term growth to let it to be beleaguered with problems of financial 
constraints. This means that, apart from general policies to improve education and 
skill levels, specific government policies are necessary to enhance competitiveness in 
the manufacturing sector. Further, Lall (1994) identifies, among others, capital market 
deficiencies and the subsequent need to provide selective credit support, as one of the 
critical  avenues  through  which  government  intervention  may  be  necessary  in  the 
economic development process.  
 
       ⇒   (iv).Finally, of particular relevance to this study is the fact that financial 
reforms need to take into account small- and medium-sized enterprises in the supply 
of credit by the formal financial sector, as well as the role of the informal financial 
sector which, in Malawi, just like in most of the developing countries, is significant 
and continues to thrive even following financial liberalization. These types of market 
failures may further justify an active role for the state, as indicated above, to facilitate 
the development of a range of financial institutions to intermediate between savers 267 
 
 
 
and investors with different requirements and time horizons.  As Nissanke (2001) 
notes, “...the [financial] reform measures have excessively emphasised the need for a 
policy  shift  to  liberalization,  without  adequate  consideration  of  the  need  for 
institution-building to improve and diversify financial services to serve dynamically 
evolving demand on the part of private enterprises.” (ibid, p.358) 
 
Further, De la Torre et al (2007) suggest that whilst initiatives aimed at increasing 
credit to the small- and medium-scale enterprises requires a review of the financial 
institutions, as well as their lending practices, serious consideration has also to be 
made of the prevailing international finance code of practice, which may inadvertently 
be  discouraging  loans  to  this  segment.  De  la  Torre  and  others  observe  that  the 
financial institutions lending behaviours – both in developed and developing countries 
– are, or may be, partly due to the current requirements under international laws and 
policy  ethics  that  govern  financial  institutions  lending  practices  –  viz;  the  Basle 
Accord  and  anti-money  laundering  legislation.  For  example,  under  the  prudential 
lending  guidelines  of  the  Basle  Accord  (under  BIS),  regulations  that  require  loan 
origination dossiers to include formal financial statements, sophisticated cash flow 
analysis, and transparency in tax compliance are likely to undercut many informal, 
opaque small- and medium-scale enterprises where such documentation may not be 
available or cannot be easily produced. Likewise, anti-money laundering regulations 
that require substantial documentation to satisfy the ‘know-your-client’ requirements 
may  exclude  informal,  small-  and  medium-scale  enterprises  that  would  have 
otherwise been included. Nonetheless, the need to improve small- and medium-scale 
enterprise finance – as well as improving and levelling the contractual environment – 
remains an important issue for policymakers that are concerned with the effects of 
financial  development  on  economic  growth.  But,  how  this  challenge  is  balanced 
against  the  requirements  under  the  Basel  Accord  and  the  anti-money  laundering 
regulations are issues for future policy research and initiatives. 
 
 
7.4. CONCLUSION. 
 
Overall,  both  economic  theory  and  industrial  experience  suggest  that  financial 
liberalization,  working  through  financial  development,  has  an  impact  on  the 268 
 
 
 
competitive behaviour of firms and the performance outcome – either way, through 
prices, profits, growth in value-added, net sales, etc – in the markets which, in turn, 
influence the structural features of an industry. However, without under-estimating 
the importance of several previous attempts to increase the relevance of economic 
theory to the analysis of these relationships, it is generally agreed that new and more 
precise generalizations as to the relation of the financial development status of an 
economy and the industry structure that evolves as well as the performance patterns 
that emerges, will depend heavily upon continued empirical research. Such studies 
would  produce  results  not  only  of  academic  interest  but  also  of  fundamental 
importance  for  the  development  of  relevant  and  effective  public  policies  for  the 
promotion of market competition and economic growth.  
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